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Introductory note  
 
This collective report examines the principal dimensions of media policy in 14 
European countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey and the UK), probing into 
the historical forces, national traditions and distinct political and socio-economic 
contexts in which media policies have emerged and developed. The analysis explores 
the main instruments for media regulation in the countries under study, and assesses 
the implications of the established media policy strategies for democratic politics.  
The country chapters follow a similar structure. Following a brief introduction, the 
analysis focuses on the media landscape of the countries under review, offering an 
overview of the national media market (the press, broadcast media, online media and 
news agencies), as well as a discussion of the status of the journalistic profession and 
media literacy. The third section presents the major actors involved in media policy-
making and proceeds with a succinct presentation and explanation of the national 
regulatory framework for the media, focusing mainly on structural and content 
regulation. The final section provides a critical assessment of the principal issues and 
trends that characterise the media policies of the countries under study, together with 
an assessment of the degree to which they enable the media to feed the democratic 
process. The report also contains a chapter discussing the media-related initiatives of 
the European Union and the Council of Europe, focusing on the interventions that are 
of relevance and importance to the protection and promotion of media freedom and 
independence.   
 
 
Athens, 29 October 2010 
The Mediadem Consortium 
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The case of Belgium 
Bart Van Besien (under the scientific supervision of Pierre-François Docquir, Benoît 
Frydman and Emmanuelle Bribosia∗) 
 
1. Introduction  
Although the principle of freedom of the press was enshrined in the Dutch 
constitution of 1815, this principle remained dead letter during the fifteen years of 
Dutch rule.1 When the Belgian revolutionists drafted the constitution of 7 February 
1831, they made sure it expressly safeguarded the freedom of the press as one of the 
main “freedoms” that the Belgians were henceforth to enjoy. 
After Belgium’s independence, the competition between various political 
groupings (at first Liberals and Catholics, later on also Socialists, Regionalists and 
other parties) translated into the gradual emergence of a compartmentalised society, 
where people went to different schools, read different newspapers and organised their 
lives in separated and opposing compartments or “pillars”.2 Although only few 
newspapers were directly owned by political parties, most of them were linked to 
political parties and openly supported their policies.3 As such, one can speak about a 
media landscape where the press was traditionally “free” in the sense that the press 
was not directly owned or controlled by the state, but not necessarily “independent”, 
in the sense that the press was subject to interference by political actors and served as 
a means to influence public opinion and politics.  
One of the turning points in the evolution of the Belgian press was the 
abolition in 1848 of the stamp duty on newspapers. This led to the emergence of an 
affordable and therefore more widely spread opinion press.4 However, even though 
newspapers became more affordable, and even if they were often available at public 
places where they could be read aloud,5 they remained to a large degree a privilege of 
the few who could read and receive them. Also, the limited democratisation level and 
the fact that newspapers were for some time available in French only6 meant that not 
everybody was equally interested in reading newspapers.  
The period in between the two World Wars saw the emergence of a mass 
press, due to the introduction of universal voting rights and compulsory education, but 
also mere technical improvements in press techniques, cheaper paper and an 
increasing focus on sports, advertisements and regional news.7 
                                                 
∗ Dr. Pierre-François Docquir, senior researcher at the Perelman Centre for Legal Philosophy (ULB) 
and vice-president of the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel; Professor Benoît Frydman, Director of 
the Perelman Centre for Legal Philosophy (ULB); Professor Emmanuelle Bribosia, Director of the 
Legal Department of the Institute for European Studies (ULB). 
1 Article 227 of the Constitution of 24 August 1815 and Royal Decree of 20 April 1815. 
2 D.C. Hallin and P. Mancini, Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics (2009), at 
p. 153. 
3 Indirect links existed between the Liberal and the Catholic Parties and their supportive newspapers, 
and more direct links between the Socialist and Communist Parties and their newspapers. 
4 E. De Bens and K. Raeymaeckers, De pers in België: het verhaal van de Belgische dagbladpers 
gisteren, vandaag en morgen (2010), at p. 33. 
5 E. Witte, La Construction de la Belgique 1828 – 1847 (2010), at pp. 45-46. 
6 Flemish newspapers emerged only a couple of decades after French newspapers. See J. Gol, Le 
Monde de la Presse en Belgique (1970) at p. 19. 
7 Ibid., p. 19. 
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In the period after the Second World War, ideological clashes between 
opposing political parties gradually diminished. The press followed this evolution by 
cutting its most obvious links with political parties and by orientating itself more 
towards informing readers, rather than trying to influence its readers’ views. This 
change is also linked to a growing dependence on income from advertisements, which 
gave rise to a general tendency to voice rather moderate and uncontroversial 
opinions.8 Succeeding concentration waves resulted in a situation where newspapers 
with traditionally very different views on politics and on society are now owned by 
the same press groups, as will be discussed further below.  
The Belgian authorities’ approach towards radio and television was very 
different from the broad freedom that was granted to the written press. In 1930, the 
Belgian authorities created a national public broadcasting organisation, INR/NIR, 
which they granted a monopoly to broadcast nationwide radio programmes, in 
coexistence with the existing private local and regional radio broadcasters. The arrival 
of television in the 1950s saw the transformation of INR/NIR to RTB/BRT, which 
was promptly granted a monopoly to broadcast television signals. The preparatory 
works of the act of 18 June 1930 on radio broadcasting echo some concerns by 
members of parliament that the state monopoly would constitute a breach of the press 
freedom. The parliamentary voting nevertheless concluded in favour of the state 
monopoly, for technical reasons (i.e., only three international frequencies were 
available), and because the state monopoly was seen as an experimental and 
temporary solution.9 Almost all European governments at the time had serious 
concerns about the possible effects of these new media on society at large (i.e., their 
potential to influence the opinion of the population) and hence chose to bring them 
under direct state control instead of leaving them to the rules of the free market.10 Fact 
is that the public broadcasters’ monopolies on radio and television broadcasting have 
always been linked to a public remit which they had to fulfil (culture, sports, 
information, and “elevation of the people”).  
The state broadcasters were (and still are) directly owned by the Belgian 
authorities (at first the Belgian government, later on the Communities), and measures 
were taken in order to guarantee some degree of political control over the 
broadcasters, based on a proportional representation of the various political groupings 
within their representative bodies and personnel, and over the content of the 
programs, through guaranteed proportional airtime for various philosophical or 
religious associations. This system of internal pluralism in broadcasting, where 
various political representations keep each other in balance,11 exists until today within 
the public broadcasters, but is mostly limited to the broadcasters’ board of directors 
(and not so much their personnel).  
These monopolies were challenged as from the 1970s and 1980s on by pirate 
radios and foreign television broadcasters who reached the Belgian audience via the 
cable networks. Legislation followed slowly to legalise private radio and television 
broadcasting. Local commercial radio broadcasting was legalised in 1981 in Flanders 
and in 1982 in the French Community. In 1987, private (commercial) television 
broadcasting was legalised in both Communities, and RTL-TVI and VTM became the 
                                                 
8 G. Thoveron, “La valeur commerciale de l’objectivité”, in G. Thoveron and C. Doutrelepont (eds), La 
Presse, Pouvoir en Devenir (1996) 19. 
9 See S. Hoebeke and B. Mouffe, Le droit de la presse (2005), at p. 90. 
10 R. Otten, Achter televisie: omroepmarkten en –structuren in West-Europa (2005), at p. 23. 
11 See Hallin and Mancini, Comparing media systems, p. 166. 
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first private television channels in respectively the French and the Flemish 
Community.12 Licences for local television broadcasting have been granted since 
1987 in the French Community and since 1993 in the Flemish Community. The 
authorities tried to compensate the written press for foreseeable losses caused by 
television and radio advertising, by granting subsidies to the written press and – 
initially – by forcing the private broadcasters to open their shareholding to editors of 
the written press. 
Both radio and television have since the end of the 1990s been confronted 
with new technical developments (e.g. in the fields of cable, fibreglass, satellite, pay-
tv, video-on-demand, the internet and digitalisation), which create challenges and 
opportunities to the broadcasters in terms of new platforms and room for new players, 
but also put the role of the state and its control over radio and television in question. 
All in all, Belgium’s authorities have been quite reluctant to loose their grip on radio 
and television broadcasting. For example, the Flemish government attempted for a 
long time to close the market for private television broadcasting, by granting a 
monopoly to broadcast advertisements to the Flemish public to just one player 
(VTM). This monopoly lasted from 1989 to 1998 and was only abolished after the 
European Commission forced the Flemish government to do so.13 In Flanders, the 
monopoly granted to VTM was only challenged in 1995 by the Scandinavian SBS 
group (in order to circumvent Flemish legislation, VT4 was at first broadcast from 
London). In French-speaking Belgium, it took until 2001 before the (Luxembourg 
based) RTL group got competition from the (French) AB group.  
In sum, the influence from politicians on the media is less apparent today than 
it used to be, because the links between political groupings and the written press have 
atrophied, and because the state monopolies for broadcasting have disappeared. 
However, the Belgian authorities remain directly active in the fields of radio and 
television broadcasting, through the public broadcasters and through the application 
of much stricter rules than those applying to other media. Also, the Belgian authorities 
are interfering in the media trough a variety of direct and indirect subsidies. For the 
written press, the authorities grant mostly indirect subsidies such as a VAT tariff of 
0% for newspapers and magazines, reduced tariffs for post and distribution, 
government advertisements, etc.14 Unfortunately, there is a lot of uncertainty as to the 
total amount of these indirect subsidies, and more transparency in this regard is 
desirable. The Communities also grant direct state aid to the written press.15 For the 
audiovisual media, apart from directly sponsoring the public broadcasters, the 
Communities also grant direct subsidies to e.g. private regional television 
                                                 
12 In 1987, RTL-TVI became the first private television channel for French speaking Belgium 
(Decision of the Government of the French Community of 21 December 1987). In 1989, VTM became 
the first private television channel for Dutch speaking Belgium (Decision of the Government of the 
Flemish Community of 19 November 1987). 
13 Commission Decision 97/606/EC of 26 June 1997 pursuant to Article 90 (3) of the EC Treaty on the 
exclusive right to broadcast television advertising in Flanders, OJ L 244, 6/09/1997, P. 0018–0025.  
14 Until 2008, the French Community forced the television broadcasters to contribute part of their 
revenue (if this revenue surpassed 15 million euros) to the written press, as a compensation for revenue 
losses by the written press following the admission of commercial advertisements on television (see old 
Art. 30 FRBA).  
15 E.g. decision of the French Community’s Government of 1 July 2010 and the Act of 31 March 2004 
concerning aid to the French-language written daily press and the development of initiatives of such 
daily press in schools; Protocol between the Flemish Government and the Flemish written press 
concerning safeguards for a pluralistic, independent and efficient Flemish opinion press.  
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broadcasters16 and private local radio broadcasters.17 Finally, the authorities grant 
some direct subsidies to specific projects, such as projects supporting newspapers in 
schools, funds promoting quality journalistic research,18 and subsidies to professional 
organisations for journalists.19 
 
2. The media landscape in Belgium  
As a result of the transition of Belgium from a unitary to a federal state, the political 
and the cultural landscape in Belgium is separated along language barriers. This 
means that there is a clear separation between the French-language media on the one 
hand and the Dutch-language or Flemish media on the other hand.  In other words, it 
is more correct to speak about two separate media landscapes, rather than about one 
general Belgian media landscape. Although these two media landscapes are separate, 
they present a number of similarities. The following sections will give a detailed 
overview of the Belgian media landscape. 
 
2.1 Two separate media landscapes  
Since the 1970s, Belgium gradually evolved step by step from a unitary state to a 
complex federal state, where political power is divided between the federal (i.e., 
Belgian) level, the language-based Communities (i.e., the Flemish Community, the 
French Community and the German-speaking Community) and the territory-based 
regions (i.e., the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels-Capital 
Region). In the field of media, the main competences belong to the Communities – 
although the detailed picture is actually a more complex one.  
As concerns radio and television, Belgium’s French- and Dutch-language 
public broadcasters are separated entities (split from formerly one public broadcaster), 
with different personnel, audiences, public remits, regulations and controlling bodies. 
RTBF.be, the French-language public broadcaster, is only broadcasting French-
language programs, whereas on the other side of the linguistic border, VRT, the 
Flemish public broadcaster, is only broadcasting Dutch-language programs. The same 
linguistic separation is true for non-public broadcasters.  
As concerns newspapers, a small number of media groups control the 
newspaper market in French-speaking Belgium (i.e., Rossel, IPM and Corelio) and in 
Flanders (i.e., Corelio, De Persgroep and Concentra). There is no Flemish newspaper 
with significant sales figures in French-speaking Belgium, and almost no French 
language newspaper with significant sales figures in Flanders.20 Cross-ownership of 
newspapers across language borders is mostly limited to specialised press, such as 
                                                 
16 E.g. decision of the Flemish Government of 23 July 2010 on subsidies to certain private regional 
television broadcasters.  
17 E.g. based on Art. 161 FRBA, the French Community’s authorities force their radiobroadcasters to 
contribute part of their revenues to a fund supporting radio broadcasting.  
18 E.g. the Flemish Government grants subsidies to the Fund Pascal Decroos for Exceptional 
Journalistics. 
19 E.g. the Flemish Government grants subsidies to VVJ.  
20 La Libre Belgique is the only newspaper that sells relatively well in the other language Community. 
More than 13% of the paper’s readers live in Flanders. See De Bens and Raeymaeckers, De pers in 
België, p. 464.   
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papers focussing on business and the economy,21 and free newspapers.22 The only 
media group with an important market share for general newspapers in the other 
language is the Flemish media group Corelio (which publishes the French-language 
Editions de L’Avenir papers). 
As concerns magazines, there seem to be more crossings between Belgium’s 
two major language groups. Although the most popular magazine titles in each 
language are not available in the other language, other titles are available for both 
Communities and publishers such as Roularta and Sanoma are very active on both 
language markets.  
Belgian media tend to focus on differences between the Communities, rather 
than on similarities between them. This is especially the case with political reporting, 
where journalists often translate the same facts in opposing interpretations and 
opinions, and where the two Communities are regularly presented as opposite to each 
other.23 Also, a recent study shows that French-language politicians get very limited 
airtime on Flemish television news bulletins,24 and the same seems to be true for 
Dutch-speaking politicians on French-language television news bulletins.25 It should 
be noted in this regard that the split of Belgium’s media landscape is closely related to 
the way its political system is organised. Belgium’s political parties are split upon a 
linguistic basis, and voters can - generally speaking - only vote for candidates who 
stand for election in their own region (e.g. a voter based in Wallonia cannot vote for a 
candidate from Flanders, and vice versa). Political debate takes place within two 
distinct media fields, and elections take place on the basis of two distinct electorates.  
As such, the separation of Belgium’s media landscape and of its electorates 
challenges the country’s democratic system at a federal level, because it impedes the 
development of a shared public sphere where politicians, journalists, and other 
members of the two Communities can debate their different opinions and views.26  On 
the other hand, this problem is not unique to Belgium alone (e.g. one can wonder 
whether a democratic Europe is possible without a single European media landscape) 
and was relevant in earlier times as well, when Belgians did not overwhelmingly read 
each other’s newspapers neither.27  
                                                 
21 The group Mediafin, which publishes L’Echo and De Tijd, is a joint-venture between the French-
language publisher Rossel and the Dutch-language publisher De Persgroep. 
22 Mass Transit Media, which publishes Metro, is a joint-venture between the French-language 
publisher Rossel and the Dutch-language publisher Concentra. 
23 D. Sinardet, “Direct democracy as a tool to shape a united public opinion in a multilingual society? 
Some reflections based on the Belgian case”, in D. Sinardet and M. Hooghe (eds), Is democracy viable 
without a unified public opinion? The Swiss experience and the Belgian case (2009), Re-Bel e-book 3, 
available at: http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-ebooks/ebook-3-democracy-without-
unified-public-opinion (last visited on 25/10/2010), at p. 35. 
24 J. De Smedt, M. Hooghe and S. Walgrave, “Franstalige politici in het Vlaamse televisienieuws: 
quantité négligeable?”, ENA – Nieuwsmonitor 1/09/2010, available at: www.nieuwsarchief.be (last 
visited on 21/10/2010). 
25 M. Lits, “Media in Belgium: two separate public opinions”, in D. Sinardet and M. Hooghe (eds), Is 
democracy viable without a unified public opinion? The Swiss experience and the Belgian case (2009), 
Re-Bel e-book 3, available at: http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-ebooks/ebook-3-
democracy-without-unified-public-opinion, at p. 45. 
26 Ibid, p. 45 and Sinardet, “Direct democracy as a tool to shape a united public opinion in a 
multilingual society?”, p. 39. 
27 M. Beyen, “The duality of public opinions as a democratic asset’ – Confessions of an historian”, in 
D. Sinardet and M. Hooghe (eds), Is democracy viable without a unified public opinion? The Swiss 
experience and the Belgian case (2009), Re-Bel e-book 3, available at: 
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Be it as it may, some initiatives have been taken recently to move the French- 
and Dutch-language media closer together. Most of these initiatives took root after 13 
December 2006, when RTBF.be interrupted its normal broadcasting for a sudden 
announcement by the anchorman of its regular news bulletins that Flemish politicians 
were voting for the independence of Flanders. Although this announcement and the 
news bulletin that followed were fake, surveys showed that 89% of viewers had up to 
some point believed that the events reported were real. In the following days and 
weeks, a lively debate developed on the journalistic appropriateness of this program 
and on the impact that journalists have on public opinion and politics. Following this 
incident, the media have been paying more attention to events in the other 
Community.28 Most newspapers now regularly publish articles of opinion makers 
from the other Community. However, the attempts taken remain limited in scale and 
impact and are not always very successful. For example, before the June 2010 
elections, the public television broadcasters of the two Communities tried to jointly 
organise a political debate with politicians from both Communities, but the French-
language broadcaster’s board of directors obstructed this initiative, a decision they 
justified by divergences in the manners public broadcasters deal with far right 
political parties.  
 
2.2 Two similar media landscapes 
Although the media landscapes of Belgium’s main Communities are separate and 
distinct, they are similar in the sense that they have a similar history, during most of 
which they discussed the same news topics in the same Belgian context. Newspapers 
in both languages used to be linked to specific ideological or political trends in 
society, but have during recent decades cut these links. Another similarity is that 
media in both languages address relatively small audiences (around 4 million French-
speakers and around 6 million Dutch-speakers). Ownership of both French- and 
Dutch-language media is strongly concentrated in the hands of just a few media 
groups (e.g., the French- and the Dutch-language newspapers are dominated by 3 
media groups, the French- and Dutch-language magazines are dominated by 3 media 
groups, the French- and Dutch-language radio and television services are dominated 
by just 2 media groups).  
The majority of both the French- and Dutch-language media groups are also 
becoming active in other domains (e.g., traditional magazine and newspaper 
publishers are also active in television and radio,29 traditional newspaper publishers 
are also publishing magazines,30 traditional television broadcasters are also starting to 
publish magazines31 and all of the media players are active on the internet).32 Also, 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-ebooks/ebook-3-democracy-without-unified-public-
opinion, at p. 22. 
28 E.g. the initiative of Le Soir and De Standaard, where each journal sent journalists to the other 
Community for a certain time, with the purpose of getting to know each other better.  
29 E.g. Audiopresse, the association of Belgium’s French-language and German-language newspapers, 
participates for 34% in the television and radio broadcaster RTL Belgium; magazine publisher Roularta 
owns the television channels Canal Z and Kanaal Z and owns 50% of the shares of Vlaamse 
Mediamaatschappij (VMMa). Newspaper publisher De Persgroep owns the remaining 50% of VMMa. 
Newspaper publisher Concentra broadcasts the digital television channel Acht. Newspaper publisher 
Corelio participates in Radio Nostalgie and in the television production houses Woestijnvis and Caviar. 
30 E.g. newspaper publisher De Persgroep also publishes the magazines Dag Allemaal, Joepie, etc. 
31 E.g. television broadcaster Media Ad Infinitum also publishes the magazine Vitaya (together with 
Sanoma). 
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media consumers all over the country seem to prefer the same kind of radio and 
television programmes (i.e., mainly entertainment programmes) and tend to read the 
same type of newspapers (i.e., mainly popular and regional newspapers).  Finally, 
Belgium is a very open society, and its media – irrespective of their language – are 
heavily influenced by the international media market, especially by media from 
neighbouring countries (although the influence of French media on the media of the 
Belgian French-Community seems stronger than the influence of Dutch media on the 
media of the Flemish Community (see below). This implies not only that international 
media groups are quite strong on the Belgian market,33 it also means that Belgian 
media groups – irrespective of their language - are surprisingly active abroad, 
especially in the neighbouring countries.34  
 
2.3 The media market 
On the one hand, the Belgian media market is characterised by a relatively wide 
variety of different media available to the public. On the other hand, ownership of 
these media is concentrated into the hands of just a limited number of media groups - 
although no single group dominates the entire media market. Also, media players are 
trying to diversify their revenue streams and become more and more active in other 
media domains (cross-media concentration, the Internet, etc.). The following sections 
attempt to give an overview of the Belgian media market. 
 
2.3.1 The print media  
As described in detail below, there is a high concentration in ownership of the Belgian 
newspaper and magazine publishers. Although the consolidation of the written press 
is well described in literature, its origins and effects are not always that well 
described. On the one hand, too much consolidation endangers the pluralistic 
character of the media. On the other hand, consolidation may have positive effects as 
well, and it should be noted that several titles were saved from bankruptcy by large 
media groups. It is of course of great importance that newspapers that merge into a 
larger group can save their editorial independence.35 
Belgium counts six major French-language newspapers. Of these, two can be 
considered “quality” newspapers,36 two others “regional” newspapers,37 one a 
“popular” newspaper38 and another one a specialised “economic” newspaper.39 A 
                                                                                                                                            
32 However, cross media involvement seems to be more prominent among the Dutch-language media 
than among the French-language media. 
33 E.g. the German Bertelsmann group (RTL) is very prominent on the French language television and 
radio market. Another German group, ProSiebenSat.1 (SBS), is quite strong on the Flemish television 
market. The Finnish Sanoma group has a strong presence on the magazine markets of both 
Communities. 
34 E.g. De Persgroep owns the Dutch newspapers Het Parool, Trouw, Algemeen Dagblad and 
Volkskrant. Roularta has a strong presence in France, where it owns the titles L'Express, L'Expansion, 
Point de Vue, etc. Rossel is also active in France, with the regional newspapers La Voix du Nord, Nord 
Éclair, Nord Littoral and Lille Plus. 
35 E.g. De Morgen and Gazet van Antwerpen maintained their independent editorial staff. De Tijd and 
L’Echo also received guarantees for their editorial independence. See De Bens and Raeymaeckers, De 
pers in België, pp. 76-77. 
36 Le Soir and La Libre Belgique. 
37 The titles of Sud Press and Editions de l’Avenir. 
38 La Derniere Heure / Les Sports. 
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similar picture can be drawn of the Flemish side, where there are seven major 
newspapers,  two of which can be considered “quality” newspapers,40 two others 
“regional” newspapers,41 yet two others “popular” newspapers42 and one a specialised 
“economic” newspaper.43 Belgium has only one major German-language 
newspaper.44 Although the concepts “quality”, “regional”, “popular” and “economic” 
can have different meanings and connotations, they are used in literature (and even in 
policy practice) to distinguish different types of newspapers (e.g. these terms are used 
in the Flemish regulator’s report on media concentration in Flanders).  
On the one hand, 6 different newspaper titles for around 4 million French 
speakers and 7 different titles for a public of 6 million Dutch speakers may be 
considered a relative wide variety of newspapers. However, if one looks at the 
available titles per category, Belgian consumers can only choose between 1 or 2 titles 
in their own language. Also, these figures look pale in comparison with the figures of 
newspapers published in earlier times. At the German-language side, 1 major 
newspaper is certainly a low figure, but taking into account the limited number of 
German-speakers in Belgium (around 75,000), this is not a surprising figure. 
Compared to other countries, Belgium seems to have a relatively low or averaged 
level of newspaper readership, which partly explains the high level of concentration.45 
Free newspapers take a special position in the Belgian newspaper market. 
Although their popularity is a relatively recent phenomenon, Belgium has had 
experiences with free newspapers since the 19th century.46 Belgium currently counts 
one major free newspaper (Metro47), which is published in separate issues in French 
and Dutch. The effect of free newspapers on the circulation figures of the classic paid 
newspapers is yet unclear. According to the Flemish media regulator, there is no proof 
of a linear relationship between the increase in circulation of Metro and the sales 
figures of the paying (Flemish) newspapers, and it remains unclear whether the 
average reader considers Metro as a complement or a substitute to a paid newspaper.48  
For the French-language newspapers, the most recent figures show that the 
free newspaper Metro is the most widely spread, followed by the “regional titles” 
(Sud Press and Editions de l’Avenir), the “quality paper” Le Soir, the “popular title” 
La Dernière Heure / Les Sports, the “quality paper” La Libre Belgique and the 
“economic title” L’Echo. At the Flemish side, the most recent figures show that the 
“popular titles” (Het Laatste Nieuws / De Nieuwe Gazet and Het Nieuwsblad / De 
Gentenaar) are the best selling Flemish newspapers. These were followed by 
                                                                                                                                            
39 L’Echo. 
40 De Standaard and De Morgen. 
41 Gazet van Antwerpen and Het Belang van Limburg.  
42 Het Laatste Nieuws / De Nieuwe Gazet and Het Nieuwsblad / De Gentenaar. 
43 De Tijd. 
44 Grenz-Echo. 
45 D. Ward, A Mapping study of media concentration and ownership in ten European countries (2004), 
available at: http://www.cvdm.nl/dsresource?objectid=421&type=org (last visited on 22/10/2010), at p. 
25. According to De Bens and Raeymakers, newspaper readership in Belgium amounts to 173 readers 
per 1,000 inhabitants, which is close to the average European figure. See De Bens and Raeymaeckers, 
De pers in België, p. 149. 
46 Le Soir started as a free advertising newspaper in 1887, but later on evolved to a paying newspaper.  
47 Metro is published by Mass Transit Media (MTM), a joint-venture between Concentra and Rossel. 
48 Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media (VRM), “Mediaconcentratie in Vlaanderen Rapport 2009”, 
available at: http://www.google.com/search?ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-
8&sourceid=navclient&gfns=1&q=%E2%80%9CMediaconcentratie+in+Vlaanderen%2C+Rapport+20
09 (last visited on 22/10/2010), at p. 63. 
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respectively the free newspapers (Metro), the “regional titles” (Gazet van Antwerpen 
and Het Belang van Limburg), the “quality papers” (De Standaard and De Morgen) 
and the “economic paper” De Tijd.49 Whereas sales figures for the major French-
language papers are in a rather sharp decline, sales figures for the major Dutch-
language papers seem to be more stable.50 
Both the market of the French-language newspapers and the market of the 
Dutch-language newspapers in Belgium are marked by a high concentration. In fact, 
both markets are dominated by three major media groups: the groups Rossel,51 IPM52 
and Corelio53 for the French-language newspapers, and the groups Corelio,54 De 
Persgroep55 and Concentra56 for the Dutch-market newspapers. This concentration 
trend has been going on since the 1950s.57 At the same time, Belgium’s oligopolistic 
market structure makes it virtually impossible to launch new titles (except for the 
success of Metro almost all new ventures in the sector have failed since the 1950s).58 
Family ownership is still important for the Belgian media landscape, with most of the 
major press groups still being under the control of family shareholders.59 
The newspaper market in Belgium is currently confronted with various 
challenges, including a move to electronic versions of newspapers on the Internet, the 
availability of free news online and the success of free newspapers (e.g. the publishers 
and journalists of French-language newspapers are quite anxious about the recent 
success of Metro), a decline in sales figures (especially for the French language 
newspapers), and difficulties in finding alternative ways of funding via 
advertisements (due to the economic crisis and due to the availability of other 
advertising platforms, e.g. the websites of other media players).  These challenges 
partly explain a move towards consolidation and towards cross-media involvement 
(e.g. expansion in other media sectors and on the Internet).  
The periodical press in Belgium is also highly concentrated with a couple of 
media groups controlling the market in both Communities. The most important of 
them are Roularta,60 the Finnish group Sanoma,61 Editions Ciné Revue,62 and De 
                                                 
49 See the latest figures of CIM, available at: http://www.cim.be (last visited on 22/10/2010). 
50 Minus 4.14% for the French-language newspapers and minus 0.53 for Dutch-language newspapers 
for the second quarter of 2010, compared with the second quarter of 2009. See Centre for Information 
on the Media, available at: 
http://www.cim.be/fr/media/presse/authentification/r%C3%A9sultats/r%C3%A9sultats-public (last 
visited on 22/10/2010).   
51 Le Soir, the newspapers of Sudpresse and the German-language Grenz-Echo all belong to Rossel. 
Rossel also participates for 50% in Metro, L’Echo and De Tijd.  
52 La Libre Belgique and La Dernière Heure belong to the group IPM.  
53 The titles of “Editions de l’Avenir” belong to Corelio. 
54 Corelio also publishes the newspapers De Standaard, Het Nieuwsblad and De Gentenaar.  
55 De Persgroep owns Het Laatste Nieuws, De Nieuwe Gazet and De Morgen and participates for 50% 
in L’Echo and De Tijd.  
56 Concentra publishes Het Belang van Limburg and owns 90% of the shares of De Vlijt, the publisher 
of Gazet van Antwerpen. Concentra also participates for 50% in Metro.  
57 See De Bens and Raeymaeckers, De pers in België, p. 74. 
58 M. Kelly, G. Mazzoleni and D. McQuail (eds), The media in Europe (2004), at p. 18.  
59 I.e., the family Rossel-Hurbain for Rossel, the family Le Hodey for IPM, the family Van Thillo for 
De Persgroup and the family Theelen for Concentra.  
60 Roularta is the publisher of Belgium’s most important newsweeklies Le Vif/L’Express (in French) 
and Knack (in Dutch), the economic magazines Trends-Tendances and Bizz (both of which are 
published separately in French and in Dutch), and a number of television, lifestyle, regional and 
specialised magazines.  
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Persgroep.63 Figures for 2008 show that Editions Ciné Revue has 26.7% of the 
French-language magazines, but no significant part of the Dutch-language market. 
Similarly, De Persgroep has 31.3% of the market of Dutch-language magazines, but 
no significant sales in French-speaking Belgium. Roularta has 24.2% of the French-
language magazines and 10.6% of the Dutch-language magazines. Sanoma has 23.9% 
of the market of French-language magazines and no less than 47% of the market of 
Dutch-language magazines.  
As shown above, the market for magazines is a very heterogeneous market, 
with some magazines focusing on news and general information, and others focusing 
on more specific audiences or themes. According to figures from CIM,64 the most 
widely sold magazines in Belgium are television magazines and so called “popular” 
magazines. These are followed by respectively women’s magazines, news magazines 
and specialised magazines. 
Figures show quite a sharp decline in the number of magazines sold.65 Like the 
newspaper market, the market for magazines seems saturated with few new 
magazines appearing (and even fewer of these surviving).66 
 
2.3.2 Radio and television 
At both sides of the language border, there is a growing evolution towards digital 
television and so-called catch-up television services. In Flanders, all analogue 
terrestrial television services were switched off on 3 November 2008, whereas in the 
French Community analogue terrestrial broadcast ceased to be on 1 March 2010. 
Also, the Flemish public broadcaster VRT recently sold its terrestrial digital 
broadcasting facilities to Norkring Belgium (which is a joint venture between VRT 
(51%) and the Norwegian Norkring (49%)).67 Digital terrestrial switch-over is giving 
rise to a growing number of television channels (mostly thematic channels), a 
growing number of non-linear television services such as video-on-demand (which 
also increases interactivity), and a growing number of distributors of television 
services on the Belgian market.68 
Although there are quite a lot of television channels available, there is – once 
again – a strong concentration in Belgium’s television landscape. At the French-
                                                                                                                                            
61 Sanoma focuses on women’s magazines (e.g. Flair and Libelle), lifestyle magazines (e.g. Feeling), 
popular magazines (e.g. Story) and television magazines (e.g. TéléMoustique and TeveBlad).  
62 Editions Ciné Revue publishes the television magazine Ciné Télé Revue, which is the most widely 
sold magazine in French-speaking Belgium, but is not available in the Dutch-language.  
63 Newspaper publisher De Persgroep focuses on popular magazines (e.g. Dag Allemaal), lifestyle 
magazines (e.g. Genieten), youth magazines (e.g. Joepie) and television magazines (e.g. TV-Familie). 
64 See Centre for Information on the Media, 
http://www.cim.be/fr/media/presse/authentification/r%C3%A9sultats/r%C3%A9sultats-public (last 
visited on 22/10/2010). CIM’s main activities concern research about and verification of circulation 
figures of the Belgian media. As such, CIM has a considerable influence on the flow of advertisement 
budgets towards media players.  
65 173 million magazines sold in 2008, compared to close to 200 million magazines sold in 1999. Ibid.  
66 Kelly, Mazzoleni and McQuail, The Media in Europe, p, 20. 
67 Norkring belongs to the Norwegian Telenor group. 
68 For more information for advertisement income for digital television, see K. Berte, “Reclame in een 
digital medialandschap”, unpublished PhD thesis, Ghent University (2009-2010). 
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language side, apart from the public broadcaster RTBF.be69 and the main private 
television broadcaster RTL group, other smaller players are BeTV, BTV, SiA 
(Belgacom), Liberty TV Europe, MCM, Belgian Business Television (Roularta), 
PPMG, MTV and the twelve local television broadcasters.70 At the Flemish side, next 
to the public broadcaster VRT and the main private broadcaster Vlaamse Media 
Maatschappij (VMMa),71 other players are SBS Belgium,72 Media Ad Infinitum, SiA 
(Belgacom), Telenet, Concentra, Alfacam, Actua TV, Belgian Business Television 
(Roularta), Life!TV, Icon Europe and the ten local or regional television 
broadcasters.73  
At the French-language side, RTL’s commercial channel RTL-TVI (23.6%) 
was the most widely watched channel in 2008, followed by the public broadcaster’s 
channel La Une (14.6%). These two dominant channels are followed by the channels 
TF1 (13.2%), France 2 (6.6%) and France 3 (6.5%), all of which are French (i.e., not 
Belgian) channels. Together, these five channels account for more than 63% of the 
audiences in French-speaking Belgium.74 At the Dutch-language side, there is a 
similar strong concentration, but the public broadcaster has a bigger and ever growing 
market share than its commercial counterparts. VRT’s Eén was the most widely 
watched channel in 2008 (31.8%), followed by VMMa’s VTM (21.3%). Other 
channels lag behind (Canvas/Ketnet: 8.4%; VT4: 6.5%: 2BE: 5.9%; VijfTV: 4.5%; 
Vitaya: 3.6%). Together, the different channels of VRT and VMMa accounted for 
more than 67% of the market. Channels from the Netherlands only accounted for 
3.8% of the market share in 2008.75  
It is worth noting that the main French-language private broadcaster (RTL 
Belgium) has rejected the competence of the Belgian authorities over its broadcasting 
services, arguing that its television activities are executed by its mother company, 
RTL Group, which is subject to the laws of Luxembourg.76 In order to solve this 
problem of a broadcaster based and licensed in one European Member State 
(Luxembourg), but focusing its television programs on the audiences of a different 
Member State (Belgium), the government of the French Community of Belgium and 
the government of Luxembourg in June 2009 signed a cooperation agreement 
whereby some of the regulations applying in Belgium’s French Community (that are 
more strict than the European Audiovisual Media Services (AVMS) Directive and do 
not exist in Luxembourg) are henceforth also applied to RTL’s channels RTL-TVI, 
                                                 
69 In January 2010, RTBF changed its name from RTBF to RTBF.be, to stress its focus on new 
technologies and in particular the Internet.  
70 For the detailed overview see Le Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel, “L'offre de médias et le 
pluralisme en Communauté française”, available at: http://www.csa.be/pluralisme (last visited on 
22/10/2010).  
71 VMMa is owned for 50% by De Persgroep and for 50% by Roularta. 
72 SBS Belgium is owned by the German media group ProSiebenSat.1 Media, Europe’s second biggest 
media group (behind RTL Group).  
73 See for a detailed study Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media (VRM), “Mediaconcentratie in 
Vlaanderen Rapport 2009”. 
74 See figures Communauté française de Belgique Service général de l’Audiovisuel et des Multimédias, 
“Annuaire de l’Audiovisuel 2009”, at p. 72. 
75 See figures VRT Jaarverslag 2008, 52. 
76 RTL Group owns 66% of the shares of RTL Belgium. The other 34% of RTL Belgium’s shares are 
owned by Audiopresse, the association of Belgium’s French-language and German-language 
newspapers. RTL Group is a Luxembourg group controlled by the German Bertelsmann-group. With 
its 45 television channels and 32 radio channels in 11 European countries, RTL Group is one of the 
major audiovisual groups of Europe.  
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Club RTL and Plug RTL. The legal validity of the agreement is the object of debate. 
In a controversial decision of 15 January 2009, the Conseil d’Etat decided that RTL 
was permitted to rely upon its Luxembourg authorisation to broadcast towards the 
French Community of Belgium. However, this judgment related to legislation 
applicable prior to the transposition of the AVMS Directive. In a case that occurred 
after the transposition of the AVMS Directive, the French Community’s regulator 
(CSA), in a decision of 3 December 2009, sent a reference for preliminary ruling to 
the European Court of Justice seeking clarification as to which state is allowed to 
claim jurisdiction upon the services edited by RTL (Case C-517/09).77  
As regards distribution, Belgium is one of the most widely cabled countries in 
the European Union. The development of the cable networks started as early as the 
1960s.78 While the cable operators (mainly Tecteo for the French Community and 
Telenet for the Flemish Community) are still largely dominating the distribution 
market of television services, their supremacy is under challenge by other operators, 
such as for IPTV, satellite and mobile television. Increased competition resulted in 
consolidation and concentration of the market of television distributors (and in the 
market of internet access providers).79 In Flanders, the main television broadcasters 
(i.e., VRT, VMMa and SBS Belgium) recently accused the network operators Telenet 
and Belgacom TV of threatening their revenue streams, by giving too much freedom 
to viewers of digital television to record television programs. The broadcasters claim 
that this jeopardises their advertisement income (i.e., because viewers skip 
commercials) and income from video-on-demand services. It is unclear how this 
disagreement between broadcasters and operators will be solved and to what extent 
these actors will have to adapt to new technologies and developments. 
Radio signals are still mainly transmitted via analogue means, but there is a 
transition towards digital radio. Radio programs are mainly accessible via terrestrial 
broadcasting, cable, satellite and the Internet. The public broadcasters of both 
Communities have since the 1990s been broadcasting their radio programmes 
digitally. VRT recently sold its terrestrial analogue and digital broadcasting facilities 
to Norkring Belgium (see above for television). Digital radio broadcasts are available 
via different platforms, including the Internet, satellite, terrestrial and mobile 
broadcasting. There is a lot of uncertainty about the type of format80 that should be 
used for broadcasting digital radio, and given the investments needed to develop 
digital broadcasting and the extent of the current cable network that needs to be 
upgraded, Belgium’s switch towards digital radio is slower than in other European 
countries.81 RTBF.be is suggesting a public-private cooperation in order to finance 
digital switchover for radio broadcasting. The Flemish government’s frequency plan 
for digital radio dates from 12 October 2007 and the French Community launched a 
                                                 
77 See Official Journal C 051, 27/02/2010, 19–20. 
78 See European Institute for the Media, “Final report of the study on the information of the citizen in 
the EU: obligations for the media and the Institutions concerning the citizen’s right to be fully and 
objectively informed”, 31/08/2004, at p. 33. 
79 MAVISE, “TV market in Belgium”, available at: http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=4 (last visited 
on 22/10/2010). 
80 E.g. DAB (Digital Audio Broadcasting), DMB (Digital Multimedia Broadcasting), DVB (Digital 
Video Broadcasting), DRM (Digital Radio Mondiale), etc. 
81 Communauté française de Belgique Service général de l’Audiovisuel et des Multimédias, “Annuaire 
de l’Audiovisuel 2009”, at p. 479. 
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plan for the transition to digital radio broadcasting on 9 July 2007.82 In contrast to 
what happened to analogue television broadcasting, the Belgian authorities do no 
seem to have an official policy to completely switch off analogue radio broadcasting 
in the near future. An argument often heard is that digital switch over would put the 
further existence of smaller radio broadcasters (e.g. local radio stations, specialised 
radio stations, Community type radio stations, etc.) at risk.  
Belgium’s (terrestrial) radio landscape is similar to its television landscape, 
insofar that there are quite a lot of radio channels available, but that there is also a 
strong concentration in the market. At the French-language side, the public 
broadcaster RTBF.be and the commercial RTL group dominate the market. These 
main players are followed by the French NRJ group. At the Dutch-language side, the 
public broadcaster VRT and the commercial broadcaster VMMa dominate the market. 
At both sides of the language borders, a number of independent local, regional and 
community-focussed radios83 are operating.84 It can be noted that it is only since 2008 
that the French Community succeeded in formulating a new frequency plan on 
terrestrial radio broadcasting, making an end to ten years of legal uncertainty for the 
private radio broadcasters as to whether or not they needed a licence to broadcast in 
the French Community. 
To conclude the chapter about radio and television broadcasting, there 
currently is a lively discussion going on about the public remit of the public 
broadcasters. This discussion is partly fuelled by serious budget reductions that the 
Communities enforce on the public broadcasters. As such, an important part of the 
discussion focuses on the funding of the public broadcasters by the authorities – and 
indirectly by the taxpayers. Also, discussions are currently ongoing on new 
management contracts between the public broadcasters and the authorities.85 Some 
fundamental questions are raised in this context, notably concerning which specific 
tasks should fall under the public remit of the public broadcasters, and which tasks 
they should refrain from performing. For instance, should the focus of the public 
broadcasters lay on culture, on information, on science, on sports or on entertainment? 
In what sense should the public broadcasters be allowed to develop into alternative 
funding and new technologies? As said, there is a lively debate going on about these 
issues between various stakeholders and many of the questions raised are expected to 
be addressed in the new management contracts between the public broadcasters and 
the Communities. 
 
2.3.3 Media online 
According to the figures of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), as per 
September 2009, Belgium counted 7,292,300 Internet users, i.e., a 70% penetration 
level. An ESS survey on daily use of the internet per country puts Belgium 
                                                 
82 See also a recent consultation, Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel, “Consultation publique sur le 
lancement de services audiovisuels numériques par voie hertzienne et le suivi du Plan stratégique de 
transition numérique”, available at: http://www.csa.be/consultations/show/13 (last visited on 
22/10/2010). 
83 E.g. radios for the Turkish community in Belgium, etc. 
84 See for more details Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel, “L'offre de médias et le pluralisme en 
Communauté française” and VRM, “Mediaconcentratie in Vlaanderen Rapport 2009”, p. 18-25. 
85 The current management contracts between the French Community and RTBF.be and between the 
Flemish Community and VRT run from 2007 to 2011.  
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somewhere in the middle of the European countries surveyed.86 Figures for 2008 
show that internet radio or internet television were only used by 14% of the 
population in Wallonia, 15% of the population in Flanders and 22% of the population 
in Brussels. These figures are relatively low, compared to the overall figure of 20% 
for the entire European Union. Internet sites of newspapers or magazines were used 
by 13% of the population in Wallonia, 24% of the population in Flanders and 27% of 
the population in Brussels. Again, these figures are relatively low (especially the 
figure for Wallonia), compared to the overall figure of 25% for the entire European 
Union.87 
Where over the last couple of years, the sales figures of newspapers have been 
declining or at best stabilising, Internet sites of newspapers have at the same time seen 
a huge increase in popularity. In general, almost all newspapers and magazines have 
developed a full online version of their product, which is constantly updated. 
However, many newspapers and magazines only publish a limited number of their 
articles for free on their website, and ask their readers to subscribe to the paying 
online or paper version to gain access to all articles. This strategy of a hybrid paying–
free model is especially popular with the specialised papers (such as the economic 
newspapers). Recently, many newspapers have also developed applications for mobile 
electronic devices, such as mobile phones and iPads. Most newspapers publish a lot of 
video-content on their websites and some of them even created their own studio to 
develop further in the direction of video-content. Similarly, almost all television and 
radio broadcasters have also developed an online version of their channels, where 
they offer not only information about their programs and a limited number of 
programs for downloading, but also a type of information that can be classified as 
“written press” activities. All of this means of course that the borderline between 
different types of media services (such as between the written press and television) is 
fading.  
The evolution of media players entering into the internet world, together with 
the newspapers’ struggle to survive and to make their websites profitable through 
advertisement, has caused the main French-language newspaper publishers (i.e., 
Rossel, IPM and Corelio-subsidiary Editions de l’Avenir) to contest RTBF.be’s 
offering “written press” activities on its websites. These publishers recently 
announced they would start legal proceedings against RTBF.be, claiming that the 
public broadcaster is infringing on its public remit and is guilty of unfair competition 
by offering certain activities on its Internet sites.88 They claim in particular that 
RTBF.be should not be allowed to offer services of the written press (as opposed to 
audiovisual services) on its internet sites, especially not if RTBF.be is using 
taxpayers’ money to offer such services. After the failure of a government-sponsored 
attempt to reconcile the parties, the newspaper publishers recently threatened to 
summon RTBF.be to court.  
 
                                                 
86 European Social Survey, “Exploring public attitudes, informing public policy - Selected findings 
from the first three rounds”, 5, available at: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org (last visited on 
22/10/2010). 
87 “Mediaconcentratie in Vlaanderen Rapport 2009”, p. 69. 
88 See also Communication 2009/C 257/01 of the European Commission on the application of State aid 
rules to public service broadcasting, OJ C257, 27/10/2009. 
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2.3.4 Social media online  
Social media online (such as blogs, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) do not seem to have 
conquered a prominent place in the Belgian media landscape. Although most media 
players are active on social media such as Facebook through e.g. fan clubs for and 
links to newspapers, and although journalists often have a Facebook or Twitter 
account, they do not overwhelmingly use these new media for their reporting. Private 
media blogs exist, but most of these blogs are initiatives of established journalists.89 
Citizens also provide news items through social media, but such information is not 
always trustworthy.90 
As concerns content production methods for media online, it seems that the 
Internet sites of most traditional media players are provided with content by 
professional journalists and traditional press agencies. User-generated content for 
online versions of traditional media services are mostly limited to readers’ sections 
and comments on forums.  
All in all, social media are developing in Belgium (and in theory, they have 
the capacity to divert advertisement income away from traditional media players), but 
for the moment their influence seems rather limited.  
 
2.3.5 News agencies 
Belga News Agency is the most important news agency for Belgium. Other news 
agencies are the big international news agencies and specialised Belgian news 
agencies. Given Belga’s position as the only major Belgian news agency, its 
organisation (i.e., its main shareholders are in fact the same media groups that are its 
main clients) and influence on the Belgian press (i.e., in terms of structural pluralism 
and content-wise) is sometimes seen as controversial.91 Also, there is a lack of 
scientific data on the extent to which Belgian media rely on information from Belga. 
All in all, it can be said that there is a very strong concentration in the market of press 
agencies in Belgium. Given the importance of press agencies for the proper 
functioning of the media, it is surprising that there is no legislation that guarantees 
pluralism in the sector and that there is almost no literature on press agencies in 
Belgium.  
 
2.4 Journalists’ background and education 
Belgium counts a wide variety of different types of journalists, depending on the type 
of media they work for, the kind of work they do, the type of contract they have with 
a media group, etc. Some but not all journalists have the legally protected status of 
“professional journalist” under the act of 30 December 1963. This act regulates the 
                                                 
89 Some examples of social media are www.apache.be; www.dewereldmorgen.be; www.politics.be; 
www.mediakritiek.be, etc. 
90 One of the most noteworthy ‘accidents’ with civic journalism was the case were the press agency 
Belga wrongly reported that Belgium’s queen Fabiola had passed away. Belga picked this “news item” 
up from its website Ihavenews.be, where citizens can report news items. For unknown reasons, the 
message was not checked by Belga, and other media players published Belga’s “news item” as 
breaking news.  
91 See T. Cochez, “Belga, waar de klant koning én aandeelhouder is”, available at: 
http://www.apache.be/2010/01/belga-waar-de-klant-koning-en-aandeelhouder-is (last visited on 
22/10/2010). 
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recognition and protection of the title of professional journalist for those journalists 
who meet the conditions laid down in the act,92 and who have applied for the 
recognition of their status of professional journalist. The act also grants certain 
benefits to recognised professional journalists, such as the deliverance of certain 
professional identification documents (e.g. press passes, admission tickets, etc.). 
However, the act of 30 December 1963 does not monopolise the title of journalist, and 
in principle everybody is free to call himself or herself a “journalist”. No special 
education or examination is needed to obtain the titles of “journalist” or “professional 
journalist”, and journalists have a wide variety of different educational and 
professional backgrounds.  
It is worth noting that a study from the Artevelde Hogeschool showed that no 
less than 10% of the Flemish journalists fight with a burn-out. Compared to an overall 
figure of 4% in general for the entire population, this seems a high figure. On top of 
this, 21% of the Flemish journalists have an increased risk of burn-out. Apparently, 
the main reasons behind these alarming figures are related to the increased 
commercialisation and digitisation (with increasingly short deadlines) of the 
profession of journalist.93 A study conducted among French-speaking journalists 
shows that almost half of them is unhappy about their working conditions and almost 
80% sees a negative evolution over the last years.94  
 
2.5 Media literacy and media status in society 
Belgium generally has an average score when it comes to media literacy. A recent 
study commissioned by the European Commission estimates Belgium’s media 
literacy level as the exact average level of the European Union as a whole.95  
Some small-scale initiatives have been taken by the Communities to improve the 
media literacy level in Belgium (e.g. the disposition of free newspapers or visits by 
journalists to secondary schools). Other initiatives have a more structural character, 
for instance, the compulsory integration since September 2010 of media education in 
the school curriculum in Flemish schools (meaning that all students graduating from 
secondary school should be able to work with computers and the internet, and to 
critically judge information to which they are exposed) or the re-launch of a dedicated 
committee on media education by the French Community (“Conseil supérieur de 
l’Education aux Médias”).  
 
                                                 
92 E.g. in order to be recognized as a professional journalist, one should – as a primary professional 
activity and against remuneration - contribute to the redaction of the daily or periodic press, of radio- or 
television news bulletins, film journals or press agencies; One should have exercised this activity 
during the last two years at the minimum; etc. 
93 See Arteveldehogeschool, “Journalist”, available at: 
http://www.arteveldehs.be/emc.asp?pageId=1848 (last visited on 22/10/2010).  
94  See Association Générale des Journalistes Professionnels de Belgique, “Dossier Enquête sur le 
moral des journalistes”, 96 La lettre de l’AJP, September 2008. 
95 European Commission, “Study on assessment criteria for media literacy levels”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/media_literacy/docs/studies/eavi_study_assess_crit_media_lit_levels_euro
pe_finrep.pdf (last visited on 22/10/2010). 
 27
3. The media policy in Belgium   
Belgium’s constitution and other fundamental legislation safeguards the freedom of 
expression and information of its citizens. Belgium scores relatively high in 
international rankings of media freedom. Nonetheless, there have been particular 
cases where the application of the freedom of the press by the Belgian courts has 
given rise to controversy. The following section gives an overview of the media 
regulatory framework in Belgium. 
 
3.1 Actors of media regulation and policy 
The authorities competent for regulating the media in Belgium are organised at the 
level of the Communities. On a policy-level, the competent authorities are the 
governments and legislative assemblies of the French Community, the Flemish 
Community and the German-speaking Community. On a regulatory level, the 
competent authorities are the “Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel” (CSA) for the 
French Community,96 the “Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media” (VRM) for the 
Flemish Community97 and the “Medienrat” for the German-speaking Community98.  
It should be noted, however, that Belgian law makes a basic distinction 
between telecommunications (which falls under federal law) and broadcasting (which 
falls under Community law).99 Although it is not always easy to make such a clear 
distinction in practice, the case law of the Constitutional Court gave the Communities 
quite broad powers to regulate everything that is related to broadcasting, resulting in 
radio, television and cable distribution all falling under the authority of the 
Communities. Telecommunications (including satellite reception and ground 
networks) is subject to federal legislation. Overall, legislation on the media is 
scattered between different levels of government, but the various governments and 
regulators try to work together through cooperation agreements.100 For instance, CSA, 
VRM and Medienrat are working together with the IBPT (the Belgian Institute for 
Postal and Telecommunication Services) in a Conference of Regulators for the sector 
of Electronic Communications (CRC).101 
In general, the press in Belgium was given a broad freedom to organise itself 
without too much interference from the authorities (as described above, the situation 
is different for the audiovisual media, where government interference is more strongly 
felt). Journalists used this freedom to organise themselves in professional 
organisations where deontological codes were developed for all associated journalists 
to comply with. The most important of these self-regulatory organisations are CDJ102 
                                                 
96 See Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel de la Communauté française official website, available at: 
www.csa.be (last visited on 22/10/2010). 
97 See Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media official website, available at: www.vlaamseregulatormedia.be 
(last visited on 22/10/2010). 
98 See Medienrat der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft Belgiens official website, available at: 
www.medienrat.be (last visited on 22/10/2010). 
99 Article 4, 6° of the Special Act of 8 August 1980, as amended by the Special Act of 8 August 1988. 
100 J. De Wachter and L. Parret, “Belgium” in de M. Avillez Perreira, Antitrust and new media (2000) 
95. 
101 See cooperation agreement of 17 November 2006, Moniteur belge, 28 December 2006, 75371. 
102 See Conseil de Déontologie journalistique official website, available at: 
www.deontologiejournalistique.be (last visited on 22/10/2010). It must be noted that the CDJ is partly 
funded by the French Community (see the Decree of 30 April 2009). 
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and RVDJ103, the independent self-regulatory organisations of respectively the 
French- and German-language media and the Flemish media. The main representative 
organisations for journalists are AGJPB/AVBB104 and AJPP/VJPP.105 The most 
influential media industry organisations are the organisations of newspaper publishers 
(JFB106 and VDP107), the periodic press (THE PPRESS108 and UPP109) and the 
advertisement sector (JEP110).  
There is a limited number of civil society organisations and NGOs with 
influential advocacy activity in the field of media policy in Belgium. Most of the 
universities have created important media research institutes. 
 
3.2 The media regulatory framework 
3.2.1 Freedom of expression and information 
The main legal norms about freedom of expression and information in Belgium are 
incorporated in the Belgian Constitution. Article 19 of the Belgian Constitution is a 
general provision safeguarding the freedom of expression, except for the repression of 
offences committed when using this freedom. Article 25 specifically safeguards the 
freedom of the press and prohibits censorship. It also sets a principle of stepped 
liability for both criminal prosecutions and civil liability, whereby in principle only 
one person can be prosecuted: in the first place, the author, provided that he is known 
and resident in Belgium, in second instance, the publisher, then, the printer, and 
finally the distributor. This stepped liability replaces one actor by the next actor if the 
preceding one is missing in the chain, and was established as a mechanism to prevent 
private censorship by publishers, printers or distributors (i.e., since in principle the 
author alone will be prosecuted for a published work, publishers, printers and 
distributors do not have to fear for prosecution).111 Article 150 of the Belgian 
Constitution submits all press offences to the jurisdiction of a jury (with the exception 
of press offences inspired by racism or xenophobia which are tried by professional 
judges). By submitting press offences to a jury (i.e., representatives of the people), the 
Belgian Constitution meant to install a special judicial protection for authors, 
journalists and editors: in practice, the cost of trials by jury has led criminal 
authorities to a general attitude of not bringing proceedings against the press (which 
means that the press is de facto only subject to civil proceedings). Article 32 of the 
Constitution provides that everyone has the right to consult any administrative 
                                                 
103 See Raad voor de Journalistiek official website, available at: www.rvdj.be (last visited on 
22/10/2010). 
104 See General Association of Professional Journalists in Belgium official website (available at: 
www.agjpb.be and www.avbb.be). This organisation consists of a French-German wing, AJP, and a 
Flemish wing, VVJ. 
105 See Association of Journalists of the Periodic Press official website, available at: www.ajpp-vjpp.be 
(last visited on 22/10/2010). 
106 For the French-language newspapers see JFB official website, available at: www.jfb.be (last visited 
on 22/10/2010).  
107 For the Dutch-language newspapers see VDP official website, available at: www.dagbladpers.org 
(last visited on 22/10/2010). 
108 See Organisation of publishers of the periodic press, official website, available at: 
www.theppress.be (last visited on 22/10/2010). 
109 See Union of publishers of the periodic press, official website, available at: www.upp.be (last 
visited on 22/10/2010). 
110 See Jury for Ethics and Publicity, available at: www.jep.be (last visited on 22/10/2010). 
111 Note that article 25 of the Constitution has recently been declared subject to revision (see below). 
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document and to have a copy made of such document, except in limited cases as 
specified by secondary legislation.112 
Although there is no legal registration or notification obligation in Belgium for 
publishing a newspaper, a magazine or a book, Article 299 of the Penal Code 
stipulates that publishing or distributing a printed matter without mentioning the real 
name and address of the writer or the printer is punishable. This is not considered a 
major obstacle to free publishing. The Penal Code also contains specific language on 
the punishment of libel (articles 443 – 452). 
The main broadcasting acts for the French Community are the Act of 27 
February 2003 on audiovisual media services113 (hereafter “FRBA”) and the Act of 14 
July 1997 on the Belgian radio and television of the French Community (hereafter 
“RTBF-Act”). The main broadcasting act for the Flemish Community is the Act of 27 
March 2009 on radio and television broadcasting (hereafter “FLBA”). For the 
German-speaking Community, the main acts are the Act of 27 June 2005 on 
audiovisual media services and film showings (hereafter “GBA”) and the Act of 27 
June 1986 on the Belgian radio and television centre of the German-speaking 
Community (hereafter “BRF-Act”). For the region of Brussels, the main act is the Act 
of 30 March 1995 on electronic communication networks, electronic services and 
broadcasting activities in the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital. Other important 
documents for the public broadcasters are the management contracts between the 
public broadcasters and the Communities (i.e., management contract of 13 October 
2006 between RTBF.be and the French Community for the period 2007-2011 and the 
management contract of 20 July 2006 between VRT and the Flemish Community for 
the period 2007-2011).  
Other relevant legislation are the different anti-discrimination acts of 10 May 
2007 which limit the freedom of expression if this amounts to unlawful 
discrimination114 and the Holocaust Denial Act of 23 March 1995 which makes it 
illegal to publicly “deny, grossly minimise, justify or approve the genocide committed 
by the German National Socialist regime during the Second World War”. 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and article 
19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) are directly 
applicable by Belgian judges and, as such, are of main importance in Belgium’s case 
law on media freedom and independence. 
                                                 
112 The exception referred to in article 32 has been laid out in different legislative acts, such as the Act 
of 11 April 1994 (federal level), the Decree of 26 March 2004 (Flemish level) and the Act of 12 
November 1997 (provincial and municipal level). Exceptions mainly relate to sensitive personal 
information, public security or abusive requests. 
113 Coordinated on July 24, 2009, following the transposition of the AVMS Directive. 
114 The Racial Equality Act of 10 May 2007 implements the EU Racial Equality Directive and the 1965 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and prohibits 
discrimination on grounds of alleged race, color, descent, national or ethnic origin, and nationality. The 
Gender Equality Act of 10 May 2007 fights discrimination related to sex and assimilated grounds (i.e. 
maternity, pregnancy and transsexualism). The General Anti-discrimination Act of 10 May 2007 
implements Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 and prohibits discrimination on all other 
grounds (i.e., age, sexual orientation, civil status, birth, wealth/income, religious or philosophical 
belief, state of health, disability, physical characteristics, political opinion, language, genetic 
characteristic, social origin). This Act also contains language that incitement to hatred, discrimination 
or violence is punishable (see art. 22 of the Act and art. 444 Penal Code). 
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Important case law for the principle of freedom of the press includes the 
decision of 24 February 1997 of the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”) 
in the case of De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium. In this case, the ECtHR blamed 
Belgium for the conviction of two journalists of the Flemish magazine Humo, for 
their critical remarks towards judges. The ECtHR ruled that it was unnecessary to 
convict these journalists (even if they were only convicted to a symbolic sum of 1 
Belgian Franc), and concluded to a breach of Articles 10 and 6 ECHR. The ECtHR 
noted that the articles published by the journalists contributed to an important public 
debate,115 and were based on relevant sources and information. The ECtHR expressly 
stated that “freedom of expression is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" 
that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference 
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any section of the 
Community” and that “journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to a degree 
of exaggeration, or even provocation” (paragraph 46).116 
Also, the Belgian Court of Cassation - Belgium’s court of last resort - 
interprets Article 25 of the Constitution on the freedom of the press and the 
prohibition of censorship as applying only to the written press, and not to e.g. radio or 
television.117 This interpretation of Article 25 of the Belgian Constitution is based on 
a restrictive interpretation of the concept of “the press”, as meaning the “printing 
press” only and not the media in general, as this was the only form of press or media 
existing at the time the Constitution was drafted. Furthermore, the Belgian Court of 
Cassation interprets Article 25 of the Constitution as applying only to prior 
censorship, which means in practice that the prohibition of censorship applies only if 
there has not yet been any dissemination and that this prohibition does not apply from 
the moment there has been some kind of dissemination.118   
However, these interpretations of Article 25 of the Constitution are subject to 
controversy and are not shared by all scholars or lower courts.  Some of the courts119 
have granted injunctions for taking newspapers or magazines out of distribution, 
based on the argument that, since the papers and magazines were already available for 
sale, their judicial ruling did not constitute prior censorship. These cases covered a 
range of different facts and allegations, going from defamation to breach of privacy, 
breach of the presumption of innocence and breach of confidentiality of parliamentary 
inquiries.  
One of these cases (Leempoel & Ciné Revue v. Belgium)120 was ultimately 
brought before the ECtHR, which found no violation of freedom of expression in the 
way the Belgian court had ordered the magazine Ciné Revue to be withdrawn from 
sale and banned from further distribution. The ECtHR found that the publication of 
the article in Ciné Revue - which included a copy of strictly confidential 
correspondence of a judge - breached the private life of the judge, and did not 
contribute to the general interest of society. The ECtHR ruled that the grounds121 
given by the Belgian court to justify the provisional ban on further sale and 
                                                 
115 On incest, violence within families, criticism of the judicial system, etc. 
116 ECtHR, De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium (no. 7/1996/626/809), 24 February 1997. 
117 Cassation, 9 December 1981 and Cassation, 2 June 2006.   
118 Cassation, 29 June 2000. See B. Frydman and J. Englebert, “Le contrôle judiciaire de la presse”, 6 
Auteurs & Médias, 2002. 
119 See case law cited by D. Voorhoof, Handboek Mediarecht (2003), pp. 63-75. 
120 ECtHR, Leempoel & S.A. Ed. Ciné Revue v. Belgium (no. 64772/01), 9 November 2006.  
121 I.e., limitation of the extent of damage caused to a person’s private life. 
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distribution were relevant and sufficient and that the limitation of the publisher’s right 
to freedom of expression could in casu be seen as necessary in a democratic society 
and proportionate to the aim pursued.  
Nevertheless, Belgian case law and literature remain divided about the exact 
implications of this case law of the Court of Cassation and of the ECtHR. In scholarly 
literature, one of the recurring issues is the unilateral character of some of the judicial 
decisions where newspapers or magazines were taken out of circulation. These 
decisions are often taken on the basis of a special procedure for urgent applications,122 
where a claimant starts a unilateral proceeding before a judge, claiming that his case 
is too urgent to convene the publisher, and where the judge “provisionally” (i.e., 
pending a definitive decision) orders the paper or magazine to be taken out of 
circulation, in order to prevent further harm to the claimant, without hearing the 
publisher.123 
All in all, one can conclude that, where the general rule of prohibition of 
censorship does still stand in Belgium, there is a lack of legal security whether this 
rule applies also to judicial decisions. The distinction made by the Court of Cassation 
and some other courts between media of the written press and other media does not 
seem supportive of the press freedom in Belgium. However, things may change soon 
since Article 25 of the Constitution has recently been declared subject to revision, and 
it is generally expected that its scope will be extended to other forms of media, such 
as radio, television and the Internet.124 
Belgium scores 11 points on Freedom House’s “Freedom of the Press 2008” 
ranking, putting the country on a shared fifth place with Sweden in the global press 
freedom ranking (only Finland, Iceland, Denmark and Norway score better). Belgium 
occupies an eleventh place on Reporters Without Borders’ global “Press Freedom 
Index 2009” (after Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Iceland and Lithuania).  
 
3.2.2   Structural regulation 
As a general rule, radio and television broadcasters need to obtain a licence if they 
want to broadcast in Flanders. In the French Community, editors of terrestrial radio 
services (FM) need to obtain a licence (which entitles them to broadcast using a 
                                                 
122 Articles 584, 588-589, 1025-1034 and 1035-1041 of the Belgian Judicial Code. 
123 Several problems are identified with these decisions. First, it can be argued that these decisions are 
not proportionate, because the judge could as well suffice with ordering a rectification to be published 
together with the article or a reference that the article is the subject of a judicial proceeding, instead of 
prohibiting the further circulation of the entire paper or magazine. Also, it is often difficult for a judge 
to assess the urgency of the case and the balance between the rights of the publishers on the one hand 
and the possible harm that may be caused to the applicant by postponing the hearing in order to 
convene the publisher on the other hand. Furthermore, such unilateral proceedings are supposed to only 
bring about “provisional” measures, but a provisional measure of further publication in fact means that 
the publisher must defend himself before a judge - often the same judge that ordered the provisional 
measure - in order to have his article published. Some courts even ordered a prohibition on 
broadcasting a television program (i.e., even before there was any kind of dissemination), following a 
unilateral request by a claimant, based on the Court of Cassation’s interpretation of article 25 of the 
Constitution as applying only to the written press, and not to audiovisual media. See for instance Pres. 
Tr. Brussels, 24 October 2001, A&M 2002/2, 177 and case law cited by D. Voorhoof, Handboek 
Mediarecht, 63-75. 
124 Declaration of revision of the Constitution, Moniteur belge, 7 May 2010, 25762. 
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designated frequency). Radio services transmitted by other means (cable, internet) are 
only required to make a declaration to the CSA. Editors of television services 
generally only need to make a declaration to the competent authorities if they intend 
to broadcast in the French Community.125 Broadcasters in both Communities need to 
comply with a set of rules that are applicable to their broadcasting activities. 
Publishers of newspapers or magazines and owners of Internet sites, etc. do not need 
to obtain such licence or make such declaration.  
The general competition rules of the federal Act of 15 September 2006 on the 
protection of economic competition (hereafter “Competition Act”) and relevant EU 
laws apply to the media sector. There are no media-specific competition rules, except 
the rules for television and radio broadcasters described below. There are no special 
rules for newspapers or magazines concerning ownership, concentration or protection 
of pluralism, nor are there obligations for newspapers or magazines to provide 
transparency about their capital structure, shareholders or owners. So far, the Belgian 
authorities have prohibited no merger of media companies.126 In theory, the Belgian 
federal government has the power to overrule a decision of the Belgian competition 
watchdog, and can declare a concentration admissible for general interest reasons, 
overriding the competition related risk on the Belgian market (or part of it) (Art. 60 
Competition Act). There are no rules prohibiting foreign ownership of media in 
Belgium. 
For radio and television broadcasters, the following competition and 
ownership rules apply: 
For the French Community, the regulator (CSA) monitors whether editors or 
distributors with a “significant position” in the audiovisual sector are not threatening 
the access of the public to a pluralistic offer of broadcasting services (Art. 7 FRBA). 
A presumption of significant position exists in the following situations: 1. a natural or 
legal person holds more than 24% of the capital of 2 editors of television services 
(directly or indirectly); 2. Same rule for radio services; 3. several editors of television 
services, directly or indirectly controlled by the same natural or legal person, have an 
audience share of 20%; 4. Same rule for radio services. If the CSA concludes that a 
threat to pluralism exists, it will start negotiations with the people or companies 
concerned with a view to reaching a solution to this threat. If negotiations do not lead 
to an agreement within six months time, or if such agreement is violated, a range of 
sanctions may be applied, ranging from fines to revocation of licences. Article 6 
FRBA contains specific requirements for audiovisual broadcasting companies to 
make available to the public some basic information about their companies. This 
article also contains some specific transparency requirements for media players to 
obtain a licence from the authorities (e.g. requirements to identify the persons or legal 
entities that participate in the company’s capital, the amount of such participation, 
participations in other media players and service providers, etc). The CSA runs a 
website dedicated to all this transparency-related information.127  
                                                 
125 For an explanation to the creation of a merely declarative regime, see the preparatory works of the 
current Decree (Parlement de la Communauté française, dossier 634 (2008-2009)). If they wish to use 
terrestrial broadcast (analogue or digital), the editors of television services still need to apply for an 
authorisation. 
126 But certain conditions were imposed to safeguard pluralism e.g. when Tecteo acquired BeTV. 
127 See Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel, “L'offre de médias et le pluralisme en Communauté 
française”, available at: http://www.csa.be/pluralisme (last visited on 22/10/2010). 
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For the Flemish Community, a similar regulation applies where the Flemish 
Regulator (VRM) has the task to monitor concentrations in the Flemish media sector 
(Art. 218 FLBA) and to apply sanctions in case a company has significant market 
power. Significant market power exists if a company has, alone or together with other 
companies, an economic power that enables it to act in a significant way 
independently from its competitors, clients or consumers (Art. 190 FLBA). The 
sanctions are rather “soft” sanctions, ranging from obligations to provide additional 
transparency to obligations to grant access or interconnection to networks, etc. (Art. 
192 FLBA). It is unclear if VRM can also apply harder sanctions (fines and 
revocation of licences) in case pluralism is in danger. Every year, VRM publishes a 
report on the concentration in different media sectors in Flanders. VRM also 
developed a “media database”, which can be used for the annual reports and for ad 
hoc reports in response to specific questions.128  
Cross media: Rules on the limitation of cross-media ownership in Belgium are 
not so much targeted to media companies as such, but rather to persons combining 
different functions and mandates in various media companies (the underlying 
rationale is to limit evasions of the rules through setting up structures with various 
subsidiaries and connected companies). For instance, in the French Community, one 
cannot be a director to RTBF.be and at the same time hold a function or have interests 
in a competitor of RTBF.be (Art. 12 RTBF-Act). Also, a person cannot be a member 
of the board of directors of a local television station and at the same time hold the 
position of director or executive of other service providers, press companies or 
organisations with similar activities, if such other position may cause a conflict of 
interest with the local television station (Art. 72 FRBA). In Flanders, a director to 
VRT can not have a function or a mandate in another media company (Art. 12 
FLBA). A director to a Flemish Community-wide or regional radio broadcaster can 
not have a political mandate and can not be a director to a public broadcaster or 
another local or regional radio broadcaster (Art. 138 and 141 FLBA). Only one fifth 
of the directors of a Flemish regional television broadcaster may be a director or have 
a leading role in another media company, an advertisement company, VRT or a 
private broadcaster that targets the entire Flemish Community (Art. 172 FLBA). 
Finally, when the first commercial television and radio broadcasters appeared in 
Belgium, the Belgian authorities required that newspaper and magazine editors had to 
participate in the commercial broadcasters (amounting to 31% in RTL-TVI129 and to 
51% in VTM130), but these rules did not survive. These compulsory concentration 
rules were meant to secure the survival of the written press, by guaranteeing that 
advertisement revenues lost to the commercial radio and television broadcasting 
would in fact flow back to the written press.  
Specific rules exist regarding interaction between politicians and the media. In 
general terms, there is interaction rather than separation between the political world 
and the public radio and television broadcasters. This system can be described as a 
system of internal pluralism, whereby different political parties have a proportionate 
representation in the public broadcasters’ governing bodies. This system is tempered 
with legal safeguards regarding the content of the public broadcasters’ programming 
                                                 
128 See Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media, “Persberichten 2010”, available at:  
http://www.vlaamseregulatormedia.be/nl/documentatie.aspx (last visited on 2/10/2010). 
129 Decision of the Government of the French Community of 21 December 1987. 
130 See art. 8 Act of the Flemish Community of 28 January 1987. 
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(see below). In this sense, Belgium is a clear example of the “Democratic Corporatist” 
model described by Hallin and Mancini.131  
Public broadcasters are subject to a system where influence from politicians, at 
least on the level of their boards of directors, is institutionalised, although in a 
proportionate manner. The underlying rationale of this system is aimed at 
safeguarding a sufficient degree of internal pluralism within the public broadcasters. 
For example, in the French Community, the board of directors of the public 
broadcaster (RTBF.be) must be composed, in a proportionate manner, of 
representatives of the various recognised political groupings in the Parliament of the 
French Community.132 In the Flemish Community, the directors of the public 
broadcaster (VRT) are appointed by the Flemish government, in proportion to their 
representation in the Flemish Parliament.133 In the German-speaking Community, the 
board of directors of the public broadcaster (BRF) must be composed of 
representatives of the various political parties in the Parliament of the German-
speaking Community, in a proportionate manner.134 In all three Communities, the 
position of director at the public broadcaster is incompatible with several political 
mandates (e.g., in a government or in a parliament).135 
A special regime applies to regional and local broadcasters, which are also 
subject to influence from politicians, but where this influence is more limited (and 
also proportionate). For example, in the French Community, maximum half of the 
directors of a local television station may have a political mandate. Those directors 
that have a political mandate should represent in a proportionate manner the political 
parties in the councils of the municipalities located within the emission region of the 
local television (in Brussels-Capital: proportionate representation of the political 
parties in the Parliament of the French Community).136 In the Flemish Community, 
the boards of directors of regional television broadcasters must be composed in a 
proportionate way, and only 1/5th of their directors may have a political mandate (they 
should not have an executive mandate).137 Also, the general assembly of the Flemish 
regional television stations must be composed in a representative way as regards 
political, social, cultural, ideological and regional criteria.138 
 
3.2.3   Content regulation  
All Communities have issued specific and detailed legislation on content regulation, 
such as on cultural matters (e.g. in order to promote their own language) and on 
specific requirements for news programs (e.g. in order to ensure quality and 
impartiality of such programs). Other examples are rules regarding access to airtime 
for various philosophical or religious associations.139 Specific rules and quota exist on 
compulsory investments in content production. Although most of these rules are a 
                                                 
131 Hallin and Mancini, Comparing media systems, p. 166. 
132 Art. 11, § 1 RTBF-Act and Art. 19 Act of 16 July 1973 on the protection of ideological and 
philosophical convictions (hereafter “Culture Pact Act”). 
133 Art. 12, §1 FLBA and Art. 19 Culture Pact Act. 
134 Art. 8, § 1 BRF-Act and Art. 19 Culture Pact Act. 
135 Art. 12 RTBF-Act; Art. 12 § 2 FLBA; and Art. 9, § 2 BRF-Act. 
136 Art. 70 FRBA. 
137 Art. 172 FLBA. 
138 Art. 171 FLBA. 
139 E.g. Art. 7, § 3-4 RTBF-Act and art. 35-36 FLBA provide that various “representative associations” 
are entitled to broadcast on the radio and television channels of the public broadcasters. 
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mere translation into Belgian law of the European directives,140 some of them are 
specific to the Belgian case.141  
In general, programming and content of both private and public broadcasters 
should stay clear from political, philosophical and ideological influences. Also, some 
provisions specifically restrict politicians’ control over private, regional and local 
broadcasters. For example, the French Community’s FRBA stipulates that all “editors 
of broadcasting services” (both radio and television services) should be independent 
of government, political parties, employers’ organisations and labour associations.142 
Specifically for local television broadcasters, the FRBA stipulates that their 
programming should remain independent from governments, municipal and 
provincial authorities, political parties, employers’ and labour organisations, 
philosophical or religious movements, etc.143 RTBF.be, every editor of audiovisual 
services who uses a closed distribution platform and each local television broadcaster 
should recognise a committee of journalists which it should consult at various 
occasions e.g. for the organisation of the editorial staff for informative programmes, 
for the establishment of the internal rules relating to information processing, and in 
general for all decisions that fundamentally change the editorial line of the 
broadcaster.144 Similarly, in Flanders, all information programs must respect a spirit 
of political and ideological impartiality.145 Also, all editors of private television 
services, all regional television broadcasters and all linear radio broadcasters in 
Flanders must be independent from political parties.146 Directors of Community-wide 
and regional radio broadcasters must not have a political mandate.147 For all its 
informative programs, the Flemish public broadcaster (VRT) must respect a 
deontological code and an editorial statute that safeguards the independency of the 
editorial staff.148  Flemish private and regional television broadcasters that broadcast 
news bulletins and other informative programmes should also have their own editorial 
staff and an editorial statute that safeguards the independency of their editorial staff 
(although it is unclear to what extent the obligation to have an editorial statute is 
complied with).149  
Newspapers and magazines do not have such legal obligations to have an 
editorial statute. However, a tradition exists of foundations within newspapers that 
take care of the editorial principles and the values of the newspapers. The statutes of 
these foundations mostly contain specific safeguards with regard to the editorial 
staff’s independence (e.g. in case of take-overs or in case a chief editor is appointed or 
dismissed). It is also worth noting that there is a recent initiative of the Flemish 
government to make press subsidies dependent on the presence of an editorial statute 
or on other factors ensuring the independence of the editorial staff. Also, some 
                                                 
140 Belgium was one of the first countries to implement the AVMS Directive into national law. 
141 E.g. French-language television broadcasters should reserve 20% of their airtime (excl. airtime for 
informative programs, sport events, etc.) for audiovisual works whose original version was made in the 
French language (Art. 42, 2° FRBA), and should ensure that the majority of their programs (except for 
music programmes) are offered in the French language (Art. 42, 3° FRBA). 
142 Art. 35, § 1, 5° FRBA. 
143 art. 66, § 1, 10° FRBA. 
144 Art. 19bis RTBF-Act and art. 35 and 66 FRBA. 
145 Art. 39 FLBA. 
146 Art. 163, 3°, 174, 2°, 169, 4° and 130 FLBA. 
147 Art. 138 and 141 FLBA. 
148 Art. 29, §1 FLBA. 
149 Art. 164 and 169, 9° FLBA. 
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newspapers have recently taken other initiatives to improve their accountability 
towards their readers’ public (e.g. the Flemish newspaper De Standaard recently 
appointed an independent ombudsman).  
All of the Communities have issued specific and detailed legislation on 
advertising (e.g. rules regarding advertisement in children’s programs, prohibition of 
advertising or sponsoring in news and other informative programs, prohibition for 
news journalists to mislead the public by promoting a product or service in an 
advertising spot, prohibition for sponsors to influence editorial content, prohibition to 
limit advertising to certain groups, product or services, etc.).  
The Act of 23 June 1961 on the Right of Reply grants a broad right of reply to 
any individual or corporation named or implicitly referred to in a newspaper or a 
magazine, and a more limited right of reply to any individual or corporation named or 
implicitly referred to in an audiovisual broadcasting (i.e., radio or television). In the 
case of audiovisual broadcasts,150 the claimant must prove a personal interest in the 
reply and the right of reply consists only in the right to rectify incorrect facts relating 
to the claimant and to reply to facts or declarations that touch the honour of the 
claimant. The right of reply should always be free of charge and refusal of the right of 
reply may lead to penal sanctions. The Act on the right of reply of 1961 does not 
apply to electronic versions of newspapers.151 Several legislative proposals aimed at 
applying similar rules to electronic media have failed so far, but self-regulation exists 
in this field.  
The Act of 7 April 2005 on the Protection of Journalistic Sources protects 
journalists from investigative measures (such as the interception of communication, 
surveillance and judicial home search and seizure) if this could breach the secrecy of 
their sources. Following a decision of the Belgian Constitutional Court of 7 June 
2006, this protection of journalistic sources covers everybody who exercises an 
informative activity whether or not they are professional journalists (for instance, the 
protection includes bloggers).152  
The Belgian Ethical Code for Journalists of 1982 is the most important code of 
conduct for journalists. This code has been approved by the main journalists’ 
organisation AGJPB/AVBB and by some of the main publishers’ organisations.153 
Another important code is the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Journalists, 
approved at a meeting of the Journalists' Unions of the (then) six countries of the 
European Community in Munich in 1971. The 1990s saw a surge of complaints about 
journalists’ compliance with ethical principles, but more recently, monitoring by CDJ 
and RVDJ (see above) seem to have led to a more positive evolution.154 In September 
2010, RVDJ published a new code for journalistic ethics, which is based on previous 
                                                 
150 For Flanders, the right of reply for audiovisual broadcasts is also covered by Art. 103-112 FLBA. 
151 P.-F. Docquir, “Le droit de réponse 2.0 ou la tentation d’un droit subjectif d’accès à la tribune 
médiatique” in Les propos qui heurtent, choquent ou inquiètent, Revue de la Faculté de Droit, 
Université Libre de Bruxelles (2008) 303. 
152 For more information see e.g. D. Voorhoof, Het journalistiek bronnengeheim onthuld (2008), and J. 
Englebert, “Le statut de la presse: du droit de la presse au droit de l’information”, 35 Revue de la 
Faculté de Droit de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles (Les propos qui heurtent, choquent ou inquiètent) 
(2007), 231. 
153 For an English version of this code See EthicNet, “Code of journalistic principles, Belgium”, 
available at: http://ethicnet.uta.fi/belgium/code_of_journalistic_principles (last visited on 22/10/2010). 
154 De Bens and Raeymaeckers, De pers in België, pp. 230-232. 
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texts, but takes into account recent developments such as the digitalisation of the 
media and the increasing use of images in news coverage.  
Finally, although search-engines play an increasingly important role as 
“gateways” to information, the Belgian legislators have not taken any major initiatives 
to regulate search-engines. However, in 2007, the Court of First Instance of Brussels 
rendered an important judicial decision whereby Google was condemned for violating 
Belgian copyright law by publishing links to and abstracts of articles from Belgian 
newspapers on its Google News site and through its catch function, without the 
permission of the newspaper publishers.155 The Court ruled that Google had to pay a 
sum of 25,000 Euros for each day it continued to display content from the 
plaintiff’s156 publications in violation of copyright. This is an important decision in so 
far that it limits search engines’ possibilities to use and display content that is 
protected by copyright. An appeal against this decision is still pending.  
 
4. Assessment of Belgian media policy and democratic politics  
The most obvious conclusion from the overview provided in this report is that 
Belgium has two major different media landscapes (French-language and Dutch-
language media). This separation is partly due to differences in language and culture 
between the two Communities and partly to a division on the policy and regulation 
level where the two Communities have their own policies, rules and institutions. This 
separation of the media presents the country with various challenges. It is first of all 
uncertain whether a good understanding and cooperation between the various 
Communities is possible in the absence of a shared public sphere in Belgium. A 
second challenge posed by Belgium’s linguistic separation of the media concerns the 
scattering of legal and regulatory competences among different levels of government, 
which need to cooperate on some specific issues (such as the convergence of 
telecommunication and media regulations).  
All in all, it is correct to say that there is an adequate level of uniformity in 
Belgium’s media policy. This is partly due to the shared common heritage from pre-
federalisation times and the fact that Communities’ regulations are based on European 
directives and are largely influenced by the interpretations of the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice. Also, on an institutional level, the 
regulators established by the Communities are almost mirror-like. When it is 
necessary, these regulators work together with the federal institutions. At the same 
time, the Communities have a broad autonomy as concerns media policy (e.g. radio, 
television, cable, subsidies to the written press, etc.) and different legal texts apply in 
each Community. As such, Belgium’s media policy has a mixed character – uniform 
and separate at the same time – and it is expected that, though the core of its 
regulations will remain commonly shared, differences will probably increase.  
The Belgian authorities have, in principle, granted quite a lot of freedom to the 
media. As such, the freedom of the press has always been protected under the 
Constitution and the written press has never been under direct state control. Also, the 
authorities opted to stay out of the field of journalists’ ethics and have encouraged 
self-regulation rather than government regulation. However, with the arrival of radio 
                                                 
155 Court of First Instance of Brussels, Google, Inc. vs. SCRL Copiepresse, 13 February 2007. 
156 The plaintiff was Copiepresse, an association managing the copyrights of the main French-language 
Belgian newspapers. 
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and television, a radically different path was chosen whereby these new media were 
brought under direct state control. Over the last decades, radio and television 
monopolies have been abolished and political influences in the public broadcasters 
have decreased significantly. Nevertheless, one can say that the Belgian authorities 
have been quite reluctant in opening the markets for radio and television broadcasting, 
and that a certain degree of pressure from the European level was needed to open the 
market. Ironically, with the arrival of the Internet, the most recent forms of new media 
seem to escape any form of control by the authorities.  
The freedom granted to the media in Belgium goes together with a moderate 
“laissez faire” policy on behalf of its authorities. As such, the Belgian authorities are 
not very keen to develop ground-breaking media policies and prefer to leave room for 
self-regulatory initiatives from the media sector (in some cases, authorities intervene 
to encourage or fund self-regulation initiatives). Also, many regulations on the media 
were in fact instigated by the media sector, and one can say that Belgium’s policy 
makers have an open attitude towards demands - and pressure - from the media sector 
(e.g. as regards subsidies to the press). At the same time, at certain occasions, 
Belgium has taken legal and regulatory initiatives that were innovative (e.g. the 
Flemish regulations on the use of a ‘PP’ symbol for product placement), and, at 
several instances, Belgium has adopted European directives more stringently than 
strictly required by European law (e.g. as concerns rules on advertisement).  
The major principles on the freedom and independence of the media are well 
enshrined in Belgium’s constitution and its main legislation. However, some 
evolutions in the case law of the Belgian courts have limited the scope of these 
principles. For instance, according to the case law of the Court of Cassation, the 
constitutionally protected freedom of the press applies only to the written press and 
the constitutional prohibition of censorship applies only to prior censorship. Also, 
based upon unilateral requests in libel and defamation cases, some of the lower courts 
ordered magazines to be taken out of circulation and television programs to be 
prohibited from broadcasting. In specific circumstances, the European Court of 
Human Rights has judged that this Belgian case law does not violate freedom of 
expression. It is generally expected that Belgium will in the near future extend its 
constitutional freedom of the press to other forms of media, such as radio, television 
and the Internet through a revision of article 25 of its Constitution. In the meantime, 
the above cited evolution in Belgian case law does not prevent the country from 
scoring well in international rankings on media freedom. 
There are many different newspapers, magazines, television channels, radio 
channels and Internet media available to the Belgian public, but ownership of these 
different media is highly concentrated in the hands of just a few media groups. 
However, no single media group dominates the entire media market. In recent times, 
concentration seems to have increased, with existing media players becoming active 
in other media domains (cross-media concentration). On the other hand, it seems that 
new types of media (such as digital television, video-on-demand, different types of 
media-on-line, etc) are to a certain degree bringing more diversity in the existing 
media landscape. All in all, the national market for classical types of media outlets 
seems to be saturated and to leave little room for new titles or even for further 
consolidation. This is especially the case for the written press. It is expected that the 
Belgian media groups will continue to increase their presence in other media outlets, 
and probably will continue to develop towards further integration at the international 
level, or that international players will increase their presence in Belgium.  
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Belgium’s authorities have not taken many significant measures against this 
increasing concentration in the media sector. No specific anti-trust legislation has 
been adopted for the media, and although general anti-trust rules apply, no media-
specific legislation safeguards an adequate degree of diversity in media outlets (i.e., 
external pluralism). In the past, the Belgian authorities have taken some attempts to 
support the survival of certain media outlets, for instance by granting direct and 
indirect subsidies to the written press or by forcing the first commercial television 
broadcasters to admit newspaper and magazine editors amid their shareholders in 
order to grant these a part of the television advertisement income. However, direct 
subsidies have largely disappeared since, and neither did the compulsory cross-
concentration rules between the written press and the commercial broadcasters 
survive. All in all, these attempts to support external pluralism in the media show not 
only that policy makers are convinced of the importance of the media for our 
democratic system, but also that the measures that have been taken were in fact not 
very effective. Internal media pluralism (i.e., diversity of content within the media) is 
more effectively protected by Belgian legislation (see rules for content regulation 
above), albeit that these rules are mainly focussed on radio and television 
broadcasting and not on other forms of media.  
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The case of Bulgaria 
Ruzha Smilova, Daniel Smilov, Georgi Ganev 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last twenty years, Bulgaria has gone through a series of radical reforms of its 
public institutions and regulatory framework. The transition from a communist 
society towards liberal democracy, market economy, and EU membership, had a 
profound impact on the media environment of the country. Following the fall of the 
communist regime in November 1989, the Bulgarian media, comprising the state-
owned press, radio and television underwent rapid transformation in terms of 
ownership and organisation, initially in the print press and radio broadcasting, and at 
the end of the 1990s in the television as well. The combined processes of 
democratisation and economic liberalisation generally created conditions for reducing 
state intervention in the media and for enhancing its diversity and independence.  
At the start, the public radio and television were released from the 
comprehensive direct control of the Communist party and its state apparatus – they 
were “de-ideologised” and “de-politicised”. They nevertheless remained under the 
indirect control of the state. Even today, state bodies (still) appoint the members of an 
independent Council on Electronic Media-CEM (prior to 1998 called National 
Council for the Radio and Television), which selects the directors of the public 
electronic media. Since the majority of the members of this Council are nominated 
with the support of the parliamentary majority (though nominally these members - 
and the whole body - are to be politically neutral media experts), CEM has been 
criticised as an indirect channel for exercising political control in the public electronic 
media. This political control over the electronic media has been enhanced by the fact 
that the state finances the public radio and television channels through a direct state 
subsidy, and has limited the flow of commercial money into them. Thus, it becomes 
clear that following the democratic transition, state intervention in the media has 
declined, yet, it is far from eliminated.  
The post-communist state legally removed the monopoly of the state 
electronic media already in 1991,157 and the pro-reform government of the Union of 
Democratic Forces in October 1992 gave the first private licence for broadcasting in 
the capital Sofia (Radio FM+). In 1993 the first private radio started operating outside 
the capital. By mid-1997, there were more than 150 private radio stations (though 
only 50 of them had valid licences). The private TV cable channels proliferated with a 
similar intensity. The first cable networks were developed in 1992/1993, and by mid-
1997 there were more than 400 cable TV operators. The regulation and the process of 
licences lagged considerably behind: here as well less than ¼ of the operators had the 
required licence.  
While the end of censorship made the press more diverse and independent, its 
diversity and independence were qualified by the fact that many newspapers 
(especially during the first years of the transition) served as the mouthpiece of 
particular political parties. The media, in general, took an active part in the framing of 
the Bulgarian political spectrum in the early 1990s: they were both shaped by and 
                                                 
157 Postanovlenie [Executive Order] № 114 of the Council of Ministers from 1991, State Gazette № 
51/1991. This state act authorised the Committee on the Postal and Communications Services to issue 
licences for radio broadcasting and for use of the state cable system. 
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shaping the political forces in the country. This peculiar interaction created numerous 
constitutional and political controversies around the issue of media independence 
from governmental intervention. The focus has, however, been on the public 
electronic media. 
The end of the 1990s marked a new era of developments in Bulgarian politics. 
The processes of privatisation and restitution of property158 had been finalised, the 
print media were exclusively private, while there were major private TV channels, 
and cable networks covering the country. The possibilities for direct political control 
in such an environment decreased, or, as it will be argued below, changed their focus. 
These developments coincided with profound changes in the political landscape in the 
country: the parties of the first ten years of the transition – the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party (BSP) and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) – started to lose ground to 
ever new political players, who relied massively on media exposure for party-building 
purposes. These developments created a new dynamic, which we will address in more 
detail in the final section of the report.  
The report starts with an overview of the Bulgarian media landscape. Then it 
explores the normative framework, the regulatory bodies and the constitutional 
debates on media independence in the country. The goal is to place Bulgarian media 
policy in a political and social context and assess its relevance for democratic politics. 
 
2. The media landscape in Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian press market is characterised by a high number of dailies per capita and 
low newspaper circulation. Despite the decline in circulation figures in the last years, 
Bulgaria still has a large number of newspapers, totalling 436 in 2009 with an overall 
circulation of 355 million copies. The peak in the number of newspapers and 
circulation was 2000, with around 550 newspapers and circulation over 450 million. 
The lowest point was in 2003, when the titles dropped below 400 with a total 
circulation of 300 million.  In 2009 there were 67 dailies (3 less than in 2008), with a 
decreased circulation by 6.6% compared to 2008. The number of weeklies was 183 
(around 10 less than in the previous year) and that of magazines 603. Around ½ of the 
newspapers are published in the capital Sofia, which enjoys 88% of the total 
circulation of newspapers in the country.159 The tabloids “Weekend” and “Treta 
Vuzrast” currently have the highest circulation figures among the weekly editions.  
With the exception of a few local newspapers and the official State Gazette, all 
print media in Bulgaria are privately owned, including foreign ownership. The two 
highest circulation dailies were until recently owned by the German group 
Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (WAZ). Currently, a new player entered the print 
media market, the New Bulgarian Media Group, whose hold on the media market as a 
whole is growing. Even the biggest, in terms of circulation, dailies and weeklies do 
not enjoy vary large market shares and cannot exercise significant influence by 
                                                 
158 The process of restitution of property to its pre-socialist-era owners/their inheritors started in 1991 
with the restitution of agricultural land, and continued from the mid-90s with the restitution of urban 
property. The restitution was a long and controversial process, which took more than a decade to 
complete. 
159 National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, “Development of book publishing and press in the 
Republic of Bulgaria in 2009”, available at: 
http://www.nsi.bg/publikacia.php?n=239&r=%7C3%7C&P=65&SP=113&PSP=3 (last visited on 
22/10/2010). 
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themselves on public opinion. The level of rivalry and competition among different 
titles is relatively high, which guarantees that readers have a broad selection of 
information sources and points of view.  
Free newspapers entered the print press market in 2008.160 They were 
generally met with hostility by the traditional press – as potential killers of the 
circulation of the print press, and as “truth killers” because of their perceived inferior 
journalistic quality.        
The revenues from advertising in the print media in the country have also 
declined at a fast speed. Thus in 2009 these amounted to 163.8 million levs, which 
according to official data is 9% less than in 2008.161 Many newspapers are sustained 
through funds from other economic activities of their owners. According to analyses, 
published in rival print media outlets, the aim of the publishers of such unprofitable 
titles is to keep the channels open for influencing public opinion, and in this way to 
exercise political pressure for the benefit of their other business interests.162  
There are no direct or indirect state subsidies for the Bulgarian print media: 
there are no reductions in value added tax, no preferential rates for 
telecommunications services and no lower social security contributions for the sector. 
This renders the sustainability of the smaller circulation newspapers under constant 
threat. So is media pluralism in the country. State advertising163 and the state subsidy 
for the political parties164 are the only source of indirect state finance for Bulgarian 
media.165 State advertising is subject to the general procurement requirements, yet to 
                                                 
160 In September 2008 the first free daily “19 minutes” started with 100,000 circulation. It was followed 
by “Gradski vestnik” published by the influential Economedia group (publisher of the most serious 
daily in the country “Dnevnik” and the most influential weekly – “Capital”). “Gradski vestnik” had 
100,000 circulation (yet was read by some 230,000) and was of good journalistic quality. Because of 
financial difficulties Economedia group stopped publishing it in March 2009, waiting for better times.   
“Anons” weekly and “Novinite dnes” are among the other titles of free newspapers in the country. See 
S. Tzankova, “Безплатните вестници – заплаха или стимул за вестникарския пазар в България?” 
[“Free newspapers: A threat or a stimulus for the print media market in Bulgaria”], in Медии и 
публична комуникация [Media and public communication], no. 4/2010, available at: http://media-
journal.info/?p=item&aid=80 (last visited on 22/10/2010).  
161 Unofficially, the drop in advertisement revenues is much bigger - between 35% and 50%, if the 
enormous discounts (which are a commercial secret) - usually between 25% and 50% - are taken into 
account. 
162 These publications were part of the media war in 2009/2010 between Economedia group and the 
New Bulgarian Media group. The most representative of these publoications is “Петата власт: Цветан 
Василев и Делян Пеевски превърнаха търговията с влияние в норма за медиите” [The Fifth 
Power: Tzvetan Vassilev and Delyan Peevski turned trading with influence into a norm for the media], 
Capital weekly, 16/10/2010. 
163 State advertising increased dramatically in the last couple of years because of the structural funds of 
the EU, in which there are strict requirements for publicity of the EU-funded projects. Thus with each 
EU funded project goes a “communications” budget. Additionally, most state institutions also run their 
communications campaigns, yet because of non-transparent procedures and inadequate requirements, 
these bids are often taken by smaller players in the field of the PR and advertisement markets, arguably 
connected to the governing parties. See “Най-големият и вреден клиент” [The biggest and most 
damaging client], Pari daily, 21/09/2010.  
164 According to the Law on Political Parties (State Gazette № 28/1.04.2005), the political parties and 
coalitions with elected MPs in the last elections receive state subsidy, amounting to 5% of the minimal 
salary for the country per vote received (Articles 25 and  27 of the Law on Political Parties).  
165 Some analysts claim that the print media commercials market especially regarding the dailies did 
not collapse to the levels expected for the crisis-stricken 2009 primarily because of the huge amounts 
of state subsidy money spent by the political parties during the EP and general elections campaigns in 
this year. See “Затегнете коланите” [Fasten the belts], Capital weekly, 19/02/2010.  For example, only 
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this point spending has rarely been run under transparent and competitive procedures. 
This has provided certain market players that are connected to the government with a 
significant advantage.   
Since the de-monopolisation of the electronic media sector in Bulgaria in 
1991, commercial broadcasting co-exists with the public radio and television 
channels. There are currently 2 public national TV channels: BNT1 and the world-
wide satellite channel TV Bulgaria. Starting from 2000, there are also private 
commercial TV channels that are broadcasted terrestrially nation-wide: BTV, 
NovaTV and Pro.BG (BTV being the first to receive a licence). The public Bulgarian 
national television has also 4 regional channels in Varna, Rousse, Plovdiv and 
Blagoevgrad. In 2006 the cable and satellite TV programmes amounted to 196. 42 
towns had local TV operators and private TV channels.  
In 2009, implementing changes in the licensing and registration requirements 
envisaged in a 2008 amendment to the Law on Radio and Television, CEM, the 
electronic media regulatory body, re-registered a number of radio and television 
programmes. As of December 2009, CEM registers indicate that there are 136 
television programmes (11 using air broadcast and 125 cable and satellite). In 
addition, Bulgarian citizens have access through air, cable and satellite to numerous 
foreign programmes.166 Despite the large number of registered programmes, however, 
the national market for both radio and television is relatively concentrated in the 
programmes with national air broadcasting licence. However, in recent years data on 
advertising revenues indicate that these national media are facing increasing 
competition from electronic media broadcast through cable or satellite, or on a local 
basis. In this respect, a major stumbling block for free competition is the sizeable 
annual government subsidy for the state-owned radio and television, which strongly 
enhances their competitive position in terms of attracting advertisers relative to other 
electronic media. 
Concerning radio broadcasting, in 2006 there were 143 licensed radio 
programmes. Three of them had national coverage: the two public radio programmes 
Horizont and Hristo Botev of the public radio operator Bulgarian National Radio 
(BNR) and the private Darik radio. In 42 of the 240 towns in the country there are 
local radio programmes, and in 9 towns with a population above 100,000 there are 
115 local radio programmes. There is considerable concentration of radio 
broadcasting in the bigger towns and hyper-concentration in the capital Sofia. There 
are also 18 radio networks which broadcast in the major towns. As of December 2009, 
CEM registers indicate that there are 311 radio programmes (288 using air broadcast 
and 23 cable and satellite).  
The national commercial terrestrial TV programmes have a polythematic 
profile, yet most of the private radio programmes and the cable TV channels are 
entertainment-oriented.  
                                                                                                                                            
the Blue coalition (a coalition of right-wing parties with an electoral support of around 7%) has spent 
1,300,000 million levs for political advertisements in the media, while the Socialist party – 230,000 
levs just for ads in the print media alone. See: “Партиите харчили до дупка за изборите” [The parties 
were spending as if it is the end of the world during the last elections], mediapool.bg, 14/08/2009.  
166 Data from the Council for Electronic Media (CEM), “The public register of media service”, 
available at: http://cem.bg/public_reg.php?action=1 (last visited on 22/10/2010). 
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The public electronic media - Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) and Bulgarian 
National Television (BNT) - are at present separate legal entities.167 They receive 
significant state subsidy, yet have funding from advertising as well. BNT and BNR 
have distinct Boards of Directors and General Directors, appointed by CEM. The 
political control over the public electronic media is a feature of the Bulgarian post-
communist mediascape; from 1989 to 1993 with each new government a change in 
their governance ensued and journalists were fired for criticising the government. To 
this date each new government introduces changes in the electronic media law and/or 
in CEM, in order to have tighter control over the public electronic media in the 
country. In this report we will discuss multiple examples of political interference with 
the regulation of the media, which brought uncertainty in the electronic media market 
and stalled reform.  
 Bulgaria, as an EU member state, has to switch from analogue to digital 
broadcasting by the end of 2012. The legal framework for the switchover was finally 
adopted in 2009 after a series of political scandals involving the major partners in the 
then governing coalition, who allegedly tried to push through a legislation favourable 
to their friendly business circles.  The unprincipled, ad hoc provisions in the Law on 
Digital Communications, aimed at eliminating some of the competitors for national 
digital operators, prompted the Bulgarian Constitutional Court (BCC) to intervene and 
invalidate the most outrageously unjust ones. Currently, the European Commission 
(EC) is checking the compatibility of the Bulgarian legal framework for the 
switchover with EU legislation, as well as the practice of hurriedly issuing temporary 
licences for TV programmes, which guarantee them advantages after the digital 
switchover in 2012. If the legal framework or the licensing policies are found 
wanting, this will most likely make it impossible for the country to meet the 2012 
deadline.  
The importance of internet168 has grown in the domestic media market. Most 
print media outlets provide some or all of their content on the internet free of charge 
and many also offer breaking news in a timelier manner. Even the popular “Trud” 
daily and the “24 Chasa” daily that resisted this drive and kept a limited online 
profile, went online in March 2009, offering most of their print content for free. While 
the sales figures of national newspapers have been declining (though at a lower rate, 
as shown above), web traffic reports reveal that their online versions are becoming 
extremely popular among Bulgarian internet users.169  
                                                 
167 In the crisis-stricken 2010 the cabinet and the parliamentary majority are seriously considering 
merging the two legal entities: this could be one of the changes in the currently widely discussed 
entirely new Law on the Media.  
168 There are different data on the internet penetration among the Bulgarian population. Thus Internet 
World Stats in 2010 give 47.5% penetration (compared to Romania (35.5%), Cyprus (39.3%) and 
Greece (46.2%), a level which still leaves the country well behind the average 67.6% for the EU 
countries. Source: Internet World Stats, “Internet usage in Europe”, available at: 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm (last visited on 22/10/2010). However, the data for 2009 
from Eurostat show that just 30% of the households in the country have internet access. See Eurostat, 
Internet usage in 2009 – Households and Individuals, available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-QA-09-046/EN/KS-QA-09-046-EN.PDF 
(last visited on 22/10/2010).  
169 See the website of the people-metric company Gemius, available at: http://www.audience.bg (last 
visited on 20/10/2010) for ratings according to different criteria (reach, real visitors and share) of the 
most popular web-sites in the country.  
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The major national newspapers’ websites are mainly built upon their print 
versions and offer relatively low levels of interactivity to their users, yet they are very 
popular.170 There are notable exceptions to this trend, however. The content on the 
websites of the elitist “Capital” weekly and “Dnevnik” daily (issued by the 
Economedia group) is much richer than the print-versions of the same titles, and offer 
enormous possibilities for interactive exchange with the public. They contain special 
sections for blogs and many interactive online games with diverse content – from 
political to entertainment. The popularity of their electronic versions far outgrows that 
of their print counterparts.171 There are also many news portals that do not have a 
print counterpart.172 Additionally, all major national private television channels and 
radio programmes as well as the public radio and TV programmes offer free 
audiovisual and text news services on their websites. It is indicative that the website 
of the major private TV programme BTV is the 3rd most popular website in the 
country, with some 706,466 visitors in August 2010. The website of the major 
national private radio programme Darik Radio ranked 13 with 414,485 visitors.173    
The importance of social media services is also growing.174 Facebook is by far 
the most popular e-service in 2010 and is gaining popularity at a fast speed.  There are 
no reliable data on the blog users in the country.175 In the beginning of 2009 the 
registered blogs were over 35,000. 
The internet space in the country is relatively free of interference, but there are 
proposals on the part of the Ministry of the Interior to significantly increase the access 
of police and investigators to servers and data without court permission. All such 
proposals have been blocked in Parliament so far. 
The Bulgarian media landscape is further characterised by a plethora of 
private news agencies alongside the public Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA), 
which receives a state subsidy for its operation, yet is mainly financed through 
subscription fees for its services. It is an independent176 news agency, whose 
subscription services are used by all major newspapers and the electronic media in the 
country. It is also the most authoritative news voice of the country abroad. Yet the 
                                                 
170 The web-sites of 24 chasa daily and of Trud daily are ranked 17th and 20th in the country in terms of 
e-visitors for August 2010, respectively.   
171 Www.dnevnik.bg is the 12th most popular site in Bulgaria for August 2010 (with 438,951 visitors), 
and Capital.bg - the 35th (with 180, 387). Ibid. 
172 The major ones – Information Agency Focus, available at: www.focus-news.net, and mediapool.bg, 
available at: www.mediapool.bg, are among the important private news agencies. Interestingly, the 
most popular among the news portals are not the ones belonging to the prominent publishing groups. 
173 Ibid. 
174 According to publications in the media, over 1 mln Bulgarians used Facebook in the beginning of 
2010, which is 10 times more than just a year before. 1/3 of all internet users in the country are 
registered in this social media service alone (and more than 80% of these are aged 18-40). See: “Nad 1 
milion Bulgari polzvat Facebook” [Over 1 million Bulgarians use facebbok], BNR Radio Bulgaria, 
07/05/2010.  According to another source, Facebook users in the country (by mid-June 2010) are 
already 1,5 mln ( 1,458,640). This shows that the growth rate is still high - 50% in less than half year.  
The penetration by mid- June of this social media service is 20%, which is over 1/3 of all internet users 
in the country. See “Чакам те във Facebook” [Waiting for you at facebook], Capital, 18/06/2010, 
available at: 
http://www.capital.bg/biznes/tehnologii_i_nauka/2010/06/18/919427_chakam_te_vuv_facebook/ (last 
visited on 20/10/2010).  
175 The political blogosphere in the country is analyzed by the media monitoring laboratory of the 
Media Democracy foundation. The monthly analyses for the electoral 2009 can be found at the 
foundation’s website, available at: http://www.fmd.bg/?cat=7 (last visited on 20/10/2010).   
176 The General Director of BTA is appointed by the Bulgarian Parliament. 
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national and regional print and electronic media use the services of many more news 
agencies – national177 and regional178 ones. 
The role of professional organisations and NGO activity in the development of 
the Bulgarian media is important. Among Bulgaria’s most important journalistic 
associations are the Media Coalition and the Free Speech Civil Forum Association. 
Another, the Journalists Union, is a holdover from the Communist era currently 
attempting to reform its image. More than half of the journalists in Bulgaria are 
women. The publishers of the biggest newspapers are united in their own 
organisations, such as the Union of Newspaper Publishers. Of the few NGOs that 
work on media issues, the most important is the Media Development Center, which 
provides journalists with training and legal advice. 
The Bulgarian media code of ethics, drafted within the framework of the 
PHARE project “Technical Support for Improving the Professional Standards of 
Bulgarian Journalism” was signed in 2004179 and is a major step towards media self-
regulation. It includes standards for the use of information by unidentified sources, 
preliminary nondisclosure of a source’s identity, respect of personal information, and 
non-publication of children’s personal pictures. Two media ethics bodies (one for the 
print and one for the electronic media) have established themselves as respected self-
regulatory mechanisms. The major functions of the two commissions include 
promoting adherence to the code, resolving arguments between media outlets and 
audiences, and encouraging public debate on journalistic ethics.  
The Bulgarian media space has been covered by foreign observers, such as the 
International Research & Exchanges Board, which publishes the Media Sustainability 
Index. The main conclusion of the 2009 report on Bulgaria180 was that developments 
in Bulgaria with respect to each of the five objectives, measured by the Index,181 
indicate approaching the levels of “actual and irrevocable” sustainability, though this 
stage has not been reached yet. “Reporters without Borders”182 also reports a rather 
uneven path with relatively sharp improvements and deteriorations in the last 5 years 
in terms of media independence,183 but a constant downward trend relative to other 
countries. However, in 2009, in contrast to the previous two years, there have been no 
major reported cases of violence or undue procedures against journalists. 
The media in Bulgaria is among the most trusted societal institutions, with 
some 76% of the population declaring in 2008 that they rather trust the media.184 Yet 
                                                 
177 The biggest players are  БГНЕС, Focus, Dnes+, Bulgarian news network etc.  
178 Sofia News Agency, Globus News, Kurdjali info, etc.  
179 The first signatories were the Union of Bulgarian Journalists, the Association of Bulgarian TV and 
Radio Operators, the Bulgarian Media Coalition, The Union of Print Media Publishers in Bulgaria and 
the Bulgarian Association of Regional Media. Most of the organisations in the field of the media in the 
country are signatories to this Code, with the notable exception of the New Bulgarian Media Group. 
180 See International Research and Exchanges Board, “Media sustainability index 2009”, available at: 
http://www.irex.org/programmes/MSI_EUR/2009/bulgria.asp (last visited on 20/10/2010).  
181 These objectives are: free speech, professional journalism, plurality of new sources, business 
management and supporting institutions.  
182 For their ranking, see Reporters Without Borders, “Press freedom index 2009”, available at: 
http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1001 (last visited on 20/10/2010).  
183 The fluctuations have been significantly larger than the observable trend, which makes it difficult to 
draw definitive inferences. 
184 The data are from a representative survey of the sociological agency Alpha Research, conducted in 
April 2008, quoted in “Медиите функционират при сравнително благоприятен обществен климат- 
76% им вярват, но не безусловно. Доверието в четвъртата власт” [The media work in a relatively 
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recently the credibility of the journalistic profession and of the so-called “fourth 
power” in the country has been undermined.185 The main problems are the lack of 
transparency in the ownership of the print media and its concentration in the hands of 
political party affiliates, who allegedly pressure their journalists to publish materials 
that damage the interests of their political and/or business adversaries. Generally, the 
pressure over the journalists has been growing, especially during the last two years of 
the economic crisis, which saw the shrinking of circulation and the closing down of 
many jobs in the sector. Judging from the large numbers of media outlets and from the 
absence of any licensing restrictions for practising journalism one could infer that the 
number of journalists in Bulgaria is considerable, yet no official data on this are 
available. The major trade unions in the sector (the Union of Bulgarian Journalists and 
the Union of the Journalists in Bulgaria) do not disclose information on their 
membership, and in any case many of the journalists do not hold any such 
membership.  
Despite the 20-year history of relatively free media in the country, the level of 
media literacy in Bulgaria is low: it is the second lowest in the EU (together with 4 
other EU member states that fall below the 70 points threshold of basic media 
literacy), according to a 2009 study commissioned by the EC.186 There are a couple of 
actors in the field of promoting media literacy in the country, funded by the EU: the 
Bulgarian branch of the organisation Safenet, some NGOs specialising in this field, as 
well as a public council on safe internet. However, their activities are campaign-
oriented and almost invisible.   
 
3. Media policy in Bulgaria 
Since its liberalisation in the early 90s, the media market in Bulgaria has gone through 
a series of legislative regulatory efforts. It should be mentioned that the early post-
communist governments in the country were weary of imposing too strict and detailed 
regulations, especially with regard to the print media and radio broadcasting. The 
general understanding was that the democratisation process needed free media, which 
was interpreted as “less regulated’ media.  
 
3.1 The media regulatory framework 
3.1.1 Constitutional provisions 
The processes of media liberalisation started immediately after the break-down of the 
communist regime in the country on November 10, 1989. On November Article 271 
                                                                                                                                            
beneficial atmosphere – 76% have trust in them, yet not unconditionally. Trust in the fourth power], 
Capital weekly, 30/04/2008, available at: 
http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/redakcionni_komentari/2008/04/30/491626_doverieto_v_c
hetvurtata_vlast/ (last visited on 20/10/2010). 
185 A publication in the Capital weekly is indicative of the mood in society against the media, blaming 
it for its dependency on the economic and political interests of the media private owners. See 
“Предателството на медиите” [The treason of the media], Capital weekly, 9/10/2009, available at: 
http://www.capital.bg/biznes/media_i_reklama/2009/10/09/797531_predatelstvoto_na_mediite/ (last 
visited on 20/10/2010). 
186 European Commission, Directorate General Information Society and Media, “Study on assessment 
criteria for media literacy levels”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/media/literacy/docs/studies/eavi_study_assess_crit_media_lit_levels_europe
_finrep.pdf (last visited on 20/10/2010). 
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of the socialist Penal Code, which prohibited any critique against the socialist regime, 
was abolished. A month later Article 1 of the socialist Constitution, which guaranteed 
the leading role of the Communist party in the country was also repealed. Independent 
newspapers – both commercial and affiliated with the newly established political 
parties - were appearing overnight and were spreading their influence, to reach 
unimaginable for non-sponsored by the state apparatus circulations of 300,000-
350,000 copies. Such was the circulation in 1992/1993 of the most popular at the time 
“24 hours” daily.  The legal framework for the free press was provided by the newly 
adopted in 1991 Constitution.  
The most relevant articles in the Constitution are Articles 39, 40 and 41. 
Article 39 guarantees to everyone the freedom to express and publicise her opinion, 
which right, however, may not be used against the rights or to the detriment of others, 
nor for challenging the constitutional order, for encouraging violence or perpetrating 
crime.  Article 40 guarantees freedom from censorship to all media. A confiscation or 
an injunction on any media is allowed only following judicial decision in cases of 
violations of public decency, challenges to the constitutional order, incitement of 
enmity or violence, and perpetration of crimes.  Article 41 stipulates that everyone is 
entitled to seek, obtain and disseminate information, which right may not be exercised 
to the detriment of the rights and reputation of others, or to the detriment of national 
security, public order, public health and morality. Paragraph 6 of the Transitional and 
Concluding Provisions further stipulates that until the adoption of laws concerning the 
BNT, BNR, and BTA, the National Assembly exercises the prerogatives of the Grand 
National Assembly in relation to them.  
The period after the adoption of the new constitution was characterised on the 
one hand, by rapid proliferation of the private press and private radio and cable TV 
programmes, and, on the other hand, by the preservation of state monopoly in the 
sphere of terrestrial TV broadcasting. As will be shown below, there were numerous 
political and legal struggles with regard to the state’s control over the public 
electronic media. Yet a societal consensus existed, that the press should be free from 
any form of state control and regulation (not simply censorship). The special status of 
the press in this regard was upheld in a decision of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court 
(BCC).187 The Court was asked to provide an authoritative interpretation of Articles 
39, 40 and 41 of the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression. In its decision, the Court stressed that the press should not only be 
politically independent, but also “institutionally, financially and technically separate 
from the state”. No regulations and interventions in this sphere were thus considered 
to be admissible.188  For the Court, “the press publishers are in reality market actors, 
and it is rather the market mechanisms, which determine the type and the number of 
publications, and henceforth – the plurality of points of view.”  
The situation of the electronic media is significantly different according to the 
Court. Not only does paragraph 6 of the transitory and concluding provisions state 
that Parliament is responsible for overseeing the activities of the electronic media 
until a special law is passed. The need for the regulatory role of the state towards 
these types of media is also mandated by “juridical, financial, technical or 
                                                 
187 BCC Decision № 7, 1996: Interpretation of Articles 39, 40 and 41 of the Constitution, State Gazette 
№ 55/1996. 
188 Excluded from this prohibition are the cases, as specified in Article 39(2) and 40(2) of the 
Constitution. 
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technological reasons”. One of the technological reasons is the constitutionally 
guaranteed sovereign right of the state with respect to the radio frequency spectrum 
(Article 18(3) of the Constitution), which is also used for the terrestrial radio and TV 
programmes, yet is a limited resource. Thus the freedom of the electronic media does 
not preclude state intervention. On the contrary, in the Court’s view, since the 
freedom of the electronic media is crucial for guaranteeing access to information to 
the public (another constitutionally guaranteed right according to Article 41(1) of the 
Constitution), the regulation of these media (with respect to their organisation, 
structure and financing) by an independent state body is not only admissible, but 
required.   
This decision of the BCC, though upholding state regulation of the electronic 
media, aimed to counter the majoritarian impetus of Parliament, which via its standing 
committee on the media intrusively interfered with the independent work of the 
media.  This parliamentary practice prompted the President of the Republic (under the 
pressure of several NGOs and associations of Bulgarian journalists, who actively 
campaign) to request an interpretation of the free speech constitutional provisions 
from the BCC. The result of the decision of BCC was the promulgation of the Law on 
Radio and Television (LRT), which will be discussed in detail below.   
 
3.1.2 Regulatory bodies of the electronic media: constitutional controversies 
The importance of the public electronic media for the Bulgarian parliamentary 
regime, and their special role in building the party system after the fall of 
communism, could hardly be overestimated. In the Bulgarian political system, 
characterised by the so-called “rationalised parliamentarianism”,189 a political actor 
needs to rely on a strong (parliamentary) party or a cohesive coalition of parties in 
order to have control over the government. Sometimes this institutional logic may 
even create “empty shell” parties, searching for ideological substance. Thus the 
institutional logic promotes the emergence of disciplined parties even out of 
ideologically ambiguous groupings, once they have won a substantial number of 
votes. This creates a system of representation based not on single persons, or ad hoc 
electoral alliances, but rather on stable and durable parties. 
The importance of the control over the public electronic media becomes clear 
when one takes into account the pressure of promoting strong and cohesive parties in 
a country without clearly articulated ideological differences and class cleavages which 
was the state of Bulgarian society after the fall of communism. The parties needed 
control over the major instrument of propaganda and public opinion formation – the 
electronic media – in order to solve the problems with their identity, and prevent the 
opposition from establishing and consolidating itself. Since all national electronic 
media were state-owned until 1999, the importance of such control was really crucial.  
The early transition period was characterised by an intense confrontation in 
the field of the public electronic media regulation. Four major players were involved 
                                                 
189 Rationalised parliamentarianism is characterised by the presence of strong institutional incentives 
for the creation of stable parliamentary majorities and parties in general, even in countries without 
established and long-standing ideological cleavages and democratic traditions. In Bulgaria, for 
example, in order to have control over the government, a political actor needs to rely on a strong 
(parliamentary) party, or a cohesive coalition of parties. The institutional logic itself promotes the 
emergence of disciplined parties even out of ideologically ambiguous groupings, once they have won a 
substantial number of votes. 
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in it. Along with the parliamentary majority and the opposition, and depending on the 
political circumstances (whether the president and the majority are or are not in the 
same camp) the presidential institution in Bulgaria also played a significant role in 
this sphere. The Bulgarian Constitutional Court (BCC) is the forth, and major player 
in this field: it has been involved in all the “battles” for media domination between 
these players since the fall of communism in 1989. In this field the Court did not stick 
to its customary role of arbiter in the disputes: in many cases its role was that of an 
active player. 
The principal focus of all controversies has been on the formation of a body 
responsible for the appointment of the directors of the national TV and radio, and the 
supervision of the operation of the electronic media in general. As already mentioned, 
this body is currently the Council on Electronic Media (CEM). All political majorities 
since the beginning of the reforms in 1989 have tried, and to different extent 
succeeded, to control this body, and to ensure their intervention in the workings of the 
media.  
For around five years after the adoption of the Constitution, the public 
electronic media were regulated and governed, on a “temporary basis”, by a standing 
parliamentary committee, dominated by the ruling party/coalition. This model was 
conceived when, in December 1990, the Grand National Assembly (convened to 
adopt the new Bulgarian constitution) passed Temporary Rules on the Status of the 
Bulgarian National Radio and Bulgarian National TV. The Rules were meant to be 
applicable only until the adoption of a law on public media. Such a law, however, was 
passed as late as 1996, did not prove effective because of constant challenges before 
BCC, and was replaced by a new law in 1998.  
The first major constitutional controversy took place in 1995, and was 
provoked by a challenge of the constitutionality of the Temporary Rules, especially 
with respect to the guarantees for the independence of the media provided by the 
regime of appointment of the directors of the national TV, Radio and Telegraph 
Agency.190 In assessing the legal framework, the Court first pointed out that the 
discussions in the Grand National Assembly during the adoption of the Constitution 
made clear that the appointment of directors of the public electronic media should not 
fall under the competence of the Parliament or the President of the Republic.191 A 
public body was needed - an independent Council, to regulate the media. On the basis 
of these considerations founded on the “drafters’ intent,” and Article 40(1) of the 
Constitution, the BCC struck down the provisions of the Temporary Rules, which 
granted to a Committee of the National Assembly the power to supervise directly the 
BNT and BNR, appoint their directors, approve their structure and internal orders, be 
                                                 
190 The very first interventions of the BCC in the area of media regulation took place as early as 1991. 
They concerned the constitutionality of appointments and dismissals of directors of the National TV 
and Radio, which showed the intensity of the struggle for dominance over the propaganda outlets. See 
Decision 3, 1991: Dismissal of the Director of BNT, State Gazette № 4/1992, for instance. In it, the 
Court held that the violation by the National Assembly of its own act (the Temporary Rules on the 
Status of BNT and BNR) was not a constitutional violation. The dismissal of the director was 
unobjectionable from a constitutional point of view, although he was dismissed by the Assembly as a 
whole, and not by a special independent Council, as required by the Rules. In Decision 15, 1993: 
Dismissal of the Director of BTA, State Gazette № 88/1993, BCC considered a similar case, involving 
the dismissal of the director of the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA) – based on paragraph § 6 of the 
Constitution, the Court upheld that dismissal as well. The early jurisprudence of the Court on the issue 
reveals the generally deferential attitudes of the judges to the legislature.    
191 Decision 16, 1995: Constitutionality of the Temporary Rules on the Status of the BNT and BNR, 
State Gazette № 86/1995. 
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informed about and give opinion on their programmes, and hear reports from their 
directors. The judges argued that Article 40(1) of the Constitution prohibited state 
intervention in the workings of the mass media.   
In a follow-up case,192 the Court dealt with an attempt by the National 
Assembly to reintroduce the powers of the parliamentary committee to approve the 
internal orders and the structure of the media through an amendment to the Rules. The 
BCC reaffirmed its previous decision and held that these prerogatives could not be 
delegated to a commission.  
These BCC decisions were generally satisfactory: they sought to eliminate a 
pressing political problem. Arrangements at the time threatened the open and fair 
political process, and created possibilities for malicious governmental intervention in 
the media, leading to bias and favouritism. The situation could lead to the 
marginalisation or discrimination of views contrasting those of the political majority.  
The second stage of the Bulgarian media saga took place in the 90s. The 
Videnov socialist government (January 1995 – February 1997) was the first to pass a 
separate Law on radio and television (LRT) in 1996, and establish an “independent” 
regulatory body, the National Council on Radio and TV (NCRT), the majority of 
whose members (5 out of 9), however, were to be elected by the government and the 
ruling majority in Parliament. BCC again intervened,193 announcing that this formula 
was unconstitutional. The law also empowered NCRT with extensive prerogatives, 
many of which were found to be unconstitutional.194  A third point of controversy was 
the labelling of the NCRT as a “state organ” rather than a “public organ”.195 The 
Court held that “the term ‘state’… presupposes expansive reading and the existence of 
governing (directing) prerogatives, and [thus] is in contradiction with…Article 40(1) 
of the Constitution.”196 Although largely symbolic, this last issue is revealing of the 
sensitivity of the political opposition and of the civil society as a whole to 
governmental interference with the media: by 1996 political control over the 
electronic media was a widely recognised and discussed problem in the country.  
As a result of the BCC decisions, the 1996 LRT did not have any effect during 
the rule of the Socialist government. However, it had one crucial consequence: it 
repealed the long suffering Temporary Rules and with them the legal authorisation for 
the National Assembly to govern/control the media. This effect did not come about 
                                                 
192 Decision 24, 1995: Constitutionality of Amendments to the Temporary Rules, State Gazette № 
1/1996. 
193 Decision 21, 1996: Constitutionality of Some Provisions of the Law on Radio and Television, State 
Gazette № 102/1996.  
194 In justices’ own words: “Art. 89 of LRT gives the following prerogatives for the imposition of 
coercive administrative measures… 1) giving of binding recommendations to the directors of the radio 
and television organisations; 2) temporary interruption of a particular programme; 3)temporary 
interruption of the programmes of a given media…The ‘giving of binding recommendations’… is 
outside the range of measures envisaged by Art. 40.2 of the Constitution, and amounts to a direct 
interference with the activity of the radio and television organisations… In all enumerated cases, the 
‘interruption’ prevents the dissemination and reception of information, and violates explicitly 
recognised constitutional rights.” Ibid. 
195 In justices’ own words: “According to Art. 8.2 of the LRT ‘NCRT is a specialised state organ.... it is 
an essential, basic characteristic of any state body to have governing prerogatives… [T]he competence 
of [NCRT] should be restricted to control and the imposition of administrative sanctions. The explicitly 
specified by the law prerogatives cannot include governing (directing) prerogatives vis-à-vis radio and 
television organisations…”. Ibid. 
196 Ibid. 
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automatically, however; it required another constitutional case. In a decision of 
1997,197 the BBC ruled that: “From the moment at which such legal arrangements 
were adopted, paragraph 6 of the Provisional and Concluding Rules of the 
Constitution loses its effect… Therefore, from the day of entering of the LRT into 
force, the prerogatives of the National Assembly vis-à-vis the BNR and BNT are 
permanently terminated… No consequent events could revive the effect of paragraph 
6, and to restore the prerogatives it envisages”. 
Probably the most important decision for the future of the regulation of the 
electronic media from this period was the already mentioned BCC Decision 7, 1996 
on the interpretation of Articles 39, 40 and 41 of the Constitution. In this decision, the 
Court stated that because radio frequencies are a “limited resource”, the state can 
regulate the establishment and operation of electronic media, and intervene in this 
area more extensively compared to the operation of printed media. However, the 
Court insisted that despite these possibilities of intervention, the state should respect 
the independence of the media: “the exclusion of any form of governing of the media 
by any state body is the primary condition for their structural independence.” This 
principled position of the court was in line with the developments in Bulgarian society 
at the time, which in the period 1995-1996 saw the development of strong civil 
society media organisations, spurring public discussion on the role of the media for 
the quality of Bulgarian democracy.   
With the coming to power of Kostov’s pro-reform UDF cabinet in 1997, hopes 
were high that the situation would be finally legislatively resolved in favour of media 
independence and journalistic professionalism. Partly as a result of the 1996 decisions 
of the Court, discussed above, a new Law on Radio and Television (LRT)198 was 
passed by the UDF-dominated National Assembly in 1998. The law guaranteed the 
independence of the electronic mass media from political and economic pressure 
(Article 8), protected their freedom from censorship (Article 9), and granted them the 
right to receive information from the state institutions (Article 13). It also envisaged 
the creation of a special regulatory body: the National Council on the Radio and the 
Television. The task of this body was to guarantee that the law is observed by the 
electronic media. The majority (5 out of 9) of its members should again be appointed 
by the Parliament.  
Understandably, there were complaints that this last provision of the LRT 
ensures the control of the National Assembly over the media, even though Article 
20(2) declares that “in its activity, the Council is guided by public interests, defending 
the freedom and pluralism of speech and information and the independence of the 
radio and the television”. Indeed, despite this declaratory text, the formula of NCRT 
appointments provided by the 1998 LRT was not a dramatic improvement over that of 
1996; the members were to be appointed by the President of the Republic (4) and the 
parliamentary majority (5). Since President Stoyanov was from the same party as the 
ruling majority (UDF), the formula provided similar results as the previous 
arrangements: dominance of one party in the appointment process. 
The BCC disregarded some of its own arguments from previous case law, 
concerning the link between political pluralism and media independence, and 
ultimately upheld the UDF sponsored legislation. The judges held that the first factor 
                                                 
197 Decision 17, 1997: Constitutionality of the Dismissal of the Directors of the BNR, BNT and BTA by 
the National Assembly, State Gazette № 109/1997. 
198 State Gazette № 138/24.11.1998. 
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guaranteeing the independence of the NCRT under the new arrangements was the fact 
that the MPs were obliged by the Constitution (Article 67(1)) to represent the people 
as a whole.199 In the same vein, the President expresses the “unity of the nation” 
(Article 92(1)). The second major guarantee for the independence of the NCRT was 
the principle of “rotation”, according to which the members were to be elected. 
Thirdly, the BCC pointed out that the practice of developed Western democracies 
showed that such an arrangement was ultimately acceptable. 
It is difficult to explain why the judges went out of their way in this case, 
having in mind the serious pressure from civil society groups and journalist 
organisations for striking down the law. In any event, the results of the law and the 
BCC’s decision were the de-legitimation of the NCRT and constant accusations of 
political partiality. The impression that the ruling party could pick and choose the 
directors of the national radio and TV persisted (and still does), as well as the public 
suspicion that the public radio and TV programmes are generally favouring the ruling 
party and the government. 
The 1998 LRT entrusted two regulatory bodies with the power to licence 
commercial operators of electronic media. Besides the NCRT, which became 
responsible for licensing and overseeing the radio and TV programmes, there was a 
second body, involved in the regulation of the electronic media: the State Commission 
on Telecommunications (SCT). The SCT is responsible for granting individual 
licences for the use of the radio spectrum.  
The BCC failed to prevent governmental interference with the workings of the 
SCT as well. Among the most controversial provisions of the 1998 Law on 
Telecommunications200 was the appointment of the SCT by the government. This 
provision was challenged in front of the BCC. The argument was that, since SCT was 
authorised to participate in the licensing of electronic media, its “politicisation” 
(namely the fact that its members are entirely dependent for their mandate on the 
parliamentary majority) provided no guarantees that the decisions of this body would 
not disregard expert considerations in favour of partial, political biases, in an area 
which should be free of political pressures. The Court dismissed the argument by 
observing that the control over the programmes of media operators was not within the 
powers of the SCT but with those of the NCRT instead.201 The SCT was meant to 
grant only technical licences for the use of radio frequencies. BCC held that while the 
body regulating the substance of the programmes of media operators (i.e. the NCRT) 
should be “independent”, the SCT need not be free of governmental control. On the 
contrary, the state and its bodies should control the licensing process, because the 
radio frequencies are an exclusive state monopoly according to the Constitution 
(Article 18(3)).202 This argument, however, was clearly undermined by the decision, 
                                                 
199 Decision 10, 1999: Constitutionality of the 1998 Law on Radio and TV, State Gazette № 60/1999. 
200 State Gazette № 93/1998.    
201 Decision 33, 1998: Constitutionality of the Law on Telecommunications, State Gazette № 147/1998. 
202 Another contentious issue was the term of office of the SCT, set longer than the term of the National 
Assembly. The challengers argued that appointed non-elected bodies should not have fixed mandates: 
their mandate should expire with the expiry of the term of the appointing body. The Court simply 
rejected this claim and argued that the “fixed mandate” principle was not constitutionally prohibited for 
appointed state bodies. Moreover, in certain cases the fixed mandate is desirable, because it boosts the 
independence of the agencies. The real fear of the challengers was that the present government would 
entrench its influence in the regulatory body even after the end of its staying in office. Finally, the 
judges dismissed the challenges against the envisaged re-licensing of already existing media and 
telecommunications operators. Re-licensing was required only for operators, authorised after the Law 
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adopted in 1999203, which allowed the “politicisation” of NCRT as well. In sum, the 
Court’s jurisprudence from 1998 and 1999 in this field reinforced suspicions that 
candidates close to the government were being favoured in the allocation of TV and 
radio frequencies.204  
The next controversial issue of the 1998 LRT was the requirement for re-
licensing by the regulatory bodies CEM and CRC of the already existing TV and 
radio operators (local cable TV and radio broadcasters in most cases) after its entering 
into force. The BCC upheld the constitutionality of these provisions as well. 
Politically, the 1998 LRT concentrated too much power in the hands of the 
government and the parliamentary majority, and excluded the opposition from 
participation in the granting of media and telecommunication licences.   
To conclude, the continuous attempts of the post-communist governments in 
the 1990s to regulate the electronic media did not manage to guarantee its 
independence. The regulatory bodies NCRT and SCT as a result enjoyed low 
legitimacy in the following years.  
 
3.1.3 Structural regulation 
Structural regulation of the Bulgarian media market has mainly focused on licensing 
matters. Contrary to the press, which is not subjected to licensing procedures (in line 
with the constitutional recognition that the press is free from state interference), 
detailed rules have been adopted to regulate the licensing of television and radio 
operators in the country. With regard to media ownership, there are few special rules 
regarding the sector. Rather, the media market is governed in its entirety by the 
general provisions of anti-trust regulation. There are no specific mono-media or cross-
media restrictions, nor are there currently any restrictions concerning the integration 
of the media industry with other business sectors.  
 
3.1.3.1 Licensing rules  
The regulatory regime of electronic media licensing is based on Article 18(3) of the 
Constitution, according to which the state has sovereign rights over the 
radiofrequency spectrum. Two laws currently determine the legal framework for 
licensing and registration of the radio and TV operators: the Law on the Radio and 
TV and the Law on Electronic Communications205 (which repealed in 2007 the Law 
on Telecommunications206).  
                                                                                                                                            
on Concessions (LC) had entered into force. Operators licensed before that had only to renew their 
licences – a much simpler procedure. The challengers argued that the different regimes create 
unjustified discrimination against a group of telecommunications operators. BCC rejected the claim by 
arguing that after the LC had entered into force the operators should have obtained a concession, not a 
licence for the use of radio frequencies. By obtaining a licence, they had in fact violated the LC: 
violation of a law could not be a ground of a claim for equality before the law, argued the judges. 
203 Decision 10, 1999: Constitutionality of the 1998 Law on Radio and TV. 
204 These suspicions were exacerbated when weeks after Kostov’s resignation in 2001, the Supreme 
Administrative Court annulled, on the grounds of procedural violations, the licence of Nova TV, a 
commercial national TV programme, allegedly close to Kostov and his party. 
205 State Gazette № 41/22.05.2007. 
206 State Gazette № 88/7.10.2003. 
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After the liberalisation of the media market in the country in the early 
1990s,207 the licensing procedures remained unclear until the adoption of the 1998 
LRT and often proved contradictory. The first licence for a commercial radio 
broadcaster was issued by the newly constituted Temporary Council for Radio 
Frequencies and TV Channels under the pro-reform UDF government in October 
1992. The legal framework, however, was based on a by-law of the socialist era, the 
1975 Law on Telecommunications. By 1997 there were more than 150 commercial 
radio broadcasters in the country, yet only 51 of them held valid licences.208 The 
situation was similar with respect to the commercial cable and satellite TV 
programmes. The first cable networks were built in 1992-1993, and by mid-1997 
there were around 400 TV operators in the country, where only 94 of them held valid 
licences.209 In 1994-1995 the first commercial terrestrial TV operators started 
transmitting their programmes in the country.  
The main characteristic of the licensing process for the electronic media in the 
pre-1998 period, was the lack of clear rules on licensing. Thus the licensing decisions 
were entirely in the discretion of the executive and were often politically motivated. 
The second feature was the lack of control over the electronic media market, where 
between 2/3 (radio) and 3/4 (TV) of the operators functioned without proper licences 
(they were “pirate” broadcasters), and, among many other legal breaches, massively 
violated copyright law.       
With the adoption of the 1998 LRT, a dual regulatory regime was introduced: 
a regime of licensing – for the terrestrial (analogue) radio and TV operators, and a 
regime of registration – for the cable and satellite operators.   
From 1998 (the year of entry into force of the LRT) until November 2001, 
terrestrial radio and TV operators were licensed on the basis of a competition, 
organised by an inter-institutional commission that was appointed by the Prime 
Minister: the State Commission on Telecommunications (SCT). The winner was 
decided by the Cabinet on the basis of a report by SCT. The programme licensing 
(concerning the content of the programmes, and not how they are transmitted) was de 
jure independent: it was carried out by the independent NCRT. Yet de facto it was 
also decided within the framework of the same tender procedure. SCT was the body 
issuing the licence, yet it had to take into account the position of NCRT on the content 
of the programme (the programme licence). The final decision rested with the Council 
of Ministers, the patron of SCT. As a whole, this licensing procedure of terrestrial 
radio and TV operators was heavily criticised by both the operators and the 
representatives of civil society for being non-transparent and liable to political 
influence.  
On its basis, two tenders for commercial terrestrial TV operators were held. 
However, Bulgarians became able to watch just one national terrestrial commercial 
programme, BTV (from May 2000), since the governmental decision for the national 
licence of the second winner, Nova TV, was successfully challenged in court. It took 
three years for Nova TV to win a new bid (in July 2003) and for Bulgarians, to have a 
second commercial national TV operator. This practice of constantly challenging the 
                                                 
207 Council of Ministers’ Executive order № 114 from 1991, State Gazette № 51/1991. 
208 Data quoted in D. Boryana “Deset godini, koito raztursiha elektronnite medii (no ne i natzionalniya 
efir)” [Ten years that shook the Eelectronic media (but not the National TV-broadcasting], in G. 
Lozanov, L. Deyanova and O. Spassov (eds), Media and transition (2000). 
209 Ibid., p. 49. 
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decisions of NCRT and SCT (and those of their successors, as will be explained 
below) in front of the administrative courts, and of the judiciary finally deciding the 
cases rather than the regulatory bodies, has contributed to the low credibility and 
status of the media regulatory bodies. 
Cable and satellite TV and radio operators, on the other hand, were licensed 
by SCT without a tender, solely on the basis of a registration decision of NCRT. One 
controversial issue was the requirement to re-license, according to this new procedure, 
all pre-existing cable and satellite TV and radio operators. Yet the BCC upheld the 
constitutionality of this requirement, and thus all cable/satellite operators were 
compelled to go through the registration procedure. 
Despite its many shortcomings, the 1998 LRT had one major advantage: the 
requirements for the programme licence (issued by NCRT) were identical for all types 
of TV operators, both cable/satellite and terrestrial. This principle is in line with the 
EU requirements for technical neutrality of the regulation of the content of TV 
programmes.210  
After the amendments brought to LRT by the coalition government of NDSV 
and DPS in 2001,211 a so-called “unified” procedure for the licensing of terrestrial TV 
and radio operators was introduced.  Accordingly, the decisions of the two regulatory 
bodies in the field - NCRT (succeeded in November 2001 by a new body, the Council 
on Electronic Media - CEM) and SCT (succeeded in 2001 by an independent 
Commission on Regulation of the Communications - CRC) - are interdependent. The 
decision on the licensing of the programmes is taken by CEM. CEM communicates its 
decision to CRC, which on its part issues the technical licence for the use of the 
radiofrequency spectrum. This procedure follows the principles of “functional 
interdependence” and unified licensing: while formally the licences are two – one for 
the programme and the other technical (for the use of the radiofrequency) - they are 
issued within the framework of only one procedure. Most importantly, the role of 
CEM is decisive in this procedure: CRC cannot refuse to issue a technical licence to 
the winner of a tender (since procedures are opened only if there are free 
radiofrequencies to be distributed), nor can CRC oblige CEM to issue a programme 
licence to its preferred competitor.   
Yet the process of licensing terrestrial radio and TV operators was virtually 
terminated already in mid-2001. Following the dissolution of NCRT by the new 
coalition government, the establishment of CEM took time to materialise, which 
temporarily stopped the licensing process. The 2002 amendments to LRT had the 
same effect for a longer period. They mandated to CEM and CRC the task of 
proposing a long-term strategy for the development of terrestrial radio and TV 
activities, to be approved by the Parliament. Until such strategy had been approved by 
the Parliament, issuing new licences was prohibited. The purpose of this amendment 
was obvious for the political and media analysts in the country. The new body CEM 
had lost the trust of its sponsors: the parliamentary majority. Thus the governing 
coalition effectively blocked CEM’s main prerogative - the licensing of terrestrial TV 
and radio programmes - by not adopting the required strategy until the end of its 
mandate in 2005.  
                                                 
210 N. Ognyanova “Mediyniyat zakon v kraya na analogovoto vreme” [Media law at the end of the 
analogue age], Capital weekly, 28/11/2008.   
211Amendments to LRT, State Gazette 96/ 9.11.2001. 
 61
There were other significant results produced by this governmental stance: the 
blockage of CEM’s activity happened when the second wave of licensing procedures 
was due, that for the regional terrestrial TV operators in the biggest towns of 
Bulgaria. In short, for more than 5 years, there were no new terrestrial licences issued. 
The pre-1998 licences of the regional terrestrial operators were just prolonged under 
unclear terms,212 leaving them hostage to the changing – and often politically 
motivated - will of CRC. This uncertainty of course boosted the market value of the 
already licensed national TV operators. This raised concerns within civil society that 
there are lobbyist interests behind the delay in the adoption of the strategy by 
Parliament: the majority allegedly served private interests, aiming to monopolise the 
electronic media market in the country.  
 The idea behind the delay was obviously to wait with the strategy adoption 
until a new LRT was passed. The new LRT would mandate the dissolution of CEM 
and the constitution of a new, more favourable to the parliamentary majority media 
regulatory body. After two attempts to pass such a new LRT (opposed by civil 
society/media NGO organisations and by the EU partners, as the country was already 
an official candidate-member of EU), the only option left to block the activity of 
CEM was not to adopt the required strategy. This saga, in sum, brought uncertainty to 
the media market and clearly favoured the status quo.     
The 2002 LRT amendments created a further set-back for media regulation: 
the principle of technologically-neutral regulation was abandoned, and two separate 
regimes for TV programmes licensing – one for cable, another for terrestrially 
transmitted TV programmes - were re-introduced.213   
As a result of these processes, the reform in the public media - BNT and BNR 
- was also delayed:  CEM was to be its primary “driving force” as the independent 
regulatory body of the media. The situation in the private media market further 
deteriorated, since CEM was not performing many of its LRT mandated functions, 
including control of compliance with its provisions by the private electronic media. 
One of the other major problems concerned the ownership over the media (which is 
still a pressing concern), making it difficult to guarantee equality of the media actors 
in the media market. In the final analysis, the plurality of the expressed positions - 
crucial for the quality of democracy in a country - was under threat. 
This was, roughly, the regulatory situation in the Bulgarian media market, 
approaching “the end of the analogue era”.214 The digital switchover, due to be 
completed by the EU members states by the end of 2012, brought even more 
problems. 
By technically allowing the transmission of a multiplicity of programmes, the 
digital technology offers enormous opportunities for enhancing media pluralism. This 
is one of the main reason behind the requirement that all EU members “get digital” in 
the sphere of electronic media by the end of 2012. Yet, as the transition in Bulgaria 
proceeds, there are serious concerns that rather than enhancing media pluralism, it 
will bring media concentration, if not fully-fledged monopolisation of the electronic 
media market.  
                                                 
212 §9а of the Transitory and Concluding Provisions of LRT stated, that terrestrial operators, holding 
non-renewed licences in regions, where there were no tender procedures , may continue their activities 
till such  tenders are held.  
213 N. Ognyanova “Mediyniyat zakon v kraya na analogovoto vreme”. 
214 Ibid. 
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The transition process to digital transmission started late in Bulgaria.215 
Though digital broadcasting started in May 2003 in Sofia – using one multiplex (i.e. 
digital broadcasting centre) with a capacity for six channels, it was only in 2008 that 
the coalition government of BSP, DPS and NDSV adopted a two-phase digital 
switchover plan. During the first phase (2009/July 2010) competitions had to be held, 
one for giving a licence to a company to build two national commercial multiplexes, 
another to choose a company to build the national public “multiplex”, which would 
digitally broadcast the public electronic media BNT and BNR. During the second 
phase (July 2010/December 2012), these multiplexes should take over broadcasting. 
By the end of 2012 analogue broadcasting should terminate.  
However, the procedures to follow, as well as the entire normative framework 
for the digital switchover were adopted very late. They were provided by two laws – 
the Digital Communications Act (DCA) and amendments brought to the Law on 
Radio and Television. A third law - the Public Broadcasting Act216 - was to set the 
procedures and principles for the digital broadcasting of the public electronic media 
BNT and BNR. This law was adopted in the last days of the coalition government of 
BSP, DPS and NDSV in May 2009, yet was met with hostility by the civil society. 
The reason for the hostility was a plethora of texts in the law, perceived as lobbyist by 
the public. They provided for the establishment of a state-funded national company 
“Public Digital Broadcasting”, as well as of a second company (a joint venture 
between the state and a private company) to build the digital multiplex to broadcast 
both the public BNT and BNR,  and some other TV programmes, without clear rules 
for selecting them. The envisaged financial involvement of the state without clear 
rules and criteria for selecting the operators and the company to build the multiplex, 
prompted conflict-of-interests and corruption concerns. As a result of these concerns 
even one of the minor coalition partners, NDSV, did not support this law in 
Parliament. This controversial law was finally abolished by the new government of 
GERB in the beginning of 2010.217 Important provisions for the digital switchover 
that were included in it, were subsequently incorporated in LRT and DCA, yet some 
of the lobbyist texts were maintained, and some others were added. Firstly, the 
prohibition for advertising companies to own electronic media, introduced already in 
the original 1998 LRT, was lifted. Secondly, the number of TV programmes that 
should be automatically (i.e. without competition) put on the multiplexes was 
increased. Thirdly, the requirements towards these automatically selected TV 
programmes were at the same time relaxed: to qualify, they only had to provide TV 
programmes to more than 50% of the population in the country.  
The crucial for the digital transition legislative rules were introduced only in 
March 2009, and were highly controversial. According to one of them, a multiplex 
(digital broadcasting) operator cannot develop its own transmission network. This 
prohibition was successfully challenged before the BCC.218 The other controversial 
provision concerns the so-called “must carry” requirement, according to which not 
only the public BNT and BNR, but all national terrestrially broadcasted commercial 
                                                 
215 Some steps were taken earlier – already in 2000, as reported in O. Spassov, “Public service 
television in Bulgaria at the end of the analogue age” in, M. Sükösd and A. Isanović (eds), Public 
service television in the digital age: Strategies and opportunities in five South- East European 
countries (2008).  
216 State Gazette № 37/19.05.2009. 
217 Amendments to the Law on Radio and TV, State Gazette № 12/12.02.2010. 
218 BCC Decision № 3: Constitutionality of Some Provision of the Digital Communications Act and the 
LRT, State Gazette № 45/2009. 
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TVs (i.e. BTV, Nova and Pro.bg) will go digital without having to participate in a 
competition or go through any further procedure. Each one of them will also have the 
right to put on the commercial multiplex up to 5 more additional programmes. The 
“must carry” rule applies not only to commercial TV operators with licences for 
national terrestrial broadcasting, but also to TV operators, holding regional terrestrial 
broadcasting licences, when they provide TV services with a minimum coverage of 
50% of the population.  
In the last days of its mandate the coalition government of BSP, DPS and 
NDSV managed to push through the CRC (the state commission authorised to run the 
competitions for the digital multiplexes) the decision to select the company to build 
the first two commercial multiplexes (thus fulfilling the requirements of phase 1 of 
the digital switchover plan). This decision was taken hastily and in breach of the 
requirement to hold an open and transparent competition for digital multiplex 
operators. In addition, 102 analogue regional licences were offered and won in the 
context of another non-transparent competition (with just a 6-day application period) 
by two TV operators, who met the 50% regional coverage requirement. This 
guaranteed them inclusion in the “must carry” quota for the digital multiplexes, as 
explained above. These decisions of the state Commission were very controversial, 
since they were taken just 3 days before the Constitutional Court decision (declaring 
unconstitutional some of the procedural rules for these tenders) entered into force.  
Currently the European Commission has launched an investigation on both the 
national legislation and the concrete tender procedures that were followed for their 
compatibility with EU law.219   
The new GERB government speeded the process in the spring of 2010 by 
adopting amendments to LRT and DCA, which removed the most controversial 
provisions (yet passed others, in particular with regard to media ownership, which 
will be discussed in more detail below). CRC also managed in a speedy and 
completely non-transparent way to decide on the second company that will build the 
other 3 commercial multiplexes. The same company (Hannu Pro) has also won the 
competition to build the public multiplex, which will broadcast the public BTV and 
BNR. This essentially means that a single company will control 2/3 of the 
broadcasting of digital terrestrial TV in the country. There are allegations in the media 
that this company is connected to the other company - Tower com - which won the 
competition for the other 2 multiplexes, and owns ½ of the TV transmission network 
in the country.220 Quite naturally, the EC is concerned that monopolisation by a single 
player of the Bulgarian digital media market (allowed by the new government of 
GERB, has thus been made possible.221 In view of all these developments, the 
likelihood of Bulgaria meeting the 2012 digital switchover deadline is slim. 
 
3.1.3.2 Ownership and competition rules 
One major feature of the press market in Bulgaria is the lack of special ownership 
rules and of rules that would guarantee the transparency of the market in general. This 
has long been perceived as a major problem in the field. Yet it was only in September 
2009, that the Union of the Publishers in Bulgaria sent a letter to the Prime Minister, 
                                                 
219 “Шум в ефира” [Noise in the air], Capital weekly, 10/09/2010. 
220 “Кент флeш роял” [Royal flush], Capital weekly, 16/07/2010. 
221 “Шум в ефира” [Noise in the air].   
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asking the government to take active steps towards regulating the ownership in the 
print media, the origins of the investments there, as well as media concentration. An 
inclusive working group to prepare the necessary regulations was formed, and thus in 
2010 amendments to the Law on Obligatory Depositing of Print and Other Products 
(there is no law on the press in the country, as explained above) are being 
introduced.222 The amendments require that the names of the “real owners” (the 
ultimate beneficiary/ies of the ownership in the legal entity) of the print media are 
published on the front page of the first issue of the publication for the year. Any 
changes in the ownership need also to be reported in due time. The Ministry of 
Culture has to publish information on print media ownership on its website. The 
control over the compliance with the regulation is with the municipal authorities, 
which are the beneficiaries of the substantial monetary sanctions for breach of these 
rules.  
With respect to electronic media, special ownership rules exist, yet they leave 
much to be desired. According to the LRT, only legal persons who can prove 
ownership in their properties or capital, and were not declared bankrupt in the last five 
years (Article 105 (4)) may apply for a TV or radio licence. Further restrictions 
(Article 105 (4)7 and 8) are imposed on legal entities with advertising223  and security 
as their registered object of activity (or which carry out such activities).  In May 2010, 
as already mentioned, the restriction on cross-ownership between advertising 
companies and TV operators was lifted. Telecommunications operators, enjoying a 
monopoly status on the market (which was the case with the then state-owned 
Bulgarian Telecommunications company – BTK)224 cannot apply for a licence 
(Article 105(4)9). Article 108 also requires applicants to submit a declaration that 
“they do not hold stakes, shares or other rights of participation in radio and television 
operators above the limits admissible pursuant to the anti-trust legislation of the 
Republic of Bulgaria”.  
The Bulgarian Anti-trust Law225 does not prohibit per se neither monopoly,226 
a dominant market position, nor concentration. Prohibited is just the abuse of a 
dominant position on the market. The presence of a dominant position is established 
by the Competition Commission, an independent state body, entrusted with the 
application of the anti-trust legislation in the country. The law does not set any strict 
ceilings above which a dominant position is deemed unacceptable. Determining 
whether there is a case of abuse of a dominant position or whether ownership 
                                                 
222 On Sept 23rd 2010, the amendments were voted by Parliament on their first reading. 
223Already in 1998 the LRT incorporated the restriction for advertisement companies to get TV and 
radio operator licences as well. During the years, this restriction was constantly neglected/ side-
stepped, the most prominent case being that of Krassimir Guergov, the biggest player in the 
advertisement market in Bulgaria. He was officially just a consultant to the foreign owners of the first 
commercial national TV programme – BTV, yet recently admitted to have been among its owners from 
its first days in Bulgaria. See “Едно лицемерие по-малко” [One piece of hypocrisy less], Capital” 
weekly, 4/06/2010.  
224 BTK was privatised in mid-2004 (the state sold 65% of its shares to Viva Ventures) and the 
privatisation process was complete in January 2005, when the rest of its shares were traded on the 
Bulgarian Stock Exchange –Sofia.  
225 State Gazette № 102/28.11.2008.  
226 Monopolies are only allowed when determined by Law, pursuant to Article 18 paragraph 4 of the 
Constitution.  
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concentration is permissible is a matter of discretionary decision of the state 
Competition Commission.227  
There is one special rule in the LRT (introduced in 2008), prohibiting TV and 
radio operators to become digital multiplex operators. The restriction for digital 
multiplex operators to build their own transmission networks, which was introduced 
in 2008, was successfully challenged in front of BCC, as already mentioned. Only one 
special restriction, introduced in 2009,228 remains. According to it national coverage 
TV programme licences cannot be issued to TV operators that hold a licence for 
regional/local broadcasting (yet they may give up their regional/local licences and 
then acquire a national one).229  
There are no mono-media or cross-media ownership restrictions. The existing 
rules aim only at the prevention of monopolisation of the market, and mono- and 
cross-media ownership are not interpreted as posing such a threat. There are no limits 
on market shares, circulation and audience shares, and advertising revenue shares in 
the media market or in the capital shares in a media company. Only the monopolistic 
domination of the market is excluded. Cases of cross ownership can be identified for 
all three types of media – press, TV and radio. Foreign media ownership is also 
allowed and the same ownership rules apply to it as well.  
Currently an entirely new Law on the Electronic Media is under discussion, 
which will specifically address media ownership rules. During the public discussions 
held in July 2010 on the general direction of the new media law, the position of the 
Association of TV and Radio Operators in Bulgaria (ABRO) and of press publishers 
was expressly against the introduction of special media ownership restrictions that 
would go beyond the general provisions of the Anti-trust Law. Calls for lifting the 
restriction for TV and radio operators to be digital multiplex operators were also put 
forward. Since no official draft of this law has been publicised yet, it is difficult to 
assess its content and even general orientation.230 
With respect to media competition rules, they are entirely regulated by the 
Anti-trust Law. There, as already mentioned, dominant position on the market per se 
is not prohibited, but just its abuse. Whether this is the case with the concrete 
company is established by the state Competition Commission. There are also a 
number of provisions specifying which practices constitute non-loyal competition 
practices: like libel, providing misleading information on the competitors and their 
products, misleading or comparative advertising, etc. Yet there are no specific 
provisions in this law, targeting specifically the media market.   
 
                                                 
227 The Anti-trust Law mandates (in Articles 26 (1) and (2)) the Competition Commission to permit 
ownership concentrations even when they lead to or enhance a dominant market position, when the aim 
of the concentration is the modernisation of the relevant economic activity, the improvement of the 
market structure, the better protection of consumers’ interests and when “overall the positive effect of it 
outweighs the negative influence over the competition in the respective market”. 
228 Amendments to LRT, State Gazette № 14/2009. 
229 Article116в (3) of LRT. 
230 The current chairperson of CEM, Georgi Lozanov, declared during the public discussions of the 
media law project that the philosophy behind the new law is liberalisation of the regulation, yet with 
clearer ownership rules. Voices were heard that these two desiderata are hardly compatible.  
Experience shows that the final shape of the media law will be more a matter of happenstance of 
influential interests in the media community rather than of principles.  
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3.1.4 Content regulation   
The 1998 Law on Radio and Television and the 2004 Ethics Code of the Bulgarian 
Media contain a variety of legal provisions and self-regulatory measures, which aim 
at regulating the content of information that is provided by the press and audiovisual 
media operators, so that it meets standards of responsibility, quality, objectivity and 
pluralism. Article 10 of LRT, for example, requires media providers to follow the 
following principles in their activities: free expression of opinion, right of access to 
information, non disclosure of their sources of information, personal inviolability and 
inviolability of personal life, inadmissibility of programmes propagating intolerance, 
violence, cruelty or racial, ethnic, gender or religious hatred, preservation of the purity 
of the Bulgarian language, copyright (and neighbouring rights) protection, protection 
of children from exposure to violence or any visual content that may distress 
them/hinder their development, etc. All operators - public and commercial - also have 
the obligation to include, when possible, in their programmes EU-produced TV and 
radio content, which should be a minimum 50%231 of all TV and radio content on the 
programme.  Of these EU programmes, 12% should be the work of independent EU 
producers. The requirements placed on public operators are more extensive and 
stricter: they  have to provide political, economic, cultural, scientific, educational and 
other publicly important information, guarantee access to the national and world 
cultural values, popularise scientific achievements, promote the Bulgarian and 
European cultural heritage, guarantee pluralism of opinions in each of their news and 
commentary programmes, enhance tolerance and mutual understanding in society, 
etc.232 Content regulations determine also the admissible forms of advertising. The 
public TV and radio operators are subject to stricter requirements in this respect as 
well.233 There are also strict rules, applying to all electronic media, concerning 
product placement, advertising in children programmes, advertising of alcohol and 
tobacco products, etc.   
 It is also a particular responsibility of the national public operators to inform 
citizens about the events of public life, and even the commercial media are duty 
bound to provide at least partial access to important public events (over the coverage 
of which they may have exclusive rights) to the general public.234 The media 
regulatory body CEM has many prerogatives, not only concerning the monitoring of 
compliance with the structural rules, but also of those concerning the content of the 
programmes. In short, the goal of content requirements and the relevant regulatory 
measures is to guarantee the right of citizens to receive information and to ensure 
political and cultural pluralism.  
The content regulation regarding the press, by contrast, is not provided in the 
law, nor is it enforced by a state regulatory body. It is a matter of self-regulatory 
codes of conduct of the journalists. This particularly concerns the objectivity and 
impartiality of the published information: censorship is constitutionally banned, so it 
is not for the state to determine whether the published information is objective and 
                                                 
231 50% or more of EU- produced TV content is the target, which has to be reached in the five years 
following the introduction of this provision in the law – i.e. by 2014.  
232 Article 6 (2) and (3). 
233 Article 89 of the LRT limits advertising time to 12 minutes per hour for the commercial TV 
operators, and to 15 minutes for the whole 24 hours programme of BNT (of which max 5 minutes may 
be used in prime time). 
234 Article 21 (3.1) of the LRT.  
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impartial. Thus in 2004 an Ethics Code of the Bulgarian Media235 was signed, which 
applies both to the electronic media and the press. In accepting the Code, the 
signatories declare to respect the following principles: 1. to provide truthful (strictly 
checked and cross-checked) information to the society, 2. to use open, fair and lawful 
means (the use of secret cameras, microphones and other such devises is only allowed 
when there is no other means of providing public access to crucially important for the 
society information. The use of such means should be clearly stated in the final media 
product.); 3. to respect the persons and their private life, 4. to have special 
responsibility  for the rights of the children; 5. to not discriminate on grounds of race, 
gender, religion or ethnicity; 6. to exhibit special sensitivity in informing about crimes 
and cruelty, so that the rights of both suspects and their victims are respected, and 7. 
to maintain decency of language and style.  Special sections in the code are devoted to 
guaranteeing the independence of the media from political and economic 
pressure/influence and to regulating the relations within and between the media 
outlets. The main professional associations in the field and journalistic NGOs236 
established in 2005 a “National Council for Journalistic Ethics” (NCJE). This is an 
NGO, whose main objective is the creation and support of two national media ethics 
councils for electronic and for print media. These councils currently monitor the 
compliance of the media with the above ethics code237 and mediate disputes within 
the media. Their decisions are mandatory238 for the media, and in case they are not 
complied with within the set deadline, LRT mandates CEM to impose monetary 
sanctions.239 This last mandate concerns only the electronic media, since CEM has no 
jurisdiction over the print media. The two councils and NCJE are members of the 
Alliance of Independent Press Councils of Europe.    
It could be maintained that the media deregulation and the development of 
private television and radio have enhanced the diversity and pluralism of broadcasting 
content. At the same time the media experts (both in the country and abroad) have 
been warning that the quality of the media output is deteriorating,240 because of lack 
of clear media ownership rules, attempts to gain economic and political control of the 
media and self-censorship of journalists, especially in the  local media outlets.  
Because of these problems, the mandate of CEM has been reinforced. Now it is the 
responsibility of the media regulatory body to not only issue programme licences and 
remove them when the regulations of LRT are severely and repeatedly violated, but 
also to enforce the Ethics Code of Bulgarian Media. However, with respect to both of 
these functions, the work of CEM has not been satisfactory.241 It remains to be seen 
                                                 
235 National Council for Journalists Ethics, “code of journalistic ethics of the Bulgarian media”, 
available at: www.mediaethics-bg.org (last visited on 20/10/2010). 
236 The Association of the TV and radio operators (ABRO), The Union of Publishers in Bulgaria, the 
Union of Bulgarian Journalists and a couple of NGOs – The Bulgarian Media Coalition and The 
Foundation “Centre for Media Development”. 
237According to the last available report for their activities (for 2008), they have received 18 complaints 
from citizens and media representatives, of which just 1 was found to violate the Ethics Code.    
238 Article 76 (2) of the LRT, Amendments to LRT, State Gazette № 12/2010. 
239 Article 126g of the LRT, Amendments to LRT, State Gazette № 12/2010. 
240 The 2005 report for Bulgaria of the “Media Sustainability Index” found that the quality of 
journalism and the compliance with professional standards in Bulgaria deteriorated compared to 
previous years (the index was started in 2000).  
241 The State Audit Office checked CEM’s activities for 2007-2008. According to its report the control 
of the media regulatory body over the licensed and registered TV and radio operators was ineffective. 
For the whole period just 14 (out of a total of 560) TV and radio programmes were checked, and 
though violations of the licences were established, no sanctions or other administrative measures were 
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what the effects of the recent242 reduction in the number of members of CEM (from 9 
to 5) will be on the work and effectiveness of this body. 
Currently the Bulgarian legislation does not treat the internet-generated 
content (blogs, social networking sites, etc.) as media. Such content is not regulated.  
Yet in the presently widely discussed by civil society draft of the new Electoral Code, 
the internet is treated as a media and therefore there will be regulations concerning it 
as well. The parliamentary majority plans to prohibit the libellous speech on political 
candidates in blogs and the social networking sites. The regulations in this regard will 
thus become identical for all types of media – press, electronic and internet-generated.  
Concerning the other draft law which has received much attention by civil society, the 
one on the media, it is yet unclear243 whether it will treat blogs and other internet-
generated content as media, and thus regulate them.  
It took a long time for the right of free expression through the media to take a 
root in post-communist Bulgaria, even though it enjoyed constitutional protection. For 
more than a decade, a major problem of the post-communist Bulgarian media was the 
large number of Bulgarian journalists sued for libel and insult (these were and remain 
criminal offences).  For the period 1990 – 1998 there were 45 libel trials and 6 insult 
trials against Bulgarian journalists.244 After 2000,245 the number of trials increased 
significantly but the number of convictions was relatively small.   
The legal provisions against libel and insult246 are included in the Penal 
Code247 (Articles 146, 147 and 149), which was adopted in 1968. The penalty was 
effective imprisonment (up to two years for insult and up to three years for libel) and 
financial sanctions. After a long political and legal battle (involving a negative 
decision of the BCC,248 which upheld the constitutionality of these articles of the 
Penal Code), amendments were finally passed in June 2000.249 These abolished 
imprisonment, yet imposed substantial monetary sanctions.250 
                                                                                                                                            
taken. See “Сметната палата отчете слаб контрол на СЕМ” [The national audit office reported weak 
control by CEM], Novinar, 11/11/2009. 
242 This provision was introduced with the last amendments to the LRT in June 2010, Amendments to 
LRT, State Gazette № 47/2010. 
243 The opinion of the chairperson of the working group, Geeorgi Lozanov, on the draft-law is that the 
regulation will not affect the blogs and social networking sites, since they are forms of personal 
communication, where the production of audio-visual products, if there is such, is not aimed at the 
market.  The EU regulations in the field, according to him, are only limited to audio-visual services in 
the internet, and the blogs and networking sites are not services but forms of personal communication. 
See “Интервю с доц. Георги Лозанов: Медийната регулация няма да засегне сайтове, блотове, 
социални мрежи” [An interview with assoc. Prof. Georgi Lozanov: The media regulation will not 
affect sites, blogs and social media], vsekiden.com, 22/06/2010, available at: 
www.vsekiden.com/71255 (last visited on 22/06/2010). 
244 “Програма за правна защита на съдебно преследвани журналисти” [Programme for legal 
protection of prosecuted journalists], Foundation “Reporter” (1998).  
245 The 2003 report on “Libel and Offence Trials against  Bulgarian Journalists” of the Bulgarian 
Helsinki Committee established that for the period March 2001 – March 2003 there were 91 such trials.  
246 An overview of the developments in this sphere is provided in M. Chuturkova, Свободата на 
словото и нейните граници [Freedom of speech and its limits] (2009).  
247 State Gazette № 26/2.04.1968. 
248 BCC Decision № 20: Constitutionality of Provision of the Penal Code, State Gazette № 83/1998.  
249 Amendments to the Penal Code, State Gazette № 51/23.06.2000. 
250 The fine is 1000lv to 3000lv for insult, and 3000lv to 7000 lv for libel. When the insult is public and 
disseminated in the press or in other media, and is against an official and with relation to her official 
duties, the fine is from 3000lv. and may reach up to 20 000 lv. depending on the gravity of the action 
and its consequences. 
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It is not just the Penal Code that protects the personality, honour and dignity of 
individuals. With regard to the electronic media, the LRT requires TV and radio 
operators to ensure that persons are treated with respect and that their honour, dignity, 
good name and family life are protected. However, even though operators are not 
allowed to distribute information on the personal life of the citizens without their 
consent (Article 16(1)), they may include such information on public persons/or 
persons with influence in the public life, when access to this information is in the 
public interest (Article 16(2)). When these provisions are violated, the operators owe 
a public apology to the affected persons. The public apology does not deprive the 
victims of their right to seek redress (monetary compensation) in civil court. Public 
figures and officials, as well as ordinary citizens have a right to response, which must 
be broadcasted in the next issue of the same programme (Article 18). 
 
4. Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment 
The present overview of norms and developments demonstrates the importance of the 
media for the Bulgarian parliamentary regime, and their special role in building the 
party system after the fall of communism; this political aspect could hardly be 
overestimated. There have been generally two models of interaction between political 
and media actors over the last twenty years. The first model of aggressive majoritarian 
attempts to control the (public electronic) media was characteristic of the 1990s. The 
second model started to shape after 2001, when the party system of the first ten years 
started to disintegrate, and populist newcomers won a succession of parliamentary 
elections. These developments took place against a much more pluralistic (and not 
susceptible to direct governmental control) environment. The end result was a new 
pattern of relationships between political parties and specific media, which (at their 
extreme) led to hybrid political structures - party-media or media-party -, or at least to 
very heavy emphasis on the development of capacities for media presentation and PR 
in party politics.  
In order to better grasp these developments, a brief introduction to Bulgarian 
transition politics is necessary. The 1991 Constitution introduced “rationalised 
parliamentarism” as a general logic of the political regime. Rationalisation of 
parliamentarism consists mainly in the constitutional provision of very strong 
institutional incentives for the creation of stable parliamentary majorities and parties 
in general, even in political contexts where there are no established and long-standing 
ideological cleavages and democratic traditions. In Bulgaria, in order to have control 
over the government, a political actor needs to rely on a strong (parliamentary) party, 
or a cohesive coalition of parties. The institutional logic itself promotes the 
emergence of disciplined parties even out of ideologically ambiguous groupings, once 
they have won a substantial number of votes. Sometimes rationalised parliamentarism 
may even create “empty shell” parties, waiting and searching for ideological 
substance. The institutional pressure may “invent” fake ideological differences, or 
amplify increasingly irrelevant differences. Still, the institutional logic of the regime 
attempts to create a system of representation based not on a single person, or ad hoc 
electoral alliances, but rather on stable and durable parties. 
The institutional pressures to have strong and cohesive parties in a situation 
where the ideological differences and class cleavages are not clear and articulated, 
required from the “empty shell” parties to impose control over the major instrument 
of propaganda and public opinion formation – the electronic media. Thus the control 
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over the media was one of the major instruments of the parties from the early 
transition period to solve their identity problems and to prevent the opposition from 
establishing and consolidating itself. Since all national electronic media were state-
owned until 1999, the importance of such control was really crucial. This feature of 
Bulgarian constitutional design has placed a very strong imprint on media 
development in the first ten years after the transition. 
In the beginning of the 2000s, however, new developments marked the 
Bulgarian party system. The parties, which have been established in the period 1989-
2000 came gradually under attack by new, extra-parliamentary players. These 
developments have been described as a “rise of populism”. Populism in this context is 
understood as the creation of parties, which appeal to the people as a whole, and are 
very light in terms of programme/ideology and organisational structures.251 The rise 
of populism in Bulgaria is closely linked with developments in the media 
environment. The ideological and organisational lightness of the political parties 
increases the weight of PR and media in the political process. This leads to occasional 
interesting symbiotic creations – hybrids between media and political structures.  
Consider the Ataka party, for instance. Days before the 2005 presidential 
election the pollsters in Bulgaria were in for a big shock: out of the blue, a new 
political actor appeared claiming 8-9% of the voters’ support. Since this was so 
surprising, the rumour was that leading polling agencies delayed the announcement of 
their data, because they doubted the accuracy of their results. The new actor was a 
party organised around a TV cable station and a journalist radically criticising the 
political establishment as corrupt and dangerous from the point of view of the national 
interests. The TV station was called “SKAT”, and the journalist Volen Siderov. 
Siderov had a programme “Ataka” on the station, which he successfully managed to 
turn into a nationalist political party of the same name. Siderov’s biography is 
instructive for the student of populism. In the beginning of the transition, Siderov was 
the editor-in-chief of the newspaper of the UDF - the main democratic reformist party 
- Democracy. After that he became a journalist in one of the most influential dailies 
Monitor, a newspaper on the borderline between the serious press and the tabloids. 
Ataka ultimately entered the Bulgarian parliament in 2005, surprisingly becoming the 
biggest opposition group in it (albeit for a short period of time, since the group soon 
after disintegrated). The other bigger parties – the BSP, the tsarist NDSV, and the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) – formed a grand ruling coalition.  
The role of the media, and TV SKAT in particular, explains much of the 
success of Ataka. This was the main tool of mobilisation of electoral support of the 
organisation. SKAT is in fact a TV station which provides a forum for populist 
discourse. It has mainly publicist and analytical programmes, giving voice to the 
second, third and the lower tiers of the political and intellectual elite. Not surprisingly, 
the station is “anti-elitist” (meaning against the empowered political elites), defends 
public morality, national interests, national integrity, etc. All this is presented with a 
degree of popular culture, conspiracy theories, and tiny bits of high culture.252 The 
                                                 
251 See the publication G. Mesežnikov, O. Gyárfášová, and D. Smilov (eds), Populist politics and 
liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, working paper, available at: 
http://www.ivo.sk/5353/en/news/ivo-released-working-paper-populist-politics-and-liberal-democracy-
in-central-and-eastern-europe (last visited on 20/10/2010). 
252 It is very important that the network does not invest in the quality of the picture or the quality of the 
content of its programmes. This is probably an intentional aesthetic choice, which gives to the whole 
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party Ataka, in this sense, represented a hybrid between a political organisation and a 
media outlet. The success of this party demonstrated the increased relative weight of 
media presentation and PR in party politics and party building.  
In 2007 there was another electoral shock for the political establishment in 
Bulgaria. At the May EU parliamentary elections a new political party – GERB – led 
by the popular mayor of Sofia Boiko Borissov won most of the votes. GERB’s main 
resource was the personal charisma and appeal of its leader. The party was registered 
and set up only in 2006, reflecting the political ambitions of its leader to convert his 
general popularity into representation at the national level. Borissov speaks directly to 
the Bulgarian people. Much of his success could be attributed to his ability to speak to 
the ordinary people, to look like many of them, and to articulate what they commonly 
think about complex governmental matters. Thus, electoral success and mobilisation 
are to be attributed largely to personality factors, not programmatic issues. In this 
sense, Borissov is to a large extent a product not of party life and party politics, but of 
media presentation. He has an extremely fine sense for PR matters and manages 
always to be in the focus of media attention. His use of street jargon in a relatively 
delicate manner and with a fine sense of humour makes him one of the media 
favourites. 
The parliamentary elections in Bulgaria on July 5, 2009 confirmed the already 
existing trend of diminishing of the electoral strength and appeal of the so-called 
“traditional” parties, identifying themselves along the left-right political spectrum: the 
centre-left Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the successor of the once-mighty 
centre-right Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). These were the two major parties of 
the 1990s, which dominated the political scene during the most decisive years of the 
Bulgarian transition. As of September 2010, these “traditional” parties enjoyed the 
support of less than 20 % of the population. Most of the rest of the Bulgarian citizens 
express preference for new political players, who campaign mainly along two issues: 
the fight against corruption and mild nationalism.  
In line with this trend, in July 2009, the clear winner of the parliamentary 
elections was the political party GERB, which took 116 out of the 240 seats in the 
Bulgarian National Assembly. Second came the incumbent BSP with 40 seats, which 
was more than twice less than what they had in 2005. DPS (the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms) – a regional party representing mostly the Bulgarian Turks - was the 
only party of the triple ruling coalition (BSP, DPS and NDSV), which was able to 
stabilise and even slightly increase its performance in comparison with 2005. In 
contrast, the party of the former tsar Simeon II – NDSV – failed to clear the 4% 
electoral threshold and remained outside of the parliament: this was a dramatic 
development having in mind that this party had won 40% of the vote of Bulgarians in 
the 2001 parliamentary elections. Of particular importance was the fact that most of 
the remaining vote went to populist and nationalist parties such as Ataka, “Order, Law 
and Justice”, and Leader, the first two of which got over the 4% electoral threshold.          
                                                                                                                                            
show a very “natural” air, bringing it close to reality TV and even the documentary genre. The overall 
effect is that it is as if “the people” express themselves in the programmes of this TV. 
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Table 1: Results of the 2009 parliamentary elections 
№ Party Votes Percentage of the total vote 
1 Order, Law and Justice 174582 4.13% 
2 Leader 137795 3.26% 
3 GERB 1678641 39.72% 
4 Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) 610521 14.45% 
5 ATAKA 395733 9.36% 
6 Coalition for Bulgaria (BSP) 748147 17.70% 
7 Blue Coalition (UDF and Democrats for Strong Bulgaria 285662 6.76% 
 
The electoral results were a confirmation of the seemingly perpetual capacity 
of the Bulgarian party system to disintegrate and transform. Thus, both the dominant 
parties of the 1990s (BSP and UDF), and the dominant party of the early 2000s 
(NDSV) are now losing strength and being marginalised: the NDSV is already an 
extra-parliamentary party, while the successors of the UDF are dangerously close to 
the electoral threshold. In their stead there are rising new players, who are very light 
both in terms of programmes and ideologies, and in terms of party structure and 
organisation. It is as if they come from the virtual world of the electronic media, 
materialise during elections, and then disappear in virtual reality again within a few 
years. 
With these developments in the political sphere, it is clear that the media have 
again become an area of intense political contestation. It is no surprise that at present 
there are attempts by the ruling majority to revamp the CEM – the Council on the 
Electronic Media – with the apparent intention to increase its influence on this body 
(or at least to diminish the influence of its opponents in it). Further, there are 
important changes in the media market, which are influenced significantly by the 
political processes. A financial group owning one of the Bulgarian banks (and 
allegedly close to DPS) has provided credits for the creation of an influential media 
group – The New Bulgarian Media Group. It owns the daily with the biggest 
circulation (“Telegraf”), the most influential tabloid newspaper (“Weekend”), as well 
as a host of other publications and TV stations. It also controls the company, which 
will build 2/3 of the digital multiplexes in the country. It is telling that this financial 
group became the authorised banker of most of the Bulgarian publicly owned 
companies during the reign of the so-called “triple coalition” in which the DPS was a 
key player. All these developments make the Bulgarian case very interesting from the 
point of view of the intersection of media and party politics. 
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The case of Croatia 
Helena Popović, Paško Bilić, Tomislav Jelić and Nada Švob-Đokić 
 
1. Introduction 
In its recent history Croatia has experienced most of the problems that post-socialist 
states have faced regarding the media, that is “slow technological change; weak news 
competition; crisis of public service broadcasting; persisting political pressure on the 
media; weak professional performance of journalists; problematic minority access to 
the media; hate and nationalist speech; inadequate press and media markets; 
Europeanisation of media regulation”.253 The differences between socialist and 
communist practices and political systems in eastern, south-eastern and central 
Europe, as well as the historical and cultural specificities have added to the 
transitional complexity, and have resulted in different ways in which the system has 
been challenged and in which institution building has been processed. 
Croatia gained independence through the breakdown of Yugoslavia, which 
had serious repercussions for the democratisation processes that were delayed due to 
the war (1991-1995). In the beginning of the 1990s, the nationalist movement led by 
the Croatian Democratic Union (the winners of the first parliamentary elections in 
Croatia in 1990) mobilised dissident groups of the previous system, but also gained 
the support of the masses, triggered by the beginning of the war in 1991. The media 
system has been seriously affected by such developments.  
The reorganisation of the Croatian media landscape began in the early 
nineties, with the transformation of the socialist system into a democratic political 
system introducing a liberal market economy. Transition from the state controlled and 
publicly owned media to a system in which the media were to become public 
institutions and services or private enterprises did not go smoothly.254 At the 
beginning of the nineties, the new parliament enforced new media regulations that led 
to initial democratic changes. Submitted to regulation were the institutions and areas 
like the news agency HINA in 1990, the national radio television HRT in 1991, 1992, 
1993 and 1996, the telecommunication area in 1994, and public information 
regulation in 1996.255 The privatisation processes which enabled the emergence of 
commercial media started. However, the first liberalisation results incited worries 
about the loss of control over the media and these processes were suspended.  In the 
nineties, the media were still seen as a means for reinforcing the power of the political 
establishment. The newly established regime controlled the media through various 
methods, for example by appointing people loyal to the regime to supervisory 
regulatory bodies through which control was exercised (e.g. the Programme Council 
of the Croatian Radio Television - HRT), or through the distribution of concessions. 
Pressure was particularly put on national television, whereas the press was not of 
primary concern to the authorities, though those that openly criticised the regime - 
such as the weekly Feral Tribune - were submitted to various forms of oppression, for 
                                                 
253 See: M. Sükösd, P. Bajomi- Lázár (eds), Reinventing media: Media policy reform in East Central 
Europe (2003), at p. 15.  
254 See: Z. Perusko, Televizija u Europi: zakonodavstvo, javne politike i neovisnost – Hrvatska 
[Television accross Europe: regulation, policy and independence - Croatia] (2005). 
255 See: N. Zgrabljić Rotar, “Hrvatska medijska politika i javni mediji” [Croatian media policy and 
public media], 9(1) Medijska istraživanja (2003) 59.  
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example through legal provisions, attempts to stop its distribution or tax impositions 
that did not apply to other printed media.256 Civil society activities were viewed as 
dangerous when not in accordance with state politics. Civil society organisations and 
media supported from abroad, such as human rights organisations or organisations 
that dealt with democratisation (e.g. the Open Society Institute, Croatian Helsinki 
Committee, etc.) were under direct political pressure. In the second half of the 
nineties, particularly in 1996, civil society started to express its dissatisfaction with 
political pressures being exercised.  An indicator of this was the formation of the civil 
society group Forum 21 that claimed the right to independent and free media. In the 
same year the Radio 101 protest took place in which 100,000 citizens of Zagreb 
fought the decision to deny Radio 101 its concession.257 Regardless of these initial 
actions, it was only with the death of Franjo Tuđman (1999), and the new elections in 
2000, that concrete steps to democratisation were taken.   
In 2000, when the left coalition came to power, a new set of media regulations 
was passed. It aimed to create a framework for the development of public media and a 
more favourable environment for the introduction of commercial media. While the 
press market opened up at the end of the nineties,258 in 2000 the entrance of foreign 
owned commercial television into the market marked the first steps towards a 
pluralistic media system. This period was particularly characterised by the attempts to 
implement regulations and procedures that would enable independent and free media 
performances. De-linking the state from the media was the primary task, while 
competition introduced by the commercial media was seen as positive.259 The 
emergence of commercial media was in that period viewed as a support to pluralism 
and independence from the state-controlled media. However, this optimism was soon 
replaced by a new worry, linked to the obvious profit-oriented logic that proved to be 
the driving force of the commercial media, which regarded their public attributes as 
secondary. The awareness of such media orientations was connected to the third phase 
in Croatian media policy, which emerged with the acceptance of the Croatian 
application for membership of the EU and the candidate country status awarded in 
2004. In this period the focus slowly transferred from a national to a European and 
global context.260 Parallel to the adjustment to European regulations the Croatian 
media system is still struggling with internal problems linked to issues associated with 
the transition from one political and economic system to another. At the same time, 
new challenges have emerged - such as fast technological changes, convergence, 
audience fragmentation, hyper-commercialisation, the spread of tabloid media and 
sensationalism – that force the actors involved in the media landscape to 
simultaneously “juggle” multiple problems on various levels.   
 
                                                 
256 See: M. Thompson, Kovanje rata: mediji u Srbiji, Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini [Forging war: 
media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina] (1995), p. 185. 
257 See: S. Malovič and G. W. Selnow, The people, press and politics of Croatia (2001). 
258 The first concession to Nova TV was granted in 1999, while the RTL entered the market in 2003. 
259 See: Z. Peruško, “Medijska koncentracija: izazov pluralizmu medija u Srednjoj i Istočnoj Europi 
[Media concentration: a challenge to media pluralism in Central and Eastern Europe]”, 9(1) Medijska 
istraživanja (2003), at p. 40. 
260 See: Z. Peruško and H. Popović, “Media concentration trends in central and eastern Europe”, in K. 
Jakubowiz and M. Sükösd (eds.), Finding the Right Place on the Map: Central and Eastern European 
media change in a global perspective (2008) 165. 
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2. The media landscape in Croatia 
The diversity of the media landscape in Croatia is manifested in a large number of 
different information sources as well as in the fast changes of their structural, 
technological and content characteristics. However, due to concentration trends it is 
not always clear whether these numerous sources reflect diverse opinions and critical 
views or just differ in the mode and area of their expression. This is seen in the 
oscillating number of printed media that also show signs of frequent content changes. 
Reliable figures on sold copies and generated income are hard to obtain. Competition 
is high but there are also trends of growing concentration. In this respect the printed 
media market is at the same time dynamic and not easily surveyed. Radio is 
regionally structured and with strong regional competition. National radio public 
channels have a very small audience share. Television, on the other hand, is the most 
widespread medium with two public service broadcasters (PSB) and two commercial 
channels dominating the national audience share. Internet Protocol Television is 
increasingly diversifying the number of channels and the governmental strategy of 
implementation of Digital Television Broadcasting is currently under way. The 
number of Internet users is rising steadily and the competition between Internet 
portals is also increasing. Social media are among the most popular websites and 
Internet users favour them as information sources over television or newspapers. 
There are also several news agencies with diverging political orientations. According 
to the information by the Croatian Journalists’ Association (CJA) the majority of 
journalists are highly educated.  
 
2.1 The media market 
The press  
The number of newspapers, magazines, free press and other printed media has 
multiplied in the last twenty years or so and has also proved unstable, showing a 
tendency to frequent change. According to different sources the overall number of 
printed media currently oscillates between 850 and 2,525. 
The daily with the highest circulation, 24 sata (Twenty four hours) is a pure 
tabloid launched in 2005. It has a new, small format and brief news, and is sold at the 
lowest price of only 4,00 Croatian kuna, while the other dailies costs 7,00. Večernji 
list (Evening paper) is a conservative daily with a long tradition (founded in 1959), 
while Jutarnji list (Morning paper), founded in 1998 was initiated as its left centre 
alternative. Today it is difficult to identify its political leaning. Slobodna Dalmacija is 
a daily most popular in the Dalmatian region, and Novi list is similar in the Istria 
region. Vjesnik is a broadsheet still owned by the state with a very small circulation 
and with clear support for the government. In an attempt to categorise the dailies 
along the tabloid-broadsheet continuum, only two papers can be clearly classified: 24 
sata as a tabloid and Vjesnik as a broadsheet. Novi list can also be categorised as a 
newspaper with broadsheet elements, while the other dailies - Večernji list, Jutarnji 
list, Slobodna Dalmacija - are all hybrids. Sportske novosti is the only daily 
specialising in sport. 
In 2009, the planned editions for the most popular daily newspapers were: 24 
sata – 215,000; Jutarnji list – 103,919; Večernji list – 142,000; Slobodna Dalmacija – 
67,000; Sportske novosti – 41,148; Novi list – 47,000. 
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Data on sold copies and generated income is not easily accessible. The website 
of the Styria Group261 publishes data on its outlets, according to which 24 sata sells 
181,396 copies while 80,000 copies are distributed as a free afternoon edition; 
Večernji list sells 96,806 copies. However, this has to be taken with some reservation, 
since data from the media outlets are often geared to attracting advertisers. Similar 
data is not available on other websites of media outlets, nor are they accessible on the 
website of the Croatian Chamber of Economy (CCE).  
The audience share for 2009, as visible from the research agency Puls, shows 
that the daily 24 sata has the highest percentage of average issue readership (AIR)262 
(31%), followed by Jutarnji list (13.6%), Večernji list (13.4%), Slobodna Dalmacija 
(6.8%), Sportske novosti (4.4%) and Novi list (3.9%). In addition, the average reach263 
of 24 sata (60.7%) is followed by Jutarnji list (31.9%), Večernji list (30.4%), 
Slobodna Dalmacija (12.2%), Sportske novosti (11.1%) and Novi list (6.8%). 
According to the same source 44.7% of the sample does not read any final edition 
newspaper (AIR), while the average reach shows that 13.8% do not read any daily 
newspaper. 
The AIR for weeklies in 2008 shows that the women’s magazine Gloria is the 
most popular with 7.8% followed by the celebrity magazine Story (4.8%), the political 
weekly Globus  (3.7%) and the other political weekly Nacional (3,1%). The average 
reach of these weeklies is: Gloria – 19.8%; Story – 12.0%; Globus – 9.1%; Nacional 
– 7.8%. 
Nearly all major newspapers have a website that is free of charge. The only 
exception is Novi list. 
The Austrian company Styria Media International AG owns the daily 24 sata, 
Večernji list, and, since 2009, Poslovni dnevnik - a daily specialising in business and 
politics with a small number of printed copies.264 Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 
Medien Gruppe (WAZ) is the biggest shareholder of Europapress Holding (EPH): it 
holds 50% of the shares and controls the largest part of the Croatian print market. The 
media tycoon and board director of EPH, Ninoslav Pavić, owns a large part; however 
the real ownership structure is not transparent, neither are their business activities. An 
example is the sale contract of Slobodna Dalmacija, previously owned by the state 
and sold in 2005 under dubious circumstances. The sale contract has been proclaimed 
confidential, even though there is frequent public pressure to reveal it. EPH owns 
Jutarnji list, Slobodna Dalmacija, Sportske novosti and the popular weeklies Globus 
and Gloria. EPH also has many Internet portals, a news agency (EPEHA) and a photo 
agency (CROPIX).  
Notwithstanding the low transparency of the ownership shares it is evident 
that these foreign companies and their local subsidiaries dominate the Croatian print 
                                                 
261 Available at: http://www.styria-international.com/en/firma.php?tochter=3 (last visited on 
21/10/2010). 
262 AIR – average issue readership, the percentage of respondents from the whole sample or target 
group that read the last issue of a certain daily newspaper. MEDIApuls, “Media report, dailies 2009”, 
unpublished commissioned research study. 
263 Average reach – the percentage of respondents from a whole sample or target group that read at 
least one issue of a certain daily newspaper over a longer period (last fourteen issues). 
264 According to the Styria Group website, it is 12,000, but according to the data on planned copies, 
collected by the CCE, it is 4,860 copies. 
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market. They have also transferred their competition and development strategies into 
the local market. 
Due to the high number of print outlets, competition is high. The market of 
daily newspapers is regionally structured, while the magazines are nationally 
structured. However, there is a growing concentration of media ownership control by 
a small number of media companies. The estimation is that EPH holds around 60% of 
the total share in Croatia.  
 
Radio  
The total number of registered radio stations in Croatia is approximately 165 (more 
than 100 of them have Internet streaming).  There are six radio stations with national 
reach; the public service broadcasting (PSB) stations - Croatian Radio 1, Croatian 
Radio 2, Croatian Radio 3; and three commercial stations - Croatian Catholic Radio 
(100% owned by the Croatian Bishops’ Conference), Otvoreni Radio (owned by 
Adrimex (25%) and Media-Plan (75%)), and Narodni Radio (owned by Miroslav 
Drljača (20%), Juraj Hrvačić (60%) and Marko Perković (20%)). Seven PSB radio 
stations operate at a regional level in addition to 22 commercial regional stations. The 
rest are local. 
According to the research agency Puls, data from 2009 show that Narodni 
Radio (a radio station predominantly playing folk music) has the highest average daily 
reach265 (10%), followed by Antena Zagreb (8.7%), Otvoreni Radio (6.1%), and the 
PSB Croatian Radio 1 (5%). 
According to a study conducted in 2006 on the media market in Croatia, the 
radio market is regionally structured (the study on media markets in Croatia identified 
twenty one regional markets). Based on the Croatian average, local stations hold 47% 
of radio audiences, regional hold 18%, while national commercial stations hold 24%. 
Three national public channels have a joint share of 10% of the audiences. On 
average, in each region there are two or more strong radio competitors.266 
 
Television  
The terrestrial television broadcasters operating at the national level in Croatia include 
the PSB Croatian Radio-Television (HRT) with two channels, HTV 1 and HTV 2, and 
two commercial television broadcasters: RTL Television and Nova TV. In addition 
there are 13 local and 8 regional television broadcasters.  
Nova TV entered the Croatian market in 2000. It is owned by the Central 
European Media Enterprises (CME). RTL Television, launched in 2004, has the 
following ownership structure: RTL Group (74%), Agrokor (13%) and Atlantic Grupa 
(13%).267 
                                                 
265 Radio daily reach is the percentage of the sample or target population that listens to the radio station 
for at least five minutes daily. 
266 See: Z. Peruško and K. Jurlin “The Croatian media market: regulation and concentration trends”, 
unpublished study for the Media Division of the Council of Europe (2006). 
267 Electronic Media Council, “Televizijski nakladnici” [Television publishers], available at: 
http://www.e-mediji.hr/nakladnici/televizijski_nakladnici.php (last visited on 21/10/2010). 
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The television market in Croatia is national and highly concentrated. In 2005, 
the average audience share of the first three television channels in Croatia was 
92.22%, while all the regional and local television companies together had a share 
below 8%. In 2005, the public service broadcaster HRT had 53.97% of the audience 
share (HRT 1 – 38.18% and HRT 2 – 15.79%), while the commercial Nova TV had 
13.48 % and RTL 24.77%.  
Data from 2008 show a changing trend with a decrease of the audience share 
of the PSB (46.62%) and an increase in that of the commercial television companies: 
Nova TV (19.48%) and RTL (22.88%). It also shows that the regional and local 
televisions’ audience share is increasing and is now around 11%.268 
If the three television companies are compared in terms of genre coverage, the 
PSB HRT – in accordance with its public service role - has most broadcasting time 
devoted to news programmes (even though this percentage is low compared to other 
European PSBs), educational programmes, sports events, art and culture, religious 
programmes, history and other content that is considered to be of public interest. 
Nova TV focuses its output on movies, series and soaps, while RTL specialises in 
comedy, drama and light entertainment.  
A research study269 on primetime news bulletins that included all three 
television companies in a comparative perspective (for 2005 and 2007/2008) showed 
that international news (de-linked from Croatia in any way) were lacking. In 
2007/2008 the PSB news had 13.30% of their total number of clips devoted to 
international news, whereas Nova TV had 15.24% and RTL 17.79%, which was 
clearly insufficient. The same research confirmed a trend in the PSB that showed it 
was changing and adjusting to the commercial media in the battle for audiences and 
advertisers. In the period from 2005 till 2008, the number of crime stories has 
increased in all three television companies. In 2007/2008, the PSB had 9.90% of clips 
devoted to crime; Nova TV had 21% and RTL 18.4%.  
The PSB is financed through the licence fee. Owners of radio and television 
receivers are obliged to pay an amount of 1.5% of the average monthly net salary of 
the employees in the Republic of Croatia, on the basis of the statistical data for the 
previous year. Other means of financing for the PSB are advertising, production of 
audiovisual and other services (web pages, teletext, on demand services, production of 
music, concerts etc.).  
The PSB is currently faced with a multiple crisis: a financial crisis (due to 
dubious spending); an excessive number of employees (around 3,700); forms of 
censorship;270 and crises in the managerial structure (e.g. procedural problems in 
appointing the new General Manager). 
The multi-channel environment is developing in Croatia. There are services 
such as Internet streaming and the services provided in cooperation with 
telecommunications companies, such as Video on Demand and Internet Protocol 
                                                 
268 According to AGB Nielsen’s annual average audience share for television stations.  
269 See: T. Perišin, “Televizijske vijesti: u potrazi za vrijednostima” [TV news: a quest for values] 14(2) 
Medijska istraživanja (2008) 63. 
270 See: “Ravnatelj HRTa Vanja Sutlić opet prekoračio ovlasti (Kadija te tuži, kadija ti sudi ili Sutlić 
mimo odluka Etičkog povjerenstva”[CRT Director Vanja Sutlić  again oversteps his authorities (The 
judge accuses, the judge prosecutes or Sutlić oversteps decisions of the Ethic Board], Politika.com, 
available at: http://pollitika.com/ravnatelj-hrt-a-vanja-sutlic-opet-prekoracio-ovlasti-kadija-te-tuzi-
kadija-ti-sudi-ili-sutlic-mimo-odluka-etickog-povjerenstva (last visited on 21/10/2010). 
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Television (IPTV), offered by T-Com, the leading telecommunications provider, 
through their MaxTV HD service. Both the IPTV and digital terrestrial television 
(DTT) platforms are further developing to include new channels and services: the 
national television broadcasters plan to introduce linear services (including new 
specialised television channels) and non-linear services (including Internet video 
portals, programmes for mobile phones etc.). PSB HRT plans to launch three 
specialised programmes (most probably a news and current affairs channel, a sports 
channel and an educational channel) in addition to the two channels it already has, 
while the commercial television company Nova TV has plans for a movie channel and 
RTL TV plans to develop a children’s television channel. The only new specialised 
channel that has so far been awarded a national concession to begin experimental 
Digital Video Broadcasting – Terrestrial (DVB-T) is Kapital Network, the first 
business channel focusing on the economy and entrepreneurship in Croatia and the 
south-eastern European region. The tender issued by the Council for Electronic Media 
aimed at three specialised channels. However, due to the incompleteness and poor 
quality of the proposals, only Kapital Network received a concession.271 
 
Digitalisation of the electronic media  
The preparations for the digitalisation process in Croatia began in 2002 with a pilot 
DVB-T transmission. The DVB forum was initiated by the Croatian 
Telecommunication Agency (CTA), with the aim to create a national strategy in the 
transition from analogue to digital television and, more specifically, to prepare 
institutions and citizens in Croatia for the implementation of DVB technology, based 
on the trends in the EU. In 2003 the CTA started to prepare for the coming trends by 
monitoring new technologies and planning frequencies for the new platform. The 
frequency plan for digital television has been created and CTA has worked on its 
compatibility with the neighbouring countries. 
In 2008, the Croatian Government passed the Strategy of Transfer from 
Analogue to Digital Television Broadcasting, which opened the way for its gradual 
implementation. The analogue switch-off started at the beginning of 2010, and is 
planned to be accomplished by 1 January, 2011. To ease the transition to digital 
transmission the government has developed a subsidy system through which all users 
receive a voucher towards purchasing a receiver for all digital terrestrial television 
signals (terrestrial, cable or satellite).272 
 
New online media services 
The number of Internet users is growing in Croatia. The research conducted by GfK273 
in December 2009, showed that 66% of the households (approximately 951,000) have 
                                                 
271 See DVB, “Croatia”, available at:  
http://www.dvb.org/%28RoxenUserID=c03a046ae9180f0766c19ab67836ceb5%29/about_dvb/dvb_wo
rldwide/croatia/index.xml (last visited on 21/10/2010).  
272 See e-Croatia, “The second digital region in Croatia”, available at: http://www.e-
hrvatska.hr/sdu/en/e-hrv/vijest.html?h=/en/e-
hrv/contentParagraph/0111111111111111111116&c=/en/DigitalTelevision/Strategy-Implementation 
(last visited on 21/10/2010).  
273 See GfK Croatia, “Gdje smo danas u informatičkoj pismenosti?” [Where are we today in ICT 
literacy?], available at: http://www.gfk.hr/public_relations/press/press_articles/005364/index.hr.html 
(last visited on 21/10/2010).  
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a computer, while 57% of households have an Internet connection (the highest 
percentage of users, 61%, are located in the capital Zagreb and the surrounding area). 
Cable connection is the most popular, used by 40% of the respondents; 
wireless connection is used by 29%, analogue dial-up by 19%, cable Internet by 5%, 
ISDN modem by 5%, mobile phone by 3%, and other connections by 5%. The 
dominant service providers are T-Com (72%), Optima, Optinet and B-Net (around 6% 
each), Iskon Internet and CARNET (around 5% each). The most frequent modes of 
Internet usage are search engines, information seeking, email usage and usage of 
social networks. The Internet is more used by men than women (51% versus 49%) 
and by the younger population.  
The weekly reach274 of portals in 2009 shows that the website of the tabloid 
daily newspaper 24 sata (www.24sata.hr) is the most popular with 14.4% of users; 
followed by NET – 12.4% (www.net.hr); INDEX – 11.8% (www.index.hr); T-portal 
– 10.9% (www.tportal.hr); NJUSKALO – 9.1% (www.njuskalo.hr); Jutarnji list – 8% 
(www.jutranji.hr); Večernji list – 7.9% (www.vecernji.hr); and Moj posao  - 6.8% 
(www.moj-posao.net). The most preferred web portal is NET (5.5%), followed by 
INDEX (3.9%) and T-portal (2.7%). 
 
Social media online 
According to the GfK research,275 approximately 850,000 citizens use social network 
sites (SNS). Some 19% of Internet users use the Internet because of SNS. However, 
SNS are but one aspect of social media and other types are largely unaddressed for 
research in social science or market research in Croatia. Some data is available 
through specific international web services. Alexa276 places SNS Facebook 
(facebook.com) second on the “top sites” list in Croatia which confirms the 
aforementioned usage statistics. Video sharing service YouTube (youtube.com) 
comes in fourth and Wikipedia, the collaborative web-based encyclopaedia project 
(wikipedia.org), is in ninth place. The weblog publishing tool Blogger (blogger.com) 
has the fifteenth place and SNS and micro-blogging service Twiter (twitter.com) is 
number twenty one. According to the latest research, Internet users place the highest 
trust on Wikipedia as an information source (61%) followed by television (53%) and 
newspapers (49%).277 
There is also a noticeable trend of other websites using Facebook as part of 
their marketing strategy to improve Google search results. As an example, the Jutarnji 
list news web portal (jutarnji.hr) may be mentioned, since this portal has been one of 
the first to introduce direct commenting on its articles through Facebook.  
 
                                                 
274 Defined as the percentage of respondents from the whole sample or target group, that visited certain 
web portal in the last seven days. 
275 GfK Croatia, “Gdje smo danas u informatičkoj pismenosti?” for 2009. Based on a representative 
sample of citizens older than 15 years (n=1000). 
276 “Top sites in Croatia”, available at: http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/HR (last visited on 
21/10/2010). 
277 “Hrvata na Facebooku više od Slovenaca i Austrijanaca” [More Croatians on the facebook than 
Slovenians and Austrians], vecernji.hr, 01/09/2010, available at: http://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/hrvata-
facebooku-vise-slovenaca-austrijanaca-clanak-185913 (last visited on 21/10/2010). 
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News agencies 
HINA278 was the first Croatian news agency established by the Croatian News 
Agency Act (OG 96/01) in 1990. The new Act on HINA passed in 2001 enabled its 
transformation form state to public status. The funds of the agency are mainly ensured 
by agreements with the state and other users of its services. The agency offers 
multimedia services, a photo and audio service, and an electronic data base (EVA). It 
employs 160 people, of whom 130 are journalists and editors, with around 60 foreign 
correspondents. The position of journalists is further regulated through the statute and 
the collective agreement. HINA is a member of the European Alliance of News 
Agencies. 
STINA279 is a news agency based in Split, founded in 1991 with the aim of 
providing an alternative to the nationalistic and state discourse that prevailed at the 
beginning of the 1990s. It mainly focuses on the region and eastern and central 
Europe. It has a network of fifty correspondents, and has developed projects linked to 
information and educational topics. 
IKA280 is a Catholic news agency, founded in 1993, owned by the Croatian 
Bishops’ Conference. It gathers and distributes information linked to religious 
matters. It has a correspondence with Catholic agencies worldwide.  
EPEHA (news agency) and CROPIX (photo agency) were founded within the 
EPH Group and supply their own outlets with information.   
 
2.2 Media literacy and media status in society 
Media consumption in Croatia is clearly marked by the domination of electronic 
media, particularly television, and by the decline of the influence of printed media. 
Electronic media and media online are ever more easily accessed, but the involvement 
of the citizens in online content production is low.  
Croatia is a country of about 4,435 million inhabitants. Age structure 
according to the 30 June 2008 estimate is the following: 0-14 years – 15.4%, 15-64 
years – 67.3% and 65 and over 17.3%. According to the 2001 census the illiteracy rate 
was 1.8%, or 0.7% of the male population and 2.8% of the female population.281 
According to the research (N=1000) conducted by the research agency Media 
Meter and the Faculty of Political Science (University of Zagreb) at the end of 2009 
(“Croatian Journalists and Media in the Eyes of the Citizens: Credibility, 
Trustworthiness, and Impact”)282, the most credible sources of information are the 
Internet (45%), radio (39%), television (35%), magazines (30%) and weeklies (31%), 
and finally dailies (24%). Citizens are more inclined to trust foreign media while, in 
the national context, they are more inclined to trust local media than the national ones. 
                                                 
278 See HINA, official website, available at: http://websrv2.hina.hr/hina/web/index.action (last visited 
on 21/10/2010). 
279 See STINA, official website, available at: http://stina.hr/index_en.htm (last visited on 21/10/2010).  
280 See IKA, official website, available at: www.ika.hr (last visited on 21/10/2010). 
281 Central Bureau of Statistics, “Statistical yearbook 2009”, available at: www.dzs.hr (last visited on 
21/10/2010). 
282 See: “Hrvati vjeruju internetu i radiju, novinama i televiziji ne” [The Croatians trust internet and 
radio, not newspapers and television], JutarnjiLIST, JutarnjiLIST, 05/11/2009, available at:  
http://www.jutarnji.hr/gradani--novinari-su-pismeni--no-skloni-manipulaciji-i-
senzacionalizmu/334731/ (last visited on 21/10/2010).  
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Of 19 social institutions the citizens trust the Church most (3.44 on a 1-5 scale), 
followed by scientists (3.36), educational institutions (3.32) and the army (3.25). 
Journalists occupy the eighth place with (3.27) while political institutions are the least 
trusted (2.21).283  
 
2.3 Journalists’ background and education 
The only data available on journalists’ background and education is from the CJA 
regarding their membership. In 2009, the CJA had 3,185 members, of which 3,047 are 
full members (1,725 employed, 714 freelancers, 527 retired, and 81 journalists with 
an inactive status). There are 1,326 female and 1,859 male members in the CJA. 
According to the level of education members are distributed in the following 
categories: 19 members have a PhD, 44 have a master’s degree, 1,691 have a 
bachelor’s, 173 have other forms of higher education, 1,233 have accomplished 
secondary school, and 25 have no adequate education. Around 60% have 
accomplished higher education.  
Media-related studies are developed within two institutions at the University 
of Zagreb: the Faculty of Political Science - Journalism Studies, and University of 
Zagreb Croatian Studies - Communication Studies. The University of Dubrovnik 
(founded in 2003) has the Department of Communication Studies. In addition to these 
public institutions there are private higher education institutions that are oriented 
towards journalism practice, such as the Journalist School, formed within the NCL 
Group (owner of the political weekly Nacional) in which education lasts for three 
years. There are also short programmes for journalist training, for example those of 
the International Centre for the Education of Journalists (ICEJ). 
 
3. Media policy in Croatia  
A national media policy has never been elaborated. Most media policies are 
developed and implemented through the mandates and activities of the state bodies 
and organs involved in media regulation or through media companies present in the 
media market. The communication and cooperation among these actors is rare and 
occasional while the eventual impacts of their interactions on media policies are not 
quite clear. 
The main state and non-state actors involved in the media policy processes are 
presented in the following text, as well as the key legal provisions and acts that define 
and regulate freedom of expression and information. Some inadequacies of the legal 
acts are emphasised so that this sub-section is concluded with an assessment of access 
to information and freedom of the press. Structural regulations are examined in the 
sub-section that follows. Requirements and concessions for the establishment of 
media service providers are evaluated as well as transparency of the ownership 
structure, concentration restrictions and market competition. Considerations on 
content regulations follow to show that although considered adequate for electronic 
media, these regulations fail to address printed media. Quota rules and advertising 
                                                 
283 See “Istraživanja: Hrvati, većinom kseno i homofobi, najviše vjeruju Crkvi i Internetu” [Research: 
The Croatians, mostly xeno and homophobes, trust mostly the Church and Internet], Manjgura, 
available at: http://manjgura.hr/mediji/istrazivanja-hrvati-vecinom-kseno-i-homofobi-najvise-vjeruju-
crkvi-i-internetu/ (last visited on 21/10/2010).  
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regulations are presented, as well as defamation and libel rules. New provisions for 
electronic publications are discussed in line with adequate legal acts. Access to 
information and protection of journalists are also examined. The chapter concludes 
with the overview of media policy tools not mentioned previously, but which 
influence the overall media policy in Croatia. 
 
3.1 Actors of media regulation and policy 
The Croatian Parliament, the Croatian Government, the Ministry of Culture, the 
Ministry of Sea, Transport and Infrastructure as well as specialised agencies and 
councils are involved in media regulation and policy. 
The Ministry of Culture is the central state administrative body which has 
responsibility for creating the legislative framework in the media field. Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Central State Administrative Bodies Act,284 the Ministry of Culture 
deals with administrative affairs in the area of public information. These affairs 
include various activities such as drafting of media acts and giving legal opinions and 
interpretations of provisions of the media acts. These duties are discharged by the 
Media Department of the Ministry of Culture. However, the Ministry of Culture is not 
in the position to influence the independence and functioning of the media 
organisations and companies directly, but its indirect influence is nevertheless rather 
strong. Its task is to provide for the clear and effective legal framework which has to 
be practically implemented. The Croatian media legislation was assessed as fully 
harmonised with the European media standards and the acquis communnitaire. 
The Electronic Media Council (EMC) is a body of the Electronic Media 
Agency which is responsible for regulatory tasks. The EMC is established by the new 
Electronic Media Act (EMA)285 as an independent regulatory body in the field of 
electronic media. The EMC has seven members (including the president) appointed 
by the Parliament, upon recommendation from the Government, with a mandate of 
five years. It is financed with 0.5% of the total annual gross income gained in the 
previous year by all media service providers offering and engaging in audio and 
audiovisual media services. The tasks of the Council are to conduct the procedures for 
granting concessions and licences; implement provisions relating to the protection of 
pluralism and diversity; ensure the supervision of implementation of provisions on 
programme principles and obligations; consider the complaints of citizens on the 
media service providers’ behaviour; cooperate with regulatory bodies of other states 
and the European Commission. The EMC has an important and powerful role in 
media regulation, especially in the regulation of commercial television. It has at its 
disposal an administrative service mandated to monitor programmes of electronic 
media. However, the work of this service is not transparent enough and it is 
sometimes inadequate. Infringements of EMA are clearly visible, but there are no 
repercussions for the media organisations that do not respect its provisions. 
The Ministry of Sea, Transport and Infrastructure (MSTI)286 is responsible for 
electronic communications. The MSTI creates strategies for the technological 
                                                 
284 OG 199/03, 30/04, 136/04, 22/05, 44/06, 5/08, 27/08 and 77/09. 
285 OG 153/09, available at: http://www.e-mediji.hr/propisi/zakonski_akti.php (last visited on 
21/10/2010). 
286 See Ministry of Sea, Transport and Infrastructure, official website, available at: www.mmpi.hr (last 
visited on 21/10/2010). 
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development of electronic communication in Croatia and monitors its implementation. 
The national regulatory body is the Croatian Post and Electronic Communications 
Agency (CPECA), a public agency in charge of sustainable competitive conditions in 
the market, the monitoring and regulation of prices and the general business 
requirements in the electronic communication market. The Agency is also in charge 
of market analysis; it defines the rights and obligations of telecommunication 
operators and decides on the allocation, transfer and withdrawal of licences. It also 
creates the radio frequencies plan, manages the technical maintenance of the 
radiofrequency spectrum, monitors the implementation of ECA and cooperates with 
the EU regulatory bodies and other legal entities. The CPECA reports its annual 
activity to the Croatian Parliament and to the Government. Funds for carrying out 
these tasks are secured from various fees (for the use of addresses and numbers, the 
use of  radio-frequency spectrum etc.) and from a percentage of the total annual gross 
revenue earned by operators in the previous calendar year through providing 
electronic communication networks and services in the market. 
The Parliamentary Committee on Information, Computerisation and the 
Media (PCICM)287 of the Croatian Parliament participates in the enactment of 
legislation in the field of media, and monitors the implementation of media policy.  
The regulatory body for market competition is the Agency for Market 
Competition Protection (AMCP) and the Council for Market Competition Protection 
(CMCP) that operates within the agency. The CMCP consists of five members 
appointed by the Croatian Parliament upon recommendation from the Government.  
The area of audiovisual activities is within the purview of the Ministry of 
Culture. The public regulatory body is the Croatian Audiovisual Centre (CAC),288 
financed through the state budget and its own activities. Among other tasks, the CAC 
issues public calls for applications for funding of audiovisual production. 
The National Programme for the Promotion of Audiovisual Activity adopted 
by the Minister of Culture for a four-year period, aims to define a framework for the 
stimulation of audiovisual activities. It is funded through the state budget and a part of 
the annual gross income derived from the exercise of audiovisual activities by: 
Croatian Radio-Television (2%); broadcasters of television programmes at the 
national level (0.8%); broadcasters of television programmes at the regional level 
(0.5%); operators of cable distribution systems (0.5%); operators in fixed and mobile 
telecommunications networks and Internet providers (1%); and individuals who 
display audiovisual work in public (0.1%). 
The Croatian Journalists’ Association (CJA) is a professional association of 
journalists which has over three thousand members. It is a member of the 
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ). The main goals of the CJA are as 
follows: fulfilling of the professional interests, ethical standards and ensuring the 
freedom of public expression; promoting the constitutional right of the public to be 
informed on all events in the society and the right of any person to the freedom of 
expression, opinion and accessibility to the public media; protection of the honour and 
dignity of the profession; protection of journalists against the self–will of publishers 
and preventing monopoly; material and social protection of journalists. This 
                                                 
287 See Croatian parliament, page of the Parliamentary Committee on Information, Computerisation and 
the Media, available at: http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?sec=2665 (last visited on 21/10/2010). 
288 Croatian Audiovisual Centre, official website, available at: 
http://www.havc.hr/index_eng.php?menu_id=9 (last visited on 21/10/2010).  
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Association has an Assembly as the main administrative body, which elects a 
President, Executive Board, Supervisory Board, Council of Honour and some 
members of the Administrative Board of the Solidarity Fund. The CJA has a 
significant influence in the media policy formulation and implementation due to the 
activities of its members, as well as due to the participation in drafting of past and 
current media legislation. Its assessments of particular issues related to the media 
freedom are crucial in shaping of public opinion and initiating necessary steps for 
legislative changes. Its Council of Honour has a significant role in maintaining high 
ethical standards in the journalists’ profession.  
The Croatian Journalist Union (CJU),289 founded in 1990, has more than 
3,000 members. Its activities include the free provision of legal advice in labour 
disputes between media owners and journalists. The CJU also negotiates collective 
work agreements for journalists and media workers with the state and media owners 
at the national level, in order to protect all workers, especially those working in small 
local media and part-time media associates. This association has raised issues 
regarding the worsening of the position of journalists in Croatia, as they have been 
increasingly subjected to precarious work, with short-term contracts, which keeps 
them in a constant position of insecurity. At the same time, media owners profit by 
avoiding paying social benefits (which is a backlash not only to journalists, but to the 
state’s taxation system as well). This has serious repercussions on the quality of 
journalists’ work and media performance in general.  
The Croatian Helsinki Committee, established in 1993, has played a role in the 
monitoring of the freedom of information and expression. 
The Centre for Media and Communication Research, established in 2007 at 
the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Zagreb is the university centre for 
the study of media and communication. It collects analyses and evaluates information 
on media.  
 
3.2 The media regulatory framework 
3.2.1 Freedom of expression and information 
The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia290 guarantees freedom of speech and is 
thought in accordance with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights291 (UDHR) and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).292 The Constitution (Article 38) defines the freedom of expression in its full 
complexity guaranteeing its main components: freedom of the press and other media 
communication, freedom of speech and public expression as well as the right of free 
establishment of all institutions of public communication. This constitutional 
provision forbids any form of censorship. It also guarantees the right of correction to 
anyone whose constitutional and legal rights have been violated by public 
                                                 
289 See Croatian Journalist Union, official website, available at: http://www.snh.hr/ (last visited on 
21/10/2010).  
290 OG 56/90, 135/97, 113/00, 28/01 and 55/01- corrigendum. 
291 United Nations, “The universal declaration of human rights”, available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (last visited on 21/10/2010). 
292 See Human Rights Education Associates, “Convention for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11”, available at: 
http://www.hrea.org/erc/Library/hrdocs/coe/echr.html (last visited on 21/10/2010). 
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information. In Article 39 of the Constitution, incitement to war, violence, national, 
race or religious hatred, and any other type of intolerance is prohibited. These 
constitutional provisions lay down the legal basis which is further elaborated in the 
media legislation.  
In the spirit of the above mentioned constitutional provision, Article 3 of the 
Media Act (MA)293 states that the freedom of expression and freedom of media shall 
be guaranteed. This article even further deepens the meaning of the freedom of media 
stating that the freedom of media is particularly based on: freedom of the expression 
of opinion, independence of media, freedom of collecting, researching, publishing and 
disseminating information for the purpose of informing the public; pluralism and 
diversity of media, free flow of information and openness of the media for different 
opinions, beliefs and for various contents, accessibility to public information, 
respecting the protection of human personality, privacy and dignity, freedom of 
establishing legal persons for the performance of all media, printing and distribution 
of press and other media from the country and abroad, production and publishing of 
radio, television and other electronic media, autonomy of editors-in-chief, journalists 
and other authors of programme contents in compliance with  professional codex. The 
limitation of the freedom of media shall be permitted only when and as necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or public 
peace and order, prevention of disorder or criminal acts, protection of health and 
morality, protection of the reputation or rights of others, prevention of disclosing 
confidential information or for preservation of the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary exclusively in the manner stipulated by this Law.  
This declaratory provision covers all aspects of freedom of expression, but it 
lacks its full elaboration in the MA. From the observations of the public and experts it 
can be concluded that the improper regulation of issues such as respecting the 
protection of human personality, privacy and dignity could be stated as the main 
shortcoming of this Act.  
The protection of interests such as human personality, privacy and dignity 
often compete with freedom of expression. Yet these interests should not always 
triumph over freedom of expression. However, the lack of journalists’ and editors’ 
professionalism in treating very delicate private matters has often been the stumbling 
block to the implementation of the formally correct legal norms which need to be 
backed by further elaboration of the rules for their enforcement. This points out to 
another very serious problem: the lack of any sanctions for the breach of the 
guaranties defined by this Act.  
Under the pressure of some international organisations that monitored the 
drafting of the MA and which were concerned with political influence on the media, a 
provision was incorporated in Article 1(2) of the MA, according to which the 
provisions of this Act shall be applied and interpreted in line with the ECHR. 
According to Article 10 of that Convention the right of freedom of expression 
includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. However, the MA 
cannot provide for the full implementation of this provision since it lacks the needed 
application rules and measures as well as criteria of media freedoms. The Act does 
not even prescribe the obligation for the media publishers to publish truthful, 
                                                 
293 OG 163/03, 59/04, available at: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/306926.html (last 
visited on 21/10/2010). 
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complete and timely information respecting the right of the public to be informed 
about events, phenomena, persons, things and activities as well as the rules of 
journalists’ profession and ethics. The issues of the truthful and complete information 
as well as obeying the rules of journalists’ profession and ethics regularly arise as the 
unsolvable problems in the implementation of this Act. 
The same importance to the Convention is attached in the wording of Article 
2(4) of the Electronic Media Act (EMA)294 which states that the ECHR shall apply to 
the relations governed by that Act. Article 3 of the EMA states that the freedom of 
expression as well as the freedom of full programmes of electronic media shall be 
guaranteed. Article 8 stipulates that the Republic of Croatia shall ensure the freedom 
of transmission and reception of audio and audiovisual media services from the EU 
Member States and other European states party to the European Convention on 
Transfrontier Television of the Council of Europe and that it may, in particular cases, 
restrict the freedom of broadcasting of those services only in compliance with 
international agreements and this Act. EMA incorporates the provisions of the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive and formally guarantees to the media service 
providers the right to design programmes independently. It also envisages their 
liability for the programme. Their eventual exposure to indirect interference of their 
owners or co-owners e.g. local and regional units of self-government, cannot exclude 
them from legal responsibility.  
The Republic of Croatia is a party to the European Convention on 
Transfrontier Television which in Article 4 regulates that the Parties shall ensure 
freedom of expression and information in accordance with Article 10 of the ECHR 
and that they shall guarantee freedom of reception and shall not restrict the 
retransmission on their territories of 
programme services which comply 
with the terms of this Convention. 
There have been no cases of 
restricting the freedom of reception 
and retransmission of programme 
services in the Republic of Croatia. 
Even though the legal 
framework ensures freedom of 
expression, political pressures are 
still occasionally present. Criticism 
of the establishment still has 
repercussions. Powerful media 
moguls and entrepreneurs guard the 
mediated sphere and diminish the 
space for critique. This is 
particularly problematic for small 
media outlets that are critical and 
focus on investigative journalism.295 Needless to say, this reduces media diversity.  
                                                 
294 OG 122/03, 79/07, 32/08, 153/09, available at: http://www.e-mediji.hr/propisi/zakonski_akti.php 
(last visited on 21/10/2010). 
295 The Feral Tribune - a critical weekly - did not manage to attract advertisers because they could not 
afford to be associated with the paper; they were threatened by large players that were often the target 
of criticism in the Feral Tribune.  
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Another problem is access to information. Public institutions retain a closed 
position towards the public, regardless of the regulatory provisions in the Access to 
Information Act (AIA)296 that guarantees access to public sources. This creates 
difficulties in journalists’ work. The pilot research, ordered by the CJA and the 
Association for Independent Media Culture, showed that most of the journalists were 
denied access to information (73%), by ministries and public institutions (schools, 
hospitals, faculties, social institutions). The denial of access was usually not explained 
but was brushed aside with the excuse of “not having the information”. The average 
period of waiting for an answer was around two weeks. However, even though most 
of the journalists stated that they are familiar with the AIA, they never used it as an 
argument for their enquiry.297 The Freedom House analysis for 2010298 puts Croatia 
on the 85th place in the global press freedom rankings (196 states), and gives it a 
“partly free” status. This low ranking is partially a result of the killing of two 
journalists in October 2009. However, the “partly free” status seems to be relatively 
stable with a slight tendency to worsening. The above chart clearly demonstrates such 
a tendency by showing the scores for legal, political and economic environment for 
Croatia in the period from 2002 until 2010.299 The legal environment tends to be most 
stable which can lead to the conclusion that the implementation is the main problem. 
 
 
3.2.2 Structural regulation 
In the Republic of Croatia any natural or legal person may establish a newspaper 
publisher or other media services provider. According to Article 11 of the Media Act 
(MA) and Article 2 of the Electronic Media Act (EMA) a newspaper publisher, radio 
and television broadcaster and other media service providers may be established and 
entered into a court or other register as a legal or natural person, provided that the 
legally stipulated conditions have been met and that they have a seat, i.e. a permanent 
residence and the editor’s office seat in the Republic of Croatia. The press registration 
is required. A newspaper publisher is obliged to report the publishing of the press in 
the Register kept by the Croatian Chamber of Economy. This model of establishing 
newspaper publishers and other media services providers meets all democratic 
standards and corresponds to the right of establishment criteria in the EU. 
Governmental bodies do not have any role in establishment of publishers and 
broadcasters. 
According to Article 22 paragraph 1 of the EMA, providing television and/or 
radio media services may be performed by legal and natural persons (television and/or 
radio broadcasters) entered in the court register or other register prescribed in the 
Republic of Croatia in accordance with this Act and separate regulation. Operators 
must have obtained a concession and concluded a concession contract in accordance 
                                                 
296 OG 172/03, available at: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/307079.html (last visited on 
21/10/2010). 
297 The research was conducted by the sociologist Snježana Beros. See H-Alter, “Kokoši na tri noge” 
[Three-legged chicken], available at:  
http://www.h-alter.org/vijesti/mediji/kokosi-na-tri-noge (last visited 22/10/2010).  
298 Freedom House, Freedom of the press 2010, “Table of global press freedom rankings”, available at: 
http://freedomhouse.org/images/File/fop/2010/FOTP2010Global&RegionalTables.pdf (last visited on 
21/10/2010).   
299 For yearly analyses see Freedom House, Freedom of the press, available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16 (last visited on 21/10/2010). 
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with the EMA and the Concessions Act (CA).300 The Electronic Media Council 
(EMC) as an independent regulatory body conducts the procedure of granting 
concessions in compliance with the EMA, the CA and the ordinance referred to in 
Article 73(3) of the EMA. The EMC enters into a concession contract with the most 
advantageous tendered pursuit to the EMA. Also the EMC conducts the procedure of 
granting licences for providing audio and/or audiovisual media services on demand 
and satellite, Internet and cable transfer of audiovisual and/or radio programmes. This 
procedure of granting the concessions and licences, clearly prescribed by the EMA, 
satisfies the necessary criterion of transparency. 
The protection of pluralism and diversity in the media finds its realisation 
through a number of measures prescribed by the media legislation. Since the 
application of general competition rules are not sufficient to guarantee the observance 
of demands concerning cultural and media diversity and the pluralistic expressions of 
ideas and opinions, the most important measures for the protection of these values 
prescribed by the media legislation are the transparency of ownership structure and 
prohibition of the impermissible concentration.  
The media legislation guarantees transparency of ownership structure by 
imposing the obligation of publishing in the official gazette data on stock holders and 
share holders every year. According to Article 37 of the MA an impermissible 
concentration of enterprises in the market of general information daily newspapers or 
general information weekly magazines shall be considered to exist if the market share 
of participants in that particular enterprises’ concentration exceeds 40% of all sold 
copies. This restriction imposed to the newspaper publishers was at the time of the 
adoption of this law criticised as an inappropriate threshold in a rather small Croatian 
print market. However, there were no proposals for its removal or imposition of a 
harsher measure that would eventually allow for an increase of the sold copies.  
The EMA (Article 54) regulates impermissible concentration taking into 
account the horizontal integration phenomena as well as vertical integration 
phenomena. Article 54 precisely regulates the impermissible concentration in the 
areas of TV and radio broadcasting and print media.301  
According to Article 60(1) of the EMA a legal person whose activity is 
collection, shaping and mediation in advertising, as well as a natural or legal person, 
or a group of connected persons, that has more than 10% of the ownership share in the 
capital of an advertising company, i.e. property of that sort, or has more than 10% of 
management or voters’ rights, may not be a television and/or radio broadcaster and/or 
founder of radio and/or television broadcaster, nor can it have ownership of stocks or 
shares in the capital of the television and/or radio broadcaster. According to Article 61 
                                                 
300 OG 125/08, available at: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/306318.html (last visited on 
21/10/2010). 
301 It regulates concentration  for TV and/or radio broadcasters with a concession on state level in 
relation to other broadcasters on the regional, county, city or municipality level; in relation to 
publishers of daily newspapers; in relation to a legal persons who perform the activity of a newspaper 
agency; the television and/or radio broadcaster with a concession on state level which simultaneously 
publishes daily newspapers; television and/or radio broadcaster with concession at the local or regional 
level in relation to other broadcasters at the local or regional level; television and/or radio broadcaster 
with concession at the local or regional level who simultaneously publish daily newspapers; the media 
service provider who has the licence for satellite, Internet and cable transmission and who 
simultaneously publishes daily newspapers; the media service provider who has the licence for 
satellite, Internet and cable transmission and who has a certain share of the capital of a publisher who 
publishes daily newspapers. 
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of the EMA an operator who performs the activity of audiovisual and/or radio 
programme transmission may not be the television and/or radio broadcaster as well as 
the media service provider who has the licence for satellite, Internet and cable 
transmission of the audiovisual and/or radio programme or other permissible ways of 
transmission. The mentioned provisions on ownership and concentration also apply to 
foreign legal and natural persons, regardless of the state in which they have their 
seats, i.e. permanent residence. 
The regulations on the protection of competition, through the Market 
Competition Protection Act (MCPA)302, also apply to publishers, legal persons 
engaged in media distribution, and other legal persons performing tasks related to 
public informing as well as to media service providers. This Act generally regulates 
the abuse of dominant position and incompatible concentration and represents the 
additional tool for the protection of plurality and diversity in the media sector.  
However, some of these provisions have been criticised by the Croatian 
Chamber of Economy (CCE), engaged in the collection of data. The CCE argues that 
there is no official classification of relevant markets, which results in figures on 
market shares being calculated in an arbitrary manner. Furthermore, the monitoring of 
the provision according to which media owners have to make their data public is not 
regulated and nobody knows whether this is implemented or not. The overall 
evaluation of the MA is that it is outdated and needs to be written in accordance with 
new developments in the media sphere.  
 
3.2.3 Content regulation 
Regarding general content requirements designed to satisfy citizens’ information 
needs and ensure equal media access for diverse points of view, the Croatian media 
legislation regulates these questions in a satisfactory manner, especially in relation to 
the commercial electronic media. However, there is a lacuna in the Media Act (MA) 
in relation to the obligation of the printed media since this Act does not prescribe the 
obligation for the media publishers to publish truthful, complete and timely 
information respecting the right of the public to be informed about events, 
phenomena, persons, things and activities.  
This Act does not regulate the printed media principles and obligations 
regarding the citizens’ information needs and the equal media access for diverse 
points of view.303 In spite of the fact that it provides for the journalists’ right to 
express their standpoints regarding all events, occurrences, persons, subjects and 
activities, it fails to ensure the adoption of self-regulatory media statutes that should 
enable journalists to exercise these rights by regulating relationships between the 
publisher, editor-in-chief and journalist as well as their mutual rights and obligations. 
The media statutes should be defined within the first six months of the media 
organisation’s establishment and operation. If this is not the case, it should be defined 
through an arbitration procedure requested by the journalists’ representative. 
However, it is suspected that almost none of the media organisations have followed 
this regulation, and this is a problem that has been raised by the CJU. 
                                                 
302 OG 48/95, 52/97, 89/98, 122/03, 79/09, available at:  
http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2009_07_79_1877.html (last visited on 21/10/2010). 
303 In light of the freedom of expression guarantees, the state refrains from intervening in the regulation 
of contents. 
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The publishers in the Republic of Croatia are free to establish the programme 
basis of the media independently. Prior to a change or important supplement to the 
programme basis, the publisher is obliged to obtain the opinion of the editorial board 
(MA, Article 14). According to Article 7(1) of the Electronic Media Act (EMA), 
media service providers, in compliance with this Act, independently form the 
programme basis of the media and are liable for the programme provision. 
The question of the codes of conduct, ethics codes and codes on editorial 
freedom is generally regulated by the MA. A journalist has the right to refuse to 
prepare, write or participate in the drafting of a report, the content of which is 
contrary to the rules of the journalist profession and ethics, about which he will 
inform the editor-in-chief in writing. If a journalist refuses to act upon an order 
because, by doing so, he would break the rules of the journalists’ profession, the 
employer may not terminate his working contract, decrease his salary or alter his 
position in the editorial board. If in case of a dispute journalists express facts which 
justify the doubt that the termination of the working contract, decrease of salary or 
altered position in the editorial board is the consequence of refusing to act upon order, 
the burden of proof falls on the publisher (MA, Article 28). The ethics code has been 
established by the Croatian Journalists’ Association, but it has been regularly 
breached since this organisation has not a clout to actively enforce the ethics rules 
among its members. 
Regarding quota rules and obligations to invest in content production, the 
EMA imposes on the broadcasters the obligation to ensure broadcasting a prescribed 
portion of own production, European works and audiovisual works of independent 
producers. According to the Draft Proposal of the Croatian Radio Television Act 
(CRTA), the Croatian Radio Television will have a significantly higher quota and 
obligations regarding the mentioned works than the commercial broadcasters. These 
rules are generally observed except the quota for the own production which has been 
breached in prime time by commercial broadcasters. The new EMA has lowered this 
quota in order to accommodate economic potential of the broadcasters. 
The current CRTA (2003) emphasises the importance of balanced 
broadcasting of information, culture, education and entertainment. The content has to 
be of interest to the public, defined as political, economic, social, health, cultural, 
educational, scientific, religious, ecological, sport and other events that facilitate an 
open and free debate. CRTA stresses that attention has to be given to specific groups 
such as the Croatian diaspora, national minorities, children and youth, and people 
with disabilities. More than 55% of the programme has to be produced in the Croatian 
language (particularly movies, documentaries, cartoons and entertainment), while 
50% of the remaining programme has to be in a European language or of European 
production. (Article 10) A minimum of 10% of the television programme has to be 
produced by independent producers (exceptions are news, sports events, games and 
advertisements) (Article 11). 
Radio and television broadcasters operating at regional and local levels have 
to devote 10% of their total weekly programme to news. National operators have to 
include 30 minutes of news programme daily, with one news bulletin at least 20 
minutes in length (EMA, Article 36). The television broadcaster has to devote 20% of 
its daily programme to its own production, while the similar quota for radio 
broadcasters is 30% of their daily programme. Radio broadcasters also have to play 
20% of Croatian music daily (EMA, Article 39). 
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European audiovisual works (which includes Croatian audiovisual works and 
own production) need to comprise the majority of broadcasting time. In order to fulfil 
this requirement, the broadcasters annually have to increase it by 20%, compared to 
the previous year. (EMA, Articles 40, 41, 42). This does not include news, sports, 
games, advertisements, teletext and telemarketing. Independent production has to 
comprise 10% of annual broadcasting time (EMA, Article 44).  
A new draft of the CRTA has been prepared and was a matter for public 
debate in April 2010. The main reason for change is harmonisation with EU 
regulations, particularly concerning the protection of market competition which aims 
to ensure that public services are clearly separated from the commercial activities of 
the PSB. In this respect the law has to be harmonised with the Rules on State 
Subsidies for Public Broadcasting Services304 through which the public function of 
the PSB has to be more precisely defined.  
The act needs to be changed in respect to technological innovations that enable 
diversification of services through different platforms of distribution. New regulations 
are needed that would be in accordance with the new EMA. The proposed draft 
introduces a five-year contract between the CRT and the Croatian Government that 
would define the financial assets needed to fulfil the contractual programme-related 
units. Funds gained through state subsidies (licence fees) can only be used for the 
costs of maintaining the public service. The envisaged changes diminish the role of 
the Programme Council, particularly to the domain of programme monitoring and the 
appointment of editors, while the Supervisory Board takes over the appointment of 
the general manager and financial supervision. So far the consensus on the draft act 
proposal and the way the PBS should operate in future has not been reached. 
Advertising is regulated in the MA (Article 20) and relates to all media. It is 
also regulated in the EMA (for all electronic media) and the CRTA305 for public 
service broadcasting. Regulation is in line with the current European standards and 
the EU legislation. The essential change is expected as regards the Croatian Radio 
Television since the draft proposal of the CRTA significantly shortens the duration of 
commercials in each of the HRT programmes in television programme channels, 
especially in prime time which will undoubtedly improve the market position of the 
commercial broadcasters and their ability to invest more in their programme. 
The Illegal Advertising Act (IAA)306 applies to advertising rules linked to fair 
competition. The EMA (Article 16) prohibits covert audiovisual commercial 
communication and subliminal techniques. The overall duration of advertising and 
teleshopping for television broadcasters shall not exceed 12 minutes per hour. These 
can be inserted between and within a programme, but in such a way that the integrity 
and value of the programme and authors’ rights are not violated. For non-profit media 
the overall time of advertising cannot exceed three minutes per hour (EMA, Article 
48). 
In respect to defamation and libel rules, in the light of the present legal 
provisions on the criminal offences of libel and defamation in Article 199, 200 and 
                                                 
304 OG 31/10, available at: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2010_03_31_726.html (last 
visited on 21/10/2010). 
305 OG 25/03, available at: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2003_02_25_362.html (last 
visited on 21/10/2010).  
306 OG 43/09, available at: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2009_04_43_984.html (last 
visited on 21/10/2010).  
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203 of the Penal Code,307 it is an accepted view that the criminal offences mentioned 
may be considered decriminalised since the current provisions prescribe a fine for the 
defamation as well as for press libel. However, the Penal Code expressly stipulates 
that there is no criminal action if a defamation or libellous content has been rendered 
in the journalist job with the exception of the behaviour that is only aimed at harming 
one’s honour and reputation which can be clearly concluded from the way of 
expressing and other circumstances. 
Also, according to Article 21(1) and (7) of the MA, the publisher who by 
publishing information in the media causes damage to another person shall be obliged 
to pay compensation, except in cases stipulated by that Act. If the information has 
been authorised, and certain parts thereof contain evident insults or libels, the 
authorisation shall not exclude joint liability of both the publisher and the editor in 
chief, if they failed to act in good faith. 
According to Article 7 of the MA every person shall have the right to the 
protection of privacy, dignity, reputation and honour. A person performing public 
service or duty shall have the right to the protection of privacy except in cases related 
to public service or duty that he performs. A person who by his statements, behaviour 
and other acts relating to his personal or family life himself draws attention of the 
public cannot request the same level of the protection of privacy as other citizens. 
There shall be no violation of the right to the protection of privacy if in relation to the 
published information a justified interest of the public prevails over the protection of 
privacy with regard to journalist profession or information (Article 8). It is assumed 
that the protection of privacy is the weakest part of the Act because there is a 
widespread opinion that the media trespassing on someone’s privacy happens too 
often without any responsibility on the part of the media. 
According to Article 16 of the MA, the media shall be obliged to respect 
privacy, dignity, reputation and honour of citizens, especially of children, youth and 
the family. The publishing of information that discloses identity (e.g. of a child, of a 
witness) shall be prohibited. This provision is also regularly breached on the 
detriment of the children and young people without any consequence on the part of 
the media.  
Concerning the rules for private websites, blogs, news groups and civic 
journalism, the EMA regulates electronic publications i.e. edited websites and/or 
portals containing electronic versions of printed press and/or media information thus 
being available to general public regardless of their volume. The Act forbids the 
hatred speech in the electronic publications as well as the contents which offend 
human dignity and contain immoral and pornographic content or might seriously 
impair the physical, mental or moral development of minors. The Croatian media 
legislation does not regulate private websites and blogs, although the rule that the 
hatred speech is not allowed on the private websites and blogs applies as a general 
rule deriving from other legislation. 
The MA contains the rules regarding information gathering processes. Article 
6 of the MA states as follows: “With the aim of publishing information through the 
media, bodies of executive, legislative and judiciary power and bodies of local and 
regional self-government units, as well as other legal and natural persons who 
                                                 
307 OG 110/97, 27/98, 50/00, 129/00, 51/01, 111/03, 190/03, 105/04, 84/05, 71/06, 110/07 and 152/08 
(last visited on 21/10/2010).  
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perform public service and/or duty, shall be obliged to provide accurate, complete and 
timely information on issues from their scope of activity. Information held by the 
mentioned persons shall be accessible to journalists under equal condition” (MA, 
Article 6(1)-(2). This issue is also regulated by the Access to Information Act (AIA). 
Generally speaking, these legal provisions regulating the access to information have 
not been fully observed so far by the private and public (state bodies, bodies of local 
and regional self-government) legal persons, which has added to the partial 
obstruction of the fulfilling of the media’s mission to inform citizens truthfully, 
completely and timely about the events, phenomena, persons, things and activities. 
This problem has been spotted as very significant so that amending of the AIA is 
under way. 
The protection of journalists’ sources is also addressed by the MA in the way 
that it gives guarantees against the disclosure of the published information. In the 
specified cases which relate to interest of national security, territorial integrity and 
protection of the health the court may order the journalist to disclose data on the 
source of the published information or information he intends to publish. Although 
this provision was seen as an intrusion on the journalists’ freedom there has never 
been a request for its enforcement before the court. Furthermore, the courts have no 
means to enforce it since there is no fine prescribed in the law in case of the breach of 
such a court order.  
By virtue of Article 3 of the MA limitation to the freedom of the media may 
be permitted only when and to the extent necessary in a democratic society in the 
interest of national security. This situation has never occurred in the Republic of 
Croatia even during the war in the 1990s. The same applies for the provision of the 
EMA that openly forbids the audio and/or audiovisual services jeopardising the 
constitutional order and national security [but this situation also has never happened].  
 
3.3 Other media policy tools 
The Fund for Promotion of Pluralism and Diversity of Electronic Media which is the 
Fund of the Croatian Electronic Media Agency (EMA, Articles 63 and 64) has a 
significant impact on the democratic functions of the media. The Fund’s means (3% 
from the CRT fee) are regularly used for stimulating the production and broadcasting 
of audiovisual and radio programmes of television and/or radio broadcasters at the 
local and regional levels which are of public interest and audiovisual and radio 
programmes of non-profit television and/or radio broadcasters (community television 
/radio). The financing from the Fund includes particularly programmes important for 
the exercise of citizens’ right to public information, promotion of cultural creativity 
and fostering of cultural heritage, development of upbringing, education, science and 
arts, promotion of works in dialects of the Croatian language, promotion of special 
programmes in areas of special state concern, national minorities in the Republic of 
Croatia, encouragement of the development of the awareness of gender equality, and 
promotion of programmes for children and youth aiming at enhancing their well 
being. 
The Fund is also used for stimulating employment of highly qualified skilled 
employees in television and/or radio broadcasters at the local and regional levels and 
non-profit television and/or radio broadcasters. Notably, it is the only financier to a 
number of local broadcasters since they would not be able to operate without financial 
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means earmarked for their programmes. The role of the Fund is especially essential 
for the national minorities’ media which broadcast in their languages. Grants are 
distributed once a year based on the public tender and prescribed criteria. 
 
4.  Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment 
The deregulation in the media sector took place during the 1990s and started with the 
adoption of the Act on Public Information (1996) liberalising domestic media 
ownership. This Act did not contain any restrictions on the printed and electronic 
media ownership, which triggered the establishment of many new printed media. The 
media ownership restrictions for the printed media were imposed by the Media Act 
(MA) in 2003, in the form which is effective today. Two foreign TV companies 
entered the media market in 2000 and 2003, but the deregulation of the electronic 
media started in 2003 when the Croatian Radio Television Act (CRTA) prescribed the 
privatisation of the third channel of the Croatian Radio Television (CRT) which was 
allocated to the private company established by the foreign capital. In addition to the 
CRT, 24 television and 155 radio concessionaries are active in the Republic of Croatia 
today, while the number of electronic publishers has not been established. The 
number of printed media oscillates between 2,525 in 2008 and about 850 in 2010. 
All political forces as well as the proponents of foreign investment supported 
deregulation in the media sector predicting a fast development and benefits for both 
the citizens and the media. However, the first results of liberalisation warned about 
the consequences of uncontrolled privatisation for the overall media landscape and the 
unrestricted concentration of cross-media was stopped. The Electronic Media Act 
(EMA) adopted in 2003 set forth the rules for the diagonal integration which was 
positively accepted by the public. 
The transition to democracy significantly influenced the media and media 
policy in the 1990s. At that time the state influence on the media was evident 
especially as regards the CRT and the state owned newspaper Vjesnik. The local 
media owned by the local self-government units were also under the political aegis of 
local politicians. In 2003 the CRTA was adopted transforming the CRT from the state 
run television into the public television. Since then the political influence on the 
media has been losing its leverage and it has been slowly superseded by the pressure 
of different commercial interests. In the transitional context the links between the 
(foreign) commercial investors and the local political elites were at that time strong 
and functional. They were well harmonised in transferring the control over media to 
commercial interests which contributed to the establishment of the media market 
where the positions of new owners were privileged and in many respects favoured by 
the state. Today the forms of state intervention and control of media are not visible in 
the operation of the private media companies. Limited political influence can be 
exerted through the procedure of appointing the members of the governing bodies 
which can eventually promote certain political interests. The state retains its founding 
rights in the CRT, the Croatian Information and News Agency (HINA) and the 
newspaper Vjesnik. It financially supports the activities of Vjesnik and of HINA 
although the agency operates on the contractual basis with users of its services, while 
the CRT is financed through the radio-television fees and advertising. Political 
intervention is more visible on local levels where the local self-government units own 
and co-own a number of local media. The commercial interests are also entrenched in 
the media companies which depend on their advertising revenues and are compelled 
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to modify their standpoints accordingly. 
Although the current media legislation protects pluralism and diversity of the 
media the fact that the media outlets earn their income in the market makes them 
vulnerable to the interests of commercial groups. Article 28 of the EMA expressly 
forbids state bodies and their representatives, as well as labour unions and various 
interest groups, to exert influence over television and/or radio broadcasters regarding 
the creation of audiovisual or radio programme. However, the current economic crisis 
induces some media to restore links with the state and political powers and to try to 
enter the Government programme for the economic recovery, which may have the 
worst possible impact on the media independence and functioning. The media is 
trying to survive through harsh conditions imposed by the recession. A number of 
media companies are running debts due to the current situation in the market. This 
adverse situation also has a negative impact on the work of journalists and their 
determination to work in line with the best professional and ethics practices. 
The public service broadcaster, the CRT, is at the moment in the middle of the 
financial, organisational and editorial crises. The present situation in the public 
service may illustrate the adverse economic and legal developments. The CRT is 
currently indebted trying to cut its operational expenses. At the same time the public 
television is undergoing a crisis in terms of its leadership and editorship exposed to 
harsh inner tensions provoked by different interest groups. The Programme Council 
has not managed to appoint the director general of the CRT since December 2009 
when the director general and other members of the CRT Management Board 
resigned under the pressure of the Programme Council. The company is currently run 
by the acting director general and acting members of the CRT Management Board. 
The Programme Council is also in the disarray whereas some of its members have 
submitted resignations to the Croatian Parliament. Now the CRT, which is a PBS, 
functions without supervision of the Programme Council, representing and protecting 
public interests, as well as without the regularly appointed Management Board.  
At the same time the public television was to adjust its functioning and 
financing to the Communication from the Commission on the Application of State 
Aid Rules to Public Services Broadcasting (2009/C257/01). This adjustment 
demanded an additional effort to be invested in restructuring processes of the CRT, 
which prompted the Government to start the procedure of amending the CRTA. The 
Government has been drafting a new CRTA to be submitted to the Parliament for the 
second reading in the fall this year. The first draft was publicly debated in April 2010. 
It contained some controversial provisions, including the one stipulating that the 
Management Board should be appointed by a supervisory board nominated by the 
Croatian Parliament and proposed by the Government. In July 2010, during the first 
reading, a changed version envisaged that the civil society organisations and 
institutions should establish a programme council which would participate in 
appointing the management board together with the supervisory board. During the 
Parliament debate both position and opposition did not fully support the proposed 
concept, although they favoured the civil society participation in nomination of the 
programme council and management board. The new version of the CRTA is to be 
sent to the second reading with the intention to preserve the organisational and 
editorial independence of the public television, which would be a key democratic 
achievement in regulating its functions.  
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In parallel the Croatian Parliament received the Act on Amendments to the 
current CRTA proposing the cut of radio-television fee for 20%. This was interpreted 
as the political pressure on the public television. Following the public reaction the 
Government partly modified its proposal after negotiations with the CRT acting 
Management Board and agreed to postpone the deadline in which the Act should 
come into effect. The acting Management Board has undertaken to prepare a plan for 
the reorganisation and financial consolidation of CRT. This measure was perceived as 
a positive step towards improvement of the functioning of the public television.  
Concerning a possible government control of the media regulatory body, i.e. 
of the Croatian Electronic Media Council, it is important to note that the president and 
other members of the Council are appointed by the Croatian Parliament upon the 
proposal of the Government. The Government announces a public invitation to 
nominate candidates for Council members every four years. This procedure has been 
criticised on the grounds that involvement of civil society is low and inadequate. In 
2008 the public debate, held in line with recommendations of the European 
Commission, resulted in the conclusion that the involvement of civil society in the 
appointment of the Council members was appropriate. However, it was obvious that 
the appointed members of the Council represent only some of different groups of civil 
society. In some cases they lacked professional capacity to accomplish their job. 
The new Electronic Media Act (EMA) intends therefore to support an increase 
of administrative capacities through the Electronic Media Agency that has been added 
to the Council as a professional service. The Council works independently and 
professionally in handling its most important duties prescribed by the EMA, which 
include allocation of the concessions and licences. The Electronic Media Agency 
should be further strengthened in the near future since the Proposal of the new CRTA 
envisages a number of tasks for this body. 
The efforts, whether fruitful or not,  that the Government has invested in the 
redrafting and amending of the CRTA reflect the problems that occur in the process of 
state regulation of the public broadcasting services. They also illustrate wider 
problems of implementation and enforcement of the media regulation, particularly 
visible in the area of freedom of expression. 
The Croatian legal system has incorporated all necessary legal instruments to 
underscore the importance of freedom of expression coping at the same time with the 
protection of other concurrent rights and values such as privacy, personal dignity, 
family and professional life. There are views among legal experts that citizens are 
exposed to media violence and that the media cannot be stopped in deceiving and 
detrimental writing about someone’s personal and family life. Unfortunately, the lack 
of respect for the basic human rights is usually accompanied by the disrespect of the 
journalist ethics and in some cases caused by the pressure from the publisher itself to 
get a better position in the media market.  
In the legal sense these phenomena are to be corrected following the 
provisions of the Media Act (MA), regulating the right to correction of published 
information and the right of response to published information. The concerned natural 
or legal person has the right to request from the editor-in-chief to publish, free of 
charge, his/her correction or reply to the published information. However, these rules 
are in many cases breached or circumvented by the publishers and the cases end 
before courts that usually take decisions when the published information is no longer 
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relevant. Thus the legal institution does not help much to remedy the detrimental 
behaviour of media. This requires amending of the MA which is already under way. 
Some other legal norms are not implemented fully. For example, the Republic 
of Croatia has a legal obligation to stimulate and protect pluralism and diversity of 
media by the financial means from the state budget (MA, Article 5). Since 2005 it was 
due to stimulate the programs of local and regional media as well as media intended 
to inform persons with special needs. It should have established new printed media, 
especially local and non-profit media, and media of non-governmental organisations. 
Unfortunately the state failed to carry out this obligation due to the lack of financial 
means, as well as due to the rather marginal public interest in such media. This state 
obligation is partly compensated by the Fund for Promotion of Pluralism and 
Diversity of Electronic Media that is financed by the apportionment of 3% of the CRT 
fee in line with the CRTA. 
Media regulation and policy promote citizenship participation and democracy 
in the Republic of Croatia. The publishers and especially the public television, the 
CRT, are obliged to respect and encourage pluralism of political, religious, 
philosophical and other ideas and enable the public to be informed about them. In the 
realisation of their programming they are obliged to contribute to the respect and 
promotion of fundamental human rights and freedoms, democratic values and 
institutions, as well as to the development of the culture of public dialogue. The new 
EMA stipulates that the audiovisual or radio programs shall particularly promote 
understanding of international surroundings and the public’s sense of justice, defend 
democratic freedoms, and promote equal treatment of national minorities. 
In the Republic of Croatia the freedom of expression is guaranteed by the 
fundamental legal act, the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia as well as by a 
number of laws regulating the media sector. However, there is ample room for the 
implementation of these regulations, especially regarding the status and professional 
work of journalists.  
The protection of pluralism and diversity in the media is realised through a 
number of measures prescribed by the media legislation. Since the application of 
general competition rules are not sufficient to guarantee the observance of demands 
concerning cultural and media diversity and the pluralistic expressions of ideas and 
opinions, the most important measures for the protection of these values prescribed by 
the media legislation are the transparency of ownership structure and prohibition of 
the impermissible concentration, which are at present difficult to observe in Croatia. 
As regards general content requirements designed to satisfy citizens’ 
information needs and ensure equal media access to diverse points of view, the 
Croatian media legislation regulates these questions in relation to the commercial 
electronic media. There is a lacuna in the MA in relation to the printed media since 
this Act does not prescribe obligations of the media publishers to publish truthful, 
complete and timely information respecting the right of the public to be informed 
about the events, phenomena, persons, things and activities   
A significant impact on the democratic functions of the media exercises the 
Fund for Promotion of Pluralism and Diversity of Electronic Media established by the 
Croatian Electronic Media Agency. The Fund’s means are regularly used for 
stimulating the production and broadcasting of audiovisual radio and TV programmes 
and/or radio broadcaster at the local and regional levels. 
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The codes of conduct, ethics codes and codes on editorial freedom are 
generally regulated by the MA.  The ethics code has been established by the CJA, but 
it has been regularly breached since this organisation has not a clout to actively 
enforce the ethics rules among its members. The idea is that a new regulatory body 
should be installed to monitor implementation of these rules. 
Taking it altogether the Croatian media legislation is in line with the European 
media standards and criteria. The updated media regulations are in accordance with 
European provisions and have taken into consideration contemporary technological 
changes and new media services. Media regulation and policy are designed to 
promote citizenship participation and democracy in the Republic of Croatia. However, 
the provisions are not always clearly stated nor fully enforced. Although publishers 
and especially the public television are obliged to respect and encourage pluralism of 
political, religious, philosophical and other ideas and enable the public to be informed 
about them, such obligations may be overshadowed by professional insufficiencies, 
ideological standpoints or market interests. In this respect there is a room for the 
improvement of regulations and legal provisions. 
In such a context the media policies can hardly perform the role of public 
policies intended to regulate the development and functioning of activities having 
general social significance. In Croatia they are developed through fragmentary 
reactions to the market or state challenges, and are not quite able to express the public 
interest which itself is hard to define in a country in transition.   
 
5. Conclusion 
During the last twenty years or so the media landscape in Croatia has almost 
constantly been upset by the radical changes in the social and political status of the 
media clearly reflected in the establishment of the media market, withdrawal of the 
state control of contents and difficulties in the media regulation and functioning. This 
is clearly reflected in precarious positions of journalists, occasional political pressures 
on the media and journalists and the domination of a few big media moguls. 
Independent media, which have had an important role in the democratisation 
processes in Croatia, and which have contributed to the diversity of the Croatian 
media landscape, have a hard time coping with the pressures of the market rules and 
the revived political and state interests in the media, prompted by the present 
economic crisis. The advertising industry, which is fuel for the media industry, 
unavoidably influences the type of content. The political and economic crisis also 
incites the political elites to strengthen their interests in the media, and the media to 
rely more on public sources and funds. In this context independent, alternative and 
critical discourses are hard to maintain.  
The path from a state-controlled media system to a democratic one remains at 
the same time uneven and dynamic. The main aim of the proposed and partly 
implemented changes is harmonisation with the EU media environment, which is 
itself extremely complex. In this respect, interventions in the Croatian media system 
appear to be spiral: political and state interventions resurge from time to time, as well 
as public democratic moves and developments. Therefore it seems accurate to depict 
the processes of change as multi-directional. They are much more complicated than 
presented in the proclaimed aims and regulations. The media system is submitted to 
occasional and restricted changes mostly introduced under the pressure from the EU 
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or from markets, but it is not systematically restructured. The changes are not rooted 
in coherent media policy strategies, but reflect a fastly changing interplay of different 
influences and interests. In such a situation it is difficult to define the roles that 
politics, the state, private media or civil society may play, particularly because their 
mandates or areas of competence are not précised.  
It is therefore no wonder that the media policies are not transparently 
elaborated. To a certain degree such policies are defined through the legal regulations 
of media. However, since the legal provisions are not fully enforced, it is difficult to 
analyse the policies that they intend to promote. There are also different levels of 
policy elaboration: the state, the local political actors, private media owners and 
public media services all develop some policy aspects or particular approaches which 
are not coordinated or systematised on the country level. The absence of a systematic 
interlinking among them reflects the political and economic systemic insufficiencies.    
The dominant forces that shape the contemporary media landscape in Croatia 
slide between different types of “dependencies” (public or private) of the media. How 
do political forces ensure a framework for independent media in this context? What 
emerges as a field within which alternatives might be vivified is civil society, an area 
within which participatory democracy might promote public interests often 
marginalised by the state or private sector. However, this area is to a large extent 
limited to online media and smaller audiences. Moreover, the possible democratic 
impacts of the online media still remain to be tested. It is unknown to which extent 
they may represent commercial interests that expand very quickly through the 
application of new technologies, and whether and how they could stand for public 
interests and democratisation.  
The Croatian media reflect struggles with challenges that are linked to the 
transformation of the political and economic system and those dominating media 
systems in “old” democracies such as commercialisation, tabloidisation, infotainment, 
a rise of celebrity culture and forms of covert censorship and self-censorship. Most 
media actors react to such challenges by drafting new regulations, which may 
orientate the issuing media policies to treat these problems separately. Such an 
approach neglects a wider development context and social backgrounds of new types 
of communication that are contextualising media policies. 
This is reflected as a discrepancy between regulatory provisions and their 
practical implementation. Rather frequent and fast regulatory changes in Croatia 
during the last about fifteen years have often created confusion as to which provision 
to follow and how to interpret them. The most serious consequence is that the rules 
are not even expected to be followed, which leads to distrust in the functioning of 
public institutions and the legal system. In this respect there is a room for the 
enforcement of regulations and improvement of legal provisions in the future. 
The clearly visible improvements in the contemporary media landscape are 
seen in technological innovations, in the establishment of new media services and in 
an evident plurality of media. Although delayed and fragmented, the media policies 
are developed to rationalise and eventually organise all such changes which influence 
the local situations in a specific way that is at the moment hardly followed or 
analysed. However, the innovative new media services prompt more open and fast 
communication and thus support public interest in general democratisation of the 
society and in media democratisation in particular. The development of media policies 
is a part of such processes and expected to rationalise and improve media functioning.   
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The case of Denmark 
Henrik Søndergaard and Rasmus Helles  
 
1. Introduction 
The Danish media system represents clearly what Hallin and Mancini call the 
Democratic Corporatist Model, as it is characterised by “a historical coexistence of 
commercial media and media tied to organised social and political groups, and by a 
relatively active but legally limited role of the state”.308 One of the fundamental 
features of the Danish media system is its mixed character as it contains both 
commercial and public service media. Media policy as well as media regulation is 
first of all oriented towards finding the right balance between the different media 
types (private or public, printed or electronic media). Originally media policy was 
closely related to the culture policy of the welfare state, but since the 1980s cultural 
policy is one among many other motives for regulating the media. Quite obviously, 
media policy in Denmark has for the last decades been more directly oriented towards 
competition policy as the media themselves increasingly have come to be seen as an 
important part of the economy.    
The political conflicts on media and media policy are mainly, but not 
exclusively an ideological struggle on the proper balance between state and market. In 
this conflict the right wing parties (which currently are in power) favour market-based 
and privately owned media, whereas the left wing supports public media and a (more) 
regulated media system. The balance between state and market within the media 
system is of course partly determined by the relative strength of the political parties in 
parliament, but is also influenced by the relative strength of the media involved. 
Moreover, new technology, international developments and not at least European 
media regulations have influence as well.  
It is, however, important to notice that the fact that Denmark is such a small 
country (5,500,000 inhabitants) has a great impact on the way in which the media 
structure has developed – and on the way in which media regulation has been 
conducted. One of the consequences of being a small country is that the national 
media market has a very limited size, and one of the goals of media regulation has 
right from the beginning been to avoid some of the most harmful effects of the limited 
financial opportunities. Market size is important for all kinds of media, but it is 
obvious that it has more to say when it comes to television than to print media, since 
the economical advantage of low marginal cost increases with market size. In many 
other countries the political battle between market and state has been quite harsh, but 
in Denmark it has been more moderate, since there has for many years been a kind of 
consensus on the need for market intervention and strong public service media as a 
prerequisite for a healthy public sphere, for diversity and pluralism and not at least for 
national culture.   
The balance between private and public media ownership is not the same for 
the various media. The printed press and magazine press have always been privately 
owned and have operated since 1849 almost without any influence from the state - 
besides from heavy subsidies - whereas radio and television from the very beginning 
were organised as publicly owned monopolies. From the 1980s onwards privately 
                                                 
308 D.C. Hallin and P. Mancini, Comparing media systems (2009 [2004]), at p. 11. 
 109
owned radio stations and television channels evolved. When it comes to “new media”, 
in particular online media, the media system represents a mix between public and 
private actors – corresponding to a great extend to the structure within the “old” 
media, as “new” media hasn’t really led to new kinds of ownership.  
In terms of its political system Denmark has a long tradition for democracy 
and the Danish society has in many ways been subject to an ongoing process of 
democratisation as part and parcel of the development of the welfare society after 
World War II. When it comes to media legislation it has been oriented toward 
guaranteeing not only freedom of expression, but also giving media access to different 
groups in society and developing pluralism. Also public access media have been 
stimulated by public subsidies and initiatives in order to spread media literacy. Media 
is as most other parts of Danish society relatively highly regulated, and even though 
there have been attempts to deregulate the media during the last decades it is more 
reasonable to regard this as a process of re-regulation. As the media system has been 
rapidly expanding since the 1980s, the regulatory system has grown as well.  
 
2. The media landscape in Denmark 
In this part of the report we are looking at the Danish media system by giving an 
overview of the various media in terms of history, ownership, and market position. 
The news agencies are seen as an important part of the media system. We also explain 
the journalists’ background and education. Finally, we will look at media literacy and 
the status of the media in society. 
 
2.1 The media market 
The press 
The number of newspapers has been rapidly declining since the 1960s, partly due to 
media concentration and partly as a consequence of the fact that still fewer Danes read 
newspapers on a daily basis. The decline in newspaper readership has been particular 
visible in the last decade, as web-media has expanded.   
To get an idea of the newspaper landscape it is appropriate to distinguish 
between national and regional/local papers and between Sunday papers and everyday 
papers. In 2010 there are 9 Sunday papers,309 and 5 of these are national papers that 
are also published on workdays. These include Berlingske Tidende, Politiken and 
Jyllands-Posten (all omnibus papers) and the two tabloids B.T. and Ekstra Bladet. 
Moreover, there are 9 national papers published only on workdays, one of them being 
a weekly paper (Weekendavisen), another a specialised paper for the building industry 
(Dagbladet Licitation) and 3 of them being free of charge papers (Urban, 
MetroXpress and 24timer). The number of regional/local papers without a Sunday 
edition is 26, whereas there are 12 regional weekly newspapers – all of them run by a 
                                                 
309 Dansk Oplagskontrol, “Kontrollerede oplagstal” [Controlled circulation numbers], available at: 
www.do.dk (last visited on 14/10/2010), and TSN Gallup, “Læsertal” [readership], available at: 
www.gallup.dk/nyhedscenter/statistik/laesertal.aspx (last visited on 01/10/2010). 
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single company: Søndagsavisen. Finally, there is a huge number of mainly weekly 
free district newspapers; in 2007 there were 282 of these papers.310   
Historically newspapers in Denmark grew out of book printing, and the oldest 
newspaper is Berlingske Tidende, which dates to the 16th century.311 However, from 
the early 19th century newspapers became instruments for the political struggle for 
democracy and from the 1870s they became closely connected to the political parties. 
There were four major parties at that time, and in the beginning of the 20th century 
every city had four different local newspapers to choose from. In the 1950s the 
number of newspapers fell dramatically, as a process of concentration took place. As 
a result the newspaper market changed and a kind of newspaper monopoly was 
established at regional level – as only one of the four papers survived. Among the 
national newspapers there was concentration going on as well, and most of the 
newspapers with an explicit connection to a political party disappeared, whereas the 
omnibus papers such as Berlingske Tidende, Poltiken and Jyllands-Posten were 
competing heavily at a nation-wide level. The tabloids B.T. and Ekstra Bladet, owned 
by Berlingste Tidende and Politiken respectively, expanded especially in the 1960s 
and 1970s, but have faced major losses in readership from the 1980s and onward.   
The major newspapers affiliation with political parties has weakened during 
the second half of the 20th century, even though most of them have a political 
orientation towards right wing. It is characteristic that newspapers with connection to 
socialist parties and the labour unions have almost entirely disappeared during the last 
decade. The very last labour union owned newspaper Det fri Aktuelt was closed down 
in 2001. Also newspapers owned by political parties such as Land og Folk (The 
Communist Party) and Socialistisk Dagblad (The Socialist Peoples Party) were closed 
– in 1982 and 1991 respectively. Only the socialist paper Dagbladet Arbejderen is left 
as a political party-paper (owned by The Communist Party). Of the newspapers still 
on the market only the highbrow paper Information is left wing, whereas Politiken has 
centre-left orientation, though none of them is affiliated or financially supported by a 
political party.   
In the beginning of the 21st century major changes took place in the newspaper 
market, as a number of free newspapers were introduced – and a very costly and 
intense competition between four different free papers started.312 In 2001 the Swedish 
company Metro International launched MetroXpress as a commuter paper, and shortly 
after Det Berlingske Officin responded by launching its own free of charge commuter 
paper called Urban in order to keep a share of the advertising revenue. The two new 
papers reached quickly a balance and coexisted easily with the paid for papers. In 
2006 Icelandic businessmen introduced a new nationally distributed free of charge 
paper Nyhedsavisen on the market, and a so called “newspaper war” took its 
beginning. Det Berligske Officin launched Dato in response, a daily free of charge 
nationally distributed newspaper, and Politiken launched 24timer the day after. The 
“newspaper war” ended in 2008 when Nyhedsavisen was closed down due to financial 
problems. Dato already ended its existence in 2007, whereas 24timer in 2008 became 
a part of the company behind MetroXpress.   
                                                 
310 Rambøll Management, Udredning af den fremtidige offentlige mediestøtte [Analysis of the future 
public media support system in Denmark] (2009), at p. 59. For more precise information on district 
papers, see Danske Reklame-og Relationsbureauers Brancheforening, Media Scandinavia 2010 (2010). 
311 K. B. Jensen (ed.), Dansk Mediehistorie [Danish media history] (2001 [1996]), at p. 78f. 
312 K. Minke, Aviskrigen [The Newspaper War] (2008).  
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The current developments within the newspaper business are to a great extent 
marked by the rapid expansion online. In order to keep advertising revenues almost 
every newspaper has launched an Internet version of their paper, which makes it more 
difficult to maintain readership for the printed version. The number of subscribers has 
fallen quite substantially. The three major national newspapers – Berlingske Tidende, 
Politiken and Jyllands-Posten – have lost more than 600,000 readers from 2009 to 
2010.313 Only the niche papers Information and Kristeligt Dagblad have been able to 
avoid the decline. There is no doubt that the Danish newspapers face huge problems 
and are in the middle of a crisis that cannot but lead to a number of mergers between 
the major newspapers.314   
The printed press is heavily dependent on subsidies and it is quite clear that 
most papers would find it indeed very difficult if not downright impossible to survive 
without the subsidies. Today the printed press receives three kinds of financial help 
from the state, the one being exemption from the normal VAT (25%) and the other 
being subsidies to distribution. In 2010 the distribution subsidies are estimated to 
more than 330 million DKR.315 Moreover, Dagbladsnævnet [The Newspaper Board] 
gives financial help to projects that aim to establish new newspapers, to reorganise 
existing newspapers or to help newspapers in financial trouble.316 Dagbladsnævnet is 
a board set down by the Prime Minister (in accordance with Lov om Dagbladsnævnet 
[Law on the Newspaper Board]317) and has as its aim to promote versatility and 
pluralism within the Danish newspaper market. In 2009 the Dagbladsnævnet granted 
app. 20 million DKR to these purposes.  
In the next chapter the legal framework behind this system of public subsidies 
will be described, but it is important here to notice that in spite of the massive public 
funding the printed press regards itself as a private, market-based business.  
 
Radio 
FM is by far the most important distribution platform for radio in Denmark, and 
historically the national public service broadcaster DR, that even today holds a very 
strong position, has heavily dominated radio. Since the 1980s there has been a number 
of attempts to build a private radio industry, but so far it has turned out to be rather 
difficult to achieve this goal. When DR’s monopoly was broken in 1982, the idea was 
to establish grassroot radio as a supplement, but later efforts were concentrated on 
creating a commercial radio system that could compete with DR.   
The number of analogue radio frequencies is limited, as Denmark has only 6 
nationwide FM frequencies. Today DR runs 4 FM-channels, one of them being a 
regional station. However, it has recently been decided that DR shall give up one of 
                                                 
313 TSN Gallup, “Læsertal”. 
314 In 2003 the companies behind Politiken and Jyllands-Posten merged, but it is supposed that more 
mergers will take places in the future. 
315 Bibliotek og medier, “Dagbladspuljen” [Funds for daily newspapers], available at: 
http://www.bibliotekogmedier.dk/medieomraadet/aviser-og-blade/dagbladspuljen/ (last visited on 
14/10/2010). 
316 Bibliotek og medier, “Tilskudsmodtagere” [Recipients of funds] available at: 
www.bibliotekogmedier.dk/medieomraadet/aviser-og-blade/dagbladsnaevnet/tilskudsmodtagere/ (last 
visited on 14/10/2010). 
317 Available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=20989 (last visited on 
14/10/2010). 
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its channels by 2011, when a new privately owned, but licence fee funded radio 
channel shall be established in its place. The fifth FM frequency which has nearly-
nationwide coverage is run by SBS and is called Nova FM, whereas the sixth FM 
frequency that covers only 38% of the population is run by Berlingske Media in a 
joint venture with SBS. The channel is called PopFM and was launched in September 
2010. DR runs 17 DAB channels, three of them being redistributed from the FM 
channels, and also Nova FM redistributes its FM-channel in DAB.   
Local radio was established in 1983, originally as an experiment, but later on 
as a permanent part of the radio system. In the beginning local radio was not allowed 
to bring adverts, but later legislation was liberated in order to give room for 
commercial radio. Today there are 326318 local radio stations: 175 non-commercial 
stations and 151 commercial stations. Most local radio stations are dependent on 
public subsidies.  
In 2008 DR had a 76% audience share,319 whereas Nova FM had only 5%. The 
daily reach for radio was in 2008 70%, and DR had a daily reach on 54%, while 
commercial radio 28%. There is no up to date information on the number of listeners 
to non-commercial local radio, but an analysis from 2003320 showed that out of 43 
stations 14 had a weekly reach under 1% of the listeners.  
 
Television 
Due to the very limited number of frequencies the number of Danish television 
channels has been restricted much in the same way as radio even though analogue 
distribution ended in 2009 and was replaced by a digital terrestrial net with larger 
capacity. In the analogue terrestrial network there was only room for the two public 
service broadcasters DR and TV 2 and for local television, and as a consequence 
competition was relatively limited, as commercial broadcasting was almost entirely 
distributed through cable and satellite. The closing of analogue distribution has 
changed all this, but DR and TV 2 still have a dominant position amongst the 
audience. The most important private broadcasters, MTG and SBS, are not Danish 
companies, and they are broadcasted from England in order to avoid the relatively 
strict Danish regulation of the broadcasting sector.   
There are three public broadcasters in Denmark: DR and TV 2/Denmark, and 
8 regional (TV 2/Regioner) channels, which originally were a part of TV 2, but today 
are independent institutions. DR and the regional TV 2-stations are fully funded by 
licence fees, whereas TV 2/Denmark is funded by advertising.   
DR runs six television channels (DR 1, DR 2, DR K, Ramasjang, DR HD and 
DR Update), all of them being fully funded by licence fee and distributed nationwide. 
TV 2 runs only one public service channel (TV 2/Denmark) financed by advertising, 
but runs also 5 pay-channels (TV 2 Zulu, TV 2 Charlie, TV 2 Film, TV 2 News and 
                                                 
318 Kulturministeriet, “Lokalradio- og TV” [Local radio and television], available at: 
http://kulturministeriet.dk/da/kulturpolitik/medier/lokal_radio_tv/ (last visited on 1/10/2010). 
319 E. Harrie, “Radio och tv-landskapet i Norden” [The radio- and television landscape in Scandinavia], 
in U. Carlsson and E. Harrie (eds), Nordiska public service-medier i den digitale mediekulturen (2010), 
at p. 51. 
320 Kulturministeriet, “Medie- og Tilskudssekretariatet Notat til arbejdsgruppen vedr. den fremtidige 
lokalradio og –tv-ordning” [Memorandum to the working group on the future local radio and television 
system] (2003). 
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TV 2 Sport321). The 8 regional stations send their programmes in “windows” within 
the TV 2/Denmark schedule, but are also distributed in the local distribution system.   
Local television started in Denmark in 1984, but it was, in its original form, 
closed down in 2009, when the analogue television distribution ended and was 
replaced by a digital terrestrial system (MUX 1) with regional distribution 
architecture. The regional net within MUX 1 is partly used for privately owned and 
non-commercial local television channels distributed in particular regions and partly 
used for privately owned non-commercial channels that are distributed simultaneously 
in all 9 regions (in practical terms nationwide distribution). Today only non-
commercial local television is permitted. In 2009 there were 44 nationwide non-
commercial private broadcasters within MUX 1 and 171 local/regional non-
commercial private stations.  
MTG is the oldest private broadcaster in Denmark, and today runs 3 major 
channels (TV 3, 3+, Puls) and a number of pay channels (among the 7 film channels). 
The other important commercial broadcaster is SBS that runs 4 channels (Kanal 4, 
Kanal 5, 6’eren, The Voice TV). Even though the MTG channels and the SBS 
channels are financed by advertising, they are heavily dependent on viewers’ direct 
payment for access to the programmes.   
Except from MTG and SBS there are a number of primarily foreign channels 
distributed in Denmark, but their market share so far has been marginal. Moreover, 
there is a small number of cable-only channels in Denmark and a few number of 
Danish satellite channels.   
As mentioned, the public service broadcasters still have a strong position in 
the Danish television audience. In 2008 DR had a market share of 29%, TV 2 had 
39%, MTG had 9% and SBS had 6%. The four major broadcasters taken together had 
a market share of 83%, which clearly gives them a dominant position. 
 
Online media 
The landscape of Danish online media is extremely varied, with a large number of 
organisations offering various types of online content. For purposes of the present 
discussion, the term “online media” is narrowed down to include only websites 
offering some level of editorial content of a broadly publicistic nature (i.e. news or 
culture), which are updated periodically, and which may or may not be combined with 
interactive features (i.e. comments or a forum).   
In this group, the online activities of traditional media (the national 
newspapers and national public service media) are dominant. Taken together, the 
websites of the 7 daily, national newspapers (including 2 tabloid papers), the national 
public service provider DR, and the commercially run TV2, attract about 27% of all 
visits to Danish websites.322 In terms of content, very little is produced for online-
publication only. The majority of content (83%) is produced in the editorial offices of 
                                                 
321 TV 2 Sport is a joint venture with Viasat. 
322 Based on measurements for August 2010. Foreningen af Danske Internet Medier, “Toplisten” 
[Toplist], available at: http://www.fdim.dk (last visited on 01/10/2010). 
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traditional newspapers and TV-stations,323 and is published online and in the 
printed/broadcast version of the traditional media.  
The business models of online media in Denmark are primarily based on 
advertising revenues generated from the relatively large amounts of traffic (excluding 
the public service broadcaster DR, which is not allowed to advertise). The exact size 
and importance of the revenue from online activities for traditional media is hard to 
establish, but it has not been sufficient to replace the revenue lost to other online 
enterprises (i.e. Google), and that lost as a result of the decline in newspaper 
circulation and subscriptions. All major newspapers currently employ a number of 
strategies aimed at maximising web traffic and thereby advertising revenues, i.e. by 
supplying links that allow readers to tag articles at their twitter/facebook account and 
thereby attracting members of their social network to the site. 
No truly viable models for payment for access to online content have been 
found so far, although some newspapers have experimented with e-subscriptions, 
allowing readers access to online and/or downloadable versions of the newspaper. 
Also, the national television station TV2 run a service called Sputnik, allowing 
subscribers access to previously aired content for a fee.324  
Since 1 January 2007, the licence fee for the national public service provider 
DR has been tied to ownership of any device that allows the reception of sound and 
image broadcasts, rather than just television sets and radios. This means that the 
obligation to pay the licence fee now extends to owners of computers with online 
access, even if they do not own a TV or a radio. It has also made it possible for DR to 
stream all broadcast content online.  
The number of online media, which are not somehow part of the activities of a 
traditional media enterprise, is quite low, and are for the most part very specialised in 
terms of content. With few exceptions,325 these online-only media attract limited 
amounts of traffic, and they rely almost exclusively on advertising as their source of 
revenue, which helps explain their limited number and difficult financial situation.326   
 
Social media 
The use of social media sites and services in the Danish population is growing, and 
has already reached relatively high levels. Blogs are written by 18% of the population, 
and read by 33%. 49% regularly participate in chat or use online fora.327 The national 
statistics do not include social media as a separate category, and therefore it is 
difficult to assess the activities at large social networking sites (i.e. Facebook). Other 
sources have made some effort in specifying the use level of social networking sites. 
By 2008, about 30% of the population aged 18 or over had Facebook accounts,328 and 
about 13% of the population logged on to the service every day. The specification of 
                                                 
323 A. B., Lund, Specialmedierne i den journalistiske fødekæde [The special media in the journalistic 
food chain] (2010), at p. 3. 
324 Rambøll, Den fremtidige mediestøtte, p. 76. 
325 The Microsoft-owned http://msn.dk is the most successful online-only medium with an independent 
editorial staff, and attracts about 7% of all visits to Danish internet sites. 
326 It is not possible to draw a clear picture of the business models of online-only media, since they are 
organised in many different ways, and are often part of larger business enterprises that generate income 
from sources other than media content production. See Rambøll, Den fremtidige mediestøtte, p. 78. 
327 Danmarks Statistik, available at: http://statistikbanken.dk/BEBRIT04 (last visited on 1/10/2010). 
328 R. Helles, Personlige medier i hverdagslivet [Personal media in everyday life] (2009), at p. 87ff. 
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access to and use of social media does not indicate the precise nature of the use of 
these services.  
Currently, no reliable scientific evidence regarding the nature and distribution 
of the types of the communication taking place in social media exist, although several 
studies are under way. It is therefore not possible to gauge to what extent these sites 
are used for communication of a civic or public nature, or if topics for public opinion 
formation are voiced first in social media. Citizen journalism is also difficult to 
assess, as it may be published on virtually any online platform (in the form of a blog, 
a Facebook group, or a website).  
The only way to gauge the extent of citizen driven journalism is to note that 
none of the top 250 sites329 in the index of Danish internet use can be classified as 
citizen driven media, but this does not include activities in Facebook groups or blogs 
with large readership.   
 
News agencies 
Ritzaus Bureau is the dominant news agency. Newspaq and Dagbladenes Bureau are 
minor agencies. All the Danish newspapers and DR own Ritzaus Bureau, which is 
financed through subscription fees. Ritzaus Bureau covers Danish and international 
news and cooperates with a group of seven news agencies in Europe called Group 39. 
The group consist of ATBP (Brussels), ATS (Zürich), ANP (Amsterdam), APA 
(Vienna), FNB (Helsinki), NTB (Oslo) and TT (Stockholm). Ritzaus Bureau has 150 
employees – most of them situated in Copenhagen, but with some representation also 
in Aarhus, Odense, Brussels and Berlin.   
 
2.2 Journalists’ background and education 
According to The Danish Union of Journalists there are about 14,500 journalists in 
Denmark. Among journalists with full time jobs 36% were women (2004).330 There 
are no requirements for access to the profession of journalists, but in order to become 
a member of The Danish Union of Journalists one has to have completed an education 
in journalism/communication or to have worked as a journalist for at least three 
months.331 The education of journalists takes mainly place at Danmarks Medie - og 
Journalisthøjskole (Aarhus), at the University of Southern Denmark (Odense) and at 
the University of Roskilde. An education in journalism is usually a BA, but a BA in 
journalism can be supplemented by a MA in journalism. Many journalists in Denmark 
have other university degrees outside the fields of journalism, as the need for 
journalists with expert knowledge is increasing. The average monthly starter salary 
for a journalist in 2010 is DKR 31,000 (c. EUR 4,150),332 which is slightly higher 
than most other professions with a comparable educational background.  
                                                 
329 See Foreningen af Danske Internetmedier, “Toplisten”.  
330 Dansk Journalistforbund, Beskæftigelse og lønstatistik for kvinder [Statistics of employment and pay 
of female journalists] (2005). 
331 Dansk Journalistforbund, Bliv medlem af DJ [Join DJ], available at: 
http://www.journalistforbundet.dk/sw19955.asp (last visited on 01/10/10). 
332 Dansk Journalistforbung, “Dimittendstatistik” [Pay for newly graduated journalists], available at: 
http://www.journalistforbundet.dk/graphics/nyheder/2010/dimittend-statistik.pdf (last visited on 
01/10/2010). 
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2.3 Media literacy and media status in society 
Danish internet penetration levels are among the highest in the world. In 2010 89% of 
households had some form of internet connection.333 Statistics also show that 88% of 
the population had used the internet at least once during a three month period.334  
The use of mobile internet services is also very high: 54% of all citizens 
between 16 and 74 years of age use some form of mobile internet access regularly.335 
Literacy rates are relatively high in Denmark. In international comparisons 
Denmark is consistently placed among the top-ten countries. Even so, it should be 
noted that the reading skills of around one in ten adults are such that they experience 
severe difficulties when trying to read normal prose texts or written news.336  
The high levels of internet penetration correspond to relatively high levels of 
digital literacy337 in the Danish population. However, a large analysis of the ICT skills 
of the Danish population found that about a third of the population lack the computer 
skills necessary to perform basic tasks efficiently.338 Also, the analysis found that 
about a fifth of the population rarely or never use computers. The group of people 
with lower skills consist primarily of people over 60 years of age, with low 
educational levels. 
Taken together the statistics quoted above outline a situation, where the 
availability and use of online services is high, and where a majority of the population 
possesses the computer skills necessary to access and participate in online 
communication.  
The numbers also suggest the existence of a sizeable minority of about 15-
25% of the population, for whom the use of computers and online services is of little 
significance in their daily lives, and for whom access to the internet and online media 
is problematic or impossible.  
The high level of internet penetration in Denmark implies that a large range of 
media content is available to almost all Danish citizens. A sizeable portion of the 
content of printed newspapers is available online, just as a number of commercial and 
public service radio and television channels are streamed online.   
The public libraries also play an important role in making media content 
available to citizens. Two thirds of the population visit a public library more than 
once a year, and about 11% use the library weekly.339 About 20% do not use the 
libraries at all. In addition to books, public libraries also make newspapers and 
magazines available to users. In recent years public libraries have expanded into 
                                                 
333 Danmarks Statistik, available at: http://statistikbanken.dk/BEBRIT01 (last visited on 01/10/2010). 
334 Danmarks Statistik, available at: http://statistikbanken.dk/BEBRIT02 (last visited on 01/10/2010). 
335 Danmarks Statistik, available at: http://statistikbanken.dk/BEBRIT03 (last visited on 01/10/2010). 
336 OECD, “Literacy in the information age. Final report of the international adult literacy survey” 
(2000), available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/21/39437980.pdf (last visited on 21/10/2010).  
337 Defined in the final report of the European Commision’s ICT Skills Monitoring Group, as the 
ability to “[...] search and retrieve information, to navigate and communicate on-line, to participate in 
digital, and virtual communities.” See “Benchmarking Member state policy initiatives”, available at: 
http://www.technopolis-group.com/resources/downloads/reports/309_eSkillsRep.pdf (last visited on 
05/10/2010). 
338 Teknologisk Institut, Analyse af danskernes IKT-færdigheder [Analysis of Danes’ ICT skills] (2005). 
339 AKF, Anvendt Kommunalforskning, “Danskernes kultur- og fritidsaktiviteter 2004” [Danes’ culture 
and leisure activities], available at: http://www.akf.dk/udgivelser/2005/danskernes_kultur/ (last visited 
on 02/10/2010). 
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lending films, audio books, and digital media such as computer games and 
programmes as well. 
In addition to making media content available on a range of platforms, public 
libraries also offer to help people using the internet, and so play a part in an ongoing 
effort to raise the level of digital literacy and in making online services available to 
people having trouble reading.  
The Eurobarometer country survey for Denmark (2009) finds high levels of 
confidence in the press (50%), television (67%) and radio stations (73%).340 All 
numbers are higher than the average numbers for European countries.341  
 
3. Media policy in Denmark 
In this chapter we will look at state and non-state organisations responsible for the 
conduct of media policy in Denmark, and we will discuss the media regulatory 
framework addressing structural as well as content regulation. Moreover, we will give 
an overview of the system of public subsidies to the media, as it is of great importance 
to the actual functioning of the media system.  
 
3.1 Actors of media policy and media regulation  
State bodies and organisations 
The Ministry of Culture is the organisational structure for developing media policy in 
relation to electronic media. However, also the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation is involved as it is responsible for information technology and 
telecommunications. 
Regarding the printed press the responsible minister is the Prime Minister, but 
in legal terms the Prime Minister has very limited influence on the press. However, 
legislation that aims to keep diversity and plurality in the printed press through 
financial support is based at the Prime Minister’s office. Moreover, the Prime 
Minister’s office has regular, but rather informal meetings with representatives of the 
media – in what is called The Press Contact Committee.   
In relation to the press The Newspaper Council (Dagbladsnævnet) plays an 
important role as it administers the press subsidies. Moreover, The Financial Institute 
of the Press has the task of giving economical support to newspapers in crisis, to 
reorganise newspapers and to establish new newspapers.    
The Press Council (Pressenævnet) has the task of maintaining ethical 
standards in both printed and electronic media. The Press Council is, however, not 
part of the state administration, but is an independent, public body.   
There are two different kinds of regulation: one for DR and one for the other 
radio and television institutions. DR is regulated through a Board that has the overall 
responsibility for DR’s activities. The Board is appointed partly by the Minister of 
                                                 
340 European Commission, Directorate General Communication, Eurobarometer 72, National Report, 
“Denmark”, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_dk_dk_nat.pdf 
(last visited on 03/10/2010), at p. 22. 
341 The authors would like to thank Tatjana Hennesser for her research efforts on this and other parts of 
the report. 
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Culture, partly by the major parties in parliament and partly by the employees of DR. 
Politicians are prohibited from being elected into the board. The regional TV 2-
stations also have a board elected by the council of each of the regional stations. TV 
2/Denmark has a board with 9 members, 6 of them being appointed by the Minister of 
Culture and 3 of them selected by the staff of the station.   
The major regulatory body for radio and television is the Radio and Television 
Tribunal (RTT). In relation to DR the board has only limited responsibility as it 
oversees that DR fulfils its programming obligations as stipulated in the public service 
contract. Also when it comes to TV 2/Denmark and the regional TV 2-stations, RTT 
has the role of supervision. Moreover RTT invigilates that TV 2 follows other parts of 
the Radio and Television Act. RTT is also the regulation authority in regards to 
regional/local television and local radio as well as cable a satellite radio and 
television.   
Online media may register with The Press Council. They thereby obtain the 
same privileges as other media (especially in terms of source protection) granted 
under Medieansvarsloven [The Media Liability Act],342 and are also obliged to follow 
the normal rules for ethical conduct for the press, administered by the Press Council.  
 
Media and civil society organisations 
A great number of non-governmental organisations have impact on the development 
of Danish media politics and media regulation. The journalist organisation – The 
Danish Union of Journalists – is of great importance, as it is both a trade union and a 
professional interest and pressure group within media politics, aimed at improving the 
skills of journalists and at ensuring that the media and communications sectors 
actively promote openness and dialogue in society. The union has as one of its goals 
to contribute to national and international debates about freedom of the press, freedom 
of expression and freedom of information.343   
Danske Mediers Forum is an interest organisation consisting of DR and TV 2 
and six Danish media organisations. Its mission is to work in favour of good 
conditions for the media and for the freedom of speech. The six media organisations 
are Danske Specialmedier, Dansk Magasinpresses Udgiverforening, Danske 
Dagblades Forening, Digitale Publicister, FDIM, Radioerne and Ugeaviserne. The 
most powerful of these organisations is probably Danske Dagblades Forening, which 
is an interest and lobby organisation for all Danish newspapers.   
Local media have their own interest organisations: Danmarks lokal-tv 
Forening (local television) and DILEM (non-commercial local radio and television). 
Moreover, a number of listeners and viewers interest organisations exist – either 
political as ARF (workers/social democrats) or religious as KLF. The listeners and 
viewers organisations have a joint organisation called Samarbejdsforum for danske 
lytter - og seerorganisationer (SSL) that has quite an important role in media politics 
and is represented in the Radio and Television Tribunal and in the Dialogue Forum in 
DR and in the representatives for the regional TV 2-stations.  
                                                 
342 Medieansvarsloven [The Media Liability Act], available at: http://www.pressenaevnet.dk/Love-og-
regler/Medieansvarsloven.aspx, (last visited on 01/10/2010). 
343 Dansk Journalistforbund, “Om Dansk Journalistforbund” [About the Danish journalists 
organisation], available at: http://www.journalistforbundet.dk/sw101.asp, (last visited on 14/10/2010). 
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Since 2001 a number of artist organisations made a joint effort to create public 
debate about the public service media in an organisation called Det ny Public Service 
Råd (The New Public Service Council). The council collects documentation about 
public service media and lobbies for strong public service media. It is worth 
mentioning that the council also has economical interests in the existence of public 
service media, as DR and TV 2 are important buyers of Danish music and art.   
The actual influence that these institutions have on media policy in Denmark 
varies depending on their access to the politicians working within the field and the 
specific nature of the media policy in question. Most of the organisations have 
informal relations to some of the leading politicians or they have a privileged access 
to the management of the media. Usually, the media organisations primarily have a 
role to play when major media reforms take place. Proposals for new legislation are 
circulated among the media organisations in order to have their comments and 
opinions. During this process of public hearing the organisations can have some 
influence on the media legislation.  
Research institutions have only a limited influence on Danish media policy, 
which perhaps is rare, since media regulation has become still more complicated both 
technically and legally. Media scholars are sometimes used as advisers when major 
media reforms are planned, and sometimes the ministries involved commission 
reports on a particular subject as background for policy making.  
 
3.2 The media regulatory framework 
3.2.1 Freedom of expression and information 
In Denmark, Grundloven [The Consitution] from 1849 guarantees freedom of 
expression – revised in 1953 (§ 77), and prohibits censorship. This does not mean that 
the freedom of speech is unlimited. There are restrictions when it comes to utterances 
that incite to violence and offence due to sex, race and religion (Straffeloven [The 
Criminal Law] § 266b and § 140 on blasphemy) and defamation (Straffeloven [The 
Criminal Law] § 267).344 The point is, however, that the utterance itself cannot be an 
offence to law; the content of the utterance can. The government cannot exercise any 
control of the content of the press, despite the fact that the government through media 
laws has a role to play when it comes to the structural regulation of the press and the 
general programming obligations of public media. Denmark has signed the European 
Convention of Human Rights in 1950 and in 1992 the convention was turned into 
Danish law (Lov om den europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention [Law on the 
European Human Rights Convention]).345 Denmark is thus bound by Article 10 on 
freedom of expression.  
Part of freedom of information is the ability for the media to gain information. 
This is guaranteed through § 65 in the Constitutional Law concerning public access to 
the administration of justice. Offentlighedsloven [The Information Act] requires 
openness and access to documents within public administration.346 In Retsplejeloven 
                                                 
344 Available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=126465, (last visited on 
01/10/2010). 
345 Available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=12, (last visited on 
01/10/2010). 
346 Available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=59474, (last visited on 
01/10/2010). 
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[The Administration of Justice Act] there is a principle of open courts, which gives 
the media ability to gain information on court proceedings.347 
Anybody can start a medium without permission, except broadcast media, 
which require access to limited frequencies, as is the case for terrestrially, distributed 
radio and television. Usually, however, newly established media have to register, as it 
is also required for cable and satellite radio/television. All printed and broadcast 
media are automatically governed by the Media Liability Act.   
All media in Denmark are responsible when it comes to copyrights, 
defamation and protection of private life. Most Danish media operate under the Media 
Liability Act. It is important to note that the Media Liability Act does not cover 
foreign media even though some of these are addressing a Danish audience, as is the 
case with the biggest private television channels on the Danish market. The law 
clarifies who are responsible within the media for the media content, and maintains 
that the content of the media and the way the media act have to be in accordance with 
sound press ethics. Moreover, the law sets out rules regarding the obligation to 
publish a reply. The Press Council [Pressenævnet], which is an independent, public 
tribunal, deals with complaints about the media. People, companies, associations, etc. 
who think they have been denounced by the media can lodge a complaint to the Press 
Council. The Press Council evaluates complaints in accordance with a set of Norms 
for Press Ethics.348 The system has a strong element of self-regulation, since the 
norms themselves are not part of the law. The Press Council can express its criticism 
if the ethical norms are violated, and it can order the media in question to publish the 
criticism. Moreover, it can demand that a person who has been mistreated by the press 
is given opportunity to retort. 
 
3.2.2 Structural regulation 
The regulatory framework has changed as the media system has grown during the 
years and has become more comprehensive involving many different sectors of 
society. All political parties in Denmark agree upon the fundamental aims of media 
regulation, namely on the on hand to guarantee the media freedom of expression in 
order to act in the service of democracy and democratic needs of society – and on the 
other hand to stimulate a versatile and pluralistic media system that serves all parts of 
the population and takes into account the cultural needs of society. The political 
consensus on the overall objective of the role of the media in society is striking and it 
seems to be one of the reasons why the media regulatory framework has evolved 
without major political conflicts.  
The main criterion for public intervention in the market is whether or not 
media occupies limited frequencies. In terrestrial broadcasting the number of 
frequencies is limited, which calls for comprehensive regulation in order to ensure 
diversity. In print media and online media there are no use of limited frequencies, and 
the same is true with satellite and cable radio and television. This is why these media 
are less regulated than terrestrial broadcasting.  
                                                 
347 Available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=126338, (last visited on 
01/10/2010). 
348 Pressenævnet, Regler for god presseskik [Norms for press ethics], available at: 
http://www.pressenaevnet.dk/Love-og-regler/Regler-for-god-presseskik.aspx (last visited on 
01/10/2010). 
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In the regulation of the printed press and non-terrestrial broadcast media the 
main aim is to ensure freedom of expression and to protect consumers’ rights. The 
Press Council and the kind of self-regulation it practises are established in order to 
ensure these goals. When it comes to broadcasting, regulation is more complicated as 
several organs are involved. Regulation of radio and television was originally a result 
of the establishment of DR as state-owned monopoly institution – mainly as a way to 
ensure radio and television as a public service. The political climate in the 1920s 
when radio started was in favour of public services, and the same was true in the 
1950s when television was introduced. Until the 1980s regulation of radio and 
television was regulation of DR, but later on, when the market was opened for 
competition, new types of regulation were needed. The political climate in the 1980s 
was clearly more market-oriented than before, which meant that regulation gradually 
changed in order to give room for private broadcasting. Regulation that opened the 
market did not stand alone, as a number of initiatives were taken in order to stimulate 
local and grassroot media and to create a second Danish public service broadcaster 
(TV 2). The complexity of the media system that evolved from the 1980s paved the 
way for new regulatory organisations, the independent regulatory authority, the Radio 
and Television Tribunal [Radio- og tv-nævnet], being one of them. The importance of 
regulation in order to ensure cultural policy goals (diversity, pluralism, national 
culture) has not really been questioned, and the public money spent on subsidising the 
media has been growing since the 1980s. Media subsidising requires even more 
regulation – and consequently also more control to ensure that the money is spent 
properly. Nobody questions the need for public funding of the media, whereas the 
amount of money spent and which media companies should receive them is 
controversial. Until the 1990s media policy in Denmark was mainly about regulating 
access to the media market, but today it is more about the proper distribution of public 
funding and the specific requirements that follow the subsidies. The belief that 
regulation could protect the national culture and the national media institutions from 
the market and from foreign media has gradually been given up in favour of the view 
that positive media developments come from subsidies. This development is reflected 
in the organisation of a regulatory system in which independent regulatory organs 
such as the Radio and Television Tribunal, the Press Council and the Press Board 
ensure the principle of arms length between the media and the state.   
Lov om radio- og fjernsynsvirksomhed [The Radio and Television Act] 
regulate radio and television operating from Denmark.349 Licensing rules differ 
according to the distribution platform used. Radio and television channels distributed 
through satellite or cable are licensed simply by getting a registration at the Radio and 
Television Tribunal, since this kind of broadcasting does not occupy public 
frequencies. DR and the TV 2 regional channels have a right to broadcast. TV 
2/Denmark has a right to broadcast until 2013.   
Regional/local terrestrial distributed television requires a licence, which the 
Radio and Television Tribunal gives on the basis of a so-called “beauty contest”. Only 
non-commercial broadcasters can get a licence. The Radio and Television Act states 
that DR has to operate 3 analogue FM-radio channels. The licences for the remaining 
3 nationwide (or partly nationwide) analogue FM-channels are given by RTT and are 
based either on an auction (as is the case with Nova FM) or on a “beauty” contest (as 
                                                 
349 Available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=131197 (last visited on 
01/10/2010).  
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is the case with PopFM – and is going to be the case for the 4th FM-channel that DR 
had run until now).   
There are no ownership rules regarding Danish media, and there are no rules 
that prevent political parties or religious associations from owning media. However, 
media ownership can be affected by anti-trust legislation and legislation that seeks to 
secure competition. Konkurrenceloven [The Danish Competition Act] (Act No. 1027 
of 21st August 2007) prohibits anti-competitive agreements etc. and the abuse of a 
dominant position.350 In accordance with the Competition Act major mergers between 
companies cannot take place without permission from the Danish Competition and 
Consumer Authority. A number of mergers within the printed press have passed this 
kind of control.  
In relation to the invitation of tenders for licensing FM-radio channels certain 
media companies have been excluded in order to avoid media concentration.351 The 
decision to exclude particular media has been taken by the Danish Parliament as part 
of the legislation behind the licensing. The criteria used for exclusion is that media 
companies already having a licence and DR cannot participate. In relation to local 
media it has recently been clarified that municipalities cannot own media. This is not 
a consequence of media regulation, but of rules regarding the kind of activities 
municipalities can legally operate.  
The Radio and Television Tribunal is supervising Danish radio and television. 
The tribunal is an independent authority appointed by the Minister of Culture in 
accordance with the Radio and Television Act and the Promulgation on Rules of 
Procedure for the Radio and Television Tribunal (promulgation no. 201 of 28th of 
January 2010).352 It consists of eight members representing expertise within legal, 
financial/administrative, industrial, media and art. One of the members is appointed 
by the Cooperation of Danish Listeners and Viewers organisations (SLS). The tasks 
of the Radio and Television Tribunal comprise evaluation of public service-reports 
from DR, TV 2/Denmark and the TV2 regional stations, licensing and supervision of 
terrestrial digital television distribution, licensing and supervision of terrestrial 
distributed radio and non-commercial television stations, and registration and 
supervision of satellite, cable and digital terrestrial television and radio. Moreover, the 
tribunal grants financial support to non-commercial local radio stations and non-
commercial stations transmitting via Mux 1. Finally the tribunal decides upon 
violation of the rules regarding commercials and sponsorship. 
 
3.2.3 Content regulation 
Content regulation is exclusively related to radio and television and in particular to 
public service broadcasters. The public service broadcasters DR and TV 2 have to 
fulfil a number of programming requirements regarding diversity and quality in terms 
of programme types. In news and current affairs DR and TV 2 have special 
                                                 
350 Available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=132775 (last visited on 
01/10/2010). 
351 DR has been excluded from participating in the licensing of FM5 and FM6, and the owner of FM5 
has been excluded from participation in the competition for getting a licence to FM6.  
352 Forretningsorden for Radio- og Tv-nævnet [procedures for the radio and television tribunal], 
available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=130031 (last visited on 
01/10/2010). 
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obligations towards fair and unbiased programming, and they have to pay attention to 
the societal importance of the news reported. As it is mentioned in the Radio and 
Television Act, public service broadcasters need to pay special attention to ensure 
freedom of speech.  
In the Radio and Television Act the public service remit is articulated in 
general terms, as it emerges from paragraph 10. In paragraph 10 the fundamental 
principles of freedom of expression and the right to receive relevant information is 
stressed: “The overall public service activities shall through television, radio and 
Internet supply the entire Danish population with a wide range of programmes and 
services comprising news coverage, information, education, arts and entertainment. 
Quality, versatility and diversity must be aimed at the range of programmes provided. 
Within programming a primary concern for information and freedom of expression 
shall be taken. When it comes to information, emphasis must be placed on objectivity 
and impartiality. Programming shall ensure access to important community 
information and debate. There is also emphasis on Danish language and culture. 
Programming should also reflect the breadth of the production of art and culture and 
provide programmes that reflect the diversity of cultural interests in the Danish 
society”. 
Some private media also have to fulfil content requirements. The 5th analogue 
FM-radio channel has obligations regarding the amount of news and current affairs 
programming353 and the amount of Danish music played in the radio. Local radio and 
local/regional television are not obliged to fulfil any content requirements, but they 
have to live up to the programming they have committed themselves to when 
originally achieving their licensing from the RTT, as the RTT in accordance with 
legislation354 has to pay attention to the overall diversity in local radio and television.  
Ophavsretsloven [The Copyright Act] makes up a very important part of the 
publishing rules,355 as it states that journalists and authors have copyright to their 
products both economically and ideally (that is a protection against altering a product 
and the right to have the author’s name mentioned). Nevertheless, a number of 
restrictions to the rights exist, for instance when it comes to private use of different 
sources. The Copyright Act has particular rules for the Danish public service 
broadcasters as most of their programming is regulated through an extended collective 
licence (paragraph 30). For other media copyrights are often handed over to right 
holder organisations that administer their rights, as is the case with Koda (composers’ 
rights), Gramex (musicians’ rights) and Copy-Dan (authors’ rights and rights 
regarding cable television). Right holder organisations must be approved by the 
Minister for Culture before they can make agreements within specified fields. The 
Minister for Culture stipulates detailed provisions on the procedure for approval of the 
right holder organisations. Questions on copyright and the role of Koda and Gramex 
are very important for the economics of the Danish media, not least when it comes to 
local media.   
The Information Act [Offentlighedsloven], contains provisions regarding 
                                                 
353 Bekendtgørelse om Radio- og tv-nævnets udbud af den femte, jordbaserede FM-radiokanal [Order 
on the tender of the fifth terrestrial FM radio channel], Bekendtgørelse nr. 393 of 02/05/2006 available 
at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=11993&exp=1 (last visited on 01/10/2010). 
354 Bekendtgørelse om lokalradiovirksomhed [Order on local radio], Bekendtgørelse nr. 881 of 
17 September 2009, and Bekendtgørelse om ikke-kommercielt tv i MUX 1 [Order on non-commercial 
television in MUX 1], Bekendtgørelse nr. 882 of 17 September 2009. 
355 Available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=129901. 
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openness and access to documents within public administration. It plays a major role 
in the media’s information gathering process as the media have a right to have access 
to files within the public administration. There are exceptions, however, when it come 
to matters of a personal nature and matters of national security. A commission is 
preparing a revision of the Freedom of Information Act, and at the moment it is much 
debated whether a new law would extend or reduce the current amount of openness in 
public administration. 
A number of bodies are entrusted with supervision tasks in relation to the 
media. The supervision bodies constitute an important part of media regulation as 
they aim to make the legislation function as intended by the legislators. As to the 
Danish printed and electronic press the Press Council handles complaints against the 
media in accordance with the Media Liability Act and can in particular cases by itself 
make accusations (ex officio). The Press Council shall rule in cases relating to whether 
the publication made is contrary to sound press ethics, cf. section 34, and whether 
under the provisions laid down in Part 6 of this Act a mass media shall be under an 
obligation to publish a reply, including the content, form and location of the reply. 
The Press Council comprises eight members appointed by the Minister of Justice. 
Two of the members shall be appointed upon recommendation by the Danish 
Journalists’ Union, two members shall be appointed to represent the editorial 
managements of the printed press and radio and television upon recommendation by 
these media, and the Danish Council for Adult Education shall appoint two members 
as public representatives upon recommendation.  
The Boards of DR and TV 2 supervise that DR and TV 2 respectively operate 
in accordance with the requirements of the Radio and Television Act and the public 
service-contracts. Each of the regional TV 2-stations has a council that supervises the 
activities of the stations.   
DR’s board has 11 members appointed by the Minister for Culture. Three 
members (including the Chairman) shall be nominated by the Minister for Culture, six 
members shall be nominated by the Danish Parliament, and the permanent staff of DR 
shall nominate two members and two deputies. The Board shall represent expertise in 
media, cultural, management and business affairs. It shall have the supreme executive 
authority over DR. It shall have overall programme responsibility and responsibility 
for the observance of the provisions laid down by The Radio and Television Act. 
TV 2’s board consists of nine members, six of which are appointed by the 
Minister of Culture and have to represent expertise within media, law, business and 
managing, cf. Statute for TV 2/Denmark Limited (of 11th of May 2010).356 
The Consumer Ombudsman decides and supervises advertisements in the 
printed press and online media and in some of the cases of advertisements within 
radio and television supervision. The Marketing Practices Consolidation Act covers 
the activities of the Consumer Ombudsman. The Consumer Ombudsman is an 
independent supervision authority appointed by the Minister of Economic and 
Business Affairs.   
In general the organs mentioned above are fulfilling their duties as intended in 
the legislation. This is perhaps not surprising, as public administration in Denmark 
                                                 
356 Kulturministeriet, “Vedtægter for TV2 Danmark A/S” [Statutes for TV2 Denmark PLC], available 
at: http://omtv2.tv2.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Vedtaegter/Vedtaegter_TV_2_dk_28.04.2010.pdf 
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usually operates quite effectively. It is, however, worth mentioning that the bodies 
with supervision tasks operate in different ways and are entrusted with different 
powers. The Radio and Television Tribunal is without doubt the most important 
regulatory body, as it covers most of the electronic media and has the power to 
regulate effectively. If a media company neglects the decisions taken by the RTT, the 
RTT can impose various sanctions on it. In practice the media companies follows the 
rules, and only rarely has the RTT found it necessary to withdraw a licence from a 
media company. Now and then the effectiveness of the Board of DR are discussed, 
primarily because some of its members have taken political controversial standpoints 
against DR or have tried to intervene in the daily operations of the institution. 
No Danish rules regulate search engine results, such as the filtering out of 
search results based on keywords that might lead to harmful content (i.e. homepages 
of racist groups). One of the few examples of systematic internet censorship is the 
filtering out of sites containing child pornography. The scheme consists of so-called 
DNS-filtering, blocking all queries to sites listed in a blacklist database and routing 
the user to a site showing a stop sign and a description of the scheme.357 Technically 
the scheme is implemented at the ISP level, and all major Danish ISPs participate, but 
a number of smaller ISPs do not.  
Another recent example of systematic internet censorship is found in a verdict 
from the Danish Supreme Court which mandated all ISPs to block queries to the site 
www.thepiratebay.org (a website indexing bittorrent files), as the site was found to 
participate in the distribution of copyrighted material. The verdict has generated a 
debate about the possible consequences for the legal rights of other site owners, since 
the verdict specifies that the ISPs should not participate in making the website and its 
contents available to their customers.  
 
3.2.4 Other media policy tools  
In Denmark media policy has for the last twenty years been developed in relation to 
political agreements between the political parties in Parliament. Agreements are made 
every fourth years and cover in particular the programming requirements for DR and 
the amount of licence fees. However, the political agreements also cover many other 
areas of media policy and have in recent years been quite comprehensive documents 
that stipulate which reforms are going to take place. The political parties produce 
policy papers carrying out their own ideas of media policy – and bring them into the 
negotiations that lead to the agreement.  
Sometimes media policy is developed in a more open way by establishing 
commissions to analyse the media system and to point at possible solutions to specific 
problems or challenges that the system faces. The idea of this kind of work is to have 
a more comprehensive, better informed and less politicised debate on media matters. 
In the 1980s the government set down a Media Committee, which gave out a series of 
analyses and proposals, and in the 1990s a similar committee prepared a number of 
reports.  
Expert reports and analysis do play an important role in the development of 
media policy, but it does not mean that policy decisions are handed over to the 
                                                 
357 For details see Rigspolitiet, “Om blokering” [On blocking], available at: 
http://www.politi.dk/da/borgerservice/boernepornofilter/om_blokering.htm (last visited on 
05/10/2010). 
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experts. Especially when it comes to questions concerning media technology and 
economics experts are involved in establishing background information. It should be 
mentioned here that some of the non-governmental organisations such as the 
Newspaper Association and the association of internet media (FDIM) produce media 
policy reports themselves in order to have influence on government media policies. 
Also the public service broadcasters produce policy papers formulating their own 
view of the media situation and what the politicians ought to do about it. 
 
4. Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment 
Taking into account that Denmark is such a small country the Danish media system 
represents a relatively high level of diversity and quality. This is not a result of a free 
media market, but comes from a combination of regulation, subsidising and market 
forces – and high professional standards within journalism.   
Freedom of expression is an important issue in Danish media policy and it has 
been discussed widely during the years. In Danish legal literature the scope of 
paragraph 77 of the Danish Constitution is one of the main topics, as most scholars 
agree that the paragraph only grants a formal protection of freedom of speech 
prohibiting any kind of censorship. More recently the discussion has focused on 
Article 10 ECHR and ECtHR rulings, particularly after the Danish High Court 
decided to follow the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, thus setting a new course in Denmark. 
Some scholars found that the Danish High Court went too far in acknowledging a 
more progressive freedom of speech for journalists and the (new) role as a “public 
watchdog”, instead of choosing a more moderate national interpretation of Article 10 
with more consideration given to the sanctity of privacy. The relationship between 
Article 10 and the Danish Copyright Act is also being tested by the press and 
discussed. Newspapers have in several cases printed extracts or even whole 
manuscripts referring to freedom of information and freedom of speech and Article 10 
ECHR, even though the copyright infringement is quite obvious. Some legal scholars 
see this as a tendency not only in Denmark, but also in other European countries, and 
suspect that it may be necessary to revise the Danish Copyright Act 
(Ophavsretsloven) and take freedom of speech into account in certain circumstances.  
The media in Denmark are, as we have seen, marked by comprehensive 
regulation, especially in regard to nationwide radio and television, whereas the printed 
press and online media are less regulated. Moreover, broadcasting as well as the 
printed press are heavily subsided and are to a great extent dependent on public 
funding.   
The main objective for media regulation is preservation of national media and 
diversity and plurality within the media. For a small and open country as Denmark 
this is imperative, since an unregulated market would lead to dominance by foreign 
media companies and in broadcasting there would be room only for foreign 
programmes. In the Danish case, then, regulation aims at compensating for the 
unwanted consequences of free market forces on the one hand, and at providing 
funding mechanisms for domestic media and domestic media products on the other. 
Media in Denmark – in particular the printed press and radio and television - are very 
dependent on both regulation and on public funding.   
This dependency is in principle problematic, as the state in practice is 
responsible for the wellbeing of most of the media. This does not mean that all media 
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are state media. The printed press is privately owned, and in broadcasting the public 
service media have a relatively independent position in relation to the state. However, 
the combination of a very open society, in which journalists have easy access to 
information about public administration, and a media system based on major public 
funding can lead to conflicts between politicians or government and the media. 
Regulation aiming at diversity, plurality and preservation of domestic media and 
culture does not fit easily with the ideals of press freedom. These ideals are, as we 
have demonstrated, nevertheless very important in Danish media politics, and in many 
ways a balance between considerations for proper funding and the independence of 
the media has been achieved. However, it is disputed what the proper balance should 
be, and particularly in relation to the governing of public service media, questions 
about political pressure have been raised. It can be argued that politicians and 
government have too much to say regarding public service media, and there is clearly 
a risk of abuse of power.  
Danish media regulation does protect freedom of speech, which was 
demonstrated in the so called cartoon crises where the Danish newspaper Jyllands-
Posten in 2003 published a number of cartoons that offended Muslims around the 
world. The cartoons were published in order to create public debate about self-
censorship in Danish media, as the Jyllands-Postens editor assumed that many 
journalists and writers feared religious fanatics. Yet, in another case regarding the 
Kurdish television channel ROJ TV transmitting from Denmark the legal protection 
of freedom of speech is going to be tested. The Turkish government has claimed that 
ROJ TV is supporting terrorism, and recently the Danish public prosecutor has 
decided to charge ROJ TV formally for violation of The Criminal Act paragraph 214e 
(on terrorism). However, it is not decided whether the court will refuse the case, as the 
court cannot decide on licensing of radio and television. Licensing of radio and 
television can only be performed by the Radio and Television Tribunal.   
More important to Danish media politics than freedom of speech is the balance 
between the various media, as market developments and the emergence of new digital 
media changes the old balance between electronic and print media and between public 
and private media. Public media have a dominant position within radio and television, 
and therefore media regulation primarily deals with the regulation and funding of the 
public service media. The actual size of public service media has a heavy impact on 
the economic possibilities for the private media. When DR and TV 2 expand their 
activities it makes it harder for private broadcasters to earn money. This is why media 
policy often has mixed goals. You cannot support public service broadcasting without 
damaging the private sector, and you cannot improve conditions for private media 
unless you reduce the scope of public service media.   
The difficult art of achieving a proper balance between public and private 
media is becoming even more difficult as new media emerge and the old borders 
between different media types become harder to draw. One of the most important 
challenges to Danish media politics is how to adjust the media subsidising system in 
order to stimulate diversity and cultural quality in new media – and how to develop a 
system that has this kind of stimulation without loosening media independence and 
freedom. Within the next few years new ways of subsidising the media will most 
likely be introduced as the current system favours “old” media and makes it very hard 
for new online media to achieve sufficient quality.  
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A major challenge is how to support the printed press which finds itself in 
serious financial problems, as the number of subscribers declines and a growing part 
of the advertising market moves from the press to online services such as Facebook 
and Google.    
Another important challenge to Danish media regulation is the implementation 
of the European media legislation. As a consequence of the Television without 
Frontiers Directive Denmark has become very open to influence from foreign media 
companies benefitting from operating from abroad. The principle of jurisdiction 
within the Directive has paved the way for a number of foreign television channels 
broadcasting from London to a Danish audience. This means that a huge part of 
Danish television is out of reach for the Danish authorities, which leads to unfair 
competition, as the channels do not have to fulfil programming obligations (they do 
not even fulfil the requirements regarding quotas for European programmes). This is 
the reason why questions regarding jurisdiction are quite important in current media 
politics.   
Also worth mentioning is the challenge that comes from the European 
regulation of public service broadcasting in relation to competition policy and state 
aid. The trials against TV 2 for overcompensation are raised by the London-based 
channels broadcasting to a Danish audience, and they clearly demonstrate the fact that 
the size of the Danish media market makes co-existence of public and private media 
very difficult. In the beginning cases against public service broadcasters were mostly 
raised by private television stations and were about financing the traditional 
broadcasting services, but now the disputes are also about the public service media 
activities on the Internet and mobile media. In these cases the newspaper publishing 
business seems to be an important actor, as it regards strong public service media as a 
threat to its own activities within the field.   
In Danish media politics this trend combined with the growing financial 
problems within the printed press will probably lead to new conflicts between public 
service media and the printed press. Politicians have so far been able to support both 
public service media and the printed press, as the two media branches were able to co-
exist relatively peacefully, but in the future it is probably going to be more difficult.   
There is a very strong cultural tradition in Denmark that supports regulation 
and public subsidising in order to maintain pluralism, diversity and national culture, 
as cultural politics is such an integrated part of welfare politics. The political conflict 
between “state” (regulation) and “market” (deregulation) is obviously also present 
within Danish media politics, but it is subordinated to a tension between national and 
international culture. So far media regulation and public subsidising of parts of the 
media has been seen as an important “wall” against foreign media. This is one of the 
main reasons why cultural policy still has a lot to say in an otherwise still more 
commercialised and internationalised media system. 
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The case of Estonia  
Urmas Loit and Halliki Harro-Loit 
 
1. Introduction 
Estonia, a small country on the Baltic Sea, has spent the past 20 years transitioning 
from a colonial territory within the USSR into an independent democracy; it became a 
Member State of the European Union in 2004. Five national and seven regional daily 
newspapers serve the population, which is 1.36 million. A plethora of weekly papers 
and magazines, six larger domestic television channels and nearly 30 radio stations 
are available within the 45,000 sq kms of Estonia. 
The national structure of the country is comprised of two relatively detached 
communities: ethnic Estonians (927,000) and a Russian-speaking community (appr. 
400,000), which predominantly consists of settlers from the Soviet era of various 
ethnical background. These two communities can be characterised by their distinctly 
separate media consumption patterns. Traditionally, ethnical Estonians have been avid 
readers, listeners and viewers. Russian-speakers tend to prefer television and watch 
Russia’s channels. Thus the Russian language newspaper market, competing both 
with Russia’s media and Estonian news products, is shrinking despite of a slight 
increase in scanty readership. 
This country report examines the media policies in Estonia since regaining of 
the country’s independence in 1991. The Estonian media market is small and 
fragmented by media consumers’ native language. The number of Estonian-speakers 
is limited to about a million. Estonia has witnessed rapid development towards 
information society and a very liberal media policy. Therefore the analysis of 
Estonian media policy provides a case study concerning the problems, possibilities 
and paradoxes occurring in case of limited resources, a well-developed environment 
of information and communication technologies (hereafter: ICT) and a liberal 
regulatory approach to the media market. 
The next section of this study examines the structure of the media market. The 
analysis highlights the specific situation concerning competition between traditional 
media channels, oligopoly and content diversity. Today competition is remarkable 
between the two national mixed type quality dailies: Postimees (owned by the 
Norway’s Schibsted) and Eesti Päevaleht (a trade mark in the portfolio of the 
Estonia’s Ekspress Group) are the newspapers with very small product differentiation. 
Tabloid Õhtuleht enjoys a sole position on the daily tabloid market, being a joint 
venture of two competing newspaper publishers.  
Newspapers also keep producing news online. Delfi is the only converged 
online news-producing portal, which is owned by the Ekspress Group, and which 
maintains a wide audience in both language groups and provides visitors a popular 
venue for commenting on news items. Also television channels compete for audience, 
while the digital turn has revoked fragmentation. Radio maintains stability in 
listenership. Baltic News Service (BNS) is the only news agency in Estonia, and it is 
operating across the Baltics.  
Estonian ICT development started in the late 1990s. In 1998 the Principles of 
Estonian Information Policy were adopted by the Estonian government. Now about 
60% of the population uses Internet at least once a week. 
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The issue of media literacy and digital literacy are actively debated in Estonia. 
The Internet usage is especially high among young people, reaching 99.9 % of 11-18 
year old pupils. It is partly due to the activity of the Estonian government that brought 
computers and internet connection to Estonian schools since 1997 (The Tiger Leap 
project). National curriculum includes several topics that could support media 
education and communicative skills but hereby the teacher education is lagging 
behind. 
While the resources at such a small media market are limited and original 
news production occurs to be an expensive process, the future of professional 
journalism is one focal question in media policy concerning the accessibility of 
impartial and trustful information. On the one hand Estonia still maintains journalism 
curriculum at the university. On the other hand the professional community of 
journalists (slightly over 1,000) is loosely organised, rather loyal to their employer 
than to professional ideals.  
The third part of this report examines the media regulatory framework and the 
implementation of laws, administrative acts as well as co- and self-regulatory 
measures. Since the beginning of the transition period (after the Soviet rule) in the 
beginning of the 1990s Estonian media policy has been very liberal and market-
oriented: media organisations have enjoyed full freedom of expression. Hence it is 
difficult in Estonia to re-establish one’s rights and reputation in the court when 
damaged by the media. Estonian courts try to avoid judging moral damages, 
intimating that to measure a moral damage in financial terms is rather complicated. 
Only substantial penalties for the moral damages would force the media owners to 
pay more attention to accurate and fair performance. Only since 2009 courts have 
started to argue more about the liability of professional content providers in case an 
individual has suffered severely. In addition to the courts the role of the Ministry of 
Culture and Parliament is discussed. 
The legal protection of the rights of individuals is usually spread among 
different laws. Mostly these are defamation laws and the protection of privacy. In 
Estonia by the end of the 1990s the laws that affect individual rights, especially the 
right for the protection of one’s honour, were in process of renewal.  The protection of 
honour and privacy is now regulated by the recent Law of Obligations Act (passed in 
October 2001, entered into force on 1 January 2002). Regulation of public and private 
information is well elaborated in Estonia. The Public Information Act (first passed in 
2000) provides access to the administrative documents, while the Personal Data 
Protection Act (first passed in 1996) encompasses citizens’ informational self-
determination.  
This part of the article also offers analysis on actors who influence the media 
policy. Implementing a liberal media policy means that the ownership is 
predominantly controlled by the market (owners) and that the role of the state is 
restricted to minimally supervising compliance with the formal conditions of the 
broadcasting licence and general legislative rules for the programming output, even 
though the cross ownership has also been inconsistently ruled out by the 
corresponding law.  
The aim of the fourth part is to provide a critical analysis of the Estonian 
media policy in the context of European media and communication policy and how it 
feeds the democratic processes. The economic pressure springing from the interests of 
media ventures could be counterbalanced by the ideology of professional 
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independence, but in Estonia the professional culture seems to be too weak to resist 
such pressure in case media organisation has its very strong content-independence 
(wall) policy.  
The authors have analysed various statistical data retrievable from interactive 
databases on the Internet processed upon specific criteria and non-public databases 
available for pay, and have creatively processed other data publicly available. 
 
2. The media landscape in Estonia  
The media landscape in Estonia is characterised by large variety of media outlets and 
channels, despite the littleness of the potential audience and its segmentation 
supremely according to the spoken language. However, the variety has been larger in 
the mid 1990s when the foreign capital had yet not flown in and there was more 
enthusiasm among the media creators based on the recent liberation from the Soviet 
regime and possibilities deriving from exercising the freedom of expression. 
The new innovative media emerges rapidly, too, as Estonia has been in the 
forefront with its e-solutions (e-banking, e-parking, e-government, e-prescriptions, 
etc). In the wake waters also the social media develops, although creating a different 
paradigm compared to the mainstream media system. 
 
2.1 The media market 
Print media 
The press has fully moved away from state control and is now an independently run 
sector. Newspaper privatisation took place at the beginning of the 1990s on a case-by-
case basis, with the government agreeing that it should no longer be involved in 
newspaper publishing. 
The newspaper sector, like the rest of media, is characterised by heavy 
concentration of ownership. However, the market has stabilised since major mergers 
in 1998. Two major publishing groups dominate the national market: Postimees 
Group (part of Eesti Meedia) and Ekspress Group. In 1998, two Scandinavian media 
companies, Sweden’s Marieberg and Norway’s Schibsted, made important 
acquisitions in Estonia that further strengthened media concentration. Marieberg sold 
its possessions back to Estonian owners in 2001 – Ekspress Group – which now is a 
public stock company with the majority share in the hands of a local businessman. 
Schibsted is involved in all types of media (print, television, radio), while Ekspress 
Group has been focusing on print (second biggest quality daily Eesti Päevaleht, 
weeklies Eesti Ekspress and Maaleht) and Internet (the largest internet news portal 
Delfi). 
Mainstream newspapers in business in 2009 were as follows: five national 
dailies (four in Estonian, one in Russian), eight weeklies (five in Estonian, three in 
Russian) and 23 independent regional papers (18 in Estonian, five in Russian). In 
addition, several municipalities publish their messengers (news sheets) on weekly or 
monthly bases; many of them craft these according to journalistic convention. The 
overall estimated number of newspaper titles in Estonia is 151, including newspaper-
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like publications and advertising papers.358 Circulations figures for all papers have 
substantially decreased. The combined daily circulation of all the member papers of 
the Estonian Newspaper Association in 1992 was 831,400. In 2005 it was 543,600 
whilst in 2009 491,300. The circulation of the two largest national daily newspapers 
remains under 60,000 of each (Postimees, Õhtuleht). The circulation of the largest 
weeklies (Maaleht, Eesti Ekspress) is approximately 30,000 to 40,000. The circulation 
of regional (daily) papers is between 3,000 and 14,000. The circulations of Russian-
language weeklies (dailies have seized to appear, except for Postimees in Russian 
with circulation of 9,800) reach 15,000. 
 
Table 2.1: Major newspapers by ownership, circulation and readership 
 Newspaper Ownership Circulation* 
(Aug 2010) 
Readership 
(Q1, 2010) 
Postimees Eesti Meedia (Schibsted) 56,100 200,000 
Eesti 
Päevaleht Ekspress Group 29,800 106,000 
Äripäev 
(business) Bonnier 12,200 42,000 
Dailies 
Mixed type 
quality papers 
Postimees (in 
Russian) 
Eesti Meedia 
(Schibsted) 9,800 59,000 
Tabloid Õhtuleht 
Eesti Meedia 
(Schibsted) 50% 
Ekspress Group 50% 
55,100 178,000 
Eesti 
Ekspress Ekspress Group 32,000 93,000 
Maaleht 
(rural) Ekspress Group 42,600 125,000 
Den za 
dnyom (in 
Russian) 
Eesti Meedia 
(Schibsted) 13,000 44,000 
MK-Estonia 
(in Russian) 
Moskovskiy 
Komsomolec 
LAT individual 
(Baltic Media 
Alliance) 
10,000 49,000 
Weeklies 
Delovye 
vedomosti 
(business, 
RU) 
Bonnier 4,100 17,000 
Circulations of March 2010 were slightly higher than those of August 2010. 
Data about circulations by Estonian Newspaper Association. Data about readership by TNS EMOR. Data 
about ownership by Central Commercial Register and from public sources. 
 
 
 
                                                 
358 National Library of Estonia, Statistics 2009. 
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Table 2.1: Major newspapers by ownership, circulation and readership (continues) 
 Newspaper Ownership Circulation* (Aug 2010) 
Readership 
(Q1, 2010) 
Pärnu 
Postimees 
Eesti Meedia 
(Schibsted) 66% 
Pressinvest (EST 
individuals) 
13,700 32,000 
Sakala 
Eesti Meedia 
(Schibsted) 66% 
Pressinvest (EST 
individuals) 
9,400 30,000 
Meie Maa 
SWE individual 
99.97% 
EST individuals 
0.03% 
7,300 15,000 
Põhjarannik / 
Severnoye 
Poberezhye 
 
Luterma Ltd. (EST) 
19.4% 
Journalists 80.6% 
7,300 EST 16,000 RUS 13,000 
Virumaa 
Teataja 
Eesti Meedia 
(Schibsted) 66% 
Pressinvest (EST 
individuals) 
7,300 25,000 
Võrumaa 
Teataja Individuals (EST) 4,500 20,000 
Saarte Hääl 
(former Oma 
Saar) 
An individual (EST) 4,500 12,000 
Lääne Elu Individuals (EST) 4,100 10,000 
Valgamaalane 
Eesti Meedia 
(Schibsted) 66% 
Pressinvest (EST 
individuals) 
3,000 12,000 
Nädaline 
Individuals (EST) 
65% 
A venture (EST) 35%
3,100 9,000 
Regional and 
local papers 
Viru Prospekt 
(in Russian) 
Individuals (EST 
residents) 5,300 NA 
Tallinna 
Linnaleht 
Eesti Meedia 
(Schibsted) 50% 
Ekspress Group 50% 
27,500 52,000 
Tallinna 
Linnaleht (in 
Russian) 
Eesti Meedia 
(Schibsted) 50% 
Ekspress Group 50% 
22,500 54,000 
Free papers 
(weekly) 
Tartu 
Ekspress EST ventures 20,000 NA 
Circulations of March 2010 were slightly higher than those of August 2010. 
Data about circulations by Estonian Newspaper Association. Data about readership by TNS EMOR. Data 
about ownership by Central Commercial Register and from public sources. 
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The newspaper sector has gradually lost its majority share in total advertising 
expenditure to television. In 2004 the newspapers’ advertising share was 44.5% 
compared to televisions’ 25.6%. By the first quarter of 2010 the proportions were 
equally 31% out of the total expenditure. In the second quarter of 2010 proportions 
turned into 32:29 percent in favour of the television industry. Still the overall print 
sector share exceeds the television share by four percentage points. 
 
  Figure 2.1: Advertising expenditure breakdown, Q2 2010 
Newspapers, 29%
Magazines, 7%
Television, 32%
Radio, 10%
Outdoor, 9%
Internet, 14%
 
  Data of TNS EMOR. 
 
 
The print media continues to enjoy a 0% value added tax for subscriptions 
although single copy sales are taxed with the regular rate of 20% (up to July 2009, the 
rate was 18%). 
Family, home and lifestyle magazines lead the magazine market; they are the 
most commercially oriented magazines. Publications for youth and children, comics, 
travel, vocation and sports are considered by the research carried out by the 
University of Tartu (2005) to be partially commercially oriented. The rest (including 
the popular science, professional, trade and hobby magazines) are considered socially 
oriented magazines and their circulations are low. The number of magazine titles in 
Estonia is 328.359 According to a more stringent classification by the researchers of 
the University of Tartu this number might be up to 150.360  
The number of popular magazines decreased considerably in 1998 when 
several magazines of the same type merged during a merger of two competing 
publishers. Also, in 2008 and 2009 a number of magazines have been either shut 
                                                 
359 National Library of Estonia, Statistics 2009. 
360 As this group considers only about one in seven periodical publications to be magazines. See P. 
Vihalemm (ed.), Meediasüsteem ja meediakasutus Eestis 1965-2004 [Media system and media usage in 
Estonia in 1965-2004] (2004). 
 138
down or merged because of the slack economic period, and a new-coming publisher 
(Kalev Meedia, later renamed Luterma) seized to exist. 
 
Radio 
The Estonian audience can listen to four (plus one local in Tallinn) public and 25 
private radio programmes, provided by one public service broadcaster 
(Rahvusringhääling, ERR) as well as 15 private broadcasters. Among the biggest 
commercial radio broadcasters are the Sky Media Group and the Trio Radio Group. 
Both operate six programmes, most of them distributed nationally. The two 
broadcasters combine to comprise about two thirds of the total radio advertising 
market. The third biggest player, part of the international MTG group, The 
Mediainvest Holding Ltd., operates two music radio programmes.  
Programmes of the public radio air across nation-wide coverage areas 
delineated by law while private stations are limited to semi-national coverage areas 
provided by “regional” licences.  
Along with the public service broadcaster, Radio Kuku is the only commercial 
nationwide talk-radio programme (part of Trio Radio Group). Also the two Christian 
radio stations – Pereraadio and Raadio7 – provide talk programmes. The locally 
oriented radios (eight in total) do have some talk features in their formats. All radio 
stations broadcast terrestrially; most of them have a parallel stream running on the 
Internet. Digital radio has not been implemented and probably shall not be in the near 
future, as it provides comparatively few cost-effective advantages (especially in 
regard to sound quality) compared to analogue transmission. 
 
Television 
The public service broadcaster ERR runs two channels. Eesti Televisioon (ETV) airs 
general-audience programming in Estonian. ETV2, initially launched as a digital 
channel in August 2008, introduced specialised programming the next season after the 
digital switchover. It provides programmes for children, documentaries and reruns of 
archived audiovisual works. Although it predominantly broadcasts in Estonian, it also 
includes a daily newscast and some feature programmes in Russian as well as 
Estonian programmes with Russian subtitles.  
Estonian viewers can watch several private national TV channels, the number 
of which has somewhat increased during the digital transition, which intensely started 
in 2008. Kanal 2 and TV3, which continued to broadcast also in analogue mode until 
the final switchover, still dominate on the television market along with ERR’s ETV1. 
Still digitally launched fragmentation is also taking place and the newcoming 
channels (TV 6, Kanal 11 and others) are increasing their daily shares. 
Scandinavian operators dominate the private television sector. Norway’s 
Schibsted owns Kanal 2 (which also runs Kanal 11) and Sweden’s MTG Group owns 
TV3 (which also runs TV 6, lately turned into a pay-TV). Other channels distribute 
via cable networks (Alo TV, Telekanal Seitse, TV 14, TVN, Orsent and some other, 
locally distributed channels in cable) and have marginal daily shares. 
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Table 2.2: Daily share (%) of television channels, June 2009 and June 2010 
Channel June 2009 June 2010 
ETV 13.5 15.8 
Kanal 2 19.4 15.6 
TV 3 14.4 11.5 
Kanal 11 1.9 2.6 
TV 6 1.7 2.4 
ETV2 1.2 2.6 
Seitse 0.2 0.3 
PBK* 12.1 10.5 
RTR Planeta* 3.5 3.9 
3+* 3.0 3.0 
Ren TV* 2.4 2.5 
Other 23.3 27.0 
Video 2.4 2.2 
PBK – Pervyi Baltiskiy Kanal, the Baltic version of Russia’s Pervyi Kanal. 
* - Russian language programmes mostly originated from Russia. 
Processed data of TNS EMOR. 
 
Estonians prefer domestic programmes while Russian speakers like those 
broadcasted from Russia. Channels from the Russian Federation (as well as other pan-
European satellite channels) can be watched on cable networks. Most urban areas 
have been covered by cable television networks, which are being remodeled into 
digital networks within broadband data communication service packages.  
The public service broadcaster is fully financed by allocations from the state 
budget, while the private broadcasters rely on advertising revenues and other business 
earnings. Since 2002, as a rule, the public television does not have advertising as part 
of programming and a source of income. The same applies for the public radio as of 
2005. By the authority of the Broadcasting Council the public broadcaster may 
include those adverts in its programming which go together with the broadcasting 
rights of some major events (sports, song festivals, etc). Private broadcasters claim 
that ERR overuses this opportunity, allowing the sports federations act as advertising 
agencies for ERR.361 ERR has rejected the accusations, stating that ERR aired only 
320 minutes of advertising in 2009 (on both channels), which is less than 0.1% of the 
annual advertising volume of private TV channels.362 Up to the end of the analogue 
era the large private television organisations (Kanal 2, TV 3) paid for their licences 
annually to the state budget. When introducing the digital mode the payment was 
waived and that earned criticism on behalf of newspaper publishers. 
                                                 
361 See U. Oru, “Avalik-õiguslikud kõrvalhüpped” [Public escapade], Postimees, 5/01/2010, available 
at: http://www.postimees.ee/?id=207804 (last visited on 6/10/2010). 
362 See A. Jõesaar, “Avalik-õiguslik meediamajandus” [Public media economy], Sirp, 19/02/2010, 
available at: http://www.sirp.ee/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10226:avalik-
oiguslik-meediamajandus&catid=8:meedia&Itemid=11&issue=3287 (last visited 6.10/2010).  
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The digital switchover in television took place as of 1 July 2010, almost two 
years earlier than initially planned by the government’s Concept of Digital Television, 
adopted in 2004.363 The switch-off of the analogue transmission mode involved the 
shutdown of the only local terrestrial television station – Alo TV – as there is no local 
television as such in the digital era (Alo TV is now distributed by some cable 
networks). From that point the television players will only be either “regional” or 
“national” and need to be customers of the broadcasting transmission center Levira, 
which exclusively runs all transmission facilities over the country. The enlarged 
technical options (increase in available channels for transmission) have still not 
produced many new programmes, as the human and financial resources for television 
broadcasting are limited. Pay-TVs are now also terrestrially distributed.   
Standing in autumn, 2010, digital television appears in the form of satellite 
broadcasting (Viasat), terrestrial broadcasting and also cable. The latter to a large 
extent is still in analogue mode, but under development to fully digital encoding. The 
biggest telecommunication operator, Elion, distributes the digital TV signal in the 
form of IPTV. The additional digital services along with streamed programming have 
not been yet introduced in the Estonian television market, except for some services by 
Elion in IPTV (e.g. pay-reruns of certain programmes). Some initial steps have been 
made to provide a limited selection of TV clips for mobile phones.  
 
Media online 
The rate of computerisation and Internet penetration in Estonia is comparatively high. 
68% of all households have an Internet connection. 97% of offices are computerised 
and 99% of those have Internet connections. Around 74% of the total population of 
age 16-74 uses the Internet.364 
The Internet usage is especially high among young people, reaching 99.9% of 
11-18 year old pupils. This is partly due to the decision of the Estonian government to 
introduce computers and Internet connection to Estonian schools in 1997 (The Tiger 
Leap project). National curriculum includes several topics which could support media 
education and communicative skills. However, at this point the teachers’ education is 
lagging behind.365  
Web portals started as advanced search engines and www-catalogues in the 
late 1990s which by the turn of the century developed into several types of portals, 
including the news portals. The biggest, thriving and influential news portal is 
Delfi.ee, currently owned by the Express Group. This portal produces along with 
references to other media sources some original content (including video and podcast) 
with the emphasis on headlines and the opportunity to comment on the news. 
Comment sections have invoked several debates and court cases about the liability of 
the media owner for the comments left by the visitors. Delfi.ee runs also a portal in 
the Russian language. The company has subsidiaries also in Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, 
and Ukraine.  
                                                 
363 See U. Loit., “Estonia” in Open Society Institute (ed.), Television across Europe: regulation, policy 
and independence, Volume 1 (2005) 612, at pp. 612-613. 
364 Data by Statistics Estonia 2010. 
365 See H. Harro-Loit and K. Ugur, “Media education as part of higher education curricula”, 47 
Informacijos mokslai/ Information Sciences (2008) 78. 
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Most Estonian-language newspapers have online versions since the middle of 
1990s. The bigger newspapers presently employ separate staff for their paper and 
online editions. Also, the contents of the two versions are, to great extent, separated. 
Online versions of the newspapers can mostly be accessed for free; the attempts to 
charge the readers a full subscription fee have as yet failed. In 2009, Postimees, Eesti 
Päevaleht and some other newspapers declared that they would limit the availability 
of the stories from the paper version online with the intention to charge for using the 
archive and the paper-version online. By fall, 2010 Postimees and Eesti Ekspress have 
launched that kind of system, however charging symbolic amounts per some articles 
(€ 0.06) or per day (€ 0.32).  
The public service broadcaster, ERR, runs an online news portal that often 
serves as an agency source for radio stations, as does the Baltic News Service and 
dailies’ online versions. The public service broadcaster, as well as Kanal 2 and TV 3, 
makes available its television programmes on demand. 
 
Table 2.3: Top visited news portals, week 38/2010 
News Portal Visitors per week Specification 
Delfi 701204  
Postimees Online 647685  
Õhtuleht 319236 tabloid daily online 
E24 241589 Postimees’s economic news 
Äripäev 88718 Business daily online 
kompravda.eu/nordeurope.kp.ru 6583 Komsomolskaya Pravda (RU) 
dzd.ee 48355 Estonian Russian language weekly 
uudised.err.ee 35932 PSB news portal 
Data of tnsmetrix by TNS EMOR 
  
Many media organisations encourage people’s media within their outlets and 
channels, using the best pieces in their everyday news flow. For instance Delfi has 
launched a special section “Rahva Hääl” (People’s voice) in which the portal visitors 
can upload photos and news items. Also both larger private televisions have enabled 
the viewers to upload their videos on websites. Several media outlets have accounts 
on Facebook and Twitter, as well as RSS feeds and clips uploaded on YouTube.   
Most terrestrial radio programmes can be listened to online. The public service 
broadcaster, Radio Kuku (a talk station run by the Trio Radio Group) and some other 
radio stations make their talk programmes available also as on-demand archives.  
Although the share of Internet advertising has been constantly rising in the 
total advertising expenditure (3% in 2004; 14 percent in quarter 2, 2010), experts and 
industry professionals often conclude the cash flow still remains insufficient for cost 
benefit.  
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Social media online 
The new innovative, interactive media services have instituted themselves among 
Estonian Internet-users, being preferentially used by younger age groups. Private 
websites, blogs, facebook, twitter, news groups on commercial net providers and 
other utilities are commonly known and progressively employed. 
The research about user patterns is making its initial steps, thus 
comprehensive, wide based statistics can be hardly found on social media online 
operating leverage. The estimated number of active blogs is (standing in spring 2010) 
about 6,500.366 This is less than a year earlier (8,000). The number on entries weekly 
reaches 7,300 (a year earlier – 10,000). The peak-time of blogging in Estonia was 
spring 2009. An average blogger in Estonia is a 20 years old woman. The proportion 
of men and women among bloggers is 28 to 72%. 
According to Eurostat, 21% of people contribute content produced by 
themselves to the Internet (December 2009). 260,000 people (20.3% of the 
population) have been registered as Facebook users.367 During the ash cloud crisis the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the national air company and travel agency Estravel 
communicated with their customers via Facebook. Resolving the acute issues over the 
Internet enabled to lower the workload of customer services’ phone lines.  
Still the research done by the University of Tartu indicates that young age 
groups are quite passive in producing their own content to the Internet. They would 
rather upload photos and pictures (88% of users) and videos (62%), rather than 
school-related homework (less than half of users) or poems/stories (a quarter of 
users).368 
The blogging versus journalism discussion has also instituted itself in Estonia 
and debates are ongoing. However, the empiric observations of “civic” journalism 
(often provided by former journalists) allow to note that objective content and opinion 
are often blurred. Sometimes the entries tend to purposely insult or offend in a 
provocative manner. The good practices of journalism usually do not extend to blog 
entries. 
Another way to put blogs to use is politicians disseminating their “private” 
thoughts about public issues, with an intention for the mainstream media to pick these 
quotes up and replicate in mass media. In these blogs the politicians are often not 
bounded with the diplomatic phrasing they employ in their everyday jobs. 
 
News agencies 
There is one news agency operating in Estonia: the Baltic News Service (BNS), which 
is a regional news agency covering Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. BNS is the 
possession of the Finnish company Alma Media. The domestic Estonian News 
                                                 
366 Data in this passage about the blogosphere by T. Toots (CEO, Freqmedia OÜ) “Sotsiaalmeedia 
statistikast” [About statistics of social media], available at: http://www.slideshare.net (last visited on 
23/10/2010). 
367 Data by facebakers.com, September 2010. 
368 P. Runnel, P. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt and K. Reinsalu, “The Estonian tiger leap from post 
Communism to the information society: From policy to practice”, 40 Journal of Baltic Studies (2009) 
29. 
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Agency (Eesti Teadete Agentuur, ETA) was privatised in 2000 and went bankrupt 
three years later. 
 
Other media outlets 
Almost every municipality (both urban and rural) publishes a messenger-type outlet, 
which often takes the shape of a traditional newspaper. These newspapers are usually 
issued as independent editions, although the mainstream media (the Newspaper 
Association) declares them to be non-newspapers. Occasionally these outlets are 
accused of political bias; municipalities inconsistently violate editorial independence, 
especially on the eve of elections. Municipalities often accuse the independent media 
of paying insufficient attention to local issues and deliberately leaving certain issues 
uncovered. Regardless, municipal papers in some areas have proved to be important 
sources of local information. In some cases they are distributed on a subscription 
basis. 
 
Media ownership and concentration 
The media has been comparatively highly concentrated. In a small country like 
Estonia the concentration is somewhat inevitable, as some experts put it: due to 
shortage of resources, to attain quality, to achieve cost effectiveness.369 Two larger 
media companies, Ekspress Group and Eesti Meedia, exhibit large concentration both 
horizontal and vertical, especially the latter, whose possessions cover cross media. 
Eesti Meedia has shares in several newspapers (50-100%), 100% shares in nationwide 
television and 32% of the shares of one of the two largest radio ventures (Trio LSL). 
Ekspress Group owns a variety of different newspapers and the biggest news portal 
Delfi. In addition, the major competing publishers have joint ventures (50:50 shares) 
for magazines, a tabloid daily (Õhtuleht) and a weekly free paper (Linnaleht), along 
with the postal delivery company Express Post.  
 
2.2 Journalists’ background and education 
The journalist job is considered to be an unlicensed profession, which does not need 
any kind of registration, qualification, or affiliation to a professional guild. It means 
that anyone may act as a journalist – be a reporter, a columnist, an editor. In many 
cases journalistic job is being done on a free-lance basis, possibly even not on a 
regular basis. 
The majority of journalistic jobs in Estonia are mainly concentrated into three 
companies: Eesti Meedia, Ekspress Group and ERR. The overall number of 
journalistic jobs in 2009 was about 1,200.370 The Estonian Journalists’ Union has 
about 800 members (including retired and former journalists, students, and 
freelancers). The limited number of jobs is a factor that increases the importance of 
the loyalty of journalists to the employer in their careers. The number of women 
                                                 
369 See Loit, “Estonia”, pp 605-606. 
370 The research project “Changing Journalism Cultures: A Comparative Perspective” (University of 
Tartu, 2008-2011) identified 1193 journalistic jobs in all the media in 2009. Freelancers are not 
included. Data referred to in this section have been collected and processed within the above mentioned 
project. 
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slightly exceeds the number of men in journalist jobs (52:48%), while at the end of 
the 1980s the standing was reverse (44:56%). 
The early 1990s were characterised by a generation shift: the inflow of young, 
often inexperienced journalists to the job due to restructuring the journalistic system 
(abandoning older generations of journalists, accruing of new jobs, etc). By 2009 the 
composition of journalistic jobs by age have shaped back to the model on 1988, still 
holding a shortfall of senior journalists – which inter alia affects the editorial boards’ 
ability to perceive historic contexts by having personally experienced recent past. 
 
Table 2.4: Breakdown of journalistic jobs by age groups (%) 
Age group 1988 1995 2009 
under 20 years NA NA 0.4 
20-29 12 40 28 
30-39 31 28 28 
40-49 27 15 25 
50-59 25 14 13 
60+ 5 3 5 
Data by the University of Tartu.371 
 
As to the duration of job career, the mid 1990s were characterised by 
disposing of long-term experienced journalists – often through restructuring the 
industry – replacing them of very young generations of journalists. When in 1988 the 
share of journalists working more than 16 years in the job was 43%, it decreased to 
22% by 1995. In 2009 the share was 32% – yet not reaching that of two decades 
earlier.  
The share of people working as journalists having journalistic education or at 
least related training had increased by 2009 (53%), compared to the shares of 1988 
and 1995 (both years 29%). This can be explained by widening opportunities for 
journalism and media studies (various curricula in several higher educational 
institutions). Also the number of graduates has increased in the recent decade.  
  
 
                                                 
371 See P. Tali, Eesti ajakirjanike töö iseloomu muutumine (1988-2009) [Changing work practices of 
Estonian journalists (1988-2009)], Bachelor’s Thesis, manuscript, University of Tartu (2010). 
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Table 2.5: Number of staff and graduates of the institute of journalism and communication of the 
University of Tartu working at media organisations in Estonia (standing at November 2009)  
Outlet Management and 
journalists 
Journalism 
graduates from 
University of Tartu 
Percentage (%) 
out of total 
ERR 274 51 18.6 
Postimees  67 26 38.8 
Eesti Päevaleht 71 25 35.2 
Õhtuleht 43 10 23.3 
Äripäev 34 6 17.6 
Eesti Ekspress 32 11 34.4 
Maaleht 29 11 37.9 
Regional and local 
papers* 
114 26 22.8 
Magazines** 74 19 25.7 
TOTAL*** 738 185 25.1 
Data by the University of Tartu, institute of journalism and communication. 
Statistics bases on information displayed on media organisations’ homepages. 
* Surveyed regional and local papers: Pärnu Postimees, Sakala, Meie Maa, Oma Saar, Põhjarannik; 
Virumaa Teataja, Võrumaa Teataja, Lääne Elu. 
** Surveyed magazines: Eesti Naine, Anne, Kodukiri, Pere ja Kodu, Kodu & Aed; Elukiri, Cosmopolitan, 
Kroonika, Haridus, Akadeemia, Looming, Horisont, Arvutimaailm, Director. 
*** Independent production companies, niche magazines, diminutive local papers, some cultural outlets, and 
outlets of particular organisations not included. 
 
Although only 25% of all professionals in journalism have graduated from the 
oldest institution in the country providing degrees in journalism – University of Tartu 
– the general public and even the professional community still holds it responsible for 
low degree of professionalism in journalism and poor skills of novices. 
On the other hand the media organisations demurely spend on professional 
training. The Estonian Media Centre (founded as a media college by the newspaper 
association and the association of broadcasters in 1995) failed, as the large media 
organisations were reluctant to sustainably finance these mid-career training courses 
(not to produce workforce for the competitors).  
 
2.3 Media literacy and media status in society 
Media consumption is an integral facet of everyday life in Estonia. Regular 
newspaper readers make up 74.3% of the population (Estonians: 76.3%, Russian-
speakers: 70.2%); 58.9% (Estonians: 71.8%, Russian-speakers: 32.2%) read 
magazines regularly. Consumption of print media in general is decreasing. The 
average inhabitant of Estonia listens to radio for four hours and one minute daily, and 
watches TV for another four hours and nine minutes per day. 66.6% of the population 
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has used the Internet during the past six months.372 Internet usage seems on a 
permanent upswing while rates of TV consumption are stable and radio listening has 
decreased. 
Broadcasting is a notably more trusted medium than newspapers, although it 
does not produce much original content. According to Eurobarometer (fall 2009), 
70% of all population trust or generally trust television content, compared to 43% for 
print media. Public service broadcasting is trusted by about a quarter more than 
private broadcasting (75% versus 58%).373 The trust rating for Internet was 42% in 
2009, compared to over 50% in 2003.  
Estonia, in the context of media literacy, holds the best position among the 
Baltic countries374, since the national curriculum includes elements of media 
education. The cross-curricular theme “media education” was introduced to the 
National Curriculum in 2002 and curricula of mother language also include media 
education with focus on different types of written texts.375 In sum on the curriculum 
level the media educators have been active for about a decade.376 In 2010 the Estonian 
Association of Media Educators was revived. Although a whole generation has grown 
up within the internetised environment, the research indicates that young Estonian 
media users tend to be passive consumers rather than active content creators and 
commentators.377 
 
3. Media policy in Estonia 
Media policy in Estonia is characterised by absence of any policy paper and by 
resolving issues on a case-by-case basis without any apparent long-term vision 
followed. The Ministry of Culture, the authority for working on media issues, has 
claimed that the policy is reflected in imposed laws.378 However, undermanned units 
merely allow sporadic supervision and cautious enforcement of media related laws 
makes the legislation “sleeping”. As the freedom of press is perceived as an absolute 
one, no official hurries to fall under resentment of the media community.  
 
3.1 Actors of media regulation and policy 
Media issues are under the governance of the Ministry of Culture. This body acts as a 
regulator for broadcasters: it issues licences and supervises the implementation of the 
Broadcasting Act [Ringhäälinguseadus]. It also handles copyright issues and 
supervises compliance with the Act to Regulate Dissemination of Works Which 
Contain Pornography or Promote Violence or Cruelty [Pornograafilise sisuga ja vägi-
valda või julmust propageerivate teoste leviku reguleerimise seadus]. For the latter 
                                                 
372  Data by TNS EMOR (2008). 
373 Data by Turu-uuringute AS (2009). 
374 H. Harro-Loit, “From media policy to integrated communications policy” in B. Klimkiewics, (ed.), 
Media freedom and pluralism. Media policy challenges in the enlarged Europe, (2010) 45. 
375 H. Harro-Loit, et al., “Läbivad teemad õppekavas” [Cross-curricula themes], Haridus, 11-12/2007, 
at pp. 18-24. 
376 K. Ugur, and H. Harro-Loit, “Media literacy in the Estonian national curriculum”, in S. Kotilainen 
and S.-B. Arnolds-Granlund (eds), Media literacy education. Nordic perspective (2010) 133.  
377 P. Runnel, P. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt and K. Reinsalu, “The Estonian tiger leap from post 
Communism to the information society: From policy to practice”. 
378 English translations of Estonian legal acts can be retrieved at: http://www.legaltext.ee/indexen.htm 
(last visited on 23/10/2010). 
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task, the Ministry has instituted a commission to evaluate the cases under discussion. 
For supervision purposes the Media Division has been instituted within the Ministry. 
The Division employs two officials. As the latter also work on copyright and other 
policy-making related issues, the supervision is sporadic and usually not qualitative. 
The rest of the media landscape even less gets the sights of the Ministry. Yet in 
matters considering broadcasting the Ministry has declared that its broadcasting 
policy appears without a formulated policy paper. 
Advertising issues are under the scrutiny of the Consumer Protection Board, 
which has assembled an advisory body for construing the provisions of the 
Advertising Act [Reklaamiseadus]. 
The technical aspects of broadcasting and other electronic media lay under 
superintendence of the Technical Surveillance Authority – a regulator within the 
governance area of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications.  
The Public Broadcasting Council, a body appointed by parliament, supervises 
public service broadcasting. In total, there are nine members in this council, five of 
them politicians and four from related professions. 
The Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate is the supervisor for 
implementation of the Public Information Act and Personal Data Protection Act. 
All supervisory units tend to be undermanned to fulfill their tasks sufficiently. 
Their attention to media related issues is usually initiated by complaints by the public. 
The main non-governmental media organisations are the Newspaper 
Association (defining itself as a multitask organisation for newspaper publishers, 
editors and journalists), and the Association of Broadcasters (representing the 
interests of commercial broadcasters, both television and radio). The Estonian 
Journalists’ Union plays the role of a trade union as well as that of a professional 
guild. Media educators have formed the Association of Media Educators. Independent 
producers in the audiovisual sector have a representation body as do advertising 
agencies. While associations of publishers and broadcasters assemble most of the 
players of these sectors, the most active journalists have no affiliation with a 
journalists’ union. 
Media self-regulation rests upon the press council, founded in 1991. In 2002 it 
went through a cataclysm which led to the creation of a new press council affiliated to 
the newspaper association. As the original press council also continued to operate, 
two press councils exist. As explained more in detail in Section 3.2.2, the 
contradiction lays in principles of implementing self-regulatory mechanisms, while 
the newspaper association reduced the issue to “mismanagement by the then 
chairperson”. 
 
3.2 The media regulatory framework 
3.2.1 Freedom of expression and information  
The Constitution grants freedom of expression. Two comprehensive constitutional 
articles provide grounds for the free dissemination of ideas, opinions, beliefs and 
other information by word, print, picture or other means379 and for freely obtaining 
                                                 
379 Constitution [Põhiseadus], Article 45. 
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information disseminated for public use.380 Although legally provided with 
reservations, these rights are interpreted as “first priority” rights and this is the way 
they are implemented by the media. Any kind of in-depth criticism or editorial 
processing is often considered “censorship”, although these activities contain no state 
intervention or sanctions. Censorship is banned by the Constitution.   
The Constitution does not distinguish between press freedom and the general 
freedom of expression (like for instance in Germany). At the same time the media 
organisations have381 employed the freedom of speech for most part as the specific 
defence right for the press, even if not “irreplaceably contributing to the political 
debate” (as the European Court of Human Rights has reasoned the protection of press 
freedom). The key problem is that special privileges for media may be in strong 
tension with the general free speech guarantees. The Strasbourg Court has at times 
come close to giving higher protection to media speech than to the expression of 
individuals. These cases are mostly connected to political speech and politicians. 
Hence, it is important to keep in mind that the Strasbourg Court affords an especially 
high level of protection to “political speech”. Another important point is that the 
Court often talks about information that “the public has a right to receive”. Hence, the 
Strasbourg Court is concerned with audience based, rather than speaker based 
values.382 In debates concerning freedom of expression held in Estonia this 
complicated differentiation concerning the Strasbourg case law is not usually taken 
into consideration. 
From a legislative point of view, Estonia offers a liberal environment for the 
media. No specific “media law” exists, except for the Broadcasting Act. The print 
media issues are covered by general laws, sometimes leaving unregulated areas (e.g. 
the person responsible for the publication and liabilities of the responsible editors). 
The only law that ever refers to “journalistic data processing” is the Personal Data 
Protection Act. No licence, permit or registration is required to set up a newspaper. 
Estonia signed the European Convention on Human Rights in 1993 and 
ratified it in 1996. It is thus bound to respect Article 10 of the Convention. According 
to Freedom House, in 2010 Estonia ranks at the 19th position in the table of global 
media freedom, sharing the position with Germany. Estonia lies between Portugal 
(rank 18) and the USA (rank 24).383  Estonia lags behind its Nordic neighbours 
(Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark), but has the best position midst its 
Baltic neighbours -Lithuania (rank 32) and Latvia (rank 55), and among other Central 
and Eastern European countries. 
 
3.2.2 Structural regulation 
Statutory rules regulate the broadcasting and advertising sectors while the written 
press relies mostly on self-regulation. 
The Broadcasting Act, passed in 1994, regulates radio and television. The law 
was brought in line with EU directives at the millennium shift and is currently under 
                                                 
380 Constitution, Article 44. 
381 Until the Supreme Court case RK 3-2-1-43-09 of 10 June 2009, Vjatšeslav Leedo vs Delfi. 
382 H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media freedom under the Human Rights Act, (2006), at p. 25, 61, 68.  
383 Freedom House, Freedom of the press 2010, Table of global press freedom rankings, available at: 
http://freedomhouse.org/images/File/fop/2010/FOTP2010Global&RegionalTables.pdf (last visited on 
2/10/2010). 
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revision in the light of the recent EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive. Standing 
at fall, 2010, the draft law is under discussion by the government, after what is going 
to be submitted to the parliament for adoption. As of 2005 the Act on Electronic 
Communication entered into force. In combination with the Broadcasting Act, this 
law delineates competencies for the Ministry of Culture, which issues the 
broadcasting licences (for content), and for the Estonian Technical Surveillance 
Authority (known prior to 2008 as the Communication Board), which allocates 
frequencies and issues technical licences. 
The Broadcasting Act sets up the licensing conditions for terrestrial radio and 
TV broadcasting. The licences are issued on contest base and reissued after at least 
every five years on the same conditions. The cable televisions need also to take a 
licence but there is no contest while issuing these. Internet television and radio does 
not need any licence under the current law. For the issuance of content licences the 
Ministry of Culture has instituted a commission to discuss the applications, the 
resolution of which has a character of a recommendation for the minister who makes 
the final call. 
The Ministry has the right to refuse to issue a licence in case “a person 
operating as a television and radio broadcaster or the responsible publisher of a daily 
or a weekly newspaper would become simultaneously a person operating as a 
television and radio broadcaster and the responsible publisher of a daily or a weekly 
newspaper in the territory planned for the broadcasting activity or a part of the 
territory of Estonia”. This restriction shall not extend to the television guide published 
by a broadcaster itself.384 However, this restraint has never been implemented, 
although the formal conditions of Schibsted’s possessions in Estonia (enjoying shares 
in several newspapers of 50-100%, 100% shares of nation-wide television and 32% of 
the shares in one of the two largest radio ventures) would require enforcement of the 
clause under discussion. Moreover, the Broadcasting Act provides only the grounds 
for refusing to issue a broadcasting licence, not for revoking a licence. Monopoly or 
cartel conditions are not listed as one of the reasons for which a licence may be 
revoked, nor is there any general statement prohibiting concentration in the market.385  
The probable cause for not implementing this provision lays in its declaratory 
nature. There are no sufficient legal definitions (e.g. “responsible publisher”) in the 
regulation. Furthermore, the possessions of Schibsted have been registered under 
different legal entities: Kanal 2 is registered as a property of Schibsted, while 
Postimees as the property of Eesti Meedia. This may allow the argument that 
Schibsted’s holdings do not even exhibit concentration according to the law.386 
Thus there is also no mono-media ownership regulation, presumably due to 
the liberalist viewpoints of the legislator. On the other hand, cross-media ownership is 
disallowed, but only in a declaration. The draft Media Services Act387 limits the 
restraint, under which the licence issuance may be rejected, to “substantially 
producing of potential endamagement to competition on some media markets”, which 
again does not provide explicit legal definitions. 
As of 2007 the regulation about the public service broadcaster ERR has been 
separated into an individual act, enacting also the merge of the hitherto separate 
                                                 
384 Broadcasting Act, article 40, section 4, subsection 8. 
385 Loit, U., “Estonia”, at p. 605. 
386 Ibid. 
387 Standing at 13/08/2010, in the stage of inter-ministerial coordination on the draft. 
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public radio and public television. The law specified the objective and functions of 
public broadcasting and reinforced the liabilities of responsible officials (members of 
the board and the broadcasting council).  
According to amendments made in 2001, there is no advertising in public 
service broadcasting; as of July, 2002 it was excluded from public television. In 2005 
ads were removed from public service radio. This leaves the allocations from the state 
budget to be the sole main source (except for own earnings from providing some 
services) for financing ERR.  
The Competition Act [Konkurentsiseadus] holds a general scope of regulation 
and addresses no media-related specific issues. The Competition Authority has 
seldom processed media-related cases: there have been only four complaints during 
the last five years and four authorisations of concentration of media ventures since 
2005.388 
The written press has no specific laws affecting its operations and thus relies 
mostly on self-regulation. However, the latter tends to perform rather in favour of 
media organisations than the general public, meaning that self-regulatory mechanisms 
rather justify media behaviour than protect public interest. As a result of dissentions 
on principles of self-regulation,389 two press councils have existed since 2002. The 
majority of mainstream media organisations (including online media and TV 
broadcasters) only recognise the press council that is affiliated to the Estonian 
Newspaper Association. The original press council (the Estonian Press Council, 
established in 1991) works jointly with the Journalists’ Union, still finding 
cooperation with some media outlets and channels.  
The main instrument of media accountability is the Code of Ethics for the 
Estonian Press,390 which was adopted on the basis of wide consensus represented by 
the media associations in 1997. It has never been amended since and has been adapted 
for the online media pursuant to applicability, i.e. as much as the provisions can be 
applied to online media issues.  
 
3.2.3 Content regulation  
General content requirements and quota rules 
Content requirements have been set for broadcasting, while printed press and new 
media operate on their own. The public broadcasting has more prescriptions on 
content than private broadcaster and, as to the EU regulations, private televisions have 
more obligations than private radios. The rules have been enforced by the 
Broadcasting Act, which is being drafted into the Media Services Act 
                                                 
388  Data gained from the Estonian Competition Authority’s website, http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee 
(last visited on 2/10/2010).  
389 The newspaper association has found that the lay organisations, institutionally participating in the 
work of the original press council should not interfere in the self-regulatory processes which should be 
left solely for publishers’ consideration. Estonian media hardly withstands any criticism, including 
academic one, towards them. Therefore, the new council avoids these potential conflicts: does not 
proceed complaints on general quality on media, complaints submitted for someone else, etc. For more 
details see E. Lauk., “How will It all unfold? Media Systems and Journalism Cultures in Post –
Communist Countries” in K. Jakubowicz and M. Sükösd (eds), Finding the right place on the map. 
Central and Eastern European media change in a global perspective (2008) 193. 
390 See Estonian Press Council, “The code of ethics for the Estonian press”, available at: 
http://www.asn.org.ee/english/code_of_ethics.html (last visited on 2/10/2010). 
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[Meediateenuste seadus]. The draft of the latter has yet not been released for the 
general public. According to the explanations by the Ministry of Culture,391 the new 
law simplifies the licensing procedures and sets rules for non-linear services. The 
blogs and other internet-based media remain out of the scope of the draft law. 
The Broadcasting Act392 prescribes all broadcasters (radio and television) to 
provide newscasts for at least 5% of the daily transmission time. The minimum 
weekly transmission time is 84 hours for radio, 56 hours for television and 21 hours 
for cable television. In some cases this has been extended under the conditions of the 
broadcasting licence. Television operators along with the requirements imposed by 
the European directives (European audiovisual works for at least 51% of the total 
transmission time; works by independent producers for at least 10% of the total 
transmission time) must carry at least 10% of own production,393 of which half must 
be broadcasted during the prime broadcasting time (between 19 and 23 hours). 
All broadcasters need, in the case of a threat to public security or the 
constitutional order, promptly transmit the official announcements of the State 
institutions in all their programme services at their own expense. Broadcasters also 
must, without delay and free of charge, transmit in all their programme services 
information which is necessary for the protection of the life, health and security of 
persons or for the prevention of damage to property or of danger, or for the prevention 
or reduction of environmental damage.394 
The task list for the public broadcaster is much more comprehensive, assigned 
by the law. The functions inter alia include the following activities: 
y Producing at least two television programme services and four twenty-four-
hour radio programme services; 
y Making available, to a reasonable extent, the programme services and the 
programmes’ archive through electronic networks; 
y Recording events and works of significant importance to the Estonian national 
culture or history, and guaranteeing the preservation of the recordings; 
y Distributing the programmes and media services introducing Estonian culture 
and society all over the world; 
y Intermediating the best works of the world culture; 
y Transmitting programmes which, within the limits of the possibilities of 
National Broadcasting, meet the information needs of all sections of the 
population, including minorities; 
y Guaranteeing the operational transmission of adequate information in 
situations which pose a danger to the population or the state; 
                                                 
391 See V. Rosental., “Meediateenuste seadus hakkab asendama ringhäälinguseadust” [The Media 
Services Act shall replace the Broadcasting Act], Äripäev, 18/03/2010. 
392 Programming requirements contained in article 4¹. 
393 Under the Broadcasting Act “own production” means programmes and programme services relating 
to contemporary Estonia or Estonian cultural heritage, produced by a broadcaster itself or in co-
operation with producers from the member states of the European Union or commissioned from an 
independent European producer (article 4¹, section 3).  
394 Broadcasting Act, article 10. 
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y Reflecting, to the maximum possible extent, the events which take place in 
Estonia in its newscasts and other programmes.395 
In addition to that the programme services of the public broadcaster must be 
diverse and balanced, promote social cohesion, include independent and appropriate 
news, and maintain political balance, especially during the election campaigns.396  
The obligation for political balance has been imposed also on private 
broadcasters in the way that all political parties and political movements should be 
granted transmission time to present their positions on equal terms, which may be set 
by the broadcaster.397 
 
Codes of conduct 
The Code of Ethics for the Estonian Press (hereafter: the Code) has been accepted by 
all the Estonian media organisations and both Press Councils base their adjudications 
on this Code. 
The general ideology of the Code is biased towards a teleological approach: 
the wording of the Code directs the media organisation or journalist towards moral 
reasoning that takes into consideration the result of one’s decision or action. The 
recurrent dilemma of values is consideration of individual suffering against the 
importance of the information for public interest. The Code allows journalists to use 
ethically questionable means for getting information in cases “where the public has a 
right to know information that cannot be obtained in an honest way”.398 For this 
particular article the Code has also been often criticised both by the professional 
community and the outstanders. 
Another particularity of the Estonian Code is to lay the responsibility for the 
quality of journalism both on journalists and the media organisation. It particularly 
emphasises the responsibility of news organisations for publishing truthful and 
accurate information.399 
The Code has never been amended since its adoption in 1997. One of the 
reasons is the lasting opposition between the two Press Councils, and between the 
original press council and the newspaper association (essentially about the right to 
provide methodical criticism towards media). Another reason may be that journalists 
have not adopted the Code as the primary guide of their everyday work. This, in turn, 
seems to be closely related to the education of journalists. Two pilot-studies on 
journalists’ professional values in 2009/2010400 indicate that journalists without 
professional education tend not to value professional ethics. They are not acquainted 
with the Code and only have vague ideas about the basic norms of professional ethics 
as the interviews revealed. As mentioned above, this code is adapted also to cases 
concerning new media, as there is no specific code for net ethics. 
                                                 
395 Estonian National Broadcasting Act [Eesti Rahvusringhäälingu seadus], article 5. 
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397 Broadcasting Act, article 6¹. 
398 Code, art. 3.7. 
399 Code, art. 1.4. 
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An independent code has been adopted by the business daily Äripäev in 1993 
and amended twice. Äripäev’s code defines the rules for business journalists in cases 
of personal business interests that the general code does not provide and sets the inner 
rules of the company. 
Advertising rules 
The advertising rules are mainly set by the Advertising Act [Reklaamiseadus]. 
In addition, some specialised laws (e.g. the Medicinal Products Act [Ravimiseadus]) 
provide some special requirements for advertising in the particular sector. There is a 
total ban for advertising of tobacco, health services, infant formulae, gambling, 
services offered for satisfaction of sexual desire and some items illegal also by their 
nature. In addition, advocates and sworn translators, notaries and bailiffs, and patent 
agents cannot advertise. Advertising of plant protection products, alcohol, medicinal 
products, and financial services has certain restrictions – either by channel, by 
locating the advert, or by time. No advertising is allowed on public television and 
public radio, pursuant to the Estonian National Broadcasting Act. 
As the Advertising Act was introduced as an imposing of good practices by 
legal means in 1997, Estonia is almost the only country in Europe in which the self-
regulation in the advertising sector has not emerged. On the other hand the 
Advertising Act is the example of a sleeping law, as it is poorly and inconsistently 
enforced. 
 
Rules regarding media publishing 
The Law of Obligations Act [Võlaõigusseadus] covers defamation. Estonian 
jurisprudence does not itemize libel. In Estonia defamation appears only in the form 
of a civil suit – it is not a penal offence since 2002.  
The defamation of a person, inter alia by passing undue judgement, by the 
unjustified use of the name or image of the person, or by breaching the inviolability of 
the private life or another personality right of the person is, as a rule, unlawful.401 The 
burden of proof rests with the person disclosing the information, i.e. with the media. 
In the case of disclosing incorrect information, the damaged party may demand 
refuting the information or publishing a correction at the offender’s expense, even if 
the disclosure of the information was lawful.402 However, this regulation does not 
favour people bringing their cases to the court, as also the burden of proof for moral 
damage rests with the complainant. Standing at fall, 2010 the Ministry of Justice has 
proposed amendments to the Law of Obligations Act to introduce “punitive damages” 
which the media organisations, especially the Newspaper Association completely 
resist, claiming it affects the freedom of speech.  
Privacy protection is carried through the Personal Data Protection Act 
(Isikuandmete kaitse seadus; hereafter: PSPA) and the Law of Obligations Act. The 
first is the only law explicitly specifying media conduct. The PSPA provides the 
conditions and procedure for processing of personal data and liability for the violation 
of the requirements. Among sensitive personal data are the following: data revealing 
political opinions or religious or philosophical beliefs; ethnic or racial origin; data on 
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the state of health or disability; information on sex life; information concerning 
commission of an offence or falling victim to an offence before a public court 
hearing, etc. 
Personal data may be processed and disclosed in the media for journalistic 
purposes without the consent of the data subject, if there is predominant public 
interest therefore and this is in accordance with the principles of journalism ethics. 
Disclosure of information must not cause excessive damage to the rights of a data 
subject.403 
In 2007 also the Public Information Act [Avaliku teabe seadus] was renewed 
(entered into force on 1 January 2008) and supplemented by the formerly single 
Databases Act. As a rule, the data processed in the database shall be publicly 
accessible, unless the access to which on the ground of law is restricted. Concurrently, 
the databases shall not publicly contain personal data, unless the imperative of 
disclosing of those derives from the law.404 
Copyright is under protection of the Copyright Act [Autoriõiguse seadus], 
which came into force in 1992. The effectiveness of collecting the royalties depends 
largely on the performance of collecting societies. For instance the Estonian Authors’ 
Society has established a solid system collecting royalties even before the law took 
effect – the system of which is often critically assessed by the broadcasters for high 
fees. On the other hand the Estonian Association of the Phonogram Producers was 
established only in 1998 and is still going to law against private broadcasters to 
establish the degree of fair and reasonable royalties. 
The State Secrets and Classified Information of Foreign States Act 
[Riigisaladuse ja salastatud välisteabe seadus] settles the grounds for the protection 
of state secrets and the classified information of foreign states (considering Estonia 
being the full member of the EU and the NATO), and liability incurring from 
violating the act. The distinctive feature of this law is that the restrictions of 
dissemination apply to any person having “accidentally” or otherwise got the grasp of 
any information classified under that act. It means that even in case of information 
unlawfully leaked to the mass media the media outlets have no right to replicate it and 
liability applies to anyone publicising the classified information. 
 
Rules regarding information gathering processes 
Article 44 of the Constitution provides a comparatively wide framework for access of 
the general public to the public information. The Public Information Act, passed only 
in 2000, sets rules for complying with requests for information. Also, it prescribes 
disclosing public information in the Internet.  
The journalists’ sources have been legally protected only in case of 
broadcasting (under the Broadcasting Act). In other respects (printed press), it has 
been the matter for self-regulation. Although no cataclysms have yet occurred the 
Ministry of Justice has initiated a law to extend the regulation in the Broadcasting Act 
also to journalists in all other media channels. Besides the current law obligates the 
journalists to reveal their sources on the request of the court of law – even in civil 
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404 E. Tikk and A. Nõmper, Informatsioon ja õigus [Information and law] (2007), at p. 160.  
 155
cases. The draft law limits this only to a narrow list of serious criminal frauds. 
However, the Newspaper Association finds the suggested list of frauds too wide and 
hazardous for future sources’ security, and opposes also this legal initiative. 
 
Rules regarding social media publishing and search engines 
No special rules regarding social media publishing exist in Estonia. Neither are there 
any rules about search-engines. The latter has yet not become topical either.  
 
4. Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment  
Newspaper subscription and reading traditions go back to the nineteenth century due 
to the high rate of literacy among Estonians (over 90% in the 1890s). During the 
nineteenth century, the press played the considerable role of educator and national and 
cultural integrator. These traditions were maintained during the Soviet period with the 
press fulfilling a dual role: on the one hand it was the Communist Party propaganda 
channel, on the other hand, within the framework of the same official and censored 
press a hidden oppositional agenda was developed.405 Therefore, the press played a 
particularly significant role in the independence movement in 1989/1991. 
The roots of the almost absolute press freedom lay in the totalitarian past when 
the mass media was strongly canonised and controlled out of the editorial boards 
(censorship on many levels: including hidden, pre- and post-censorship). The 
reasonable abandonment of external interventions has overgrown into rejecting any 
public regulation, including protecting the rights of persons affected by the media 
conduct. This also explains for example the severe reluctance of the newspaper 
association against the drafted law amendments to legally institute the protection of 
journalists’ sources and introduce punitive damages for reducing endamagement. 
Advantageously, the professional training in the University of Tartu started as 
early as in 1954, initially as part of philology curriculum. In 1978 a separate 
department of journalism was founded. When in the rest of the USSR the journalism 
training was predominantly attached to the communist party instituted higher 
education for ideology training, in Estonia it was bounded to scholarship of national 
culture. Paradoxically, the journalism education at the university406 provides 
advantages also under the current situation in which the values of the professional 
media system have been strongly subjected to market principles. A research university 
by combining the resources of research and teaching is capable of continuing the 
critical-analytical education on journalism.407 
The media had experienced drastic structural changes by the end of the 1990s, 
when the market began to stabilise and foreign investments arrived. There were 
certain expectations that foreign owners’ experience and know-how would be a good 
basis for the further development of journalistic professionalism and democratic 
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406 Currently the journalism related courses are held also in other universities than the University of 
Tartu. For instance the curriculum of The Baltic Film and Media School, affiliated to the Tallinn 
University includes portions of television and media studies. 
407 H. Harro-Loit, “Cost effectiveness of journalism education in a small nation-state”, 2 Journalism 
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media cultures;408 but this was not the case. As Peter Gross claims, “there is no 
indication that the Eastern European media outlets that came under Western European 
ownership have in any way measurably improved their journalism”.409 For the local 
managers of the media outlets and media elite, a serious conflict of interests arises: 
under the pressure of ensuring profit for the investors they should also be concerned 
about the quality of national journalism. As a consequence, commercial ideology 
increasingly prevails over public service ideology and aggressive commercial policies 
are being pursued at the expense of journalistic standards. Journalism has largely lost 
its traditional cultural and integrating roles. On the other hand, investigative 
journalism is gradually developing that was completely unthinkable under the Soviet 
regime.410 
Expanding online news provides challenge for the professional journalism. 
Non-limited space possibilities mean that online journalists have to produce several 
news items per day, therefore, often using various kinds of publicly available 
information such as PR news, promotional writing, translations from other online 
information sources, etc. rather than investing in the development of original 
journalism online. The colonisation of online news discourse by PR offerings is part 
of a wider social practice but in the context of expanding online publishing 
possibilities it is important to estimate how much original-professional journalistic 
input is provided by media organisations.411  
Concerning the question about preserving professional journalism one should 
keep in mind that the media organisations, which operate in small media markets (like 
Estonia), are generally vulnerable to the intervention of promotional materials, as they 
are eager to collect all the advertising money available. There are different attitudes 
among the news organisations towards what should be considered promotional 
material and whether it should be avoided, tolerated or even looked at. The 
counterbalance to economic pressure should be the ideology of professional 
independence, but in Estonia the professional culture seems to be too weak to resist 
such pressure in case the media organisation has its strong content-independence 
policy. E.g. national dailies do use various means in filtering promotional material 
away from their journalists such as in-house regulations, the physical separation of 
advertising and editorial departments on different floors or the use of specific layout 
software programs, though the editors have admitted that operation has sometimes 
happened in their organisations. Furthermore, a very small job-market makes the 
ideology of professional independence vulnerable. Journalists, instead of being loyal 
in the first instance to their professional ideals, have to be in first instance loyal to the 
ideology of their employer.412 
Although the current trend is to integrate media and information or 
communications policy, in the case of Estonia one can see paradoxes with the aim of 
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strengthening the public sphere. The Estonian communications policy (liberalisation 
of the telecommunication market, decreasing prices, government initiatives e.g. Tiger 
Leap project for schools, development of e-banking and other e- services, etc.) has 
guaranteed rapid increase in the Internet usage since the end of the 1990s. Hence 
realisation of communication rights of citizens (e.g. access to full and fair information 
that affect their lives; the right to express one’s views; etc.) seems to be rather well 
achieved. In practical terms this means, that citizens need to have competences of 
information processing that helps them to satisfy their needs and desires. Hence, 
“access to communication” is linked to the question of media literacy.  
Factors that determine the content of media are mutually constituted by the 
size of the media market, its structure, professional journalistic discourse, 
accountability instruments, the regulatory and policy framework and technologies. 
Here the Estonian policy trend to evaluate “market neutrality” neglects the 
commercial pressure that affects the quality of information. Research has shown that 
the principle of liberal market policy has led to commercial broadcasters having 
certain advantages while the Public Service Broadcasting has had problems with the 
legal frame, leadership and financing. Still, the public service broadcaster is seen as a 
credible source of information and a channel of quality.413 
 
5. Conclusion 
Socio-politically Estonia is a small but very liberal media market in the discretion of 
media-economic levers. Concentration is not avoidable, as the market fragmentation 
between numerous small and poor media organisations would also not assure 
professional quality of journalism inevitable for a democratic society. However, the 
democratic society needs endurance of professional and reliable journalism, which 
rather interprets than conveys the news. Especially under circumstances in which the 
electronic information flow causes extensive heterogeneity in media use. Therefore 
the role of professional journalism would create a common agenda, national identity 
and a trustworthy arena for the public debate. As Jane Singer says speaking about 
journalism during the Internet era - instead of being only gate-keepers professional 
journalists must become sense-makers; instead of being agenda-setters they must 
become interpreters of whatever is both credible and valuable.414  
This outlines the media-political paradox of a small media market: on the one 
hand it is inevitable to maintain a liberal media policy, which would support both 
economic operations and press freedom. The state interference may impoverish the 
market, dependant on political forces. On the other hand, the prevalence of 
commercial values provides apparent diversity (plenitude of news, pluralism of 
views), but unavoidably cheapens the content. Hence, the question of diversity and 
quality of journalistic content remains a vulnerable issue.415  
Another media quality related problem lays in the ability of individuals to 
protect themselves against misleading information disseminated by media which is 
                                                 
413 M. Lõhmus, M, H. Tiikmaa, A. Jõesaar, “Duality of Estonian public service media”, 3 /1 (4) Central 
European Journal of Communication (2010) 95. 
414 J. B. Singer, “The socially responsible existentialist: A normative emphasis for journalists in a new 
media environment”, 7 Journalism Studies (2006) 2.  
415 A. Balčytienė and H. Harro-Loit, “Preserving journalism 2010”, in B. Dobek-Ostrowska, M.  
Głowacki, K. Jakubowicz and M. Sükösd et al. (eds), Comparative media systems. European and 
global perspectives (2010) 193.  
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committed to commercial value and speed. In other words, media-politically it would 
be predilectable to maintain a system under which the media organisations find 
economically motivating to check the accuracy of information prior to publication. 
Currently the media organisations rarely fear facing law suits by individuals.  
During the two decades of regained independence the competence of law 
courts has increased in the field of public information and journalism-related breaches 
of human rights. In this regard the court case Vjatšeslav Leedo vs. Delfi (2009) 
sustained a subversive character. The adjudication of the Supreme Court on 17 pages 
for the first time publicly debated over liability of a media organisation in readers’ 
generated comments to online news items. Inter alia partly the argumentation was 
based on economic models of particular media organisations: as the readers generated 
comments these were regarded to be a part of the business model. As the Supreme 
Court stated: the media organisation gets more profit when news get more comments. 
Hence, news organisations are liable for the comments.  
As to the media-political discourse, until the millennium shift the analysis 
mainly focused on broadcasting policy. It was that way not only in Estonia but 
generally in academic publications about media in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Comprehensive analysis about court cases, shaping the public communication 
policies, is almost absent both in Estonia and the rest of Europe (except for Anglo-
American countries). Lawyers have paid attention to communication law only 
recently: the textbook for students of journalism and communication about media 
regulation was published in 1996,416 while the corresponding textbook for lawyers 
appeared only in 2007.417  
                                                 
416 H. Harro, Ajakirjandusvabadusest kommunikatsioonivabaduse poole [From freedom of press 
towards freedom of communication](1996). 
417 Tikk and Nõmper, Informatsioon ja õigus.  
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The case of Finland 
Heikki Kuutti, Riitta Sokka and Pasi Nevalainen 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to describe the historical development and legal 
regulation of the Finnish media market and to evaluate its current status. 
The introduction offers a historical summary of the Finnish media and a brief 
glance at media freedom. A historical review reveals the country’s path from a 
dominion to an independent county and at the same time the development from a 
mostly self-regulated, political based media into a commercial system of western 
values. The second section explains the features of the present Finnish media market 
and the third section summarises the major actors in the media field and the legal 
regulation of the media market. We conclude the report by contemplating critically on 
the Finnish media market, which due to the commercial pressures of the media 
industry both the quantity of journalists and the quality of journalism will decline. 
According to the ranking list of Reporters without Borders Finland has for 
many years, along with the other Nordic countries, been one of the countries with a 
high level of media freedom. Similarly, Freedom House ranks Finland in the category 
of “free countries” in political rights, civil liberties and press freedom. The overall 
ranking of Finland in the World Democracy Audit is fourth and in anti-corruption 
sixth of a total of 150 countries.418 
The circulation of dailies is the third highest in the world after Japan and 
Norway. Although newspapers are popular for all age groups, adults are particularly 
heavy users of media.419 A recent study shows that Finns also have the highest media 
literacy skills in Europe.420 At the same time, a key characteristic of Finns is a fairly 
strong trust in authority, which also extends in their attitudes towards the media. 
According to recent Eurobarometer 72, the number of Finns who trust both 
governmental authorities and the media is significantly higher than European 
averages.421 These studies provide an interesting basis for review. 
                                                 
418See Reporters without Borders. “Press freedom index 2009”, available at: http://en.rsf.org/press-
freedom-index-2009,1001.html (last visited on 14/10/2010) and Freedom House, “Map of freedom in 
the world 2010, Finland”, available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010 (last visited on 14/10/2010). 
419  Statistics Finland, “Finnish Mass Media 2009”, at p. 52. Typically, the time spent in the media 
varies from half an hour to an hour. Young people spend more time on the Internet. 
420 European Commission, Directorate General Education and Culture, “Study on the current trends and 
approaches to media literacy in Europe 2009”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/media/literacy/docs/studies/country/finland.pdf (last visited on 14/10/2010). 
Communication and media skills are regarded as central among the goals of learning and teaching in 
schools. Yet, media competence is not very explicit in subject. 
421 European Commission, Directorate General Communication, Eurobarometer 72 (National Report 
figure QA10a), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_en.htm (last 
visited on 14/10/2010); Sanomalehtien Liitto, “Medioiden mielikuvat 2010” [Report: Public opinion 
concerning media], Suomen lehdistö 6-7/2010, p. 5. The Finns have high degrees of trust - 74% in the 
judiciary, 48% in the government, compared to European averages - 43% in the judiciary and 29% in 
the national government. The most trusted media in Finland are radio with 79%, television with 71%, 
the print press with 55% and the Internet with 43%. According to a straw poll, 59% of the Finnish 
population find media news websites are reliable, but only 16% think that the Internet is reliable. The 
national and local media are active in supporting literacy campaigns in schools. 
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The development of the media has been firmly connected to Finland’s social 
development. In order to understand the media field, an awareness of the historical 
context is necessary, particularly from the viewpoint of the freedom of the media. 
Prior to becoming independent, Finland was a part of the Kingdom of Sweden, 
(from the 12th century until 1809) and then an autonomous Grand Duchy of the 
Russian Empire until 1917, when Finland declared independence. The nation building 
took place during the 19th century wave of European language-based nationalism. 
During the autonomy period, freedom of the press was restricted, most severely 
around the turn of the century, when the authoritarian Russian rule closed down a 
number of newspapers. The Finnish parliamentary reform, which introduced 
multiparty democracy and universal suffrage in 1907, launched a growth period of a 
political press system,422 which lasted till the 1920s but lingered in some form for the 
rest of the 20th century. 
Since declaring independence in 1917, Finland’s multi-party democracy and 
constitution have supported the freedom of the press. The development of Finland’s 
society was problematic particularly during the inter War years of the 1920s and 
1930s, which were marked by the instability of domestic policy largely as result of the 
1918 civil war. At that time, central government was weak and the key feature of 
internal politics was the disagreement between the Right and the Left wings of 
politics. During the inter War years, opportunities for publishing communist 
newspapers were limited as the government banned the communist party and tried to 
restrain excessive radicalism. 
During World War II, the content of the press, particularly war 
correspondence, was subject to censorship though not on a large-scale. The 
government directed the press through instructions but largely the press practiced self-
censorship. After the Second World War, the Friendship and Cooperation Pact (1948-
91) with the Soviet Union dominated Finnish foreign policy. Although the 
government ended press control after the war, the press continued to practice self-
censorship. In 1948, the government added a section to the Finnish Penal Code, which 
forbade the publication of articles that “defame foreign countries or endanger external 
relations”. In practice, the law remained a permanent deterrent until 1995 when the 
government abolished it. The term “Finlandisation” was used to express the habit of 
bypassing embarrassing foreign policy manners in the press. 
Finland, nevertheless, maintained its independency throughout the Cold War 
period and in parallel with an increasingly neutral foreign policy developed both 
politically and economically towards a western style of democracy. When the 
ideological division of Europe ended in 1989, Finland moved to join the European 
Union, doing so in 1995 alongside Sweden and Austria. 
The roots of almost every Finnish daily newspaper can be found in the 
political press system that emerged with universal suffrage in 1907: most newspapers 
were committed to one of the political parties. From the late 1920s onwards, the value 
of modern journalism and entertainment started to replace the dominance of party 
political journalism. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the party press system visibly 
declined to the extent that one party oriented newspaper in each market area gained a 
decisive lead over the others. At the same time, party oriented newspapers reformed 
                                                 
422 In the political press system, most of the newspapers were committed to party politics at least to 
some degree. 
 164
as universal newspapers offering full news services. Since the 1990s, the media has 
experienced changes in concentration through co-operation agreements and chain 
ownership. Publishers have bought other daily newspapers, cross ownership has been 
extended, and expenses have been cut by joint news production. Since the 1990s, the 
three main challenges newspapers generally face have been the declines in readership 
and advertising income and the expansion of broadband Internet connections. During 
the last two decades, the widespread use of the Internet has particularly challenged 
traditional media and consequently the industry is becoming increasingly integrated 
and interactive. 
In practice, the newspaper business has been a freely accessible arena in 
Finland. Any individual with resources has been able to establish a newspaper. By 
contrast, rules regulate the licensing of radio and television communication. 
Students of technology started radio broadcasts in Finland in the 1920s and 
established the public Broadcasting Company “Yleisradio” (YLE) in 1926, which 
became state owned in 1934. YLE had a monopoly on radio broadcasts from 1934 to 
1985. By the beginning of the 1980s, although YLE met its public service 
requirements, other players sought access to the radio broadcast market. The proposal 
to open up the radio market was opposed by left-wing politicians until 1985, when 22 
commercial local radios were granted commissions for a trial period. The licence for 
the first nationwide private radio channel “Radio Nova” was granted in 1997. 
Television broadcast was never a state monopoly. Students active in broadcast 
technology started transmissions in the early 1950s, which developed into the first 
commercial Finnish TV channel, “Tesvisio”, in 1956. The Public Broadcasting 
Company YLE started regular television broadcasts two years later, with the 
commercial “Mainos-TV” (MTV) as a client hiring programme blocks. When 
Tesvisio was on the verge of bankruptcy, YLE purchased it in 1964. In spite of this 
MTV continued as a commercial broadcaster in Yle´s channels. As cable television 
and the foreign supply of programmes became more common in the urban areas in the 
1980s, it caused an element of confusion in YLE’s position in the market as a Public 
Service Broadcaster (PSB).  Eventually, in 1993, MTV started its broadcasts at its 
own commercial channel, while the two remaining channels became purely PSB 
channels. Subsequently, in 1997, the government granted a licence to “Nelonen”, 
another commercial channel. Since the turn of the century, Finnish television 
broadcasting has rapidly evolved further due to the world’s first full digitalisation 
programme, new ‘free distribution’ channels and pay-tv. 
During the last few decades, the government has made determined efforts to 
develop an information society.423 The competitiveness strategy of the government 
emphasises skills and innovation policy as the solution to challenges of globalisation. 
As a part of its Information Society strategy, the government is actively promoting the 
construction of a national high-speed broadband network. In 2009 the government 
announced Finland to be the first country in the world to introduce a universal service 
obligation for broadband Internet. Every household currently has the right to have a 
broadband connection with a minimum speed of 1 Mbit/s.; the plan is to significantly 
increase the speed to 100Mbit/s by 2015. The motives behind the policy are mixed. 
                                                 
423 Ministry of Finance published the first information society program “Suomi – kohti 
tietoyhteiskuntaa” [Finland – Towards an information society] in 1995; SITRA (Finnish National Fund 
for Research and Development) published the second report “Elämänlaatu, tietotaito ja kilpailukyky” 
[Quality of life, knowledge and competitiveness] in 1998. 
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On the one hand broadband offers new potential for developing online services, on the 
other hand broadband opens up the way to transfer television broadcasting to the 
Internet and make more radio frequencies available for more profitable services.424 
However, the Minister of Communications, Suvi Lindén, has described the new 
legislation as “one of the most significant achievements in regional policy by the 
government”.425 
From the late 1980s onward, Finnish media and communication policy has 
steadily moved from the state controlled markets towards the EU-led competition 
policy, which is more favourable to commercial actors. In 2010, the altered status of 
the media is visible in three areas of media policy: broadcasting, the printed press and 
broadband Internet.426 
 
2. The media landscape in Finland 
The activities of the traditional media, the press, radio and television, are shifting 
towards new electronic environments, especially the Internet. At the same time, the 
developments are causing both new possibilities and difficulties in terms of finance 
and public attainment. 
The total media market in Finland has grown from 3.7 billion to 4.4 billion 
Euros in ten years (1998-2008). The biggest growth has occurred in the electronic 
media whose share has grown due to television and the Internet. The media market’s 
share of GDP has at the same time decreased to 2.4%.427 
Finland has a very strong domestic production particularly in the print media 
due to a small language area. On the other hand, electronic entertainment media such 
as films and music records are often of foreign origin. The media industry is a major 
employer with 25,000 directly and 20,000 indirectly employed people. The domestic 
media industry ownership has experienced changes in recent years as the media 
companies have concentrated to form large businesses.428 
In the context of the print media, a key characteristic is the strength of regional 
newspapers, which provide a generic news service covering foreign, national and 
local topics. Typically, only one full service newspaper, with no serious competition, 
dominates in each province, and there are only five nationwide dailies.429 Also, there 
is relatively high concentration of newspapers into chains and the trend is expected to 
continue.430 Another characteristic typical of the newspaper market structure is the 
high ratio of subscription to single-copy sales, which is nearly 9 to 1. Competition in 
single copy sales concentrates in the two evening tabloids. Although competition 
                                                 
424 See H. Nieminen, “Public interest in media policy: the case of Finland”, Interactions (2010) 
forthcoming, at p. 16-18. 
425 “First nation makes broadband access a legal right”, CNN news, 01/07/2010, available at: 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-01/tech/finland.broadband_1_broadband-access-internet-access-
universal-service?_s=PM:TECH (last visited on 14/10/2010). 
426 Nieminen, “Public interest in media policy: the case of Finland”, at p. 21. 
427 Statistics Finland, “Finnish Mass Media 2009”, at p. 37. 
428 Ibid., at p. 43 and p. 45.  
429 Finland has two official languages. Helsingin Sanomat, Ilta Sanomat, Iltalehti and Kauppalehti are 
published in Finnish while Hufvudstadsbladet is a Swedish language publication. 
430 Statistics Finland, “Finnish Mass Media 2009”, at p. 169. There are 200 newspaper titles; the market 
share of the four biggest publishers is 56 percent; only 10 of the 53 dailies appear outside of chain 
ownership. 
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between newspapers is ambivalent with the exception of the evening tabloids, the 
newspaper industry does face the serious problem of declining circulation since the 
beginning of the 1990s, which has led to an increase in the importance of electronic 
media and decreasing newspaper volumes. 
The Finnish government used to significantly subsidise newspapers by various 
means. However, since the mid-1990s, direct state aid has been drastically reduced.  
At one stage, the government directed aid to the party press in order to promote 
political pluralism, but this nominal subsidy violated EU competition legislation. 
Today only two forms of public subsidy remain: direct small-scale subsidy for 
minority language media and an indirect subsidy of zero VAT rating for standing 
orders (subscriptions).431 
The other dominant sector of print media is the magazine market. The largest 
groups are consumer magazines and the trade and organisation magazines. The 
magazine market consists of a high level of pluralism and over 3,000 titles, however, 
the four largest publishers hold three quarters of the market share. In contrast to the 
newspaper sector the total circulation, despite declining sales of trade and 
organization titles, has developed steadily.432 
Television in Finland is fully based on digital distribution since March 2008.  
As a result, the number of television channels has increased significantly. About half 
of the households have terrestrial television and another half cable television. The 
share of satellite television is just 6%.433 The state owned Finnish Broadcasting 
Company YLE has traditionally been a strong actor in the television market and 
currently attracts about half of the audience. The share of pay-tv subscribers has 
increased rapidly from 5% (2000) to 25% (2008).434 
The state regulates the operations of YLE via the Act on the Finnish 
Broadcasting Company, and YLE’s financing via the Act on the State Television and 
Radio Fund.435 YLE may not sell advertising blocks or show sponsored programmes. 
Instead, the state finances YLE by a licence fee that every household with a television 
set must pay, regardless of the use. The state has in recent years established a range of 
options to finance public broadcasting including the “broadcasting fee”, by which 
households should pay the fee regardless of whether or not they use PSB and own a 
television set. There is an on-going debate about the role of public broadcasting and 
the extent to which YLE will offer the same services as commercial companies.436 
YLE has six nationwide analogical radio channels distributed via the FM 
network and a couple of digital radio channels which the television network 
distributes437. Ten commercial radio stations have licences for nationwide 
                                                 
431 Ibid., at p. 177;  Nieminen, “Public interest in media policy: the case of Finland”, at p. 19. 
432 Statistics Finland, “Finnish Mass Media 2009”, pp. 200-201. State support for cultural magazines 
was 1€ million in 2009. 
433 Ministry of Communication and Transport, “Koko Suomi siirtyi digiaikaan” [The whole Finland 
proceeds to the digital era], available at: http://www.lvm.fi/web/fi/uutinen/view/820406 (last visited 
14/10/2010); Statistics Finland, “Finnish Mass Media 2009”, at p. 65. 
434 Statistics Finland, “Finnish Mass Media 2009”, at p. 219. 
435 Act on the Finnish Broadcasting Company (1380/1993) and Act on the State Television and Radio 
Fund (745/1998). 
436 The TV licence fee cost about 235 Euros in 2010, see Law 745/1998. See also Nieminen, “Public 
interest in media policy: the case of Finland”, at p. 10-16. 
437 Two of the nationwide channels are in Swedish. YLE has also 20 provincial radios and one Sami 
language radio in Lapland. 
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transmissions and 47 for local transmissions.438 In recent years commercial radio 
stations, largely foreign owned, have attracted more listeners (50% of audience) than 
YLE (44%)439 and while their annual revenues have increased in the last ten years to 
53.2€ million, YLE spent 68€ million of television licence money on radio 
broadcasting in 2009.440 
The popularity of the Internet has grown rapidly in the last ten years, with a 
domestic penetration rate of 75% in 2008 and has challenged the traditional norms of 
media. Nevertheless, the most popular media websites in Finland, excluding portals, 
are maintained by the traditional mass media. The four most popular belong to the 
evening papers, Ilta-Sanomat and Iltalehti, and the broadcasters YLE and MTV. 
Online versions of newspapers have proliferated quite rapidly during the 2000s and all 
Finnish dailies publish regularly updated online versions.441 However, online 
publishing is facing financial problems. Media houses have initially chosen to 
distribute free content on the Internet, which the public is not willing to pay for. 
Media companies have developed different strategies in order to make the Internet 
profitable such as selling e-copies of newspapers and commercial blocks in popular 
net sites. In many cases the contents of pages are meant to persuade visitors to buy 
products in which case the income is based on the sales of advertisements of spin-
offs. Television companies are distributing programmes via the web, usually for a 
certain period of time after being shown on air.442 Major media companies also offer 
mobile services. However, the type and quality of services provided varies. 
Several media houses have profiles in social media in order to get hints for 
stories and to take part in public discussions. According to a recent study, practically 
all Finnish journalists use social media to some degree in their work. The main 
reasons are for seeking background information, topics and new points of view to the 
stories, and charting public opinion. Popular sites visited in the Internet are 
informative sites, various newsgroups, blogs and social media. However, in 
journalists’ opinions information in the social media should be assessed critically.443 
Nearly half of the Finnish Internet users participate in discussion groups on the 
Internet. The most popular social media in 2010 is “Facebook” with a 45% 
penetration rate.444 Politicians, political parties and various non-governmental 
organisations have taken advantage of social media which has been discovered as a 
useful media to share information on their activities. In recent years, some authorities 
                                                 
438 FICORA Toimiluvanvaraisten radioiden sisältötutkimus 2008 [Content study of licenced radio 
stations 2008], available at: 
http://www.ficora.fi/attachments/suomiry/5C7WyEjO5/Toimiluvan_varaisten_radioiden_sisaltotutkim
us_2008.pdf (last visited on 14/10/2010). 
439 Statistics Finland, “Finnish Mass Media 2009”, at p. 94 and pp. 102-103. In 1998-2008 the reach of 
YLE has dropped from 54% to 44% while commercial stations have increased to 50%. Commercial 
radio is most popular amongst the younger generation while PSB YLE is most popular amongst the 
older generations. 
440Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE), “Annual report 2009”, available at: 
http://yle.fi/fbc/annualreport.shtml (last visited on 14/10/2010). 
441 Statistics Finland, “Finnish Mass Media 2009”, pp. 218-219. In 2008, there were 164 Internet 
newspapers and 248 Internet magazines.  
442 For YLE programmes see: http://areena.yle.fi/, for MTV programmes see: http://www.katsomo.fi 
(last visited on 14/10/2010). 
443 J. Laine, Sosiaalisen median hyödyntäminen uutistoimittajan työssä [The use of social media in 
journalism] (2010). 
444 Statistics Finland, “Finnish Mass Media 2009”, at p. 219; Facebook, “Facebook statistics Finland”, 
available at: www.facebakers.com/countries-with-facebook/FI/ (last visited on 14/10/2010). 
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have begun to use social media in particular opportunities. In recent years for instance 
the police has started to join popular social media sites with “Police” profiles, the 
purpose being to offer a new channel to contact police, crime prevention, informing 
and discussion. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has in turn started to utilise of social 
media by maintaining contact with Finns abroad. 
 
3. Media policy in Finland 
The Finnish Constitution is the most fundamental provider of the freedom of 
expression and consequently the freedom of media. There are also several rules in 
legislation regulating media environment structure and journalism practices. 
Structural regulation relates to licensing, ownership and competition of the media. 
Regulations about journalistic practices concern both access to information and 
publishing information. In addition to legislation, there are several self-regulation 
rules regarding journalism.   
 
3.1 Actors of media regulation and policy 
State bodies, ministries and ombudsmen work with legislation, permits and 
surveillance of media market. The two most important ministries concerning the 
media are the Ministry of Transport and Communication and the Ministry of 
Education and Culture. The Ministry of Transport and Communication prepares 
legislation on communication networks, issues of privacy protection and data security 
and the policy of frequencies. The Ministry also oversees telecommunications, the 
operating licences and the press subsidy system. An agency under the Ministry is the 
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority, FICORA, that maintains an overview 
of the functionality of electronic communications networks and  information security, 
reports of eventual information security threats, plans and administers the use of radio 
frequencies, communications network numbers and network addresses (e.g. FI-
domain names). FICORA also collects television and licence fees to be used for PSB 
programme production.  
The Ministry of Education and Culture deals with the content for TV, video 
and motion pictures, copyright matters, education, archiving and research. The 
Ministry also grants subsidies for cultural periodicals. The Finnish Government 
appoints the Copyright Council for three years at a time to assist the Ministry in 
copyright matters and to issue opinions on the application of the Copyright Act.  
The Data Protection Board is an independent authority affiliated to the 
Ministry of Justice, and the most important decision-making agency in personal data 
matters. The board may grant permission for the processing of personal data, provided 
that the vital interests of the subject are protected. The Data Protection Ombudsman 
provides direction and guidance on the processing of personal data, supervises the 
processing in order to achieve the objectives of the Personal Data Act (523/1999), as 
well as makes decisions concerning the right of access and rectification.  
The Supreme Court handles lawsuits of a precedent nature concerning media, 
e.g. freedom of speech and media freedom. The Supreme Administrative Court is the 
last resort in administrative cases, including cases relating to publicity and 
accessibility of the material of public authorities.  
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In the context of journalism, the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the 
Chancellor of Justice observe openness in public work and give remarks of 
misbehaviour of authorities in information delivery.  
Thus, the Finnish communication policy aims to secure basic communication 
services for all citizens and promotes the transparency of decision-making of 
authorities by securing the accessibility of official papers. The main concerns relate to 
information security and privacy protection. They are secured by laws, supervision, 
guidance and permission procedures. 
Unionisation in Finland is endemic and there are several associations and 
federations of media field workers, which are committed to developing the 
employment conditions in media industry and co-operating with decision-making 
state bodies. The Federation of the Finnish Media Industry, Finnmedia, is an umbrella 
organisation for the mass media and the graphic arts industry. The main purpose of 
the organisation is to promote the overall and economic operating environment for the 
media sector in Finland. Associated organisations from several sectors of the media 
include the Finnish Periodical Publishers’ Association, the Federation of the Printing 
Industry, the Finnish Newspapers Association, the Finnish Book Publishers 
Association, and the Association of Finnish Broadcasters. The aim of the Association 
of Finnish Advertisers is to further the interests of advertisers and to promote a policy 
of informative advertising which conforms to the accepted practice of trade. The 
Union of Journalists in Finland is a trade organisation of Finnish journalists 
(including freelancers and copy editors) with the main tasks of developing the 
employment conditions of journalists and promoting media freedom. The code of 
conduct, “Guidelines for good journalistic practice”, interpreted by the Council for 
Mass Media, was formally adopted by the Union. Several members of the union are 
associated with several associative associations supporting special fields of 
journalism, e.g. investigative journalism, political journalism, crime and court 
journalism, and economic journalism.  
In Finland the media industry has self-regulatory bodies, which assess the 
ethical conduct of journalists and advertisers. The associations of publishers and 
journalists established the Council for Mass Media to act as a self-regulatory body for 
mass media content and to cultivate responsibility in mass media. In addition, 
representatives of the public sit on the Council. The Council evaluates media ethics 
based on the complaints of the media public. A mass media outlet, which the Council 
regards as having violated good journalistic practice must publish the resolution of the 
Council without delay and without direct comment. Resolutions are also published in 
the website of the Council. In addition to interpreting desirable journalistic practice 
and dealing with complaints, the Council gives statements on actual topics. An 
exceptional feature in the Finnish media field is that in practice all of the Finnish 
media organisations are members of the Council for Mass Media and have committed 
themselves to self-regulation and accepted the objectives of the Council. Advertisers 
have a similar self-regulatory body, the Council of Ethics in Advertising, which issues 
statements on whether or not an advertisement or advertising practice is ethically 
acceptable 
Education of communication and journalism as well as media research is 
performed in several Finnish universities, of which the most important are Helsinki, 
Jyväskylä, Tampere and Turku along with their research institutions. Media research 
in Finland is conducted by universities, associations and companies. The most 
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important function of the Finnish Audit Bureau of Circulations (FABC) is to audit 
circulations of newspapers and periodicals that are sold by subscription or as single 
copies. Every year, circulation audits are undertaken for more than 400 such 
publications. Another important function of the FABC is research. Since 1972, the 
bureau has commissioned the National Readership Survey (NRS), which produces 
readership figures for newspapers and periodicals and information about the structure 
of the readership. The Finnish Association of Marketing Communication Agencies 
regularly yields marketing information, e.g. on readership and marketing expenditure. 
Finnpanel Ltd measures television viewing and radio listening. The purpose of the 
research is to monitor the trends of television and radio consumption in households 
and by individuals. Finland is also a member of Nordic Information Centre for Media 
and Communication Research (NORDICOM) with Denmark, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden.  
Noteworthy is, that although the media environment in Finland is lightly 
regulated and mainly subject to self-regulation, there are only few civic organisations 
in the media market. This may be due to the high degree of trust the Finns place on 
officials and media actors.445 
The purpose of Electronic Frontier Finland (EFFI) is to defend active users of 
electronic communication. EFFI influences legislative proposals concerning personal 
privacy, freedom of speech and user rights in copyright law. In Favour of the 
Freedom of Speech” is a non-religious, non-political and independent, non-profit 
association to support the freedom of speech and to inform about violations of the 
freedom in Finland and globally. 
 
3.2 Structural regulation 
The Finnish Government issued an Information Society Programme in 2003.446 The 
purpose of the programme was to boost competitiveness and productivity and to 
improve citizens’ utilisation of information and new communications technologies. 
On the basis of this programme, the licensing regulation concerning the mobile 
television network (DVB-H) operations was altered.447 FICORA instead of the 
government grants the licences and the procedure is now more straightforward. Long-
term radio and television operations need a licence from the government for terrestrial 
digital transmissions and terrestrial antenna network.448 The government proclaims 
vacancies for licence applications, which are granted for a maximum period of twenty 
years.449 This procedure is due to the shortage of radio frequencies. FICORA is also 
                                                 
445 European Commission, Directorate General Communication, Eurobarometer 72, at p. 5;  
Sanomalehtien liitto: “Medioiden mielikuvat 2010” [Report: Public opinion concerning media], 
Suomen lehdistö (2010) 6-7, pp. 5-7. 
446 Finnish Government, Government Policy Programmes, “Information society”, available at: 
http://valtioneuvosto.fi/tietoarkisto/politiikkaohjelmat/tietoyhteiskuntaohjelma/en.jsp (last visited on 
09/08/2010). 
447 Government Bill 98/2006. 
448 Act on Television and Radio Operations (744/1998), section 10. A licence may be granted to an 
individual, an organization or a foundation, which is financially secure and has the capability to 
maintain regular operations in accordance with the licence. Network service providers in public 
authority networks are required to have the ability and professional skills needed in their field of 
operation.  
449 Communications Market Act (393/2003), section 8. 
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responsible for granting short-term450 television and radio broadcasting licences. 
Cable and satellite-relayed television operations do not need a licence in Finland.451 
As stated in several governmental bills, the aim in the media production is to 
safeguard the diversity of programmes and the needs of special groups of the public. 
Due to this the licensing authority can attach regulations to the licences. These 
regulations can relate to (1) the regional service area of broadcasts, (2) the broadcast 
time of the day, and (3) transmission technology and transfer capacity,452 (4) the 
length of the licence period and (5) the content quota.453 On average television 
broadcasters have to reserve a majority proportion of their annual transmission time454 
for European programmes and in addition 15% of their transmission time or 
alternatively 15% of their programming budget for programmes produced by 
independent producers.455 The share of independent production was increased to 
contribute to the digital content production in Finland.456 According to FICORA, the 
radio licences include more specific requirements concerning the content of the 
programmes from 2007. Nationwide radios are obliged to offer approximately 30% of 
spoken programme of the total broadcast time from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. on weekdays, 
regional radios 20% and local radios 15%. Regional and local radio licences 
necessitate that programmes on the whole are directed to the population of the 
broadcaster’s range, are of local topics or serve the interests of the special groups of 
the area.457 In addition, in 2008, FICORA specified that programmes are to be  
identifiable458 and independent compared to other licence holders. FICORA monitors 
yearly how radio channels have fulfilled their licence obligations.459 
                                                 
450 In analogue networks for a maximum duration of 3 months or eight hours per week, in digital 
network for a maximum  duration of 1 month. See Act on Television and Radio Operations (744/1998), 
section 7. 
451 The Act on Television and Radio Operations (744/1998) does not apply to television or radio 
broadcasting in the autonomous Province of Åland, where TV and radio are regulated by the Act on the 
Autonomy of Åland (1144/1991). 
452  Act on Television and Radio Operations (744/1998), section 11. 
453 “In the programme structure the needs of different population groups should be taken into account, 
as well as the aspects of communication and cultural politics. In addition, the programme has to 
promote the audio-visual culture. Programmes must be of a high quality and versatile, as well as 
including news, topical programs and entertainment.” See MTV’s licence, available at: 
http://www.lvm.fi/c/document_library/get_file?folderId=991060&name=DLFE-10002.pdf, at p.2 (last 
visited on 14/10/2010).  
454 Excluding the time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising, teletext services and 
teleshopping.  
455 An independent producer is the share capital of whom an individual television broadcaster controls 
at most 25%, or several television broadcasters at most 50%, and who, during the past three years, have 
produced no more than 90% of its programs for the same audiovisual broadcaster. Half of the 
programmes of the independent producers have to have been produced within the past five years. The 
Act on Television and Radio Operations /(/44/1998), sections 2, 16 and 17. 
456 Government Bill 241/2001. 
457 For example, the licence of nationwide Radio Nova states that there should be at least 2 hours of 
news and topical material between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. on weekdays and minimum 30% of spoken 
programme correspondingly. 
458 A programme is identifiable if 50% of the editorial content between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. on weekdays 
differs from the content of other licence holders. In this context, editorial content means the entirety of 
music, speech and other content, excluding advertising. 
459 FICORA, “Toimiluvanvaraisten radioiden sisältötutkimus 2009” [Licence-dependent radio content 
study 2009], available at:  http://www.ficora.fi/attachments 
/suomiry/5m2BNYf4S/Toimiluvanvaraisten_radioiden_sisaltotutkimus_2009.pdf, (last visited on 
30/08/2010). 
 172
The state owned public service Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE 
(Yleisradio) operates under an act of its own, the Act on Finnish Broadcasting 
Company (1380/1993). YLE also complies with an internal constitution called “The 
Guidelines of Broadcasting” (Ohjelmatoiminnan säännöstö), which has the same 
features as the Act and the ethical guidelines for journalists combined. YLE is not 
required to obtain an operating licence to carry out analogue and digital television and 
radio broadcasting on frequencies that have been allocated to it by the government. 
YLE’s purpose is to produce public service programming for access by all under 
equal terms.  
In contrast to radio and television broadcasting, the print media in Finland is 
far less regulated since there are no technical limitations. Therefore no licence, permit 
or registration is required to set up a newspaper or other publication. Anyone with the 
funds to start a publication is free to do so as long as periodicals and network 
publishers identify the publisher and responsible editor. This information is to be 
included in the publication with the information on its year of issue.460 Similar to print 
media, the online media operates free of licences, permits or registration.461 
There is no legal regulation of foreign or of the quantitative nature of 
ownership in the media market in Finland, apart from the ownership of YLE, which is 
obliged to have state ownership.462 In addition to this there are some rules related to 
the establishment of an audiovisual content producing company.463 The principal rule 
is that a company is established in Finland, if it has its head office in Finland or if the 
editorial decisions about programmes are taken in Finland. Foreign ownership is 
allowed and it has risen in the Finnish electronic media, especially in radio 
companies. Major newspapers are still nationally owned. Cross-media ownership is 
not prohibited and is very common.  
Competition on both broadcast and print media is regulated by the same laws 
in Finland. The Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992) was based on the 
injunction principle and Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) could not forbid a 
merger even if it caused a monopoly. The law was altered in 1998 when merger 
control began in Finland, and again in 2003 when the EU’s regulatory framework for 
competition rules464 was implemented in Finnish legislation. The new EC Merger 
Regulation entered into force in 2004, according to which the European Commission 
is responsible for monitoring the impacts of concentrations. If a concentration exceeds 
a certain turnover threshold (350€ million), the acquisition has to be notified to the 
                                                 
460 An eligible responsible editor is at least 15 years of age, is not a declared bankrupt and their 
competency is unrestricted. There are no legal quota rules concerning the content of print media either, 
but the content is decided by the responsible editor. See the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of 
Expression in Mass Media (460/2003), sections 4-5. 
461 Ibid., sections 12,14 and 16 apply to private individuals, who maintain a web site with regard to e.g. 
criminal and tort liability, as well as the confidentiality of sources and the right to anonymous 
expression, but there are no provisions regarding licensing.  FI- (Finland) and AX- (Åland) domain 
names are supplied by FICORA.  
462 “The State shall own and control the share capital of the company to an extent which corresponds to 
at least 70 per cent of all the shares in the company and of the votes generated by all the shares in the 
company.” See Act on the Finnish Broadcasting Company (1380/1993), section 2. 
463 The provisions of the Act on Television and Radio Operations (744/1998), section 5, handle, for 
example, a significant work force, satellite capacity and the broadcasters in European Economic Area 
and states who are parties of the European Convention on Transfrontier Television.  
464 EC Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJL 1, 04/01/2003, pp. 1-25. 
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European Commission within a week, which has the sole power to investigate. Article 
101 applies to both horizontal competition restraints (cartels) and vertical agreements 
such as distribution agreements. Corporate acquisitions and concentrations of 
companies465 have to be notified to the FCA. Also the operating licences are 
revaluated in corporate acquisitions.466 Article 102 prohibits the abuse of dominant 
position. The Communications Market Act (393/2003) describes different actions 
which can be imposed on a company with a dominant market position. FICORA can 
force a company that holds a dominant position to transfer or lease out its 
communications network or communication services to another company in the same 
market.467 The law was amended in 2008 because the Communications Market Act 
restricted the FCA’s authority468 and also to alleviate the position of small and 
medium-sized companies in the market. 
Overall, Finnish legislation is consistent with the government’s point of view 
concerning information and media. Light regulation secures the evolution of 
communication technologies and emphasises a wide variety of possibilities to media 
users. Therefore foreign and cross-media ownership is not prohibited and licensing 
regulation follows closely the developments in the media industry and aims to secure 
diversity. The changes in competition legislation have mainly been caused by the EU 
regulation and will enable the access of new firms to the media market. 
 
3.3 Freedom of expression 
Freedom of expression is included in the 12th section of the Finnish Constitution 
(731/1999). According to the section:  
Everyone has the freedom of expression. Freedom of expression entails the right 
to express, disseminate and receive information, opinions and other 
communications without prior prevention by anyone. More detailed provisions 
on the exercise of the freedom of expression are laid down by an Act. Provisions 
on restrictions relating to pictorial programmes that are necessary for the 
protection of children may be laid down by an Act. 
(Finnish Constitution, 731/1999, Section 12) 
Accordingly, preventing or censoring communication is prohibited and, 
therefore, authorities must not interfere in the publishing decisions of the media. The 
freedom of expression is surprisingly liberal in Finland. The mention of “without 
prior prevention by anyone” also permits the publishing of illegal messages. 
Interference in the dissemination of the messages would only be possible after they 
have been published or otherwise expressed.469 The only acceptable restrictions 
regard minors’ access to videos or other pictorial programmes (including for instance 
violence or sex) that are suitable only for adults. 
                                                 
465 EC Council Regulation No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger regulation), OJL 24, 29/01/2004, pp. 6-8. 
466 Act on Television and Radio Operations, section 13. 
467 Communications Market Act, section 18 and chapter 5, section 39. 
468 The Communications Market Act was compulsive compared to the European Commission 
recommendations. See the Government Bill 48/2007. 
469  See for example P. Tiilikka, Sananvapaus, yksilönsuoja ja lähdesuoja Ruotsissa, Norjassa ja 
Alankomaissa sekä Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen ratkaisukäytännössä [Freedom of expression, 
privacy and protection of sources in Sweden, Norway, Netherlands and in decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights] (2010), at p. 14. 
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In many situations, receiving information is an essential part of anyone’s 
freedom of expression. According to the Finnish Constitution  
Documents and recordings in the possession of the authorities are public, 
unless their publication has for compelling reasons been specifically restricted 
by an Act. Everyone has the right of access to public documents and recordings. 
(Finnish Constitution, 731/1999, Section 12)470  
It is notable that the principle of freedom of expression does not automatically 
guarantee this right to everyone. The freedom to publish or not to publish is an 
essential part of journalism, and ultimately the right of every editor-in-chief.471 
However, the Internet has changed the situation dramatically. There are neither any 
organisations controlling the content of the Internet nor any Internet-specific laws, but 
the laws concerning media content do apply to the Internet. Usually authors start 
investigations after a complaint. In general, there are no regulations regarding search-
engines although there are a few rules referring to Internet operators.472  
Journalists as media professionals have an outstanding position in pursuing the 
freedom of expression. Journalism has traditionally been a free profession in Finland, 
which explains the diverse educational background of current 16,000 journalists, of 
whom approximately 40% have a journalism education and 75% have a university or 
college education.473 However, there is no “obligation of expression”. Regardless of 
broad and favourable legislation, provisions of the freedom of expression do not 
necessarily guarantee the journalistic use of this freedom. According to a survey 
among Finnish journalists the majority of respondents estimated that the 
independence and autonomy in journalism are to be reduced in the near future, and 
media houses are turning towards news industrial production. Journalists have to 
adapt to different upheavals, which are to cause pressure on the costs and tighter 
production schedules, and forcing former approaches to critical evaluation and 
reform. Also analytical journalism, criticism, and observance of ethical rules were 
believed to be declining.474 The main changes over the last two years included an 
                                                 
470 The section refers to the special provision act: the Act on the Openness of Government Activities 
(61/1999) to be discussed later in this chapter. 
471 However, according to the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media (460/2003) 
there are a few exceptions regarding this freedom: the duty to publish a reply to an offensive message, 
a correction to an erroneous information, and obligation to publish official announcements to protect 
human life or health or significant environment or property interests. In addition, the right of receiving 
only guarantees the possibility of receiving messages in some form, not the right to receive all the 
messages wanted or messages in some certain form.  Messages have usually ownership or copyright, 
and publishers may charge subscriptions and television companies pay-channels.   
472 See FICORA, “Same laws apply on the internet as elsewhere”, available at: 
http://www.viestintavirasto.fi/en/index/internet/internetinvalvonta.html (last visited on 18/10/2010). 
Recently there has been a proposal to oblige operators (a) to control the down-loading of illegal 
material, i.e. films and music, from the Internet (b) to inform a customer if they download illegal 
material from the net. However, this is at the draft stage.  Finnish Internet operators have decided to 
filter paedophile material upon the request of the authorities and based on a “filter list” produced by the 
police. Filtering is based on the Act of Obstructing Dissemination of Child Pornography Material 
(1068/2006). According to the Act, the police is responsible for preparing and updating a list of 
Internet sites that include illegal material. 
473 1500 of Finnish journalists are freelancers, 1000 students and 3000 retired seniors. Over half of 
Finnish journalists are female. See Suomen Journalistiliitto, “Liiton jäsenet” [The members], available 
at: http://www.journalistiliitto.fi/liitto/liiton_jasenet/ (last visited on 13/10/2010). 
474  Jyrkiäinen, J., Journalistit muuttuvassa mediassa [Journalists in the changing media] (2008), pp. 
88-91. 
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increase in the amount of stories to be published in several media houses, an increase 
in the weekly number of stories required from an individual journalist and pronounced 
targeting of stories to specific audiences. The problem was highlighted in particular in 
the electronic media. Technological developments, including the Internet may affect 
in the future even more the journalistic work.475 In the long-term, narrowing of 
income will affect opportunities for the traditional media to recruit professional 
journalists, and the media content will be produced by less staff. This may decrease 
the quality of journalism and journalists’ ability to cover important issues.476 
Culturally, there are no restraints to the freedom of expression but political 
correctness may have a self-censorship effect on the work of journalists.477  
The most fundamental Finnish law regarding freedom of expression and media 
freedom is the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media 
(460/2003). The Act covers the most prominent features of the media environment 
and refers to the responsibilities of editors and media actors, as well as the rights of 
those attracting media attention. However, the Act does not refer to the contents of 
media publishing.478 
The Act brings the press, broadcasting and online media within the same 
framework with respect to responsibility and the exercise of freedom of expression, 
thus implementing technology-neutrality.479 However, the Act applies only partially 
to private individuals maintaining a web site on an electronic communications 
network, and operations consisting solely of the technical production, transmission, 
intermediation or distribution of publications or network messages. The 
responsibilities of operators providing online services include only technical and 
distributional matters. The Act includes some responsibilities considering illegal 
messages: to assign the sender’s identification information to authorities, to interrupt 
the delivery, and to destroy the message.480 General responsibilities for media houses 
exercising journalism are related to periodicals, network publications and 
programmes.481 
                                                 
475 Entertaining contents as well as financial accountability in own work was estimated to increase in 
journalism. Ibid. 
476 A potential problem in journalism is the concentration on popular topics which would not be the 
most important in terms of democracy and democratic participation. See K. Nordenstreng, H. 
Nieminen, and R. Meriläinen, R. “Sananvapaus, media ja demokratia” [Freedom of expression, media 
and democracy] in S. Aalto-Matturi and N. Wilhelmsson (eds) Demokratiapolitiikan suuntaviivat, 
[Trends in the politics of democracy] (2010), pp.153-163, also available at:  
http://www.om.fi/1266334043714 (last visited on 17/10/2010). 
477 Public trust for authorities is high in Finland and higher than trust for journalists, for instance. This 
might originate from the irritating tabloidisation of journalism. Interview with Kaarle Nordenstreng, 
30/08/2010 Jyväskylä. 
478 The first section of the Act refers to the main principle of freedom of expression in democracies: “In 
the application of this Act, interference with the activities of the media shall be legitimate only in so far 
as it is unavoidable, taking due note of the importance of the freedom of expression in a democracy 
subject to the rule of law”. 
479 The Act repealed two previous Acts, the Freedom of the Press Act (1/1919) and the Broadcasting 
Liability Act (219/1971). These two forms of mass communication were collected in the same Act with 
the addition of the Internet which did not have any regulation before the new regulation. 
480 Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media, section 3. 
481 A network publication means a set of network messages, arranged into a coherent whole comparable 
to a periodical, from material produced or processed by the publisher, and intended to be issued 
regularly. Ibid., section 4.  
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All programmes and network publications shall be recorded and retained for at 
least 21 days after the programme has been broadcast or the network publication 
provided to the public.482 Everyone has the right of access to a programme or network 
publication free of charge, if they have a justified reason to consider that they are the 
victim of an offence arising from their contents, or that they have sustained an injury 
or loss from the broadcasting of the programme or the provision of the network 
publication to the public. 483 A private individual, who has a justifiable reason for 
considering a message offensive, has the right to have a reply published in the same 
publication or programme.484 Erroneous information must be corrected in the media 
unless such a correction is manifestly unnecessary owing to the minor significance of 
the error. The correction is to be published in the same publication or in a programme 
by the broadcaster in question.485 The reply or correction shall be published, free of 
charge and without undue delay, in appropriate extension and in the same manner as 
the message on which the demand for a reply or correction is based. The contents of 
the reply or correction shall not be illegal or offensive.486 
The ground for the imposition of a fine for editorial misconduct is that the 
responsible editor intentionally or negligently fails in an essential manner in their duty 
to manage and supervise editorial work. Respectively, criminal liability for an offence 
arising from the contents of a message provided to the public shall lie with the 
perpetrator or accomplice, as defined in the Penal Code (39/1889). The provisions of 
the Tort Liability Act (412/1974) apply to liability for, and compensation of, injury or 
loss arising from the contents of a message provided to the public.487 
The Act requires a media outlet to publish a judgment concerning a violation 
of honour and privacy. The court may at a request made by the injured party during 
the criminal proceedings order that a notice of the judgment be published in the said 
periodical or network publication, or in a programme of the same broadcaster where 
an offence is committed.488 The publisher and the broadcaster shall publish official 
announcements in a periodical, network publication or programme free of charge, if 
                                                 
482 The duty to retain the record shall continue beyond the period if a matter arising from the contents 
of the programme or network publication is subject to pre-trial investigation, prosecutorial evaluation 
or court proceedings. In this event, the record may be disposed of only after it has been established that 
no charge will be brought in the matter or after the case arising from the contents of the programme or 
network publication has been finally decided by a court of law. The prosecutor or the court last seized 
of the matter shall notify the publisher or the broadcaster of the expiration of the duty to retain the 
record. Ibid., section 6. 
483 The publisher and the broadcaster shall also provide access to a record, without undue delay, to an 
official engaged in the pre-trial investigation or prosecutorial evaluation of an offence arising from the 
contents of a programme or network publication. Ibid., section 15..  
484 The right to reply in the act also applies to network publications and broadcast programmes that are 
broadcast on a repeated basis. Previously, the right to reply did not apply to radio and television 
programmes and there were no rules concerning network publications. Conventional cultural critique, 
political, economic or societal evaluation or similar presentation of an opinion do not, however, 
warrant the right to reply. Ibid., section 8. 
485 The right to correction applies to private individuals, corporations, foundations and public 
authorities regarding on them or their operations. Ibid., section 9. 
486 Where necessary, the editor responsible shall assist in the technical realisation of the reply. The act 
includes also deadline regulations for demands of reply and correction and procedures of applying if 
demand is rejected by the editor. Ibid., section 11. 
487 Ibid., sections 12-14. 
488 The court may reinforce the order by imposing the threat of a fine. The notice of the judgment shall 
be published free of charge and it must be reasonably detailed. The responsible editor shall see to it that 
so is done. Ibid., section 23. 
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this is necessary for the protection of human life or health or significant 
environmental or property interests, or for some other comparable important 
reason.489 
 
3.4 Access to information 
Access to the information can be seen to be crucial for the work of journalists and the 
stories published. In legislation, this is guaranteed in several ways: as the access to 
public documents,  as journalists’ right to protect their sources, and as certain freedom 
levels in journalistic information gathering in terms of  picture taking, recording and 
false identity.   
As previously mentioned, the openness of government activities was 
established in the Finnish Constitution as an essential part of freedom of expression 
and the right to receive information. Finland among the other Nordic countries has a 
long tradition of guaranteeing public accessibility to official documents by legislation. 
The national FOIA (Act on Openness of Government Activities 621/1999) sets the 
principle that official documents shall be in the public domain unless there is a 
specific reason for withholding them. The transparency of government regards 
activities of authorities and not only documents they possess. Therefore, authorities 
have certain informing requirements.490 The intention of the Act is to promote 
openness and good practice on information management in government, and provide 
private individuals and corporations with an opportunity to monitor the exercise of 
public authority and the use of public resources, to freely form an opinion, to 
influence the exercise of public authority and protect their rights and interests.491 
The application of the Act is very broad: in addition to public authorities it 
also applies to private bodies that exercise public authority. In addition to general 
authorities as state administrative and municipal authorities, state agencies and 
institutions, the Act applies also to corporations, institutions, foundations and private 
individuals appointed for the performance of a public task on the basis of the Act.492 
The public right to access refers to the information of official documents regardless of 
their form. The document may be in a paper or electronic format, a micro film, a 
register entry or a collection of entries, a voice recording, etc. The Act applies to both 
documents in the possession of an authority and to documents prepared by an 
authority or delivered to an authority.493 
According to the Act, access to documents is the main principle, while secrecy 
is an exception. Access may thus not be restricted without a lawful reason or more 
than necessary for the interest that is being protected. The Finnish FOIA consists of 
32 categories of secret documents that are exempted from release according to a 
variety of potential harm tests depending on the type of information.494 Documents 
                                                 
489 Ibid., section 7. 
490 The Act is the main provision to refer to, unless there are other laws (e.g. the Police Act, the Patient 
Act etc.) which may include stronger restrictions to information access. According to the 1st section of 
the Act “unless specially otherwise provided in this Act or another Act”. 
491 Act on Openness of Government Activities, section 3.  The Act, which came into effect in 1999, 
replaced the previous act on the publicity of official documents.   
492 Ibid., section 4. 
493 Ibid., section 5. 
494 The most central provisions on secrecy protect important public and private interests, including 
international relations and foreign affairs, criminal investigations and the prevention and prosecution of 
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are kept secret for 25 years unless otherwise provided by the law, with the exception 
of personal information which must be kept secret for 50 years after the death of the 
individual. If the release would “obviously cause significant harm to the interests 
protected”, the Government can extend the classification for another thirty years.495 
Access is limited to non-official documents which may not be archived, such 
as private notes and documents of the internal activity of an authority. Documents 
which contain information on decision-making must be stored. Preparatory documents 
are to be entered into the public domain at the time of any decisions, if not earlier.496 
If a document contains only partially secret information, access must be granted to the 
public part of it by covering the parts to be kept secret in a document. If necessary, an 
authority possessing the document is required to make this kind of distinction. 
Information seekers are not required to provide reasons for their request or to verify 
their identity unless they are requesting personal or otherwise secret information. 
Responses to requests must be made within 14 days.497 In cases where the information 
requested is withhold, authorities are required to give written refusals containing the 
reasons for the refusal and including guidelines to appeal. Appeal to a decision made 
by an authority is usually made to an administrative court.498 
In addition to answering document requests, authorities are under the 
obligation to promote access and to assist those requesting information to find it 
without knowing its location. Moreover, they are required to produce and disseminate 
information on their services and practices, as well as on the social conditions and 
developments in their field of competence. Authorities are obliged to produce sets of 
data on request. Computer systems must be planned to ensure easy access to 
information.499 Releasing the information requested does not have to be free. 
Authorities have the right to charge reasonable printing expenses (cost prices) of the 
paper documents delivered to information seekers.500 
However, in spite of legislative possibilities, several technical and other kinds 
of restrictions have been found for the access of information. Problems partly arise 
from inconsistent legal interpretations of public and non-public issues, partly from the 
negative attitudes of the authorities providing information requested and partly from 
uninformed journalists and busy journalism practices not giving time to apply for 
documents or to complain if they are not turned over. The amount of information 
requested may be too vast or the documents may only be partially public and 
separating the public part from the secret would be too difficult. Moreover, according 
                                                                                                                                            
crimes, state security, tactical and technical plans of the police, security preparations for emergency 
conditions, military intelligence and the armed forces, protection of the confidentiality of information 
and privacy of personal matters, and public and private economic interests, unless it is obvious that 
access will not compromise those interests, business secrets, and personal information including 
lifestyle and political convictions, except for those in political or elected office. Ibid., section 24. 
495 Ibid., section 31. 
496 Ibid., section 5. 
497 Information on a completed document must be released even if the document refers to a matter 
partially completed or the document is only a part of a larger issue to be decided in future. However, 
access may be restricted on the basis that handling of the matter has not yet been completed, and there 
are no documents prepared. In these kinds of situations, authorities are advised to give at least some 
oral information about the matter. See Ministry of Justice: “The act on the openness of government 
activities”, available at: http://www.om.fi/23963.htm (last visited on 13/10/2010). 
498 Act on Openness of Government Activities, section 33. 
499 Ibid., sections 18-21. 
500 In some cases authorities can also charge for especially laborious seeking of the material. Electronic 
delivery of information via e-mail is free. Ibid., section 34. 
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to the authorities, they do not have enough time to look for the information, or the 
format of the information is problematic for access or the archives are not organised 
enough to find the information requested. When authorities are uncertain whether the 
information is public or not, they usually refuse to provide access, just to be on the 
safe side.501 
Finnish law affords a great many liberties for videotaping and picture taking.  
Watching or monitoring a person with a technical device is illegal in domestic 
premises, a toilet, a dressing room or other comparable place.  Picture taking 
elsewhere is illegal only if the place is closed to the public and picture taking violates 
the person’s privacy. According to these two restrictions,  picture taking is allowed in 
public areas, such as streets or parks but also in many situations in so called partially 
public environments, such as working places, stores, schools and restaurants.502 
Journalists can also secretly record their own conversations, for instance journalists 
are permitted to tape their interviews without asking permission to do so from their 
interviewees. Eavesdropping may be judged criminal under the following conditions. 
First, a person has to listen to or record with a technical device a discussion or other 
sounds of private life, which are not intended for his or her knowledge, and which 
occur in private premises. Second, the circumstances are such that the persons 
involved in the discussion have no reason to believe that discussion can be listened to 
externally.503 According to the ethical guidelines, journalists are not obliged to reveal 
their identity when gathering information, if the anonymous method is an essential 
part for the work.504 However, according to law giving a false identity is illegal when 
misleading a public authority or impersonating a public official.505 
Journalists’ right to protect their sources is a central part of media freedom and 
independence also in Finland as it supports public debate about controversial and 
sensitive issues and protects the source from negative consequences due to the leaking 
of embarrassing information. The right is included in the Act on the Exercise of 
Freedom of Expression in Mass Media according to which:  
The originator of a message provided to the public, the publisher and the 
broadcaster are entitled to maintain the confidentiality of the source of the 
information in the message. In addition, the publisher and the broadcaster are 
entitled to maintain the confidentiality of the identity of the originator of the 
message. 
                                                 
501 H. Kuutti, “Accessibility law in the journalists’ work - A Finnish study”, available at: 
http://users.jyu.fi/~hkuutti/JULKISUUSLAKI-NETTIAINEISTO/HEIKKIKUUTTI.pdf (last visited on 
13/10/2010). 
502 Penal Code (39/1889), chapter 24 (Amendment 531/2000 Offences against privacy, public peace 
and personal reputation), section 6. However, for instance in restaurants or stores picture-taking might 
cause irritation to the customers, and the owner of the property may forbid it on the basis of disturbance 
caused to the customers.  
503  An attempt or preparation of eavesdropping and illicit observation is punishable. Ibid., sections 5-7. 
504 Council for Mass Media in Finland, “Guidelines for journalists”, available at: 
http://www.jsn.fi/Content.aspx?d=48 (last visited on 13/10/2010). According to section 9 journalists 
must aim at obtaining information openly. However, if matters of social significance cannot be 
otherwise investigated, journalist may gather information from human sources without revealing his or 
her identity or purpose. 
505 See Penal Code, chapter 16 (Amendment 563/1998 Offences against public authorities), sections 5 
and 9. 
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(Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media; 460/2003)506 
The right refers to all kinds of information which could reveal the identity of a 
journalist’s human source of or anyone involved in the story.507 Separate provisions 
apply to the duty to disclose confidential information in a pre-trial investigation or 
court proceedings.508 
The Personal Data Act (523/1999), which originally came to operation already in 
1988 (471/87) controls the automatic processing of personal data. The Act protects 
personal privacy in the processing of personal data and promotes the development of 
and compliance with good processing practice. However, there is an exception 
concerning the media. The Act does not apply to personal data files containing, solely 
and in unaltered form, data that have been published by the media consisting of 
clippings, text and photo archives. Data files meant only for editorial work, i.e. files 
including personal data maintained by a publisher, journalist or freelance journalist, 
do not fall in the scope of this law either.509 According to the Act, data protection 
authorities should inspect data files and should set conditions for their content and 
use. As the Act was seen to contradict the freedom of speech and the interdiction of 
preliminary control,510 the Act was altered on these parts in 1994. Personal privacy is, 
nevertheless, protected by specific regulation in other laws, e.g. in the Penal Code 
(39/1889). 
 
3.5 Publishing regulation 
The most common problems in terms of media freedom and freedom of expression 
relate to publishing. The restrictions of freedom of expression usually emerge from 
issues of privacy and from protecting different kinds of public interests, as for 
instance common order. Contrary to the traditional media, publishing in the Internet is 
very difficult to control, not to mention interfering in inappropriate or illegal 
practices. 
Defamation relates to spreading false information causing damage or suffering 
to a person. Both unintentional (media publishing in bona fide) and intentional 
(insulting) motives of publishing are illegal. However, spreading this kind of 
information does not constitute defamation when the issue is about criticism of 
someone’s activities in politics, business, public office, public position, science, art or 
in a comparable public position and which does not obviously “overstep the limits of 
                                                 
506 According to the law, journalists do not have to reveal the anonymous source, but the revealing as 
such is not illegal. Ethically, the question is about the journalists’ liability to protect their sources and 
about the credibility of journalism as whole. Therefore, protection of sources is a very important part of 
the ethical codes of journalism. A journalist has the right to conceal the identity of any person who has 
provided confidential information, and the editorial office should respect this principle. See Council for 
Mass Media in Finland, “Guidelines for journalists”, section 14. 
507 See Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in the Mass Media, section 16. The right refers to 
the mass media overall, including traditional media (the press, television and radio) and also the 
Internet environment, such as private blogs or internet sites.  
508 Journalists as witnesses are obliged to reveal the source in court if the case refers to imprisonment of 
more than six years, or if the source has broken secrecy regulations. However, sources are not obliged 
to be revealed in preliminary investigations regarding secrecy issues. 
509 Personal Data Act (523/1999), section 2. 
510 Government Bill 311/1993. 
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propriety”.511 Consequently, the journalist is required to have a certain confidence and 
a sufficient amount of background knowledge being able to justify the reasons or 
motives for publishing this kind of information. How confident they must be in an 
individual story depends very much on the topic and its public interest. Usually 
cultural and other critics do not relate to the relevant section of the Penal Code. In 
critiques, a journalist’s subjective treatment of an issue is understood by its nature, 
and the issue is not about established facts but personal opinions or conceits. 
Aggravated defamation concerns offences committed by using the mass media or by 
making the information or insinuation available to a large number of people.512 
Particularly, the person injured does not have to be alive. A sentence for defamation 
shall be imposed also on someone who spreads false information or a false insinuation 
about a deceased person, so that the act is conducive to causing suffering to a person 
to whom the deceased was particularly close.513 
Invasion of personal reputation concerns the mass media only and forbids 
public spreading of information of the private life of another person, so that the act is 
conducive to causing that person damage or suffering. Information does not have to 
be false to make the spreading illegal. However, like in defamation, dissemination of 
the information does not constitute an invasion of personal reputation when the issue 
is about a person in politics, business, public office or public position, or in a 
comparable position, and dissemination may affect the evaluation of that person’s 
activities in these positions. In addition, dissemination must be necessary for purposes 
of dealing with a matter with importance to society. The section is provided merely to 
regulate media publishing of private lives of private people.514 
Public incitement to an offence is prohibited when a person through the mass 
media or publicly incites anyone into the commission of an offence so that the 
exhortation or incitement causes a danger of the offence or a punishable attempt being 
committed or otherwise clearly endangers public order or security.515 Dissemination 
of depictions of violence denies the sale, distribution, manufacturing and imports of 
films or other motion picture recordings depicting brutal violence. It is important to 
note that the provision does not apply to normal journalistic publishing: “the depiction 
of violence is to be deemed justifiable because of the informative nature or manifest 
artistic value of the film or recording”.516 Ethnic agitation concerns somebody 
spreading statements or other information among the public where a certain race, a 
national, ethnic or religious group or a comparable group is threatened, defamed or 
insulted.517 In practice the aim of the provision is to protect the physical safety of 
minorities by forbidding aggressive publicity and disorder it may cause. Public 
                                                 
511 The Penal Code, chapter 24 (Amendment 531/2000 Offences against privacy, public peace and 
personal reputation), section 9. 
512 Ibid., section 10. 
513 Ibid., section 9. The provision refers to the protection of other people close to the person covered in 
the story. The close person does not have to be a close relative if he or she can be otherwise connected 
in public to the deceased one. 
514 Ibid., section 8. The section was enacted due to the reporting practices of the yellow magazine 
Hymy in 1974. However, it does not restrict journalism in terms of covering the activities or the 
behaviour of politicians, business people, athletes, or celebrities having already been in the media 
publicity. 
515 Penal Code, chapter 17 (Amendment 563/1998 Offences against public order), section 1. 
516 Ibid., chapter 17, section 17. Accordingly, dissemination of depictions of obscenity (section 18) is 
illegal like unlawful presentation or dissemination of pictorial recordings to a minor (section 19). 
517 Penal Code, chapter 11 (Amendment 212/2008 War crimes and crimes against humanity), section 
10.  
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discussion and argumentation for instance about immigration politics is considered to 
be normal media performance. A similar kind of protection is separately guaranteed to 
religious life in ‘breach of the sanctity of religion’ and in ‘prevention of worship’.518 
Compared to ethnic agitation these might be more problematic when regulating public 
discussion and critics about religious life. 
Previously mentioned the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in 
Mass Media (460/2003) relates as whole to the publishers and programmes but 
partially to private media actors, e.g. private web sites and blogs. Basically, the 
operators providing online services are responsible only on technical and 
distributional matters, for example to delete illegal messages if required. However, 
during a criminal investigation, operators are obliged to reveal technical identification 
information of the anonymous sender of illegal message. In social media publishing, 
as in the traditional media, the criminal liability for an offence arising from the 
contents of a message provided to the public shall lie with the perpetrator or 
accomplice. Thus there is no obligation to name a responsible editor for portals and 
discussion groups and only the Penal Code applies to these.519 
As a consequence, possible criminal action in the social media publishing 
concerns only the writer of an illegal message or the one who has actively supported 
the distribution of such a message. The media are not responsible by law for the 
content they do not produce, e.g. public discussions on their own websites, unless 
they (publicly announce to) moderate them. The Act on network messages relates 
merely to releasing of identifying information, ceasing the distribution, and forfeiting 
and destroying the message.520 
In terms of radio and television, the integrity of programmes must be ensured 
and commercial content (advertisements and teleshopping) distinguished from the rest 
of the programme by visual or acoustic signals or by the split screen technique.521 
Sponsoring of news and current affair programmes is not allowed.522 
The Finnish Copyright Act (821/2005) includes a few provisions to limit the 
copyright, and therefore to advance the freedom of expression in journalism. A 
disseminated work may be quoted, in accordance with proper usage, to the extent 
necessary for the purpose. An accepted purpose is usually to attest, to argue, to refer, 
to clarify, to criticise or to comment the author’s own conclusions with his or her 
quote.523 Disseminated works of art may be reproduced in pictorial form in 
                                                 
518 Penal Code, chapter 17, (Amendment 563/1998 Offences against public order), sections 10 and 11. 
519 The Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in  Mass Media, section 2, specifies a network 
publication as a set of network messages, arranged into a coherent whole comparable to a periodical 
from material produced or processed by the publisher, and intended to be issued regularly. 
Consequently, network publications contain journalistic material provided by editorial staff and 
supervised by the editor in charge such as in newspapers, magazines or television and radio 
programmes. Respectively, a network message means information, an opinion or some other message 
provided to the public by means of radio waves, an electronic communications network or some other 
comparable technical arrangement. Network messages relate to social media publishing and may be 
delivered in the websites of the (traditional) media or by transmission of private operators.  
520  Ibid., sections 17, 18 and 22. 
521 Unfair Business Practices Act (1061/1978), sections 1, 2 and 2a and Consumer Protection Act 
(38/1978), chapter 2, sections 1, 2 and 5. This also applies to when a cause or ideology is promoted or a 
person’s or advertiser’s public image, connected to an ideology or cause, is enhanced. 
522 Act on Television and Radio Operations, sections 27 and 28. 
523 There are no strict quantitative limits for quoting, and sometimes too compact quotes may mislead 
the public in terms of the original content. See Finnish Copyright Act (Law 404/1961), section 22.  
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connection with the text in a critical or scientific presentation, and in a newspaper or a 
periodical when reporting on a current event, provided that the work has not been 
created in order to be reproduced in a newspaper or a periodical.524 The media is 
permitted to publish articles from other newspapers and periodicals on current 
religious, political, or economic topics unless reproduction is expressly prohibited.525 
When quoting the whole or a part the work, which is made available to the public, the 
name of the author shall be stated in the manner required by proper usage. Also, a 
work may not be altered in a manner which is libellous to the author.526 There are no 
provisions in the Finnish Copyright Act regarding linking copyright protected 
material on the Internet. The legal character of linking has remained open so far. In 
practice ordinary hyperlinks can be considered as examples of electronic addresses, 
bookmarks or footnotes in order to refer to a material on the Internet.527 
The ethical guidelines of journalism were established to support the 
responsible use of the freedom of speech in mass communication and to encourage 
discourse on professional ethics. The guidelines refer to journalistic operations in 
information gathering and publishing, but not to opinions presented in the media.528 
Journalists are primarily responsible to the media public, publishing decisions must be 
made in accordance with journalistic principles, and journalists have the right and 
obligation to resist pressure or persuasion that attempts to steer, prevent or limit the 
communication. Information sources must be approached critically, particularly in 
controversial issues. Any information obtained must be checked as thoroughly as 
possible even if the information has been published previously. Advertising and 
editorial material should be clearly separated, and hidden advertising must be 
avoided. Information in the stories does not necessarily have to be diverse or integral, 
and stories may be published on the basis of information that is considered limited.529 
Journalist must aim to provide truthful information which is obtained openly. 
However, other means of information gathering may be used if matters of social 
significance cannot be otherwise investigated, for instance by “cover operations” 
where journalists are not revealing their identity or motives. If the interviewee 
requests to read their statements prior to publication, it is generally wise to accept as 
long as it is possible in terms of the editorial techniques.530 Ethical codes emphasise 
                                                 
524 Ibid., According to section 25, when a copy of a work of art has, with the consent of the author, 
been sold or otherwise permanently transferred, or when a work of art has been published, the work of 
art may be incorporated into a photographic picture, a film, or a television programme, provided such 
use is of secondary importance in the photograph, film or program. 
525  Ibid., section 23. This section was legislated merely to promote public discussion on important 
issues published in the media. 
526 Ibid., section 3. The same restriction is included in the ethical guidelines of journalism. According 
to section 7, it is crucial to observe good professional practice when using the work of others, and the 
source must be mentioned when the information has been published by another party. See Council for 
Mass Media in Finland, “Guidelines for journalists”. 
527  Decision of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 14.11.2003/626/4/02, available at: 
http://www.effi.org/sananvapaus/eoa-2003-11-14.pdf (last visited 14/10/2010). However, copyright 
problems emerge when copyright-protected material on the Internet is copied in other websites without 
permission. Ethically, it is important to inform web users about moving to another website via the link. 
528 Council for Mass Media in Finland, “Guidelines for journalists”. 
529 Ibid., However, news events should be pursued to the end, and reports on subjects and events should 
be supplemented once new information becomes available (for instance producing follow-up stories in 
criminal and courts issues). 
530 Ibid., However, the right strictly concerns only personal statements of the interviewee, and not the 
content, perspective or tone of the story. The interviewee’s refusal to allow the publishing of his or her 
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respect for human dignity, and the presentation of ethnic origin, nationality, sex, 
sexual orientation, convictions or other similar personal characteristics in an 
inappropriate or disparaging manner is prohibited. Incorrect information must be 
corrected immediately, and a reply offered to the media should be published as soon 
as possible without irrelevant additions.531  
Ethical guidelines in the Internet environment do not differ outstandingly from 
the rules of traditional media, press, television or radio. The media should draw up 
clear rules for its online discussion practices and responsibilities which also should be 
understood by everyone entering the sites. Online discussions should be supervised 
and the messages should be selected and edited before publication when necessary. If 
a media is committed to maintaining online discussions without filtering or editing 
their contents, discussions should be clearly distinguished from other material.532 
Besides evaluating ethics on complaints received, the Council for Mass Media 
has given some principle guidelines on media ethics. Courts should not use ethical 
codes when measuring media operations. Personal matters of celebrities may be 
published if the information regards their professional activities and the matter is of 
public interest. However, journalists should take into account that celebrities do not 
always understand the consequences of interviews. Media houses should consider 
with caution participation in so-called free trips. The names of participants in crime 
stories may be published when a considerable public interest is involved and the 
following issues are considered: the nature of the offence, the role of the offender and 
the state in juridical processing. Subliminal advertising should be avoided in order to 
maintain journalistic accountability, and the original source must be mentioned when 
quoting the information published in another media.  
 
4. Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment  
This research has investigated the developments and characteristics of Finnish media 
and media policy. In this final section we collate the work we have done and provide 
a brief discussion of the development, current situation and reflections on the future of 
freedom of the media and media policy in Finland. 
Traditionally a free media has had a strong position in the Finnish society. The 
printed press is an example of the industry, in which the actors have always been 
private entrepreneurs and independent from governmental control. By contrast 
television and radio broadcasting has been more regulated as broadcasting is subject 
to licensing. Radio broadcasting was for a long time the only state monopoly, yet 
despite this, the state owned broadcasting company YLE has not been considered as a 
significant tool of politics. Historically, content regulations existed before the Second 
World War to restrict extreme political movements and also during World War II as a 
                                                                                                                                            
statements must be complied with only if the circumstances following the interview have changed so 
significantly that the publication of the interview could be viewed as unjust.  
531 Ibid. Journalists are required to try to hear simultaneously the views of the parties involved, and 
have a comment in the same story where they are criticised. If that is not possible it may be necessary 
to give the party the opportunity to be heard afterwards.  
532 Council for Mass Media in Finland, “Lausuma verkkojulkaisusta” [The statement regarding Internet 
publishing], available at: http://www.jsn.fi/Statement.aspx?d=59 (last visited on 13/10/2010). It is good 
journalistic practice to try to identify the participants in online discussions. Anonymous discussion 
could contribute to the realisation of freedom of expression, so it should be allowed to the journalistic 
discretion.  
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form of war censorship. After the war, the press developed a tradition of self-
censorship. Generally, self-regulation by the press during the Cold War era was 
manifest by publishing foreign news concerning Finland’s foreign policy. Gradually 
the development of the society moved towards the political structure of western 
democracy and an increase in the neutral status of Finnish foreign policy, which 
released the tension previously placed on the freedom of speech. Nowadays the 
freedom of expression in Finland is exemplary and guaranteed by law. 
Finnish communication policy is executed very much on the basis of 
technological developments and the private needs of marketing forces. Instead of 
regulating the content of media, regulation in Finland has for a long time focused on 
technical norms. In a large and sparsely populated country, the government wants to 
guarantee both equal rights in communication, and also business opportunities. 
Improving technical IT capabilities has been particularly aimed at keeping Finland as 
one of the leading high-technology countries. In recent years, the most highlighted 
objective has been the building of an information society. One of the most visible 
manifestations of the policy is the new broadband law which guarantees a reasonable 
broadband access for every household. Although Internet service providers have 
questioned the universal service obligation because it is still not clear who will pay for 
loss-making services in remote areas. It seems obvious that the driving force in the 
Finnish media and communication policies has not been democratically based on the 
cultural needs and other social values, but rather on economic values and on 
promoting more competition in the media and communications markets.533 
In relation to the Finnish communication policy there is no media ownership 
legislation other than the state owning the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE). The 
Finnish media market is open to foreign owners and cross-media ownership. Also 
licensing regulation has been eased in order to enable the development of new 
communications technologies. Originally competition legislation in Finland has been 
quite rigid but not sufficiently extensive. Some provisions caused unnecessary 
bureaucracy and at the same time the Finnish Competition Authority (FCA) was 
powerless against mergers even if a monopoly ensued. The amendments to the 
competition legislation, e.g. merger control, have mainly been due to the EU 
directives and regulation as well as governments objectives to ensure a variety of 
enterprises participate in Finnish markets. It is notable that there is no specific 
competition legislation concerning the media market, but the general competition 
regulation also covers the media field. 
The freedom of expression is secured in the Finnish Constitution and is only 
restricted for the protection of children. One of the most prominent features in 
protecting the freedom of speech is the interdiction of preliminary control, which in 
principle even allows the expression of illegal messages. The Finnish FOIA (Act on 
Openness of Government Activities 621/1999) on the other hand guarantees 
accessibility to public documents of authorities. Although the law has been effective 
for over 10 years, Finnish journalists are not very familiar with the rights the 
legislation offers to everyone. Journalists’ ignorance and disregard for the content of 
                                                 
533 Nieminen, “Public interest in media policy: the case of Finland”, at p. 21; Nordenstreng, Nieminen, 
and Meriläinen, “Sananvapaus, media ja demokratia”, at p. 156. Media policy and its directions are not 
widely discussed in Finland. Current policy making can be characterised as drifting with no systematic 
definition of policy. Interview with Kaarle Nordenstreng. 
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legislation offer a lot of opportunities and excuses to authorities not to assign 
information they should give according to the law when ever requested. 
Although the Finnish legislation is generally no more restrictive than 
comparative legislation in many other countries, the Finnish Supreme Court has 
favoured privacy matters at the expense of freedom of expression which should 
guarantee publishing of controversial information also. Due to this Finland has 
received convictions in the European Court of Human Rights. According to Tiilikka, 
changes in the law are not necessary, but the law in its current form534 could be 
interpreted more permissively in the context of the freedom of expression. In 
principle, Finnish legislation does not prevent negative covering of issues of public 
interest, or even private lives of power holders when necessary. 
When examining the actors and their tasks in the Finnish media market, a 
notable aspect is that although state bodies are involved in creating legislation and the 
development of the media market, they only oversee the legality of actions and 
licence procedures. Their main concerns relate to information security and privacy 
protection. The control of actions and content from the ethical point of view is mainly 
in the hands of the self-regulatory bodies of the media. They are widely represented 
among the media actors and publish an ethical code of conduct for journalists, but the 
representation of the public is exiguous and sanctions of misconduct are lenient. 
Recently criticism has also appeared against journalists’ personal commitment to the 
codes and complaints they have received and the poor suitability of self-regulatory 
measures in the social media.535 
Journalistic culture in Finland has not been particularly investigative nor have 
journalists been particularly aggressive in information gathering and consequently 
confrontational situations to test the openness of information in practice have been 
rare. The lack of investigative journalism can be explained by the relatively young 
tradition of journalism where journalists are not ready to question the veracity of the 
answers they get from authorities or other sources. Also the historical background and 
the fairly small size of the nation could be regarded as explanatory factors for having 
a media culture, which has little critique and debate. Moreover, investigative 
journalism requires additional resources like working time and media houses are 
reluctant to let journalists to engage in long-lasting investigative projects.536 
Journalists’ right to protect their sources is high-level and essential part of 
media freedom in Finland. However, some legislative impairments to this right were 
prepared in 2009 after sensitive and private information regarding preliminary crime 
investigations were published in the media. According to the proposal, disclosure of 
the source would be possible if the reporting is likely to be in breach of 
confidentiality. At the beginning of 2010 the Ministry of Justice considered the 
weakening of the protection excessive. The proposal did not coordinate sufficiently 
with an individual’s legal protection, freedom of speech and citizens’ right to know 
                                                 
534 By the end of May 2010 the number of convictions in Finland was 12 compared to Sweden (2), 
Norway (2) and The Netherlands (3). See Tiilikka, Sananvapaus, yksilönsuoja ja lähdesuoja Ruotsissa, 
Norjassa ja Alankomaissa sekä Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuimen ratkaisukäytännössä, at p. 11. 
535  S. Huovinen, "Journalismin itsesääntely jäänyt ajastaan jälkeen" [The self-regulation of journalism 
lagging behind] in Oikeutta ja politiikkaa. Viestintäoikeuden vuosikirja 2009 [Justice and politics. 
Yearbook of communication legislation 2009], at p. 44-46. 
536 H. Kuutti, Tutkiva journalismi: Journalistinen suuntaus ja suomalaisen journalismin tutkivuus 
[Investigative Journalism: Journalistic Trend and the Investigative Nature of Finnish Journalism] pp. 
284-291. 
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about government malpractice. Also, the presentation was invalidated by arguing that 
the source of protection is the cornerstone of a free media. 
During recent decades, technology has developed rapidly and rules of 
regulation have become more liberal and considerably more new broadcasting 
licences are granted than before. Nevertheless, regulation has become more difficult 
in the context of television and radio licensing. In addition to a traditional receiver, 
television can be watched on mobile phones or on the Internet. New technology has 
revolutionised positions of the consumers, the service providers and the legislators. 
One of the ambitions of the Information Society Programme537 of the Finnish 
government was to ensure that citizens have access to fast broadband connections and 
to improve citizens’ information society skills. The Internet has in fact facilitated a 
new kind of citizen journalism, with the rise of blogs and other low-threshold 
publishing channels. The consumer has transformed into a multimedia user.538 
Traditional media companies have maintained a prominent place on the Internet, 
which has established itself as one of the most important media. The problem has 
arisen how these services are to be financed: the public is not willing to pay for media 
content on the Internet. Another issue to be taken into consideration in the future will 
be responsibilities regarding publishing in the Internet. Finnish authorities have been 
discussing the possibilities of authorising service providers and operators to intervene 
in illegal activities, e.g. racism and abusive messages in discussion groups they 
administrate. The media houses do not have to monitor public discussions on their 
own web sites if they do not see any necessity. However, at the moment, 
inappropriate messages are deleted after they have been published mainly due to the 
notification of other users. On the other hand, pre-publishing obstruction can be seen 
to contradict with the Finnish Constitution and there mentioned interdiction of 
preliminary control.  
Deregulation and the new business opportunities have lead to increasing 
competition, and to greater economic efficiency. Even the state owned Public 
Broadcasting Company YLE has not escaped from this drive towards efficiency, and 
the issue has risen about how basic public services are to be produced and financed. 
There has also been debate about the quality of the media. Increasingly services are 
produced centrally and by fewer personnel than before. The private media companies 
claim that the quality of journalism improves by rationalising. Together with the 
concentration of ownership of the media and “efficiency seeking corporation 
management”, globalisation has also contributed to the homogenisation of the content 
and hence narrowed the options available to the public. In the long-term, the 
narrowing of income will affect opportunities for traditional media to recruit 
professional journalists, and consequently less staff will produce the media content. 
This may decrease the quality of journalism and journalists’ ability to cover important 
issues. Nordenstreng argues that even if the media is concentrated there are still many 
commercial operators in the field, for whom YLE acts as a counterbalance.539 
According to a survey among Finnish journalists the majority of respondents 
                                                 
537 Finnish Government, Government Policy Programmes, “Information society”. 
538 Although newspaper circulation is declining, especially among young people, entertainment 
consumption has continuously increased. On the other hand, the Internet and various forms of social 
media has meant a proliferation of user-generated information on becoming a part of everyday, as peer 
review of information disseminated in the Internet. See Nordenstreng, Nieminen, and Meriläinen, 
“Sananvapaus, media ja demokratia”, pp.  156-157. 
539 Interview with Kaarle Nordenstreng. 
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estimated that the independence and autonomy in journalism will decline in the near 
future, as media houses are turning towards news industrial production.540 
In conclusion the Finnish media is technologically advanced, lightly regulated 
and offers many opportunities to acquire and to publish information. These 
possibilities are yet not fully exploited. However, the media companies and 
authorities are increasingly using new technologies and developing new business 
models, which have enabled interaction between the public and the media. The 
Internet has made information gathering and dissemination easier and a new kind of 
citizen journalism is evolving. Information is no longer a monopoly of the media, but 
the media can have an important role in democracy as long as there are economic and 
structural foundations guaranteeing freedom of action. 
 
 
 
                                                 
540 J. Jyrkiäinen, "Journalistit muuttuvassa mediassa", pp. 6-12.   
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The case of Germany 
Sebastian Müller and Christoph Gusy 
 
1. Introduction 
Three important historical and political developments have influenced the media 
structures541 in Germany. At the end of the Second World War, the media landscape 
had to be constituted completely anew.542 After the Nazi regime was defeated, the 
Western Allies - while thinking of new models of regulation systems – were mindful 
of the total state control of the media and its consequent abuse by the German 
propaganda system.543 The new system should constitute of an independent and 
pluralistic broadcasting system and allow critical discourse.544 The print media, on the 
other side, was organised thereafter by private publishers. These quite unique 
circumstances after the war laid the foundation for the ensuing developments, 
especially the shaping of public broadcasting in West Germany.545  
Alongside a liberal economic understanding and the shift in power on the 
federal level in West Germany, the second phase began when conservative parties and 
the liberal party took control in 1982.546 Although private publishers had tried for 
decades to convince the state and federal lawmakers to establish a regulatory 
framework for private broadcasting, the broad and comprehensive introduction of new 
rules for private media operators did not take place until the 1980s.547 Private 
broadcasting in Germany was incrementally legally authorised and has been 
developed since then.548 
The third phase was initiated with the emergence of new media services and 
the advent of digitalisation. Although the policy debate on “new” media had begun in 
the 1970s, especially with regard to satellite and cable television networks,549 the 
potential of new media services became apparent with the development of the Internet 
and digitalised transmission of broadcasting.550  
As for the current situation, the convergence of the media systems, the 
influence of liberal economic theories on the notion of media in society, and the 
                                                 
541 See as a general introduction: H. J. Kleinsteuber, “Germany”, in M. Kelly, G. Mazzoleni and D. 
McQuail (eds), The Media in Europe (2004) 78. 
542 Dussel speaks of a “(...) sharp break (...)” of the German broadcasting after the end of the war. K. 
Dussel, Deutsche Rundfunkgeschichte [German broadcasting history] (2010) at p. 179.  
543 Ibid., p. 184-185; G. Vowe, “Ordnung durch Medienpolitik und der Beitrag der Wissenschaft – das 
Beispiel Deutschland” [Structure through media policy and the contribution of science – the example 
of Germany], in O. Jarren and P. Donges (eds), Ordnung durch Medienpolitik? [Order through media 
policy?], (2007) 71, at p. 76-77. 
544 R. Steininger, “Rundfunkpolitik im ersten Kabinett Adenauer” [Media policy in the first Adenauer 
Cabinet], 21 Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte (1973) 388, at p. 389-390. 
545 Dussel, Rundfunkgeschichte, pp. 187-194. 
546 See D. Schwarzkopf, “Die ‘Medienwende’ 1983” [The media turn in 1983], in D. Schwarzkopf 
(ed.), Rundfunkpolitik in Deutschland, Band 1 [Broadcasting policy in Germany, volume I] (1999) 29. 
547 Dussel, Rundfunkgeschichte, at p. 268; W. J. Schütz, Medienpolitik. Dokumentation der 
Kommunikationspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1945-1990 [Media policy. Documents 
of the communication policy in the Federal Republic of Germany 1945-1990] (1999), pp. 433-435. 
548 See M. Eifert and W. Hoffmann-Riem, “Die Entstehung aus Ausgestaltung des dualen 
Rundfunksystems” [The development and the arrangement of the dual broadcasting system], in D. 
Schwarzkopf (ed.), Rundfunkpolitik in Deutschland [Broadcasting politics in Germany], (1999) 50. 
549 Schütz, Medienpolitik, pp. 215-309. 
550 Dussel, Rundfunkgeschichte, p. 300f. 
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constrained financial situations of public and private operators pose challenges to the 
existing system and form the subject of much discussion.551 
One of the specificities concerning media legislation and media policy 
throughout the whole last decades is the federal system of Germany and the 
differentiated system of state power that shaped the process. The Federal Republic of 
Germany is composed at the federal level of the Federal Government and the German 
Federal Parliament and the regional state level with different Bundesländer, hereafter 
referred to as states. Germany comprises of 16 states, all of which have their own 
governments and their own parliaments or representative bodies. The Basic Law 
stipulates the respective competencies of the federal lawmaker and the state 
lawmakers. The Federal Constitutional Court has ruled that in most subjects the state 
lawmakers are vested with the power to adopt legislation concerning broadcasting.552 
This historically developed political situation, together with the Federal Constitutional 
Court’s case law, has led to a highly complex legal framework at both the federal and 
the state level which has formed the media structure and media law.  
This background information report summarises the existing system. Particular 
attention is paid to those aspects that promote or hinder the free and independent 
media necessary for democratic processes. It is structured around the following topics: 
an overview of the existing media landscape, the main actors in media policy and 
media regulation, the main legal aspects as regards democratic processes and unbiased 
opinion shaping, and, finally, current issues in media policy and development. 
 
2. The media landscape in Germany 
Some figures help to depict the broader background of the German media landscape 
with regard to its recipients. By the end of 2008, Germany had a total population of 82 
million residents according to the Federal Office for Statistics.553 It is estimated that 
some 15 million people are of foreign origin,554 taking into account persons 
naturalised under German immigration law, those born in Germany in the second or 
third generation after immigration, and foreigners under the German law relating to 
foreigners.555 Germany can be deemed a country of immigration and cultural 
diversity, which is mirrored in media outlets. The official language is German, with 
some exceptions for two minority groups: the Sorbs in the Eastern part of Germany 
                                                 
551 See in this respect C.-E. Eberle, “Öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunk und Telemedienauftrag” [Public-
service broadcasting and telemedia assignment], 04 AfP (2008) 329; C. Möllers, “Pressefreiheit im 
Internet” [Freedom of press in the Internet], 03 AfP (2008)  241. 
552 BVerfGE 12, 205 (248). 
553 Federal office for Statistics, “Bevölkerungsstand”, available at: 
http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Navigation/ 
Statistiken/Bevoelkerung/Bevoelkerungsstand/Bevoelkerungsstand.psml;jsessionid=D34BDA09AFD0
25C40D903548BCD1F3B4.internet, accessed 29 May 2010. Numbers are only available by December 
31, 2008. See also 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=de&pcode=tps00001&tableSelectio
n=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 (last visited on 30/06/2010). 
554 Federal office for Statistics, “Migration und Integration”, 
http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Navigation/Statistiken/ 
Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/MigrationIntegration.psml;jsessionid=61311300015A11BCB49D0
EAAECE31221.internet (last visited on 31/05/2010). 
555 See Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, 8. Bericht über 
die Lage der Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in Deutschland [8th report on the situation of foreigners in 
Germany] (2010), p. 570f, and p. 575. 
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and the Danish minority in the Northern parts. Germany has a very potent market in 
terms of revenue for the private media companies and in terms of fees for the public 
service media. Accounting for this is, among other factors, the size of the market. In 
addition to the population in Germany, the neighbouring countries Austria and 
Switzerland also have German-speaking populations, which enlarge the German 
linguistic area to some 90 million persons. Many migrant communities in Germany 
produce and consume media outlets in their own languages. Moreover, television and 
radio programmes are received via Internet and satellite from practically all over the 
world. The German media market can thus be described as a multi-cultural and multi-
lingual market, however with a major market position and range of German linguistic 
outlets. 
 
2.1 The German media market 
The print media in terms of dailies, weeklies and Sunday editions plays an important 
role in political information as well as entertainment. Some 22.7 million newspapers 
(i.e. dailies and Sunday editions) are sold per working day.556 Statistically, 289 
products per 1,000 inhabitants are available557 and newspapers reach over 71% of the 
population.558 The print media is divided into national, regional and, in bigger cities, 
local daily newspapers, weekly newspapers, and magazines. While the number of 
national newspapers is relatively low, the number of regional and local newspapers is 
rather high. In 2009, the German print market contained 10 national dailies, 8 non-
subscription dailies, including the most successful tabloids, 333 titles that covered a 
certain region or city,559 27 weeklies and 6 Sunday titles. In the same year, the total 
number of editions, under the name of the main title, produced was 1,511.560 The 
overall number of sold subscription and non-subscription dailies including Sunday 
editions has declined within the last fifteen years by some 24% (from 30 million to 
22.7 million titles).561 Advertising revenues have also declined. Although net 
advertising revenues of 3.6 billion Euros in 2009 seem rather high compared to other 
European countries, the decline from over 6 billion Euros net in 1999 depicts the 
precarious financial situation of many publishers.562  
The media landscape for public magazines (as distinguished from periodicals 
for professionals) comprises a broad range of different titles on almost all subjects of 
modern life.563 In March 2010, 1,536 titles were published regularly, among them 136 
                                                 
556 H. Röper, “Zeitungen 2010: Rangverschiebung unter den größten Verlagen” [Newspapers 2010: 
Changes in the market position of the biggest publishers], 5 Media Perspektiven (2010) 218, at p. 219. 
557 Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (ed.), Zeitungen 2009 [Newspapers 2009], (2009), p. 
374. Data refer to residents older than fourteen years old. 
558 H.-J. Hippler, “Sieben von zehn – Leistungswerte der Zeitungen und jugendliche Mediennutzung 
[Proliferation of newspapers and young readership]”, in Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger 
(ed.), Zeitungen 2009 (2009) 126, at p. 129. 
559 Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, Zeitungen 2009, p. 364. See on concentration and 
editorial units of publishers: W. J. Schütz, “Redaktionelle und verlegerische Struktur der deutschen 
Tagespresse” [Structures of print media editorial departments and of publishers in the Germany], 9 
Media Perspektiven (2009) 484; W. J. Schütz, “Deutsche Tagespresse 2008” [German daily press 
2008], 9 Media Perspektiven (2009) 454. 
560 Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, Zeitungen 2009, p. 364. 
561 Röper “Zeitungen 2010”, p. 219. 
562 Ibid. 
563 The notion of A. Vogel of public magazines [Publikumspresse] is applied in this regard to make a 
distinction to magazines for specific professional groups. See A. Vogel, “Zeitschriftenmarkt: WAZ-
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titles with at least fortnightly publication564 and a total circulation of some 114.6 
million per publication cycle.565 Concentration among the five biggest publishers is 
rather high in this field, as they hold 64% of the market share in total and 87% of the 
market share of magazines published at least fortnightly.566 
As well as the print media and, increasingly, the Internet, television and radio 
are regarded as important, if not even, the most important channels for information 
and entertainment. In 2009, 35.3 million households owned at least one television set 
and could reach digital and analogue programmes via satellite, cable, antenna, and the 
Internet.567 As for radio, the same study counted 43.06 million receivers.568 It is 
estimated that each viewer watches over 3 hours of television per day.569  
Since the 1980s, broadcasting in Germany has been organised into a dual 
system. Public service broadcasting,570 financed mainly by fees, and private 
broadcasting, financed mainly by advertising revenues, co-exist with different 
television channels and radio station formats as well as Internet platforms. The 
national public service full coverage television channel [Vollprogramm] “Das Erste” 
is produced by a working coalition of nine state public service broadcasting 
corporations called the ARD [Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen 
Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland]. The same broadcasters produce 
nine regional television channels, which focus on regional and local issues, and more 
than 60 radio stations.571 Additionally, the federal states have established a second 
national television public service broadcaster with one channel, the Second German 
Television [Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, ZDF],572 and a national radio operator, 
Deutschlandradio, with three stations. ARD and ZDF cooperate to produce several 
specialised television channels. In 2009 they enjoyed a 38.7% market share.573 Public 
service broadcasters are principally funded by a fee paid by the owners of radio and 
                                                                                                                                            
Gruppe schließt zu dominierenden Konzernen auf” [WAZ-Group closes the gap to predominate 
corporations], Media Perspektiven (2010) 296. 
564 Vogel, “Zeitschriftenmarkt”, pp. 296-297. 
565 Ibid., pp. 298-299; Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern 
(IVW), Auflagenliste, 1. Quartal 2010 [List of editions. 1st quarter 2010] (2010), p. 4. 
566 Ibid., p.  298. 
567 Media Perspektiven, Basisdaten. Daten zur Mediensituation in Deutschland 2009 [Data on media 
situation in Germany 2009] (2009), p. 4. An estimated number of 94% of all households in Germany 
are reached. Adolf-Grimme-Institut et al. (eds), Jahrbuch Fernsehen. 2010 [Yearbook Television. 
2010] (2010), p. 278. 
568 Media Perspektiven, Basisidaten, at p. 6. 
569 Ibid., p. 64. 
570 On public service broadcasting in Germany, see C. Palzer, “Germany”, in S. Nikoltchev (ed.), Iris 
special: The public service broadcasting culture (2007) 39; W. Schulz et al., Regulation of 
broadcasting and internet services in Germany (2002), p. 5-10. 
571 ARD, “Jahrbuch 2009” [Yearbook 2009], available at: http://www.ard.de/intern/publikationen/-
/id=8080/nid=8080/did=1292570/18o9i85/index.html (last visited on 14/10/2010), at p. 220ff., 239ff. 
572 See the legal act ZDF Interstate Treaty [ZDF-Staatsvertrag, 2009]. 
573 Das Erste, ZDF, and the regional programmes [Die Dritten]. Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Landesmedienanstalten (ALM) (ed.), Jahrbuch 2009/2010 [Yearbook 2009/2010] (2010), p. 86; Adolf-
Grimme-Institut, Jahrbuch Fernsehen. 2010, at p. 281. 
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television sets.574 From 2013 the system will change and then all households will be 
charged the fee, irrespective of whether they possess a broadcasting receiver or not.575  
Turning to private broadcasting, Prosieben.Sat1 and RTL Group (the latter 
owned by Bertelsmann AG) are the main private broadcasters operating at the 
national level, next to various local and regional radio and television broadcasters that 
are partially owned by smaller groups. In 2009, private broadcasters provided 147 
national television channels, including full coverage channels (14), thematic channels 
(37), teleshopping channels (21), paid access channels (75),576 and 231 regional 
channels. They also maintained 244 radio stations, 19 of which were broadcast 
nationwide.577 However, the market share regarding advertising revenue and viewers - 
here described only for the television market - displays the predominant position of 
the RTL-Group and ProSieben.Sat1. With respect to advertising revenue, in 2009 
Prosieben.Sat1 and RTL Group enjoyed a market share of over 80%.578 They also 
succeeded in drawing an average of 45.2% viewers to their television programmes.579 
The predominant position of free television is characteristic of the German 
television market. This applies for both public service broadcasting, due to its 
mandate, and private broadcasting, due to its advertising revenues. By the end of 
2009, some 4.4 million subscribers had contracts with pay television providers.580 Pay 
television operators, financed by subscription fees, are generally characterised by low 
profit.581 
Today electronic media in Germany means Internet based services. In 2009 
between 67.1% and 69.1% used the Internet regularly.582 In 2010 the percentage has 
increased to 72%.583 An online peak between persons younger than thirty years and 
older than fifty years can be observed. While in the first group, over 90% use the 
Internet on a regular basis, the proliferation in the second group decreased 
incrementally in early 2010 from some 70% (users between fifty and fifty-nine) to 
                                                 
574 See Art. 12, Art. 13, Art. 14 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty [Staatesvertrag für Rundfunk und 
Telemedien (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag – RStV), 2010]; Art. 2 Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting Fees 
[Rundfunkgebührenstaatsvertrag, 2008].  
575 Press Release of 10 June 2010: State Secretary of the State Government of Rhineland-Palatine, 
“Ministerpräsidenten Beck und Mappus: Einfacheres und gerechteres Rundfunkfinanzierungsmodell 
beschlossen; Kontrollintensität der GEZ wird reduziert. Staatskanzlei Rheinland-Pfalz”, available at: 
http://www.rlp.de/no_cache/aktuelles/presse/einzelansicht/archive/2010/june/article/ministerpraesident
en-unterzeichnen-in-berlin-den-14-rundfunkaenderungsstaatsvertrag/ (last visited on 14/10/2010). 
576 Numbers of 1 January 2010. ALM, Jahrbuch 2009/2010, p. 55. 
577 ALM, Jahrbuch 2009/2010, p. 170-171. 
578 Ibid., p. 58-59. 
579 ALM, Jahrbuch 2009/2010, at p. 86. See also Media Perspektiven, Basisdaten, p. 69. The channels 
by the two private broadcasters taken into account are: RTL, RTL II, Super RTL, and VOX (all RTL-
Group), Sat.1, ProSieben, and kabel eins (all ProSieben.Sat.1 AG). 
580 ALM, Jahrbuch 2009/2010, p. 96. 
581 According to State Media Authorities, in 2008 the revenues only covered 87% of total costs for pay-
TV. ALM, Jahrbuch 2009/2010, at p. 96. 
582 Media Perspektiven, Basisidaten, at p. 75; See also the survey published by a private, economical 
orientated initiative, Initiative D21 (ed.), (N)onliner Atlas 2010 (2010), available at: 
http://www.initiatived21.de/category/nonliner-atlas (last visited on 14/10/2010), at p. 10.  
583 Initiative D21, Atlas 2010, at p. 10. Less than 70% are estimated by an online-survey of ARD and 
ZDF. See B. van Eimeren and B. Frees, “Fast 50 Millionen Deutsche online - Multimedia für alle?” 
[Almost 50 million people online in Germany– multimedia for everybody?], Media Perspektiven 
(2010) 334, at. p. 335. 
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some 24% (users over seventy years).584 However, this situation has not yet resulted 
into a complete change in media consumption practices. Classical media outlets such 
as newspapers, terrestrial radio and (cable, satellite or terrestrial) television are still 
the main sources of information, especially as regards politics and journalism, 
although more than 75% of the classical media outlets are equally presented in the 
Internet by the same publishers and broadcasters.585  
Communication has become one of the most important applications in the 
Internet in Germany.586 According to a representative survey carried out by the public 
service broadcaster, 34% of all Internet users are members or visitors of online social 
networks at least from time to time.587 It is the younger generation that has especially 
embraced social network services; 81% of persons younger than twenty years and 
67% of persons younger than thirty years have their own account in one of these 
services.588 The culture of reading and writing blogs has not yet been fully 
developed.589 Blogs, in fact, are not generally considered a main source for (political) 
information, neither in consumer behaviour nor with regard to its credibility.590 
However, in the election of the state parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia in 2010, it 
is reported that political blogs discussing the main party candidates did have an 
impact on the outcome.591  
Several news agencies operate in Germany and provide broad and 
differentiated services to newspaper editors and broadcasters.592 Among them, the 
most important German news agencies are dpa (Deutsche Presse Agentur [German 
Press Agency]), ddp (Deutscher Depeschendienst), kna (Katholische 
Nachrichtenagentur [Catholic Newsagency]) and epd (Evangelischer Pressedienst 
[Protestant Pressservice]) and some others. News agencies from other countries, such 
as AFP (Agence France Press) and Reuters, maintain German offices and provide 
German linguistic services. The German service of the Associated Press (AP) was 
bought by the German news agency dpp and now operates as the Deutscher Auslands 
Depeschendienst (dadp). Studies show that competition among news agencies in 
Germany is one of the most pronounced in the Western European media market.593 It 
                                                 
584 Initiative D21, Atlas 2010, at p. 14. Another survey displays similar results. See van Eimeren and 
Frees, “Deutsche online”, at p. 335. 
585 C. Neuberger and F. Lobigs, Die Bedeutung des Internets im Rahmen der Vielfaltssicherung [The 
salience of Internet in the case of ensuring pluralism of opinion] (2010), at p. 37. 
586 Over 80% of Internet users communicate via email on a regular basis. K. Busemann and C. 
Gscheidle, “Web 2.0: Communitys bei jungen Nutzern beliebt” [Web 2.0. Communities are liked by 
young users] 7 Media Perspektiven (2009) 356. 
587 ARD-ZDF, “Nutzung. Genutzte web 2.0-Anebote 2009” [Accessed web services in web 2.0, 2009], 
available at: www.ard-zdf-onlinestudie.de (last visited on 17/07/2010). 
588 Ibid.; Busmann and Gscheidle, “Web 2.0”, at p. 360. 
589 It is reported that only 12% of the users younger than 19 years read blogs. See Busmann and 
Gscheidle, “Web 2.0”, at p. 361. 
590 Neuberger and Lobigs, Die Bedeutung des Internets, p. 103. 
591 S. Grimberg, “Die stärkste Kraft. Politblogs in NRW” [The strongest force. Political blogs in 
NRW], die tageszeitung, 11/05/2010. 
592 See Hans-Bredow-Institut, Zur Entwicklung der Medien in Deutschland zwischen 1998 und 2007 
[The developments of the media in Germany between 1998 and 2007] (2008), at p. 193-198. 
593 Hans-Bredow-Institut, Entwicklung der Medien, p. 194; M. Segbers, Die Ware Nachricht. Wie 
Nachrichtenagenturen ticken [News seen as goods. How news agencies function] (2007), at p. 39. 
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has to be mentioned that dpa holds an outstanding position in the German news 
market with services reaching more than 95% of all newspapers in Germany.594  
 
2.2 Journalists’ background and education 
There are no official data available on how many journalists work in Germany and 
their educational background or training. Information supplied by representative 
studies, employers’ organisations and trade unions varies considerably, as it is 
exemplified by the number of full-time employees in Germany. It is estimated that 
between 48,000595 and 73,500596 persons work full-time as journalists.597 
According to the data available, journalists generally work either as employees 
or as freelancers working on a per-assignment basis, although broadcasters have 
established a legal position best described as comparable to a employee’s position, 
whilst remaining technically freelance.598 As well as full-time journalists, an 
estimated number of some additional 25,000 freelance journalists and some 2,600 
persons undergoing vocational training in the media (print media, broadcasting or 
other media) exist.599 Publishers appear to employ more journalists than broadcasters. 
In 2009 they employed more than 14,000 individuals.600  
It is estimated that over 60% of journalists hold a university degree in 
journalism or another subject area (usually history, political science, or economics) or 
a degree from a private journalism school.601 More than 60% have undergone an 
additional vocational training programme up to two years.602 Despite the presumably 
high quality education and training received, several media actors (unions and 
scientists alike) request more comprehensive and detailed training, so as to guarantee 
a high level of quality journalism.603 
 
2.3 Media literacy and media status in society 
The fostering of media literacy, understood as a “(…) individual’s capacity to 
                                                 
594 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Zahlen& Fakten” [Numbers& facts], available at: 
http://www.dpa.de/Zahlen-Fakten.53.0.html (last visited on 18/07/2010). 
595 S. Weischenberg, M. Malik and A. Scholl, Die Souffleure der Mediengesellschaft [The prompters in 
current media society] (2006), at p. 36. 
596 Deutsche Journalisten-Verband, “Arbeitsmarkt und Berufschancen” [Labour market and job 
opportunities], available at: http://www.djv.de/Berufschancen.2572.0.html (last visited on 24/08/2010).  
597 Deutscher Journalisten Verband, “Journalist/in werden?” [Becoming a journalist?] (2008), p. 53. 
Numbers differ because several areas of journalism are excluded in one statistic, while included in the 
other.  
598 J. G. Reitzel, Arbeitsrechtliche Aspekte der Arbeitnehmerähnlichkeit im Rundfunk [Aspects of 
labour law tailored for employees in public service broadcasters] (2007), at p. 21ff.; see also 
Weischenberg, Malik and Scholl, Mediengesellschaft, at p. 37-39. 
599 Deutsche Journalisten-Verband, “Arbeitsmarkt und Berufschancen”. 
600 Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, Zeitungen, at p. 106. 
601 Weischenberg, Malik and Scholl, Mediengesellschaft, p. 68-69. Numbers refer to 2005. 
602 Ibid., p. 66-67.  
603 Survey published by the Deutsche Journalisten Union, Gute Ausbildung dringend notwendig [The 
need for a good qualification], available at: 
http://mmm.verdi.de/archiv/2008/03/journalismus/gute_ausbildung_dringend_notwendig (last visited 
on 14/10/2010). See also: Der Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Kultur und Medien, “Medien- und 
Kommunikationsbericht der Bundesregierung 2008” [Media and communication report by the Federal 
Government] (2008), at p. 85-86. 
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interpret autonomously and critically the flow, substance, value and consequence of 
media in all its many forms (…)”604 has been part of the mandate of several public 
institutions as well as the school syllabus in Germany. The State Media Authorities, 
established in the 1980s, conduct programmes and activities to promote media 
literacy. Despite these endeavours, media literacy levels in Germany are not as high 
as one would have expected. According to an independent study605 commissioned by 
the Directorate General Information Society and Media of the European Commission, 
Germany achieves a medium level of media literacy, not uncommon for highly 
populated countries in Europe.606 
According to a “Eurobarometer” survey, published in 2008, around 46% of the 
German population trusts print media, though perceptions vary considerably in the 
western and eastern parts of Germany.607 Where 49% of the western population trusts 
print media as an information medium, 60% of the eastern German population 
reported distrust.608 Radio receives much better results: 67% of the German 
population trusts the radio with comparable figures in eastern and western Germany. 
Television reaches lower results and is trusted by 56% of the population overall. As 
for online media services, despite its gradual uptake, only 29% of the German 
population, primarily young people, trust the Internet as an information medium.  
 
3. Media policy in Germany 
3.1 Actors of media policy and media regulation  
The German media policy scene is characterised by a multiplicity of actors, due, 
amongst other factors, to the fact that competencies for media legislating are divided 
between the state and federal legislatures. While press regulations and broadcasting 
laws, together with the regulation of some content aspects for the online media, fall 
within the remit of the state legislature, the technical aspects of cable television, 
telecommunications and to some degree the regulation of the online media are 
addressed at the federal level. 
The most important actors are those at the state level. The states are, as mentioned 
earlier, assigned with the competence to propose and adopt legislation for public 
service broadcasting, as well as the licensing and ownership rules in relation to private 
broadcasters. They can also adopt rules on the content of broadcasts and online 
content.  
The public service broadcasters can also be considered actors. The working 
coalition ARD, the Second German Television and single state broadcasting 
corporations all commission scientific research programmes or expert opinions, 
                                                 
604 European Commission, Directorate General Information Society and Media, “Study on assessment 
criteria for media literacy levels”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/media_literacy/docs/studies/eavi_study_assess_crit_media_lit_levels_euro
pe_finrep.pdf (last visited on 23/7/2010), at p. 4.  
605 Ibid.  
606 Ibid., p. 68-69. 
607 This refers to the former inner-state boarder of East- and West Germany. 
608 European Commission, Directorate General Communication, Eurobarometer 69 (2008), at p. 27. 
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publish on media policy and - mainly the directors of the broadcasters - publish 
statements on current developments.609  
When it comes to the organs of the public service broadcaster, the following shall 
be highlighted. Each of the nine state broadcasting corporations, the national public 
service radio “Deutschlandradio” and the “ZDF” comprise three organs: the director 
of the corporation [Intendant], the broadcasting council [Rundfunkrat]610 and the 
administrative council [Verwaltungsrat].611 In accordance with the paradigm of state 
independence in public service broadcasting, the final decision of the content aired 
lays with the director.612 He or she is accountable for the programme and has to 
ensure that broadcasts adhere to the statutory programme mandate, the basic 
programme guidelines, the applicable media law and the common laws.613  
The broadcasting councils are the main supervision and operation organs in the 
public service system, ideally representing with their members the main groups of the 
German society and vested with the competence to decide on basic matters.614 They 
were established to ensure a state-free, competent body responsible for controlling the 
activities of the broadcasters in accordance with statutory programme mandates and 
the applicable media law. However, they cannot adopt legally binding decisions. 
According to the applicable legislation, their members are nominated and elected by 
the state parliaments, state governments and also by representatives of different 
societal groups, who enjoy a legally guaranteed right to delegate single members and 
who constitute the majority.615 Administrative councils are responsible for 
scrutinising the broadcasting corporations’ financial activities and therefore cannot 
directly influence programming.616 However, in times of financial constraints, 
budgetary cuts can impel directors to close down particular aspects of programming 
and as such diminish broadcasts’ pluralism. 
In the field of private broadcasting, currently fourteen State Media Authorities 
(SMAs) operate under different labelling, though with the same core duties.617 They 
maintain a joint body, the Association of State Media Authorities (ALM). The SMAs 
are established as public bodies based on statutory regulations adopted by state 
                                                 
609 Expert opinion commissioned by public service broadcastersm see: P. Kirchhoff, “Gutachten über 
die Finanzierung des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks” [Expert opinion on the financing of public-
service broadcasting] (2010), available at: http://www.ard.de/intern/kirchhof-gutachten/-
/id=1886/nid=1886/did=1456538/1kmjjsr/index.html (last visited on 14/10/2010). 
610 Called ‘Television Council’ in the case of the Second German Television. 
611 See as legal basis only Art. 13 para. 1 West-German-Broadcasting Act [Gesetz über den 
»Westdeutschen Rundfunk Köln« (WDR-Gesetz), 2009]. 
612 C. Hahn, Die Aufsicht des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks [Supervision of public service 
broadcasting] (2010), at p. 52 with further remarks. 
613 A. Hesse, Rundfunkrecht [Broadcasting law] (2003), at p. 163. 
614 See for further information: Hesse, Rundfunkrecht, p. 161-162; Hahn, Aufsicht, p. 49-72. 
615 See only Art. 21 Interstate Treaty on ‘Deutschlandradio’ [Staatsvertrag über die Körperschaft des 
öffenlichen Rechts “Deutschlandradio” (DLR-Staatsvertrag), 2006]; Art. 6 Bavarian Broadcasting Act 
[Gesetz über die Errichtung und die Aufgaben einer Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts “Der Bayerische 
Rundfunk” (Bayerisches Rundfunkgesetz – BayRG), 2009]; Art. 15 West-German-Broadcasting Act. 
616 See as an example Art. 21 West-German-Broadcasting Act; Hahn, Aufsicht, p. 75; Hesse, 
Rundfunkrecht, p. 166. The ZDF administrative council is an exception in this regard, as it co-decides 
on the position of the chief editor.  See Art. 27 para 2b) Interstate Treaty on Second German Television 
[ZDF-Staatsvertrag]. 
617 See ALM, Jahrbuch 2009/2010, p. 380ff. See also: P. Widlok, “Die Landesanstalt für Medien NRW 
(LfM NRW) [1987]” [State media authority for North-Rhine Westphalia], in W. R. Langenbucher, H. 
Pöttker and C. Schicha, Handbuch Medienselbstkontrolle [Manual for media self-regulation] (2005), 
329. 
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lawmakers and are deemed to be independent.618 Two organs within each of the SMA 
are responsible for supervising and regulating the private broadcasters: the director 
and the media commission619 or - as the composition can vary - body of experts.620 
While the body of experts consists of experts elected by state parliaments, 
commission members are elected and delegated by state parliaments and state 
governments, as well as representative organisations such as the unions or the 
church.621 They reflect Germany’s main societal groups. 
Complementary to the SMAs, the Regulatory Affairs Commission (ZAK) was 
established in late 2008 and is now charged with the licensing and supervision duties 
of national broadcasters.622 In essence, the SMAs retain responsibility but relinquish 
discretionary powers to the ZAK, in which all fourteen authorities work together. 
Those structures became necessary in order to guarantee equal treatment for all 
private broadcasters in the various states and to prevent operators from deliberately 
establishing themselves in the state with the lowest legal requirements.  
The Commission on the Concentration in Media (KEK) also fulfils an important 
duty, as it ascertains operators’ market shares in the licensing procedure, so as to avert 
one media company holding a monopoly of the market and consequently of opinion 
shaping. In 2006, it dismissed an application of the publisher Axel Springer AG to 
purchase shares of the private broadcaster Prosieben.Sat1.623 The KEK was 
reorganised by the heads of the various states after this decision, presumably in order 
to mitigate the so far effective and strict implementation of concentration 
regulations.624 
Finally, federal actors have to be mentioned. The Federal Government 
Commissioner for Culture and Media plays an important role at the federal level. The 
main tool of the Commissioner is to formulate media policies as non-binding 
recommendations to the legislature. This is done in a regularly published 
comprehensive report called “Media and Communication Report by the Federal 
Government”. The report was last published in 2008 and is based on a thorough 
scientific experts’ report covering all aspects of media developments and 
                                                 
618 According to the relevant law, the State Media Authorities are public legal bodies and have the 
competence of self-governance. See only Art. 2 and Art. 38 para 1 State Media Law Rhineland-
Palatine [Landesmediengesetz Rheinland-Pfalz (LMG), 2010]; ALM, Jahrbuch 2009/2010, p. 356. 
619 See only Art. 90, Art. 93, and Art. 94 State Media Law North-Rhine Westphalia 
[Landesmediengesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen (LMG NRW), 2009]. 
620 As it is the case with the Media Council Berlin-Brandenburg. Art. 9 para 1 Interstate Treaty of 
Berlin and Brandenburg on Broadcasting [Staatsvertrag über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Berlin und 
Brandenburg im Bereich des Rundfunks, 2009]. 
621 See only Art. 13 Bavarian Media Law [Gesetz über die Entwicklung, Förderung und Veranstaltung 
privater Rundfunkangebote und anderer Telemedien in Bayern (Bayerisches Mediengesetz BayMG), 
2009]. 
622 ALM, Jahrbuch 2009/2010, p. 365. 
623 Kommission zu Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich, Beteiligungsveränderung bei 
Tochtergesellschaften der ProSiebenSAT.1 Media AG, AZ: KEK 293-1 bis 5 decision of 10 January 
2006. 
624 See the critical appraisals G. Gounalakis and G. Zagouras, Medienkonzentrationsrecht. 
Vielfaltssicherung in den Medien [Law of media concentration, ensuring pluralism in the media] 
(2008), at p. 166-167 and p. 212; D. Westphal, “Abschied vom Original. Zur Deformation der KEK 
durch den 10. Rundfunkänderungsstaatsvertrag” [Parting of an original. About the deformation of 
KEK], ZUM (2008) 854, at p. 856. 
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advancements in Germany.625 Additionally, the mandated Federal Ministry and the 
Federal Parliament are responsible for the legal framework conditions of the media. 
These cover technical infrastructure, the protection of minors, data protection, and 
criminal law. When it comes to the courts as media policy actors, mention should be 
made of the European Court of Human Rights and the Federal German Constitutional 
Court. The former addressed the notion of public persons in Germany with practical 
repercussions for photograph journalism.626 The latter established the legal space for 
the broadcasting system in Germany, in which the federal and state lawmakers can 
adopt their legislation. 
As well as the KEK, the Federal Cartel Authority controls whether an intended 
merger complies with the Act Against Competition Constraints.627 The Act foresees a 
specific provision for media enterprises, which aims to preserve the market situation 
and simultaneously the pluralism of opinions in the media.628 The Federal Cartel 
Authority has adopted two negative decisions regarding media enterprises, both of 
which triggered wide discussion. One concerned the intended purchase of the “Berlin 
Publisher” (editor of one of the most sold newspapers in Berlin) by the publisher 
Holtzbrinck-Group629 (editor of another much sold newspapers) and the other 
addressed the proposed merging of broadcaster Prosieben.Sat 1 AG with publisher 
Axel Springer AG.630 
As for self-regulatory bodies, the “German Press Council” plays an important 
role. It was established in 1956 as a self-control mechanism which pursues two main 
objectives: to organise the complaint commission as control organ for press outlets 
and to foster the freedom of press and unimpeded access to news sources, both 
through political means. The press council individual complaint procedure ensures, 
among other things, that print media outlets adhere to basic ethical principles, called 
the Press Code.631 As for political means, the Press Council employs different 
approaches. This includes political lobbying aiming to enhance the legal framework 
conditions for journalists and the Press Code that can in general ensure the credibility 
of print media outlets. However, the Press Council was and still is criticised for its 
complaint procedures, first because it has not changed the journalistic practices of 
German tabloids overall,632 and secondly because it does not create legally binding 
decisions that the publishers concerned must follow.633 
                                                 
625 Der Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Kultur und Medien, “Medien- und 
Kommunikationsbericht der Bundesregierung 2008”.  
626 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 28 July 2005, von Hannover v. Germany, n. 
59320/00. 
627 Act Against Competition Constraints [Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB), 2009]. 
628 Gounalakis and Zagouras, Medienkonzentrationsrecht, p. 198. 
629 Bundeskartellamt, decision of 2 February 2004. No.: B 6 - 22121 - U - 120/03. Bundeskartellamt, 
decision of 10 December 2002. No.: B 6 22121 - U - 98/02. 
630 Bundeskartellamt, decision of 19 January 2006. No.: B 6 - 92202 - Fa - 103/05. 
631 Deutscher Presserat, Publizistische Grundsätze (Pressekodex) “Richtlinien für die publizistische 
Arbeit nach den Empfehlungen des Deutschen Presserats” [Guidelines for the journalistic work 
according to recommendations of the German Press Council] (2008). 
632 See the critical appraisal by A. Baum, “Lernprozess und Interessenkonflikt. Die freiwillige 
Selbstkontrolle der Presse dient der ganzen Gesellschaft” [Independent self-control of print media 
serves the whole society], in W. R. Langenbucher, H. Pöttker and C. Schicha (eds), Handbuch 
Medienselbstkontrolle [Manual for media self-regulation] (2005) 112, at p. 120-121. 
633 See the critical appraisal by H. Pöttker, “Der Deutsche Presserat und seine Kritiker. Playdoyer für 
eine transparente Selbstkontrolle des Journalismus” [The German Press Council. For a transparent self-
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Two main journalists unions merit attention: the German Journalists Union 
[Deutsche Journalisten Union, dju] and the German Journalists Association 
[Deutscher Journalisten Verband, DJV].634 Both associations are accepted as 
representative organisations in tariff treaty negotiations. Whilst the dju is affiliated 
with the union coalition “Ver.di”, one of the largest unions in Germany, the DJV 
presents itself as a combination of independent unions and professional 
organisations.635 The dju aspires, among other things, to foster the professional, 
social, and economic interests of its members, and contributes to the protection of the 
basic right of the freedom of press.636 DJV, with 38,000 members,637 fosters and 
pursues very similar political and ethical aims.638 Both organisations are members of 
the organisational board of the German Press Council. 
The private broadcasters have established the “Association Private 
Broadcasting and Telemedia” to represent the interests of its members. Currently, 
some 160 companies stemming from private broadcasting and private electronic 
media (such as the Internet) are members of the association. The Association is a 
lobbying actor which addresses all relevant media policies at the national and 
European (EU) level. It utilises mainly statements, press releases and talks with 
decision-makers as levers to pursue its members’ interests. Newspaper publishers 
have created a comparable institution, the Association of German Newspaper 
Publishers [Bundsverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger]. The association represents 
more than 300 daily newspapers and fourteen weeklies639 before governmental bodies 
and parliaments. It defends their economic interests and serves as a representative 
organ in tariff treaty negotiations. The Association of German Magazine Publishers 
serves as an umbrella organisation of more that 400 magazine publishers and is 
mandated with comparable tasks.640 
Many non-governmental organisations operate in the field of media policy 
either as political actors or as members of one of the regulatory bodies, i.e. the 
broadcasting councils. The list of the organisations represented in the broadcasting 
council of the West-German-Broadcaster [WDR] is a case in this point. According to 
Article 15 para. 3 of the West-German-Broadcasting Act, members of the Protestant 
and Catholic Church, the Jewish community, the German Union Association, the 
German Civil Servant Association, employers’ associations, the Free Social 
Association, the Sport Association, the Trade Association, and other individuals from 
the areas of media, culture, arts, and science shall be delegated and appointed. Two of 
                                                                                                                                            
regulation of journalism], in W. R. Langenbucher, H. Pöttker und C. Schicha (eds), Handbuch 
Medienselbstkontrolle, [Manual for media self-regulation] (2005) 125. 
634 See for the role of unions in media policy: S. Nehls, Mitbestimmte Medienpolitik. Gewerkschaften, 
Gremien und Governance in Hörfunk und Fernsehen [Co-governed media policy. Unions, committees, 
and governance in broadcasting] (2009). 
635 According to its self presentation: Deutsche Journalisten-Verband, “Der DJV – Porträt” [The 
portrait of the DJV], available at: http://www.djv.de/UEber-uns.17.0.html (last visited on 26/07/2010). 
636 Ver.di, “Aufgaben und Ziele” [Assignments and objectives], available at: 
http://dju.verdi.de/ueber_die_dju/selbstdarstellung/aufgaben_und_ziele (last visited on 26/07/2010). 
637 Deutsche Journalisten-Verband, “Der DJV – Porträt”. 
638 Deutscher Journalisten-Verband, “Grundsatzprogramm des Deutschen Journalisten-Verbands” 
[Basic policy programme] (2009). 
639 According to its self-description: Bundsverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger, “Im Auftrag der 
Zeitung” [On behalf of the newspaper], available at: http://www.bdzv.de/im_auftrag_der_zeitung.html 
(last visited on 27/07/2010). 
640 Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger, “Aims”, available at: http://www.vdz.de/keyfacts-
keyfacts.html (last visited on 28/07/2010). 
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the organisations shall be named here. “Network research” [netzwerk recherche] was 
founded in 2001 by journalists and editors to foster investigative journalism. Through 
publications,641 seminars for journalists, conferences and political lobbying, it pursues 
its aim of improving investigative journalism, developing educational concepts, and 
mentoring young journalists.642 “Reporters Without Borders” [Reporter ohne 
Grenzen] operates worldwide with its main office in Paris and a network of additional 
nine sections in other countries. In Germany, it is represented with an own section 
organised by an own office, which was founded in 1994.643  
The scientific research landscape regarding the media is broad and diverse. 
Single researchers from universities, mainly professors in media law, communication 
science or affiliated fields, are commissioned to probe into specific media related 
questions and write in depth analysis on the results. Additionally, single institutes 
were established with the clear mandate to serve as research organisations with a clear 
inclination towards policy formulation. Other institutes tend to act as mediator 
between science and politics. Although many of the researchers and institutes deserve 
to be mentioned, due to the limited space only some shall be described here. The 
probably most influential research institute is the “Hans-Bredow-Institut for Media 
Research of the Hamburg University”, which covers a broad scope of media related 
issues.644 The “Mainzer Medien Institute”, established by a private association, 
focuses on legal research activities relevant to current media political developments. 
Finally, the “Institute for Media and Communication Policies” is positioned on the 
cusp between scientific research institute and political think tank. 
 
3.2 The media regulatory framework 
3.2.1 Communication rights: Freedom of expression and information, freedom of 
the press and broadcasting in the German Basic Law 
The federal constitution, the German Basic Law,645 enshrines in its human rights 
section freedom of expression, the right to receive information and the freedom of 
press and broadcasting. The text itself, however, provides only very little information 
on how those rights and freedoms shall be interpreted legally. Article 5 para. 1 of the 
Basic Law stipulates:  
"Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions 
in speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from 
generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by 
means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no 
censorship." 
All those rights can be broadly summarised as the notion of communication 
                                                 
641 See T. Leif (ed.), Trainingshandbuch Recherche [Practical manual. Journalistic research] (2010). 
642 See the self-description: Netzwerk recherché, “Ziele des Netzwerks Recherche” [Objectives of the 
network research], available at: http://www.netzwerkrecherche.de/Verein/Ziele/ (last visited on 
27/07/2010). 
643 Reporter Ohne Grenzen, “National und international aktiv” [Active nationally and internationally], 
available at: http://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/ueber-uns/rog-in-deutschland.html (last visited on 
16/08/2010).  
644 Hans-Bredow-Institut, “Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter” [Staff], available at: http://www.hans-
bredow-institut.de/de/mitarbeiter/mitarbeiterinnen-mitarbeiter (last visited on 28/07/2010). 
645 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany [Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
2010]. 
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rights.646 However, the German courts and the legal literature developed a very 
detailed understanding of the scope of the protections afforded.647 
The Federal Constitutional Court ("the Court") has shaped the media law in 
over 190 judgments and decisions, although the key foundations for the media 
structure in Germany were laid down in just a few judgments.648  
Important, especially for the evolving understanding of broadcasting in terms 
of technical developments and the media’s role in a democratic society, is the Court’s 
interpretation of Article 5 Basic Law. According to the Court, Article 5 Basic Law 
should be interpreted in the classical way, that is, as offering protection to the bearer 
of the right against wrongful interceptions. This interpretation was generally adopted 
in cases concerning the freedom of press. However, the Court has added another 
dimension to this notion: that the state is simultaneously obliged to adopt actively 
organisational, fiscal and procedural regulations to guarantee free and independent 
broadcasting. In the words of the Court: “The legislator has to adopt in particular 
regulations which make sure broadcasting is not at the mercy of one or single groups, 
relevant social forces get a chance to speak in the whole programme and freedom of 
reporting remains untouched.”649 The Court has upheld the opinion and has reiterated 
in many decisions that the media and namely broadcasting play a crucial role in a 
democracy by allowing the discursive development of different opinions.650 Thus, it is 
not an individual right to protect operators from wrongful interceptions, but an 
obligation of the lawmakers to establish and ensure a well functioning broadcasting 
system.651 As to private broadcasting, the Court has reiterated throughout the years 
that the pluralistic broadcasting necessary for a democracy would be endangered 
under the sole regime of market forces.652 Thus the Court recognises indirectly the 
failure of the market to guarantee a pluralistic media.653 It places therefore the public 
service broadcasters in the position of fulfilling the duty of ensuring public 
discourse.654 
                                                 
646 See for instance: Fechner, Medienrecht [Media law] (2010), at p. 19. 
647 See: Hoffmann-Riem, “Art. 5 (Kommunikationsfreiheit)” [Freedom of communication], in E. 
Denninger, et al., (eds) Kommentar zum Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
[Commentary on the basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany] (2001), at para. 24ff. and 123ff. 
with further remarks also on the discussion among legal scholars. 
648 W. J. Schütz, “BVerfG-Entscheidungen zum Medienrecht” [Decisions of the Constitutional Court 
on media law], in P. Schiwy, W. J. Schütz and D. Dörr (eds), Medienrecht [Media law] (2010) 56. See 
for the role of the privately organized press: BVerfGE 20, 162 (174-176). 
649 BVerfGE 57, 295 (322), unofficial translation. 
650 Recently: BVerfG, MMR 2007, 770 (771). 
651 Hoffmann-Riem, “Art. 5”, para. 40; F. Kübler, Medien, Menschenrechte und Demokratie [Media, 
human rights and democracy] (2008), at p. 89-92. This convincing concept has triggered a broad 
reception and is still contested. See M. Bullinger, “Freiheit von Presse, Rundfunk, Film” [Freedom of 
press, broadcasting, film], in J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band VII. Freiheitsrechte [Handbook of constitutional law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Volume VII. Liberties] (2009) 909, at p. 964-965; M. Cornils, “Rundfunk-
Grundversorgung durch subventionierten Privatrundfunk?” [Basic provision of broadcasting through 
subsidised private broadcasting?], Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (2006) 789. 
652 See only BVerfG, MMR 2007, 770 (772). 
653 See for further information on negative economic influence on media: M. L. Kiefer, “Medien und 
neuer Kapitalismus” [Media and new capitalism], in G. Siegert and F. Lobigs (eds), Zwischen 
Marktversagen und Medienvielfalt [Between market failure and media pluralism] (2004) 169, at p. 181; 
M. L. Kiefer, “20 Jahre privater Rundfunk in Deutschland” [20 years of private broadcasting in 
Germany], 12 Media Perspektiven (2004) 558. 
654 BVerfGE 83, 238 (297); BVerfG, MMR 2007, 770 (771). 
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Furthermore, the Court referred to the principle of democracy enshrined in the 
German constitution, which essentially prevents state organs from exerting control on 
the content that is broadcast. According to the Court,655 the process of opinion 
forming should be “bottom-up”, that is, shaped by societal groups and not by the 
state.  
 
3.2.2 Structural and content regulation through federal and state law: some 
general remarks 
The decisions of the Court mentioned above led to the question of structural 
regulation of the responsible state organs, namely the lawmaker. Although the media 
outlets converge more and more, it is still helpful to distinguish between different 
media in order to discuss the structure of German media regulation. In this regard, 
three different, though interconnected, areas can be ascertained: broadcasting, print 
media including books, and new media services, especially through the Internet. 
Structural regulation is particularly pronounced in the broadcasting area. Here, the 
state lawmaker adopted rules actually establishing the dual broadcasting system. The 
core legal instrument, the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia (Interstate 
Broadcasting Treaty),656 which was adopted by all sixteen state lawmakers, contains 
provisions for public service and private broadcasting as well as basic rules for new 
media activities, mainly through the Internet. Besides this, the state lawmakers have 
adopted legislation on the nine different public service broadcasters, the 
Landesrundfunkanstalten,657 the financial regulation of fees for public service 
broadcasting,658 and on advertising time.659 
In addition, every state has adopted laws applying to private broadcasting.660 
These acts comprise provisions for the licensing of radio and television operators, 
some content requirements and the supervision of private broadcasters through the 
creation of independent bodies for that purpose. 
In contrast, no provisions were adopted to establish print media. The press was 
left to the market and is organised privately. However, legislation, adopted solely by 
the states, does exist to cover print media outlets’ accountability, the right to reply and 
the right to information.661  
In the area of electronic media services, limited regulation exists. The provisions 
concerning public service broadcasters exhibit the most detailed prerequisites.662 The 
                                                 
655 BVerfGE 44, 125 (140). 
656 [Staatesvertrag für Rundfunk und Telemedien (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag – RStV), 2010]. 
657 See only for the Northern regional broadcaster NDR-Staatsvertrag adopted by the state parliaments: 
Interstate Treaty on the Northern-German-Broadcasting [Staatsvertrag über den Norddeutschen 
Rundfunk (NDR-Staatsvertrag), 2005]. 
658 Broadcasting Fees State Treaty and Broadcasting Financing State Treaty 
[Rundfunkfinanzierungsstaatsvertrag, 2008]. 
659 Art. 7, Art. 7 a), Art. 8, Art. 15, Art. 16, Art. 17, Art. 44, Art. 45, and Art. 45 a) Interstate 
Broadcasting Treaty. 
660 See only State Media Law North-Rhine Westphalia. 
661 See only the Press Law of Baden-Württemberg [Landespressegesetz, Baden-Württemberg, 2009]. 
662 See only the Art. 11d) and 11f) Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. See for the implementation further 
details in: WDR, “Telemedienkonzept für das Internetangebot des WDR gültig ab 1 Juni 2009” [Online 
concept for the web services of the West-German-Broadcaster], available at: 
http://www.wdr.de/unternehmen/senderprofil/pdf/gremien/rundfunkrat/WDR_20090513_Telemedienk
onzept_Internet.pdf (last visited on 11/10/2010). 
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regulations for private broadcasters do not have the same depths, and when it comes 
to online services of newspapers and private persons, only some basic rules, mainly 
regarding accountability, are in place (for example, one has to publish the name and 
the address on the website). 
As well as these specific regulations concerning broadcasting, press, and new 
media services, some general provisions apply in variations to all areas. These include 
the protection of young people, criminal provisions concerning libel, discrimination or 
hate speech crimes, criminal proceeding provisions such as telephone tapping and 
online searching, market concentration provisions, intellectual property provisions, 
and data protection provisions to name the most important of them. Particularly 
provisions for the protection of young people and intellectual property shape the 
regime and the practice regarding Internet content. 
 
3.2.3 Structural regulation for public service broadcasting: state independence 
and general public interest 
After the Second World War, the Allied Forces espoused the idea of establishing a 
broadcasting system that would be independent from the state, although established 
by it, and controlled by representative groups of society.663 The different state 
legislations, accompanied by the rulings of the Federal Constitution Court, created a 
system of public service broadcasting, in which the broadcasting organisations can 
operate with internal self-control mechanisms and limited legal supervision by the 
relevant state government. Accordingly, the lawmakers are responsible for 
establishing and maintaining the basic framework, without the competence to 
influence programming.  These governing structures are also known as co-regulation 
or regulated self-regulation.664 
Two aspects merit attention in this context, in particular as regards operators’ 
independence from undue state influence. These are the composition of the 
broadcasting councils and the finance regime. 
 The basic function of the broadcasting councils is exemplified in the Bavarian 
Broadcasting Act, which stipulates: “The broadcasting council represents the interests 
of the general public in the field of broadcasting.”665 Comparable provisions can be 
found in other state broadcasting acts.666  
The media laws stipulate that besides the members elected by state 
parliaments, which are party members, delegates of representative groups have to be 
in the council as well.667 Representative groups enjoy the right to appoint and delegate 
                                                 
663 Steininger, “Rundfunkpolitik”, p. 389-390. 
664 I. Stapf, “Medienselbstkontrolle - Eine Einführung” [Introduction to media self-control], in W. R. 
Langenbucher, H. Pöttker and C. Schicha (eds), Handbuch Medienselbstkontrolle [Manual for media 
self-regulation] (2005) 17, at p. 29-30. For the concept see: W. Schulz and T. Held, Regulated self-
regulation as a form of modern government (2001), p. 6-7. 
665 Art. 6 para. 1 Bavarian Broadcasting Act. 
666 See only Art. 12 para. 2 Broadcasting Interstate Treaty Berlin-Brandenburg [Staatsvertrag über die 
Errichtung einer gemeinsamen Rundfunkanstalt der Länder Berlin und Brandenburg, 2009]; Art. 15 
para. 1 Interstate Treaty on South-West-Broadcasting [Staatsvertrag über den Südwestrundfunk, 2000]. 
667 See only Art. 14 Interstate Treaty on South-West-Broadcasting. 
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representatives, without interference by state organs.668 Basically, the broadcasting 
council’s composition aims to ensure a plurality of opinion. However, the majority of 
acts admit, in general, one representative of state governments as member in the 
broadcasting councils.669 
Most of the public broadcasting acts also stipulate that no member of the 
broadcasting council representing a societal group can hold simultaneously a position 
in a state government or be a member of an electoral body (European, Federal or state 
Parliament).670 Furthermore, all public service broadcasting acts include quotas for 
members of state parliaments and governments, so as to ensure societal groups hold 
the majority of positions in the councils.671 Although representatives of societal 
groups always hold a majority of votes, critics contest the independence of the 
broadcasting councils referring to the parliaments’ and governments’ 
representatives672 and the alleged affiliation of most of the remaining members to one 
of the political parties in Germany.673 Presumably party and state influence played a 
role, for instance, in the nomination and election of the new director of the 
broadcasting corporation “Bavarian Broadcasting.” The recently elected incumbent 
had been working for the conservative-liberal Federal Government in the position of 
Speaker before he was elected by the broadcasting council.674 
Crucial for the independence of public service broadcasters from the state is also 
the budget autonomy of operators.675 The financing regime of German public service 
broadcasting implies a rather demanding three step procedure with the aim of 
minimising state influence as much as possible.676 In the first step, the public 
broadcasting corporations submit their estimated financial needs. An independent 
body of sixteen experts (appointed by each state), the Commission to Determine 
Financial Needs [Kommission zur Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs, KEF], scrutinises 
the submission of the public service broadcasters and determines the financial need 
for a period of generally four years. The Commission then proposes a concrete 
amount of fees, which need to be adopted by all state parliaments.  
 
                                                 
668 The Second German TV is an exception, as it is the state governments prime minister who appoints 
the members of the television council. See Art. 21 para. 3 Interstate Treaty on the Second German 
Television. 
669 See Art. 6 para. 3 no. 2 Bavarian Broadcasting Act; Art. 5 para. 2 no. 1 Hesse Broadcasting Act 
[Gesetz über den Hessischen Rundfunk, 2007]; Art. 19 para. 1 no. 1 Interstate Treaty on the Middle-
German-Broadcasting [Staatsvertrag über den Mitteldeutschen Rundfunk (MDR), 2002]; Art. 9 para. 1 
no. 17 and no. 18 Radio Bremen Act [Radio Bremen-Gesetz, 2010]; Art. 27 para. 1 no. 1 Saarland 
Madia Act [Saarländisches Mediengesetz, 2008]; Art. 14 Interstate Treaty on the South-West-
Broadcasting; Art. 21 para. 1 a) and b) Interstate Treaty “Deutschlandradio”; Art. 21 para. 1 a) and b) 
Interstate Treaty on Second German Television. The “Deutschlandradio” treaty as well as the Interstate 
Treaty on the Second German Television stipulates that three representatives of the Federal level can 
be delegated by the Federal Government. 
670 Art. 21 para. 5 Interstate Treaty “Deutschlandradio”. 
671 See only Art. 14 Interstate Treaty on South-West-Broadcasting. 
672 See the analysis by Hahn, Aufsicht, p. 164-190; Hesse, Rundfunkrecht, p. 159-160 with further 
remarks. 
673 Hahn, Aufsicht, p. 181-184. 
674 The election is likely to contradict the Resolution 1636 (2008) “Indicators for media in a 
democracy” of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, stipulating under no. 8.20 that 
senior management positions should be refused to people with clear party political affiliations. 
675 BVerfG, NJW 1994, 1942 (1946f.); BVerfG, MMR 2007, 770 (773ff.). 
676 See Art. 14 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty and Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting Financing. 
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3.2.4 Structural regulation for private broadcasting: ensuring pluralism of 
opinion and independence through licensing and supervision proceedings 
Safeguards for media pluralism and independence in the field of private broadcasting 
rest on a differentiated legal system, which essentially relies on external control 
mechanisms.677 The supervision authorities can only resort to appointing an additional 
internal body, should the private broadcaster gain a dominant position.678 
Furthermore, the pluralism of opinions has to be ensured with regard to all private 
broadcasters, which means the law pursues at first external pluralism of different 
operators and resorts to a single channel only complementarily (see Article 25 para. 2; 
Article 26 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty).679 These basic principles have led to a 
regime of structural provisions regarding ownership.  In essence, these take the form 
of rules on incompatibility and market dominance adopted to ensure private 
broadcasting is not controlled or influenced by state interests and that a single 
company does not gain a market dominant position potentially threatening the process 
of impartial opinion shaping. The State Media Authorities and, in the case of national 
private broadcasters, the cooperation bodies implement the rules.  
The applicable licensing provisions in the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty (on 
national private broadcasting) stipulate, among other things, that a licence must not be 
issued to any legal person established according to public law (for example the 
Federal Republic of Germany or the states), legal representatives of those legal 
persons or to political parties.680 The same applies for foreign public bodies.681 State 
media legislation for regional broadcasters682 contains comparable provisions with 
occasionally more detailed requirements.683 Thus, the media law prohibits any public 
body and any political party from holding or being part of a private broadcaster.  
The Federal Constitutional Court discerned, however, that skewed public 
discourse could be the result of a dominant market position.684 Consequently, the state 
lawmakers included in the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty specific regulations on 
national broadcasting to fulfil the constitutional requirements as stipulated by the 
Court. The law refers to market shares of viewers to ascertain whether a dominant 
market position exists and, in doing so, considers all channels of all enterprises of the 
operator at issue.685 A dominant position is gained in the market in cases of a 30% or 
higher annual market share of viewers or a 25% share in cross media conjunctures.686 
                                                 
677 See ALM, Jahrbuch 2009/2010, p. 356ff.; C. Bamberger, “Sicherung der Meinungsvielfalt durch 
die Landesmedienanstalten” [Ensuring pluralism of opinions through state media authorities], ZUM 
(2000) 551; Hesse, Rundfunkrecht, p. 244f. 
678 See only Art. 32 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty; Art. 33 c) State Media Law North-Rhine 
Westphalia. 
679 B. Holznagel and A. Grünwald, “§ 25 Rundfunkstaatsvertrag” [Art. 25 Interstate Broadcasting 
Treaty], in G. Spindler and F. Schuster (eds), Recht der elektronischen Medien [Law of electronic 
media] (2008), marginal no. 5. A more differentiated approach sees M. Kühn, Meinungsvielfalt im 
Rundfunk [Pluralism of opinions in broadcasting] (2003), p. 86-87. 
680 Art. 20 a) para. 3 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
681 Ibid. 
682 Art. 20 para. 1; Art. 39 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
683 See only Art. 13 para. 3 and para. 4 State Media Law Baden-Württemberg [Landesmediengesetz 
Baden-Württemberg (LMedienG), 2010]. 
684 BverfGE 57, 259 (323); BVerfG, NJW 1987, 239 (244). 
685 Art. 26 para. 1 and 2 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
686 Art. 26 para. 2 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. This is the case when a market dominant position in 
the other media market already exists or the cross-media activities are comparable to a television 
market share of 30%. 
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The law covers several measures to address market dominance, including the 
prohibition to merge, the divestiture of programmes or shareholdings, and finally the 
adoption of measures to ensure opinion pluralism through an independent Programme 
Board representing different representative societal groups or airtime concession to an 
independent third party.687  
Moreover, according to federal antitrust law, the Federal Cartel Authority is 
entitled to scrutinise whether an intended merger leads to a market dominant position 
regarding sole economic aspects and not opinion domination.688 The same legislation 
contains a special provision determining when market dominance is achieved, which 
is only applicable to newspaper publishers and television operators.689 In essence, it 
facilitates the application of the prohibition to merger in those cases. This system 
leads in conclusion to a two level merger and market dominance control, one based on 
state media law focusing on opinion dominance and one based on federal law 
focusing on economical market dominance. 
 
3.2.5 Structural regulation of print media 
As already mentioned, the Basic Law enshrines in Article 5 the freedom of the press. 
Legal doctrine understands this right as an individual protection right against unlawful 
state interference, which simultaneously protects the press as an institution 
constitutive for democracy.690 Furthermore, the Court has ruled that the state has to 
intercept in developments threatening the impartial opinion of print media organs and 
thus the impartial process of opinion building by readers.691 This legal interpretation 
obliges the state to avert a publisher monopoly.  As this is not the case yet, no 
legislation exists establishing the press or requiring a licence procedure,692 because 
the press is organised privately without state funding or specially tailored state aid. 
Press outlets must include a legal notice [Impressum] for the person accountable, with 
further information in the case of a periodical outlet (name and address of chief 
editor).  Additionally, the responsible editor must reside permanently in Germany.693 
 As for cross-media activities of publishers, the Interstate Broadcasting 
Treaty,694 the State Media Acts695 as well as the Act against Competition 
Constraints696 contain provisions to impede dominant market positions and thus 
structure the press market.697 
Another aspect of structural regulation pertains to the distribution system in 
Germany. The Federal Constitutional Court has stated that press related activities, 
                                                 
687 Art. 26 para. 3 and 4; Art. 30 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
688 Art. 36 para. 1 Act against Competition Constraints. 
689 Art. 38 para. 3 Act against Competition Constraints. 
690 BVerfG, NJW 2007, 1117 (1118). 
691 BVerfGE 20, 162 (175-176). 
692 See for many Art. 2 Hamburg Press Act [Hamburgisches Pressegesetz, 2009]. 
693 See Art. 8 and Art. 9 Hamburg Press Act. 
694 Art. 26 para. 2 sentence 2 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
695 See only Art. 24 para. 2 sentence 3 State Media Act Baden-Württemberg. 
696 Art. 38 para. 3 Act against Competition Constrains. 
697 See for further information: Bretschneider, Bewertung crossmedialer Verflechtungen im 
Medienkonzentrationsrecht [Assessment of cross-media mergers in the view of law on media 
concentration] (2010), p. 71-81; W. Schulz and T. Held, Die Zukunft der Kontrolle der Meinungsmacht 
(2006) [The future of control of opinion domination], p. 13-36. 
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including press distribution, are protected by the Basic Law.698 The press distribution 
system is thus based on the principle that every print media outlet must be disclosed 
by the distributor who is obliged to act in a neutral manner. Several large-scale 
distributors have organised the German market in such a way that every publisher can 
reach every retailer offering print media products to customers. As such, every 
publisher can more or less access the whole press market via the distributer and have 
the same chance to be purchased.699  
 
3.2.6 Structural regulation of new media services 
The legal framework for new media services is still developing in Germany,700 though 
federal701 and state legislation,702 influenced by European law already apply. 
In general, online-activities (as part of the German legal notion “telemedia”)703 are 
not subject to any licensing procedure.704 As such, every private person, private 
enterprise or public body can place and receive content online, provided that generally 
applicable legislation (i.e. rules for the protection of young people, Penal Code 
provisions, etc.) is respected. The existing legal framework for media outlets likewise 
shapes online activities. As a result, the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty obliges private 
broadcasters transmitting television programmes on the Internet to submit an 
application for a licence, with the exemption of Internet radio that can be broadcast 
without a licence.705 On the other hand, public service broadcasters are explicitly 
entitled to provide their programmes online,706 though strict content requirements 
exist, as will be shown in the next passage. Private publishers are similarly entitled to 
offer an online version of their papers. No licensing procedures apply, and content 
requirements are comparable to those applicable in the case of paper publications.  
Other rules relevant to new media services are those contained in the contested707 
legislation on block lists that impede access to websites with incriminated content, 
mostly child pornography,708 and those imposing data retention obligations, as laid 
down in the Directive 2006/24/EC.709 The latter obliges the German lawmaker to 
adopt rules for data retention stipulating that Internet providers must store all 
                                                 
698 BVerfG, NJW 1988, 1833 (1833-1834). 
699 Presse-Grosso, “Grosso-Vertriebssystem [Press distribution system], available at:  
http://www.pressegrosso.de/bereiche/recht/grosso-vertriebssystem.html (last visited on 3/08/2010). 
700 See only W. Hoffmann-Riem, “Gesetzliche Gewährleistungen der Freiheit der Kommunikation im 
Internet?” [Legally ensured freedom of communication in the Internet?], in W. Hoffmann-Riem (ed.), 
Wandel der Medienordnung [Change of the media order] (2009), 237; Fechner, Medienrecht, p. 339. 
701 Act on the Usage of Telemedia [Gesetz über die Nutzung von Telemedien, 2009]. See T. Hoeren, 
“Das Telemediengesetz” [Act on telemedia], Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2007) 801. 
Telecommunication Act [Telekommunikationsgesetz, 2010]. 
702 Art. 54-Art. 61 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
703 According to the legal definition in Art. 1 para. 1 Act on the Usage of Telemedia, the term telemedia 
refers to all information and communication services, as long as they cannot be considered as 
broadcasting or sole one-to-one telecommunication. Fechner, Medienrecht, p. 346ff. 
704 Art. 4 Act on the Usage of Telemedia. 
705 Art. 20b) Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
706 See Art. 11d) Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
707 A. Marberth-Kubicki, “Der Beginn der Internet-Zensur. Zugangssperren durch Access-Provider” 
[The advent of Internet consorship. Access barrier of providers], Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
(2009) 1792. 
708 Act to Fight Child Pornography in Communication Networks [Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der 
Kinderpornographie in Kommunikationsnetzen, 2010]. 
709 OJ L 105 of 13 April 2006, p. 54. 
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communication data and IP-addresses for six months and submit them on request to 
state prosecutors, intelligence services, and other law enforcement authorities.710 
Journalists’ organisations argued that potential information sources would retreat if 
the German legislation were to be implemented and supported a constitutional 
complaint.711 Although the Federal Constitutional Court quashed the provisions and 
required the federal lawmaker, the German Parliament, to amend the law,712 it is not 
clear whether journalists will benefit from it. 
 
 
3.3 Content regulation  
Different content regulations apply, depending on the medium used. The legislature 
has adopted tailored content regulations to shape basic programme principles for 
broadcasters and has also laid down rules for the online activities of public service 
operators. Publishers are required to respect basic journalistic principles and private 
websites are not bound to comply with specific content requirements. 
Besides these specific rules, general rules apply stemming from different areas 
of law regarding personal rights, libel, protection of young people and others. 
 
3.3.1 Content regulation for public service broadcasting 
According to the Federal Constitutional Court case law, the basic provision of 
broadcasting services [Grundversorgung] lays with the public service broadcasters.713 
This implies a duty of impartiality and the provision of unskewed information 
necessary for democratic decisions. The state lawmakers adopted content regulation 
in response to the case law. Articles 3, 10, and 11 of the Interstate Broadcasting 
Treaty stipulate important basic rules for the programmes. These are complemented 
and specified by the state Acts on the state broadcasting corporations714 and self-
                                                 
710 Art. 113a; Art. 113b Telecommunication Act. Art. 100g para. 1 Criminal Code of Procedure 
[Strafprozessordnung, 2009]. 
711 Joint expert opinion for the public hearing at the German Federal Parliament on telecommunication 
surveillance, B. H. Pöppelann, German Journalists’ Association, 19/07/2007, available at: 
http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1251&id=1134 (last visited on 30/8/2010), at 
p. 4.  
712 BVerfG, NJW 2010, 833 (843; 849); critical appraisal by N. Forgó and T. Krügel, “Vorschriften zur 
Vorratsdatenspeicherung verfassungswidrig: Nach der Entscheidung ist vor der Entscheidung” 
[Provisions on data retention unconstitutional], 4 Kommunikation & Recht (2010) 217. 
713 BVerfG, NJW 1987, 239 (241); BVerfG, NJW 1987, 2987 (2988); for further information Hesse, 
Rundfunkrecht, p. 120-130; M. Stock, “Duales System: funktionsgerecht ausgestaltet?” [Dual system: 
effectively working?], in C.-M. Ridder, et al. (eds), Bausteine einer Theorie des öffentlich-rechtlichen 
Rundfunks [Components of a theory on public service broadcasting] (2005) 54, at p. 64ff. 
714 See only Art. 4, Art. 5, Art. 6, Art. 7, and Art. 8 Interstate Treaty on Northern-German-
Broadcasting. 
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regulatory guidelines.715 The Interstate Treaty for “Deutschlandradio” and the Second 
German Television contain comparable provisions.716  
The legislation clarifies the mandate of public service broadcasting. According 
to Article 11 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty, the public service broadcasters are 
required to serve through their programming as a medium for free and independent 
public opinion shaping and thus meet the democratic, social and cultural needs of the 
society. Furthermore, public service broadcasters must provide comprehensive 
information on international, European, national, and regional events on all relevant 
aspects of life. When fulfilling these duties they are obliged to adhere to the principles 
of objectivity and impartiality of reporting and take pluralism of opinions and a 
balanced approach into account. They must also include in their programmes 
educational, informational, counselling and entertainment content.717 
As well as these requirements, public service broadcasters must respect the 
dignity of human beings and all other rules protecting the esteem of persons, such as 
libel.718 When transmitting information programmes, the applicable law stipulates 
they must be produced in accordance with commonly accepted journalistic principles, 
especially regarding independent and objective reporting.719 Specific regulations for 
advertising and protection of young people also apply. 
 The broadcasting councils monitor whether the state broadcasting corporations 
adhere to the content regulations or they act on the basis of complaints received.  
 Online activities complementing traditional broadcasting are subject to more 
detailed rules. Public service broadcasters can also provide websites with additional 
information and can transmit their programmes online. However, these activities can 
only take place within the framework stipulated in Article 11d) Interstate 
Broadcasting Treaty as well as the detailed self-regulatory concepts of each of the 
state broadcasting corporations. This is the result of a state aid procedure with the 
European Commission on public service broadcasters.720 Private publishers and 
broadcasters have a strong interest in public services broadcasters being 
circumscribed, due to market share considerations, and as such submitted a complaint 
with the European Commission. This influenced the core legal provisions on online 
activities, as public service broadcasters are only entitled to provide online content 
that refers to their traditionally broadcast, journalistic initiated721 programmes 
                                                 
715 See only Art. 15 para 3.4 Interstate Treaty on the South-West-Broadcasting. See as example the self 
regulatory guidelines of the public service operator’s working coalition ARD: ARD, Bericht 07/08. 
Leitlinien 09/10 [Report 07/08. Guidelines 09/10], available at: 
http://www.daserste.de/service/allround.asp?uid=106t3n7ad1lm6l8x&name=leitlinien (last visited on 
14/10/2010), at p. 72ff. 
716 Art. 5 Interstate Treaty on Second German Television; Art. 6 and Art. 7 Interstate Treaty on 
“Deutschlandradio”. 
717 Art. 11 para. 1 sentence 4 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
718 Art. 3 para. 1 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
719 Art. 10 para. 1 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
720 So called “Three-Step-Test” and Telemedia concepts. See only B. Peters, “Der ‘Drei-Stufen-Test’: 
Die Zukunft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Onlineangebote” [The three-step-test: The future of public 
service online offers], 1 Kommunikation & Recht (2009) 26; W. Schulz, The public service 
broadcasting mandate seen as the process of its justification. Some suggestions on the implementation 
of the three-step test to make the remit of public service broadcasters in Germany more precise (2008), 
p. 13ff. For a very general account of the online offers by public service broadcasters see: H. F. 
Schäfer, Neue Betätigungsfelder des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks (2004) [New areas of action for 
the public service broadcasting], p. 110-137. 
721 See Art. 11d) para. 1 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
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produced by them. Furthermore, several online services are prohibited, such as broad 
regional news coverage, video-on-demand of purchased films or series as well as a list 
of other services laid down in law.722 The legal situation, especially the legal notion of 
journalistic or editorially initiated programmes, seems rather vague and 
unsatisfactory. It will be interesting to follow the forthcoming legal developments in 
this regard. 
 
3.3.2 Content regulation for private broadcasting 
Contrary to public service broadcasting, private broadcasting exhibits a clear 
inclination towards economic interests. While the Federal Constitutional Court 
espouses the concept that private broadcasting must also fulfil public duties it 
recognises that due to market forces private broadcasters do not have to fulfil all 
programme principles to the same degree of public service broadcasters.723 While, for 
instance, public service broadcasters must abide by the content regulations concerning 
information and culture, private operators shall contribute broadcasts with 
informational, cultural and educational content in order to present the diversity in 
Europe and in Germany.724 Furthermore, private broadcasters are bound by the 
constitutional order, including the Human Rights chapter of the Basic Law, and 
general rules on issues such as personal rights, human dignity and criminal law.725 
Article 3 (respect of dignity) and Article 10 (journalistic requirements) of the 
Interstate Broadcasting Treaty are also applicable for private broadcasters. 
Furthermore, all state Media Acts have comparable and complementing provisions for 
regional television and radio broadcasting.726 
 Like public service broadcasters, private operators must apply all general rules 
on protection of personal rights, discriminatory behaviour and other criminalised 
forms of content. The state Media Authorities and their cooperation bodies scrutinise 
whether the private broadcaster adhere to the programme basic principles.  
 
3.3.3 Content regulation of press outlets 
The legal enactments of the federal states regarding print media established the legal 
framework for print media outlets, accompanied by a self-regulating Press Code and 
general provisions which also apply to print media providers. Accordingly, print 
media organs are obliged to verify for all news that they want to publish whether the 
sources are credible and the facts correct.727 The same applies for journalistic 
                                                 
722 According to Appendix 4 of Art. 11d) para. 5 sentence 4 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty those 
services are prohibited which mainly can be commercialised in the Internet.  
723 BVerfG, NJW 1987, 239 (240); BVerfG, NJW 1994, 1942 (1944); B. Holznagel and D. Krone, “§ 
41 Rundfunkstaatsvertrag” [Interstate Broadcasting Treaty] in G. Spindler and F. Schuster (eds), Recht 
der elektronischen Medien [Law of electronic media] marginal no. 13. 
724 Art. 41 para. 2 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. See for the programme principles: H. Gersdorf, 
Grundzüge des Rundfunkrechts. Nationaler und europäischer Regulierungsrahmen [Basic structures of 
broadcasting law. National and European regulation framework] (2003), p. 183-186; Hesse, 
Rundfunkrecht, p. 234-239. 
725 Art. 41 para. 1 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
726 See only Art. 31 State Media Law North-Rhine Westphalia; Art. 4 and Art. 5 Bavarian Media Act; 
Art. 47 Interstate Treaty on Berlin-Brandenburg Broadcasting. 
727 See for further information: J. Soehring, Presserecht [Print media law], (2010) p. 10-23. 
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publications online.728 Furthermore, no published content is permitted to violate Penal 
Code provisions. The legislature has not adopted any further content regulations to 
complement these basic principles. 
 However, the Press Code entails a detailed set of rules applicable for print 
media journalists. Those rules require, among other things, the recognition of truth 
and the dignity of human beings, journalistic accuracy when publishing facts, the 
respect for private life and the intimate sphere and protection of honour. Furthermore, 
in the Code the print media relinquishes inadequate sensational presentation of 
violence and suffering.729 However, being self-regulating provisions, it is contested 
they are implemented sufficiently, especially with regard to the tabloids.730 
  
3.3.4 Content regulation of new media services, especially the Internet 
In short, no specific content regulation exists for Internet publications in cases of 
individual private websites. In cases of websites offering a service, a basic legal 
notice with details of the accountable person or legal entity is required.731 The 
applicable Act on Telemedia does not stipulate further requirements. However, the 
general rules applying in all other outlets must also be considered in online 
publications, especially as regards fraud and hate speech.  
 Additionally, the Interstate Broadcasting Treaty stipulates basic requirements 
in cases of online journalistic services, namely the requirements of accuracy in 
journalistic reporting.732  
 
3.4 Other media policy tools  
3.4.1 Protection of information sources 
In practice, journalists are dependent on information sources working in the particular 
area of interest.733 These may be in a ministry or in the parliament. The law respects 
the special position of journalists and their relationship to sources and gives 
journalists a right to refuse to give evidence in a criminal court proceeding.734 It also 
expands the protection of journalists relating to data storage by prohibiting the police 
from confiscating material.735 However, journalists can commit a crime, namely 
betrayal of state secrets, when publishing certain information. As journalists are not 
secret bearers in the sense of the law, this is only possible if the journalist acts in 
consent with an informant (who is, for example, someone working in a ministry). 
Under such circumstance, the journalist loses the legal protection and the material can 
be confiscated.  
                                                 
728 Art. 54 para. 2 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
729 See: Presserat, Publizistische Grundsätze (Pressekodex), 2008. 
730 See the differentiated appraisal made by Pöttker, “Der Deutsche Presserat”, at p. 127ff. 
731 Art. 5 Act on the Usage of Telemedia. 
732 Art. 54 para. 2 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
733 BVerfG, NJW 2007, 1117 (1118). 
734 Art. 53 para. 1 no. 5 Criminal Code of Procedure. 
735 Art. 97 para. 5 Criminal Code of Procedure. 
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This construction may undermine journalists’ work, as informants cannot be 
sure whether such confiscation may lead to them facing criminal charges.736 The 
Federal Constitutional Court has recognised this conflict of interests and ruled that 
protection of sources must be ensured for editors and journalists.737 The sole 
publication of classified material does not alone mean state prosecutors can assume a 
criminal act and justify confiscation. However, if specific evidence shows the secret 
bearer intended a publication of the classified information, state prosecutors are 
entitled to carry out a search to confiscate evidence and thus reveal the identity of the 
informant.738 The legal situation remains somewhat uncertain and leaves journalists in 
a limbo situation. It will be interesting to see in the future whether the relatively vague 
requirements avert searching of editors’ and journalists’ offices and private premises. 
Critics have pointed out the problems with the legal circumstances and have 
advocated excluding journalists from criminalisation in such cases.739 
 
3.4.2 Libel and other forms of violation of personal rights and freedom of the 
press 
While it is true that a free and independent media landscape is important for 
democratic discourse, it is equally true that despite safeguarding in content 
regulations, media outlets do on occasion disregard individuals’ personal rights and 
must be held accountable for this. The German legal system contains several criminal 
and civil legal provisions in this regard. The civil law provides a very differentiated 
legal regime of claims against the media based on the protection of individual 
personal rights [Persönlichkeitsrecht], which is regarded a human right under German 
law.740 Furthermore, the Penal Code criminalises libel, defamation, certain forms of 
publication and distribution of pornography as well as certain forms of disregard 
towards state representatives and institutions. Due to Germany’s history, the Penal 
Code also criminalises certain allegations concerning the Nazi regime, such as 
denying the Holocaust.741 
 
3.4.3 Right to reply 
The right to reply is applicable to broadcasting, print media and journalistic 
publications in the Internet. It is recognised in various acts, such as the State Press 
Acts, the State Broadcasting Acts, the State Media Acts, and the Interstate 
Broadcasting Treaty.742 This right can only be resorted to in cases of factual assertion, 
when the person or the body concerned has a justified interest. In general, the scope of 
                                                 
736 T. Starke, “Informantenschutz zwischen Pressefreiheit und staatlichem Strafverfolgungsinteresse” 
[Protection of informants between freedom of press and state interets of effective criminal 
prosecution], 02 AfP (2007) 91, at p. 92. 
737 BVerfG, NJW 2000, 55. 
738 BVerfG, NJW 2007, 1117 (1120). 
739 See only K. Kühl, Strafgesetzbuch. Kommentar [Penal Code. Commentary] (2007), Art. 353b Penal 
Code, marginal no. 13a; D. Dunkhase, Das Pressegeheimnis. Wandel und Perspektiven gesetzlicher 
Sicherungen der Pressefreiheit gegen strafprozessuale Zwangsmaßnahmen [Protection of the print 
media secret. Change and perspectives of ensuring freedom of press] (1998), p. 174-183. 
740 See only Fechner, Medienrecht, p. 63ff.; Soehring, Presserecht, p. 257ff. 
741 See Art. 130 para. 3 Penal Code [Strafgesetzbuch, 2009]; Soehring, Presserecht, p. 254. 
742 See only Art. 11 Hamburg Press Act; Art. 11 State Media Act Rhineland-Palatine; Art. 9 West-
German-Broadcasting Act; Art. 56 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty. 
 217
this right is rather broad.743 The right is only excluded in cases of factual assertions 
that are publicly known, in trivial cases, or if the factual assertion implies itself a 
criminal act.744 To facilitate reporting about lawmakers and parliamentarian organs, 
the right to reply is also excluded for factual true reporting about those organs.745 
 
4. Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment 
4.1 General remarks 
Thus far, the description of the media landscape in Germany, the regimes and the 
actors has focused on a summary of single aspects. Not much has been said on the 
principal features and characteristics of media policy in Germany. The first topic shall 
be termed here as cognitive sovereignty of interpretation. Television, radio, print 
media, and Internet are used by persons to entertain themselves, but also to form a 
picture of the world we live in, to shape an opinion and to gain an understanding of 
the ongoing regional, national and global developments. This aspect correlates with 
the fight for attention in the media. The underlying currents of several conflicts in 
media policies are to an extent influenced by the ongoing tensions between the 
commercialisation of the media and contrariwise the idea of a space free of sole 
market forces but shaped by the diversity of cultures and pluralism of opinions. 
Finally, technical developments very much shape media policies and debates 
regarding how they are to be used. The Internet and its repercussions for traditional 
media pose new political and legal challenges. Admittedly, these topics may sound 
rather vague and abstract. Essentially, the question is: what characteristic media 
policy developments can be ascertained? 
 
4.2 The dual broadcasting system 
The most far-reaching political decision regarding the media field was to establish 
private service broadcasting.746 The whole media system was changed with this 
decision for a dual broadcasting order and the actors are still fighting today to expand 
their influence or market share or to protect their position. This was apparent as early 
as the 1950s, when private publishers tried to get a hold in broadcasting.747 Mainly 
due to technical reasons, they did not succeed. However, it was not only the private 
publishers who contested public service broadcasting’s position. The circumstances 
changed, politically and technically, during the 1980s.748 The liberal-conservative 
federal government came into power and supported private broadcasting. And on state 
                                                 
743 Fechner, Medienrecht, p. 110; Soehring, Presserecht, p. 630. 
744 Soehring, Presserecht, p. 632-636. 
745 See only Art. 56 para. 4 Interstate Broadcasting Treaty; Art. 44 para. 6 State Media Law North-
Rhine Westphalia. 
746 See the description of the dual system by M. Stock, “Noch einmal zum Reformbedarf im ‘dualen 
Rundfunksystem’: Public-Service-Rundfunk und kommerzieller Rundfunk - wie können sie 
koexistieren?” [As for the need of reforms in the dual system: how can public service broadcasting and 
commercial broadcasting co-exist?], Heft 244, Arbeitspapiere des Instituts für Rundfunkökonomie an 
der Universität zu Köln (2008). 
747 Eifert and Hoffmann-Riem, “Entstehung”, at p. 51; R. Steinmetz, “Initiativen und Durchsetzung 
privat-kommerziellen Rundfunks” [Initiative and implementation of privat-commercial broadcasting], 
in J. Wilke (ed.), Mediengeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Media history of the Federal 
Republic of Germany] (1999), p. 168ff. 
748 Schwarzkopf, “Medienwende”, p. 36-38. 
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level, several governments planned to conduct cable projects to investigate the 
technical advancements of cable networks.749 The first German private television 
channel was transmitted via cable in 1984750 and state parliaments began, rather 
hastily in some cases,751 to adopt media legislation to regulate private broadcasting.752 
The reasons for this development may be manifold. However, two basic points can be 
made. Politically, mostly conservative politicians asserted that the public service 
broadcasters, especially the state broadcasting corporations, with their common 
national channel, “Das Erste”, were too critical of conservative politics.753 They 
hoped to receive better coverage by private broadcasters. Economically, publishers 
and private broadcasting companies saw the possibility to make business. It was 
assumed private radio and television would be very profitable, if only enough 
advertising revenues were to be generated.  
What are the repercussions of this development for democratic politics and 
citizen participation? It is admittedly rather difficult to gauge the impact of private 
broadcasting on democratic processes. While some argue private channels enrich 
options available to the public and as such increase pluralism, others contest that 
private broadcasting significantly fostered media pluralism, due to media 
concentration and exchangeable content. However, an important feature of the 
democratic processes lays in the unskewed provision and receipt of information and 
reporting. The question arises as to whether private broadcasting still fulfils this task, 
taking into account, for instance, the fact that in 2008 RTL averaged twenty minutes a 
day covering political events or politically relevant information.754 According to other 
sources, RTL provided fifteen minutes per day on political relevant information in its 
news-broadcastings, and eleven minutes in other formats.755 Not surprisingly, it is 
conceded that after twenty-five years have passed since the introduction of private 
broadcasting, the results in form of channel concepts and content can not necessarily 
be deemed advantageous for the viewer and the political sphere.756 
An ongoing debate between public service and private broadcasting can be 
discerned in the remit of public service broadcasting regarding online activities. This 
area is highly contested, as it is assumed that Internet television and other services 
available via Internet will predominantly shape the media market in the future.757 The 
state aid procedure with the European Commission, initiated by the Association of 
                                                 
749 Steinmetz, “Initiativen”, pp. 179-180. 
750 Steinmetz, “Initiativen”, p. 182. 
751 Steinmetz, “Initiativen”, p. 181. 
752 Eifert and Hoffmann-Riem, “Entstehung”, p. 60. 
753 Schwarzkopf, “Medienwende”, p. 30 with further remarks. 
754 H.-J. Weiß, “Nachgesehen: Politische Publizistik in privaten Fernsehvollprogrammen” [Scrutinized: 
Political journalism in private national TV channels] ALM (ed.), Fernsehen in Deutschland. 2008 
[Television in Germany] (2009) 62, at p. 62-63. 
755 U. M. Krüger and T. Zapf-Schramm, “Politikthematisierung und Alltagskultivierung im 
Infoangebot” [Political themes in information programmes], 4 Media Perspektiven (2009) 201, at p. 
218-219. 
756 Kiefer, “20 Jahre”, p. 558 with further remarks. Krüger, “Entwicklungen des Politikangebots im 
Fernsehprogramm” [Developments of political information programmes in television channels], in C.-
M. Ridder, W. R. Langenbucher, U. Saxer and C. Steininger (eds) Bausteine einer Theorie des 
öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks [Components of a theory on public service broadcasting] (2005)  252, 
at p. 268. See also with a critical appraisal: Weiß, “Nachgesehen”, p. 64-65. 
757 The Council of Europe has postulated this development in a recent recommendation: 
Recommendation Rec(2007)3 of the Committee of Ministers to the member states on the remit of 
public service media in the information society, 31/01/2007, available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1089759 (last visited on 12/10/2010). 
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Private Broadcasters, led to very detailed legislation and self-regulating guidelines 
(also referred to as online concepts) for the Internet activities of public service 
broadcasters. This regulation basically constrains the online services of public service 
broadcasters in certain areas. In a complex procedure called the three step test, 
involving mainly broadcasting operators and the broadcasting councils, the operators 
prepare their online concept focusing particularly on the basic guidelines laid down in 
the law.758 These prescribe, among other things, that online services must be 
prompted by journalistic or editorial work, meet the democratic or cultural needs of 
the society and contribute qualitatively to journalistic competition. These content 
prescriptions are the background for the online concepts (so called telemedia 
concepts), in which each public service broadcaster has to describe what it wants to 
place online and how this meets the legal requirements.759 Shortly afterwards all 
broadcasting councils adopted the relevant online concept for each public service 
broadcasting corporation, triggering the reaction of the Association of German 
Magazine Publishers which claimed that these concepts threatened the balanced 
system of private and public service media.760  
 
4.3 Convergence and the relationship of Internet and traditional media 
The whole system is facing a challenge posed by new media services via the Internet 
regarding the technical aspects of media services and legal developments. As for the 
technical convergence, it can be observed that newspapers offer online versions of 
their papers in the Internet. Private broadcasters maintain their own websites with 
programmes and offer additional services such as video-on-demand. Public service 
broadcasters transmit their programmes - partly - via the Internet as live stream. 
Finally, private blogs gain more and more influence. As described above, these 
developments have also influenced the media law. The question arises, however, 
whether the existing differentiation of outlets (print media, broadcasting and online 
services) in the applicable law still meets the media’s needs. As this legal area 
develops very fast, it seems impossible to predict whether the differentiated legal 
system will prevail or the basic and decisive definitions will be revised.761 
 Some issues regarding the relationship between Internet services and 
traditional media, however, can already be mentioned. Currently, publishers assert 
they do not make profits with their online services. While some resort to paid content 
(such as Hamburger Abendblatt) or the online donation system Flattr (such as die 
tageszeitung), the publishers’ organisation together with the journalists’ union follows 
an additional policy strategy, seeking to convince the Federal Government to amend 
the existing intellectual property law and oblige any search engine that cites an online 
version of a newspaper or any commercial or professional reader of such a website to 
sign a contract in advance and pay for the service. Critics argue that this would 
impede the free flow of information and could commercialise single words or phrases 
unduly. As the drafted protection clause would cover very short sentences or even 
short phrases, common sayings or even single words could no longer be used without 
                                                 
758 Art. 11 d) and 11 f) Interstate Broadcasting Treaty.  
759 See as an example: WDR, “Telemedienkonzept für das Internetangebot des WDR, 2010”. 
760 Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger, “Absage an ein ausbalanciertes, faires System” [Rejection 
of a balanced, fair System], 24/06/2010, available at: http://www.firmenpresse.de/pdf-
pressinfo216387.pdf (last visited on 12/10/2010). 
761 See in this regard the illustrative article: C. Möllers, “Pressefreiheit im Internet”, 03 AfP (2008) 241. 
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paying for them, once included in a newspaper online. It is unclear, at this moment, 
under which circumstances and with which amendments such protection clause will 
be introduced into the intellectual property law. The existing draft, however, seems 
impractical and exemplifies the connections between commercialisation and control 
of content. 
 
4.4 The democratic potential of the Internet 
The Internet provides a democratic space in which new forms of participation can 
evolve.762 Firstly, due to its decentralised structure and the still existing access 
neutrality, it seems much more difficult to influence, let alone, control the stream of 
information. Secondly, organisations, be it political parties or independent non-
governmental organisations, are no longer necessarily major actors shaping political 
developments.763 It is not yet clear, whether Internet based participation will replace 
traditional forms of political participation and how it will shape forms of governing. 
However, the evolving participative tools seem to point in the direction of a 
complementing form of political participation with the potential to alter basic 
structures.764 Thirdly, the access via the Internet to credible information allows 
individuals to partake in democratic processes differently, especially on local or 
regional matters. Much more information than before can be diffused via the Internet 
and this is much easier to access than printed information on a similar scale. This 
development poses the question as to whether complementary decision structures will 
come into place to alter the common understanding of representative democratic 
processes.765 
However, these possibilities are faced with challenges posed by private 
companies and state authorities. The technical advancements to a certain degree 
threaten access neutrality or Internet neutrality. Internet providers like the large 
telecommunication networks can establish different speed standards or quality classes. 
If a company wants to use a faster transmission of contents, additional fees shall be 
paid. This development may even lead to cooperation between large Internet 
providers and companies such Google, essentially creating their own Internet and thus 
shaping users’ online consumption significantly and presumably based on market 
interests. Such developments would, however, question the intrinsic character of the 
                                                 
762 See for instance C. Leggewie and C. Bieber, “Demokratie 2.0 - Wie tragen neue Medien zur 
demokratischen Erneuerung bei?” [Democracy 2.0. How can new media services foster a democratic 
renewal?], in C. Offe (ed.), Demokratisierung der Demokratie - Diagnosen und Reformvorschläge 
[Democratisation of democracy – diagnosis and reform suggestions] (2003) 124. With a more critical 
appraisal: T. Meyer, “Gewöhnung an die Mediokratie?” [Customisation to mediocracy?], 190 vorgänge 
(2010) 92, at p. 98-99; B. Witte, K. Rautenberg and C. Auer, “Marketing statt Mitmach-Netz? Web 
2.0-Nutzung von Bremer Parteien und Medien” [Marketing instead of participation], in J. Wolling, M. 
Seifert and M. Emmer (eds), Politik 2.0? [Politics 2.0] (2010), 241. See for instance the conference of 
the political foundation Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, “Citizen 2.0: Gesellschaftliche Teilhabe im Netz kein 
Selbstläufer” [Citizen 2.0: Societal Participation in the Web does not work automatically], available at: 
http://www.boell.de/demokratie/foerderung/demokratiefoerderung-citizen20-digitale-gesellschaft-
demokratie-partizipation-9124.html (last visited on 14/10/2010). 
763 See for this J. Hoff and H. K. Hansen, “Conclusion - perspectives on politics and democracy”, in J. 
Hoff and H. K. Hansen (eds), Digital governance:// Networked societies (2006) 329. 
764 This is endorsed by O. Winkel, “Electronic Government und politische Beteiligung” [Electronic 
government and political participation], in S. Brink and H. A. Wolff (eds), Gemeinwohl und 
Verantwortung [Public weal and responsibility] (2004) 811, at p. 827. 
765 Hoff and Hansen, “Conclusion - perspectives on politics and democracy”, p. 330. 
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Internet, which lies in the opportunity that everybody with Internet access and a 
contract with a provider can publish and access contents. This means that, within the 
legal framework, any actual or legal person can transmit its own online programmes 
(such as films) or blogs. The European Commission grants technical developments of 
broadband optical networks an important place in the next decade and stresses the 
importance of equal access to such optical networks.766 This does not directly concern 
the Internet neutrality discussed here, but points to the civil engineering infrastructure 
that forms the backbone of the Internet. Furthermore, technical data-gathering tools 
render the Internet prone to inappropriate data-retention mechanisms by state 
authorities and low or almost no data-protection provisions compelling state 
authorities and private companies threaten the right to privacy.  
If the communicative prospects of the Internet concerning democratic 
participation will actually flourish depends also on the attitude of its users. It is 
asserted for instance that online users do not necessarily participate in political forums 
and that it is mainly the existing media operators who provide politically relevant 
information content.767 The websites of, for example, public service or private 
broadcasters tend to be viewed in preference to unknown blogs. If this hypothesis is 
true, the possible effects of receiving information from different sources would be 
diminished. 
Another aspect must also be highlighted. Typically, one either knows the exact 
URL of the site one is seeking, one uses Twitter or other online information services, 
or one seeks information with the help of search engines. Most Internet activity in 
Germany involves the use of search engines to receive information on a certain topic. 
The estimated market share of Google in this is some 90%.768 Taking into account the 
typical user behaviour of only scrolling the first pages with hits, the listing executed 
by Google determines to a great portion what information is imparted and thus shapes 
opinion. Furthermore, Google can edit the ranking websites on their own account and 
exclude thus basically content provided. Critics are however legitimately more 
concerned with data-protection provisions,769 as Google stores all search requests and 
filters them to create a user profile.770 Those refined data are then employed to create 
tailored search results or advertisements.771 The influential position of search engines 
and the possible misuse of such data have prompted experts to think about the 
regulation of search engines.772 Others, however, cannot discern a severe problem773 
                                                 
766 European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 20.9.2010 on regulated access to Next 
Generation Access Networks (NGA), C(2010) 6223 final, Annex II. 
767 Neuberger and Lobigs, Die Bedeutung des Internets, p. 37, p. 41ff. 
768 B. Danckert and F. J. Mayer, “Die vorherrschende Meinungsmacht von Google” [The predominant 
opinion power of Google], 4 MMR (2010) 219, available at: 
http://www.webhits.de/deutsch/index.shtml?web (last visited on 6/08/2010), at p. 219. 
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gesucht hast...” [Protection of user log files in search engines], Multimedia und Recht (2009) 448, at p. 
448f.; T. Weichert, “Datenschutz bei Suchmaschinen” [Data protection in serch engines], in D. 
Lewandowski (ed.), Handbuch Internet-Suchmaschinen [Handbook Internet search engines] (2009) 
285. 
770 See for technical details only Ott, “Nutzerdaten”, p. 450ff. 
771 S. Meyer, “Aktuelle Rechtsentwicklungen bei Suchmaschinen im Jahre 2009” [Legal developments 
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and espouse the idea of transparency criteria of search engines to enable users an 
appraisal of the search results.774 The questions of search engines’ market dominance, 
influential position on journalistic research work,775 and information administration 
are not resolved and form part of an ongoing discussion in Germany. The European 
Union is most likely to act in this regard, if new rules will be adopted. Interestingly, 
the European Union data protection body “Article 29 Data Protection Working Party” 
assumes that Google, Yahoo and Microsoft did not comply with data protection 
rules.776 
 
4.5 Media and manipulation 
Different forms of critical media influence ranging from undue impact to deliberate 
targeted manipulation can be observed in the German media, which has been the 
subject of research attention.777 Firstly, the media system is perceived as a political 
actor itself and no longer as an observer or interpreter of political events.778 Seen as 
political actors, media outlets can lose their credibility, as they do not inform 
impartially but instead try to influence political decisions intentionally. This has 
happened before in federal elections in the form of implicitly or explicitly postulated 
election endorsements.779 Media outlets have also advanced open and, it is assumed, 
intentional political positions in debates.780 Moreover, the whole interaction of media 
                                                                                                                                            
(2007), at p. 13-14; S. Ott, “Marktbeherrschende und öffentlich-rechtliche Suchmaschinen” [Marktet 
dominant and public service search engines], 7 Kommunikation & Recht (2007) 375, at p. 377-379; W. 
Schulz, T. Held and A. Laudien, Suchmaschinen als Gatekeeper in der öffentlichen Kommunikation 
[Search engines as gatekeeper for public discourse] (2005), p. 111ff., p. 119. 
773 J. Kühling, “Internetsuchmaschinen als Hüter des Wissens? Tatsächliche Probleme für den freien 
Informationszugang und rechtlicher Handlungsbedarf” [Internet search engines as knowledge 
keepers?], in G. F. Schuppert and A. Voßkuhle (eds), Governance von und durch Wissen [Governance 
through knowledge] (2008) 202, at p. 214. 
774 J. Kühling and N. Gauß, “Suchmaschinen - eine Gefahr für den Informationszugang und die 
Informationsvielfalt?” [Search engines – a threat to access to information?], ZUM (2007) 881, at p. 
888-889. 
775 Discussed for instance with regard to journalists’ investigations see the summary published under: 
“Internet-Suchmaschinen ‘kein Ersatz für primäre Recherche’” [Internet search engines, no 
replacement for original inquiry], in: epd medien 53 (2006), p. 20-21.  
776 European Commission, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “EU data protection group says 
Google, Microsoft and Yahoo! do not comply with data protection rules”, 26/05/2010. 
777 As for visualisation of politicians: M. Maurer, “Der Einfluss verbaler und visueller Informationen 
auf die Urteilsbildung über Politiker” [Influence of verbal and visual information in forming an opinion 
about politicians], in C. Schemer, W. Wirth and C. Wünsch (eds), Politische Kommunikation: 
Wahrnehmung, Verarbeitung, Wirkung [Political communication: perception, process, and effect] 
(2010) 53, at p. 66. See also the documentation of the high level conference: T. Leif (ed.), 
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Wahrheit nicht mehr öffentlich wird [Hush, lies and camouflage. When truth is no longer made public] 
(2008), available at: http://www.mainzermediendisput.de/index.php (last visited on 14/10/2010). 
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and the democratic system is analysed to ascertain to what degree the process of 
democratic decision-making is unduly influenced by the laws of media coverage.781 
As the concept of differentiated interdependencies points out,782 journalists and 
politicians may act in an interdependent relationship that can influence, depending on 
their respective positions, either the media coverage or the work of the politician. 
Another aspect was highlighted regarding media concentration and the potential 
actual manipulative influence of a media oligopoly.783 It is assumed that media 
concentration acts to the detriment of opinion pluralism.784 While the possible skewed 
results of media coverage stem from internal factors, external interests also can lead to 
partial and sometimes manipulative coverage. Another form of manipulation can be 
seen in intentionally agenda-setting mechanisms in both directions: to place 
something into the public discussion785 and, contrariwise, to prevent a subject from 
becoming a topic786 or to omit information. 
It seems, nevertheless, that whilst manipulation of media outlets is not a 
structural, endemic problem in Germany, it does occur and cannot be denied. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Currently, the main structure of the media system constitutes of a dual broadcasting 
regime with nine different state broadcasting corporations and many private 
broadcasting operators. Private publishing companies provide a wide range of print 
media outlets and magazines, implicating over 300 different papers with a circulation 
of 22 millions dailies and Sunday editions per working day. Despite these numbers, 
critical developments of media concentration can be observed. Furthermore, all 
traditional media operators provide websites and maintain different offers online. 
Finally, the digital developments and the convergence of media shape the media 
landscape significantly.787 
Besides these structural characteristics, several main aspects of current media 
policy can be discerned. Private broadcasting companies and associations sought to 
restrict the online activities of public service broadcasters through a state aid 
                                                 
781 P. Baugut and M.-T. Grundler, Politische (Nicht-)Öffentlichkeit in der Mediendemokratie. Eine 
Analyse der Beziehungen zwischen Politikern und Journalisten in Berlin [Political (non-)publicity in 
the media democracy] (2009), p. 173ff.; P. Donges and O. Jarren, Politische Kommunikation in der 
Mediengesellschaft [Political communication in the media democracy] (2006), p. 279-286 with further 
remarks. See also T. Meyer, Mediokratie [Mediocracy] (2001), p. 85ff.; T. Meyer, “Mediokratie - Auf 
dem Weg in eine andere Demokratie?” [Mediocracy – on the road to another democracy?], B 15 - 
16/2002 Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (2002) 7, at p. 8-11. The term political communication is used 
in this regard. See for further clarification of this term: Donges and Jarren, Politische Kommunikation, 
at p. 20-22. 
782 Baugut and Grundler, Mediendemokratie, p. 345. 
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concentration], B 12-13/2004 Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (2004) 3, at p. 5. 
784 Meier, “Medienkonzentration”, p. 4. 
785 See only M. Maurer, Agenda-setting (2010), at p. 86 with further information on empirical studies. 
786 Initiative Nachrichtenaufklärung, “Top-Themen 2009”, available at: 
http://www.nachrichtenaufklaerung.de/index.php?id=190 (last visited on 9/08/2010); Ver.di, “Weiße 
Flecken im Journalismus” [White spots in journalism], available at: 
http://mmm.verdi.de/archiv/2010/01-02/journalismus/weise-flecken-im-journalismus (last visited on 
9/08/2010). 
787 See only ZAK, Kommission für Zulassung und Aufsicht der Landesmedienanstalten (ed.), 
Digitalisierungsbericht 2009 [Report on digital developments] (2009). 
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complaint with the European Commission, because of the likely development that 
Internet television and radio will become core means of media transmissions. While 
this procedure has so far led to a confined online framework for public service 
broadcasters that is additionally subject to regular supervision by the broadcasting 
councils, this might only be an intermediary step. In the long run, it is very likely that 
private broadcasters and other private media companies will seek to contest the 
existing financing regime, at least aiming to reduce the services of public service 
broadcasters to some basic functions or to participate themselves in fee revenue.  
Another interesting and also concerning development can be seen in the 
discussion on Internet neutrality. Existing network providers in Germany support the 
idea of additional fees for specific services, usually those that are most demanding of 
data. This kind of traffic shaping questions, however, the core principle of the whole 
Internet. The demand of private publishers to alter the current intellectual property 
law to give them a specific protection right for mainly press outlets is linked to the 
same question of how to make more profit with the Internet.  
More organisational questions could be discerned regarding the public service 
broadcaster organs and the State Authorities in supervising private broadcasting. 
Firstly, the question of whether broadcasting councils work efficaciously in order to 
fulfil the supervision task demands further attention. Secondly, the influential position 
of state representatives and political parties mentioned here merits a deeper analysis. 
Taking the supervision of private broadcasters into account, the question has to be 
raised as to whether the responsible State Authorities fully implement the existing 
provisions. Furthermore, it is very likely that state governments and state lawmakers 
will revise and alter the existing programme supervision currently comprising joint 
bodies and fourteen Media State Authorities. Whether a single, autonomously 
working body will be vested with a more sufficient structure and a more efficacious 
remit and discretionary power must also be addressed. 
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The case of Greece 
Dia Anagnostou, Evangelia Psychogiopoulou and Anna Kandyla 
 
1. Introduction 
The development of the media in Greece has been inseparably linked to the country’s 
political system and the various social and economic interests that are represented in 
it. Throughout the 20th century, the Greek press became a pre-eminent field of 
political antagonism, with newspapers tied to different active political parties or 
opposition forces. In the post-World War II period, the dominance of the right in 
Greek politics and the exclusion of the left were also reflected in the press through the 
banning of left-leaning newspapers. The transition from a military regime to 
democracy in 1974 put an end to the censorship of political views that were critical of 
the government, and restored fundamental rights, including freedom of expression. 
Yet, the partisan character of the press, although starting to decline, continued to 
significantly define a large number of newspapers. This phenomenon is specific to the 
clientilistic nature of political relations broadly prevailing in South Europe.788  
Generally, the evolution of the Greek media has been subject to strong 
politicisation and its regulation has been characterised by haphazard policy attempts 
carried out by successive governments from the 1980s until the present. The degree 
and nature of the interconnections between the political system and the media in 
Greece have substantially transformed over time, as the political dynamics and 
economic conditions changed along with the possibilities opened by technological 
advancements. Exploring the specific characteristics of the media in Greece and the 
policies that have been adopted to regulate them, must first place the media in the 
country’s political, economic and social context. By doing so, the purpose of this 
report is to depict the emergence of the legal and regulatory framework defining the 
Greek media, and then identify the main factors that have shaped it. What are the 
policies pertaining to the media and is there a coherent set of provisions and 
government interventions that can be seen to make up “media policy”?   
Following the fall of the junta, the Greek media, comprising of the press, state 
radio and television, exhibited continuity with a number of features that had been 
acquired under the semi-democratic and authoritarian governments of the post-war 
period. At the same time, democratisation created the preconditions necessary for 
reducing state intervention in the media, in addition to enhancing its diversity and 
independence. First of all, public radio and television were released from the tight 
control of the colonels. Nonetheless, they remained under the directorship of the state 
and they continued to serve as a means for the centre-right governing party, New 
Democracy (ND), to project its views and gain support from the public. What made 
this possible was that the state completely financed and controlled the state television 
channels by appointing or dismissing directors who were thought to be in favour of 
the government or against it, respectively.789 
                                                 
788 D.C. Hallin and S. Papathanassopoulos, “Political clientilism and the media: Southern Europe and 
Latin America in comparative perspective”, 24 Media, Culture and Society (2002) 175, at p. 176-177. 
789 It is notable that the government changed the Director General of national television on average 
every twelve months. See S. Papathanassopoulos, “The politics and the effects of the deregulation of 
the Greek television”, 12 European Journal of Communication (1997) 360, at p. 364.    
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In juxtaposition to the government-controlled television and newspapers 
supporting the centre right government, a number of newspapers were closely 
associated with the left and centre-left opposition parties. They served as a medium 
for those parties to promote their views and influence upon voters. In the second half 
of the 1970s, an unprecedented shift of readership from the newspapers of the right to 
those supporting the centre and the centre-left mirrored the imminent reconstitution of 
the electoral power of the main political parties.790 It culminated with the landslide 
victory of the socialist party of PASOK that came to power in 1981. In this light, 
while the end of censorship allowed the press to become more diverse and 
independent, these two qualities were compromised by the fact that many newspapers 
still served as the mouthpiece of particular political parties.791  
Although state intervention in the media declined following the democratic 
transition, it was far from actually ending. The state’s ability to intervene was shaped 
by the fact that it continued to provide newspapers with extensive financial benefits, 
such as tax exemptions and loans.792 Such assistance was vital for the survival of 
newspapers that were for most part published by small or medium-sized enterprises, 
which were not profitable enough to sustain themselves on their own. Dating back to 
the pre-junta period, such dependency of the press on state support had enabled the 
government to effectively direct its views upon publishers and decide what was “fit to 
print”. In turn, though, this dependency also allowed publishers to exert influence 
over government policies.  
The transition to democracy and the emergence of various social movements 
at its aftermath challenged the overwhelming power that publishers had and forced 
them to somewhat diversify their views and newspaper content.793 Still, both the 
state’s control over public television and the alignment of most newspapers with 
political party views continued unabated, if not intensified, in the early 1980s. 
Eventually, they thoroughly restricted the ability of social actors who were not 
attached to a political party to influence the views and content of the media.794 The 
overall weakness of a non-politically affiliated civil society has also been evidenced 
in the sphere of journalism, which did not develop as an autonomous profession. The 
ability of journalists to represent themselves as an independent social group and to 
enforce journalism ethics through self-regulation have been undermined by 
conflicting partisan ties.  
In the 1980s, the international trend towards liberalisation and Greece’s 
membership in the European Economic Community, combined with important 
domestic developments, undermined state monopoly over the audiovisual sector.795 It 
was clear that the drive to establish a common market where goods, services, persons 
and capital could circulate unhindered would not allow state monopoly of radio and 
                                                 
790 M. Komninou, “O rolos twn MME stin triti dimokratia 1974-1994” [The role of the media in the 
third republic 1974-1994], in C. Lyrintzis et al. (eds), Koinonia kai Politiki [Society and politics] 
(1996) 219, at p. 230. 
791 For a detailed discussion, see S. Papathanassopoulos, “The decline of newspapers: the case of the 
Greek press’, 2 Journalism Studies (2001) 109.  
792 Komninou, “O rolos twn MME”, p. 231; A. Skamnakis, “Mesa mazikis epikoinwnias kai politiki 
eksousia stin Ellada” [The media and political power in Greece], Oi ekselikseis ston chwro twn meswn 
epikoinwnias [Developments in the media] (2009) 109, at p. 113-114. 
793 Skamnakis, “Mesa mazikis epikoinwnias”, p. 113. 
794 Komninou, “O rolos twn MME”, p. 233-235. 
795 S. Papathanassopoulos, “Broadcasting, politics and the state in socialist Greece”, 12 Media, Culture 
and Society (1990) 387, at p. 392. 
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television to persist much longer. At the same time, liberalisation was the result of a 
domestic political and economic crisis in the second half of the 1980s. The eruption of 
a major scandal that involved the press and the government (the so-called 
“Koskotas”scandal), the general climate of discontent with the socialist government, 
but also the inability to elect a new one (it took 3 rounds of elections in 1989-1990 to 
do so), were all signs of a growing disillusionment with the political system.796 The 
demand for liberalisation of Greek broadcasting went hand in hand with a quest for its 
autonomisation from political partisanship and state tutelage.  
Compounded by major economic difficulties, the political crisis contributed to 
bolstering the demands and pressures from the centre-right opposition forces, 
publishers and business interests to be granted licences for private radio and TV 
channels. Following the 1986 elections that returned the socialists to power (though 
their electoral power was substantially reduced), direct action on the part of the 
mayors of Athens and Thessaloniki, who were from the opposition, and who started to 
transmit programmes received from the satellite channels, led to the establishment of 
the first private radio stations.797 The first private television channels were also 
created alongside state broadcasting. Similarly, the intermeshing between political 
parties and newspapers progressively weakened with the economic crisis of the 1980s, 
which paved the way for a more commercial orientation and the expansion of 
advertising as a source of revenue. Despite its small dimension in terms of size and 
population, the Greek market has a large number of media outlets both in the print and 
the audiovisual sectors. This multifaceted and densely filled media landscape is 
described in the first section of this report.  
Since the 1980s, the commercial shift in orientation was marked by the entry 
of business entrepreneurs in the press, who together with established publishers, were 
also the first to expand their activities in the deregulated audiovisual sector.798 From 
the late 1980s onwards, the commercial shift in the press and the deregulation of the 
audiovisual media in Greece further undermined state intervention in the media and 
the ability of the government and other political forces to direct information and 
influence the content of news. They did not, however, bring an end to the multiple 
dependencies and interconnections between the various media outlets on the one 
hand, and the government and the large political parties on the other.  
Instead, the attempts of the political class to influence the media moved to the 
legislative and regulatory processes, as well as to the process of granting licences to 
private media outlets. Successive governments have used the latter to favour, or 
conversely disadvantage, radio and television channels, which they consider to be 
friendly or critically predisposed to them, respectively. As a result of the political 
favouritism driving the process of licensing, and with successive governments 
showing preference for particular media outlets, the granting of licences is still 
pending to this day. It is an astounding (and possibly rarely encountered elsewhere) 
phenomenon that nearly all private television channels with analogue transmission 
operate without proper licences, and have done so since deregulation in the late 
1980s. The failure of successive governments to accomplish the licensing process has 
been part and parcel of a legal and regulatory framework comprising norms and 
provisions that lack underlying strategic and policy goals, they are often contradictory 
                                                 
796 Komninou, “O rolos twn MME”, p. 236. 
797 Papathanassopoulos, “Broadcasting, politics and the state”, p. 393. 
798 Papathanassopoulos, “The politics and the effects of the deregulation”, p. 360. 
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and apparently unenforceable. An overview and analysis of the legal and regulatory 
frame is provided in the second part of this report. The final part of the report assesses 
the conduct of Greek media policy and examines its effects on democratic politics. 
  
2. The media landscape in Greece 
Despite the continuous decline in circulation figures, especially since the broadcasting 
deregulation in the late 1980s, Greece has an extremely large number of newspapers. 
In 2009 there were 76 national newspapers and around 420 local/regional newspapers, 
though many of them are not viable in economic terms.799 Athens-based nationally 
circulated political dailies have suffered the greatest losses in terms of sales. The 
advent of free newspapers and online media in the early 2000s intensified the decline 
of paid circulation, resulting in decreasing profits from advertising. The Sunday press 
on the other hand remains strong and has managed, over the same period, to increase 
its sales considerably. Despite their declining revenues or their loss of ability to be 
profitable, many newspapers are sustained through funds from other economic 
activities of their owners. They are maintained because of their perceived capacity to 
influence public opinion, and are thus used to exercise political pressure for the 
benefit of other business interests rather than as a profitable business venture.  
Meanwhile, the Greek print media is supported by considerable indirect state 
subsidies in the form of distribution subsidies, reduced value added tax, preferential 
rates for telecommunications services and lower social security contributions.800 The 
policy of indirect subsidies contributes to the sustainability of smaller circulation 
newspapers and can be justified on the basis of support for the right of freedom of 
information and media pluralism, especially in relation to the geography of the 
country. State advertising is another staple source of finance for Greek newspapers. 
An array of criteria has been established for its “fair” distribution,801 also in support of 
the regional press. However, doubt still exists as to whether these criteria are actually 
fully respected.802 In addition, Greek governments have displayed remarkable 
lenience towards the debts accrued by major publishers towards the state (e.g. debts to 
the national social security system), raising even more questions about the role of the 
state and the media houses’ independence from it.803 
Since liberalisation in 1989, Greece has a dual broadcasting system. There are 
currently 4 public TV channels and around 130 private channels, 8 of which are of 
                                                 
799 39 of the national newspapers were daily, 14 weekly newspapers and 23 Sunday newspapers. 
Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association, “Statistical information on newspaper circulation”, 
available at: http://www.eihea.gr/default_gr.htm (last visited on 23/7/2010).  
800 For example, approximately 40,000 million euro in annual press distribution subsidies are granted to 
around 3,500 titles. See Secretariat General for Communication-Secretariat General for Information, 
“Diakinisi tou typou” [Circulation of the press], available at: 
http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/aeroporiki_diakinisi-2.pdf (last visited on 23/7/2010).   
801 See Presidential Decree 261/1997, “Transparency in government and wider public sector advertising 
in the print and electronic media”, FEK A’ 186/1997, as amended by Law 3688/2008, FEK A’ 
163/2008, and Law 3548/2007, “Public bodies advertising in the regional and local press and other 
provisions”, FEK A’ 68/2007. 
802 The previous government of New Democracy that spent 83 million euro for advertising in the press 
only, has been alleged to have manipulated the distribution of state advertising by rewarding friendly 
outlets with government spots. See “I kratiki diafimisi sti xwra twn thaumatwn” [Public advertising in 
wonderland], Eleftherotypia, 26/10/2008. 
803 See “Fesi 90 ekat. euro apo ta MME sta tamia” [Media’s debt of 90 million euro to social security 
funds], Kathimerini, 30/10/2008. 
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national range and offer free-to-air analogue television services under some kind of 
provisional licence.804 In regards to the radio, there are 24 public stations and about 
960 in private (or municipal) ownership that have some kind of permission to air.805 
Most of them are entertainment-oriented. Cable television is virtually non-existent 
due to poor infrastructure. In 2006, however, IPTV (Internet Protocol Television) was 
introduced and there are currently 4 IPTV service providers in operation. Pay-TV 
began in 1998 but, for reasons related to the balance of power in the analogue-TV 
market, did not manage to establish a significant presence.806  
Deregulation of the audiovisual sector was a watershed in so far as it paved the 
way for a fundamental restructuring of existing ownership patterns from small and 
medium-sized enterprises to large conglomerates and business-like ventures, which 
also extended to the traditional press. Despite the existence of restrictive provisions 
(which are subsequently discussed in detail), a high degree of concentration has 
prevailed, particularly with respect to the media of national range: 6 publishers own 
the biggest nationally circulated newspapers, many magazines, a handful of broadcast 
media, as well as press distribution agencies.807  
Public radio and television are run by the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation 
(ERT). ERT currently operates 5 television stations, 2 of which are of national 
coverage, 1 worldwide satellite broadcast and 24 radio stations. ERT’s profile has not 
changed much since 1987 when it became legally “autonomous” from the state. The 
government still controls ERT’s Managing Board by appointing the majority of its 
members. Moreover, the Board changes every time the administration changes, 
reflecting the limited development of a truly “public service” broadcaster in Greece. 
In addition, ERT was not prepared to compete with the private broadcasting sector 
and able to keep up with its evolution. As a result, the major private television 
channels have enjoyed a dominant position over public broadcasting in terms of 
audience and advertising share. These are solely funded by advertising while ERT 
receives income mainly through a mandatory licence fee imposed on every electricity 
bill, state subsidies and to a lesser extent, by advertising. Despite the multiple sources 
of funding it enjoys, ERT has accumulated a sizeable deficit. In fact, due to its high 
operating costs and ineffective business plans, ERT has never managed to avoid cost 
overruns.808  
Greece is currently under digital switchover. Since 2006, ERT is active in 
digital terrestrial television without any subscription cost. In 2009, a second digital 
                                                 
804 See Secretariat General for Communication-Secretariat General for Information, “Tileoptikoi 
Stathmoi perifereiakoi-topikoi [Television channels regional local], available at: 
http://www.minpress.gr/minpress/index/mme_gr/list_tvlocal.htm (last visited on 23/7/2010).  
805 See National Council for Radio and Television, “Adeiodotithentes R/T stathmoi” [Licenced R/T 
channels], available at: http://www.esr.gr/arxeion-
xml/pages/esr/esrSite/view?section=e5f2cfb3c0aa1e7683571826e98263e5&categ=00bc3beed0871e76
83571826e98263e5&last_clicked_id= (last visited on 23/7/2010). 
806 Currently Multichoice Hellas (Nova) is the only pay-TV provider. See S. Papathanassopoulos, “The 
development of digital television in Greece”, 14 Javnost - The Public (2007) 93, at p. 96-102. 
807 These are the Lambrakis Press Group, the Pegasus Group (owned by the Bobolas family with 
interests in construction), Tegopoulos A.E., Kathimerini-Skai (owned by the Alafouzos family with 
interests in shipping), the Vardinogiannis family (with interests in energy) and the Ant1 Group (owned 
by Minos Kyriakou with interests in telecommunications).  
808 See indicatively, “Isologismos ERT A.E. 2009” [ERT A.E.’s 2009 balance sheet], available at: 
http://www.ert.gr/keep/anakoinoseis/isologismos-ert-ae-2009.htm (last visited on 27/3/2010), and “Sok 
kai deos apo ta kratikodiaita MME” [Shock and awe from the state-dependent media], Imerisia 
31/01/2010.  
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provider (DIGEA) was established by the seven major private television channels, in 
order to undertake the digital transmission of their programmes and those of any other 
station that would choose to use its services. Digital Union is the third provider set-up 
by 16 local and regional television stations. Currently digital TV services are partly 
available in major Greek cities. Full digital transition is expected to be finalised in 
2012, but concerns have been expressed as to whether it will be completed on time 
due to insufficient legal preparations, as will be demonstrated below.  
During the past few years, the importance of the internet has significantly 
grown in the domestic media market.809 Most print media outlets provide some or all 
of their content on the internet, free of charge, and many also offer breaking news in a 
timelier manner. While the sales figures of national newspapers have been declining, 
web traffic reports reveal that their online versions are becoming extremely popular 
among Greek internet users.810 Nevertheless, major national newspapers’ websites are 
mainly built upon their print versions and offer significantly low levels of interactivity 
to their users, showing that online journalism culture is still in its infancy.811 Few 
news portals that do not have a print counterpart exist. Among them, the ones that 
enjoy significant popularity are those that belong to prominent publishing groups 
which own print newspapers too.812 Additionally, all major national private television 
channels and the public broadcaster offer both audiovisual and written news services 
on their websites for free.  
The Greeks seem to have embraced social media services. One notable 
example of the use of social media in Greece, especially among teenagers and young 
adults, has been their use as a communication tool for the organisation of the major 
riots and protests, as well as for the relay of the events that took place in December 
2008.813 International and Greek media then used that information for their own 
reporting. According to a study commissioned by the Institute of Communication,814 
facebook was the most popular service in 2008. As to blogs, more than half of internet 
users visited blogs frequently, mainly for news and information, but only 10% owned 
their own blog.  Although online content production in the form of blogging is 
                                                 
809 Internet use in Greece was at 42.4% of the population in the first trimester of 2009, showing an 
average annual growth rate of 17.4% since 2005, but with significant variation among different age 
groups and between lower- and higher-educated users. See Hellenic Statistical Authority, “Ereuva 
xrisis texnologiwn pliroforisis kai epikoinwnias apo ta noikokuria” [Research on the use of information 
and communication technologies by households], available at: 
http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/A1901/PressReleases/A1901_SFA20_DT_
AN_00_2009_01_F_GR.pdf (last visited on 23/7/2010).  
810 See “Top sites in Greece”, available at: http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries;0/GR (last visited 
on 23/7/2010).  
811 L. Spyridou and A. Veglis, “Exploring structural interactivity in online newspapers: a look at the 
Greek web landscape”, 13 First Monday (2008), available at: 
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/2164/1960 (last visited on 23/7/2010).   
812 In.gr and Pathfinder.gr of Lambrakis Press Group are the most popular portals. 
813 See “Protesters rule the web in internet backwater Greece”, Reuters, 18/12/2008, available at: 
http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2008/12/18/protesters-rule-the-web-in-internet-backwater-greece/ (last 
visited on 23/7/2010). 
814 88.2% of internet users made use of some social media service(s) at least once a month in 2008. 
Among 18-34 year-olds the share of social media users was even higher. See Institute of 
Communication, “Social media research”, available at:  http://drop.io/ioc2009/asset/ioc-social-media-
research-pdf (last visited on 23/7/2010).  
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gaining ground, administering a blog is still an activity largely confined to a certain 
demographic profile.815  
News agencies act as sources of information and from this perspective are 
important for pluralism of output. In Greece, however, there is only one leading 
national news provider, the Athens News Agency-Macedonian Press Agency (ANA-
MPA), which is state owned.816 Nearly all newspapers are subscribers of ANA-MPA, 
so it can be regarded as the primary source of news information.817 ANA-MPA 
represents the international voice of Greece and collaborates with many international 
news agencies. It receives income through subscriptions and other commercial 
services, advertising and state subsidies, yet, it has accumulated a sizeable debt.818  
Journalists’ working conditions merit attention to the degree that they can 
have an impact on journalists’ professional autonomy. However, up until this day, 
there is no official data available on the exact number and profile of journalists in 
Greece. Data from journalists’ trade unions are not disclosed. Even if they were 
disclosed, they would not have been reliable since not all journalists are affiliated with 
trade unions. This is mainly attributed to the peculiarities of journalists’ work status 
and employment conditions, which do not usually match the requirements for union 
membership. Moreover, journalism as a profession has never been regulated and no 
formal licence is required to qualify for the profession.  
According to an independent study, the estimated number of journalists in 
Greece, including “related” professions, was around 17,000 in the period 2003-
2004.819 According to the same study, 63% of journalists declared having relevant 
theoretical training, despite the fact that journalists in Greece, contrary to most 
qualified occupations, are not required to follow a certain formal course of study. 
Concerning working conditions, the study reveals that many journalists experience 
financial insecurity due to lack of definition of their occupational status and low 
wages. It is notable that half of the sample reported working more than one jobs. This 
figure also includes journalists who are employed in the press offices of public 
institutions and media enterprises in parallel.820  
At this point it should be noted that despite the long history of the press and 
the advancement of electronic media, Greece has a low media literacy development. 
According to a study commissioned by the European Commission, media literacy 
                                                 
815 Blog owners are usually highly educated males between 26 and 45 years old of centre-left political 
ideology. See in this respect, “I politiki koultoura twn blog” [The political culture of blogs], 43 
Monthly Review (2008), available at: 
http://www.monthlyreview.gr/antilogos/greek/periodiko/arxeio/article_fullstory_html?obj_path=docrep
/docs/arthra/MR47_erevna_FS/gr/html/index (last visited on 23/7/2010).  
816 ANA-MPA is under the supervision of the Minister of Culture and Tourism. The Minister appoints 
4 out of the 9 members of its Board of Directors, supervises the legality of its decisions, and has the 
ability to request a financial audit.  
817 Other regional news agencies (e.g. the Cretian News Agency, the North Aegean News Agency, and 
the Peloponnesian News Agency) are complementary sources. 
818 See “Sok kai deos”, Imerisia. 
819 VPRC Public Opinion Institute, “I domi tou dimosiografikou epaggelmatos’ [The structure of the 
profession of journalism], available at: http://www.vernardakis.gr/uplmed/33_press.pdf (last visited on 
23/7/2010).  
820 According to Article 5 of the 1998 Code of conduct of the Panhellenic Federation of Journalists’ 
Unions, the latter is “accepted”, unless it challenges journalists’ professional integrity and 
independence. 
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levels in the country are estimated lower than the EU average.821 The concept of 
media education has not been sufficiently explored and there are no state institutions 
devoted to media education, nor concrete integration of media education in school 
curriculums. Media literacy initiatives are fragmentary, coming mainly from 
independent actors, such as Safenet, which is the self-regulatory body for internet 
content, and the Hellenic Audiovisual Institute.  
 
3. Media policy in Greece 
Since the late 1980s, when the Greek audiovisual market was liberalised, a series of 
legislative acts have been adopted as part of the state’s media policy to regulate the 
domestic media market. Successive governments, each one with its own agenda and 
media favourites, have sought to dictate the conditions of electronic media 
performance. One legal act has followed the other, leading to an overregulated and 
extremely detailed, albeit complex, legal framework. By contrast, the press, 
traditionally recognised as a bulwark for democracy, has not been heavily regulated. It 
has only be subject to general applicable laws, relating to such matters as defamation, 
privacy and the protection of public security and public order, limited regulation 
regarding ownership structures and self-regulation.  
Aware of the need to codify Greek media legislation, an ad hoc working group of the 
National Council for Radio and Television (NCRT), the independent authority which 
is primarily charged with media rules enforcement, has recently produced a report, 
suggesting 2/3 of national media-related legislation to be revoked, modified or 
simplified.822 The following sections seek to present and explain the Greek regulatory 
framework for the media, placing it in the socio-political context in which it has 
emerged and currently operates. The analysis focuses on both structural and content 
regulation, following a brief discussion of the major actors involved in media policy-
making and the constitutional provisions that govern the process.  
 
3.1 Actors of media policy and regulation  
Contrary to the press, whose freedom is explicitly recognised by the Greek 
Constitution (as will be explained in more detail below), radio and television are 
under the “direct control of the state”.823 One significant characteristic of the Greek 
regulatory regime is that since the liberalisation of the broadcasting market, 
competences for the regulation of the sector have regularly been transferred from one 
state body to the other without any substantial planning. This has resulted in the 
fragmentation of regulatory duties, an array of bureaucratic procedures and deficient 
coordination between actors, which has unavoidably undermined institutional stability 
for the formulation of a concrete media policy with clear objectives and aims.  
One notable example is the evolution of what is now the Secretariat General of 
Communication-Secretariat General of Information (SGC-SGI), the body that is 
                                                 
821 European Commission, Directorate General Information Society and Media, “Study on assessment 
criteria for media literacy levels”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/media_literacy/docs/studies/eavi_study_assess_crit_media_lit_levels_euro
pe_finrep.pdf (last visited on 23/7/2010).   
822 See “Rizikes allages sti radiotileoptiki nomothesia eisigountai meli tou ESR” [Proposals for radical 
changes in radio and TV legislation by members of the NCRT], Eleftherotypia, 20/4/2010. 
823 Art. 15(2) of the Greek Constitution. 
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primarily responsible for media affairs. Introduced in 1974, it functioned as the 
General Directorate for Press and Information,824 until 1994, when a proper ministry 
was established, the Ministry of Press and Mass Media. Ten years later, in 2004, the 
ministry was dissolved and two General Secretariats were created to incorporate its 
activities, both transferred to the Ministry of Interior (MI) in 2008. Through a variety 
of acts, the MI retained supervision over the functions of the SGI and transferred the 
monitoring of others to other ministries, such as the Ministry of Culture.825 It remains 
to be seen whether a clear-cut plan for the reformulation of media policy lies behind 
the described re-allocation of competences. At present, such restructuring can only be 
interpreted as part of the broader attempts of the incumbent government, the socialist 
party PASOK, to reorganise the public sector.  
The SGC-SGI collaborates with the Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and 
Networks, the body responsible for planning and implementing national 
telecommunications policy and promoting the information society. Cooperation 
between the two has intensified during the last couple of years on account of the much 
awaited passage to digital terrestrial broadcasting.   
The Greek National Council for Radio and Television (NCRT), an 
independent body since the constitutional revision of 2001, is the Greek 
administrative authority which has exclusive competence for the control of the 
broadcast media. It was set up in 1989 and its initial responsibilities illustrated the 
wish of the political majority of the time to retain control of the newly liberated 
broadcasting sector. In fact, the NCRT was not granted substantial autonomy and its 
role remained mainly consultative, also regarding the “hot” topic of awarding licences 
for broadcasting, until 2000, when Law 2863/2000 upgraded its functions.826 The 
NCRT has the mandate to secure that public and private broadcasters comply with 
domestic legislation, and can impose administrative sanctions in case of violations. Its 
operation is under parliamentary control, and its decisions are subject to judicial 
scrutiny by the Council of State. 
The gradual expansion of the competences of the NCRT, especially following 
the 2001 constitutional revision, has not matched an equivalent increase in its 
resources. The effectiveness of NCRT’s activity is substantially hindered by the lack 
of personnel, outgrowing premises and insufficient information technology 
equipment,827 in addition to unwieldy bureaucratic mechanisms and limited 
coordination with other authorities, such as the National Telecommunications and 
Post Commission (NTPC) and the Hellenic Competition Committee (HCC). The 
NTPC is the authority responsible for the regulation, supervision and monitoring of 
electronic communications. In view of the digital switchover, its role has gained 
                                                 
824 Law 216/197, “On the establishment of the Ministry of the Presidency”, FEK A’ 367/1974.  
825 The Ministry of Culture was entrusted with the supervision of ANA-MPA, the supervision of public 
service media and the supervision of the National Audiovisual Archives. At the beginning of 2010, the 
duties of the SGI were bestowed to the Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister and currently also 
government spokesman. 
826 Law 2863/2000, “National Council for Radio and Television and other provisions”, FEK A’ 
262/2000. See R. Panagiotopoulou, “20 xronia ellinikis idiotikis tileorasis (1989-2009): enas 
apologismos” [The 20 years of Greek private television (1989-2009): an account], 10 Zitimata 
Epikoinwnias (2010), p. 13. 
827 See in this respect, National Council for Radio and Television, 2009 activity report, available at: 
http://www.esr.gr/arxeion-
xml/pages/esr/esrSite/list_docs?section=035516d6c0ab1e7683571826e98263e5&categ=716aa0d6d086
1e7683571826e98263e5&last_clicked_id=link6 (last visited on 23/7/2010). 
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importance, as it is responsible for the provision of general authorisations to operators 
providing electronic communication networks and/or services to content providers 
(i.e. broadcasters). The HCC, in turn, is the authority responsible inter alia for the 
application of competition rules in the media sector.828  
A variety of journalists’ organisations and other media industry organisations 
have been established in order to promote their professional and business interests, as 
well as to influence state action in the field of the media. There are currently five 
trade unions of journalists that are organised regionally. The Union of Journalists of 
Daily Newspapers of Athens (ESYEA) and the Union of Journalists of Daily 
Newspapers of Macedonia-Thrace (ESYEMTH) are among the most significant ones. 
Grouped under the Pan-Hellenic Federation of Journalists Unions (POESY), the 
principal aim of the unions is to represent, protect and defend the journalistic 
profession, which also involves negotiating collective work agreements for journalists 
with the state and the employers. In lieu of a press council for journalists’ self-
regulation, the unions are responsible for the supervision of journalists’ ethical 
performance. In order to enforce these ethical standards, various codes of conduct 
have been adopted and disciplinary councils have been created; however the 
effectiveness of the latter has been substantially challenged.829 
Greece does not have a strong tradition of civil society organisations with 
influential advocacy activity in the field of the media. Mention is only worth being 
made of the Hellenic League for Human Rights, an NGO devoted to human rights 
protection, which follows media coverage and monitors compliance with human 
rights, and the Greek Helsinki Monitor, which has been calling for increased access of 
minority groups to media outlets.830 Media research, on the other hand, is carried out 
by a variety of institutions and seeks to inform state media policy.831 However, the 
extent to which its findings actually feed into the process is difficult to discern. 
Overall, the design of national media policy is under the responsibility of 
governmental bodies and institutions, whose functions frequently change when a 
change in government or even in the government’s agenda occurs. The establishment 
of the NCRT as an independent (or quasi-independent) regulatory authority for the 
implementation and monitoring of broadcasting policy has not been associated with 
the necessary reforms that would have allowed it to effectively carry out its functions 
and be accountable. At the same time, the action of other authorities, such as the HCC 
and the NTPC, affects the media to a greater or lesser extent and thus contributes to 
the complex institutional mix that characterises the conduct of Greek media policy. 
Limited coordination amongst the actors involved, often combined with unclear 
mandates, creates confusion as to who is actually responsible for what. Journalists’ 
unions and other professional associations have a limited say in the formulation of 
state media policy, while the public, in the absence of a strong civil society, has 
hardly any chance to express its views on media issues.  
                                                 
828 Since the entry into force of Law 3592/2007, ‘Concentration and licensing of mass media 
enterprises and other provisions’ (FEK A’ 161/2007), the HCC has a specific department devoted to 
the media. 
829 ESYEA, “Ypenthimisi tou kwdika deontologias” [A reminder of the code of ethics], 15/06/2010, 
available at: http://www.esiea.gr/gr/index.html (last visited on 23/7/2010). 
830 Greek Helsinki Monitor, “Minorities and the media in Greece”, 3/8/2001, available at: 
http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/Minorities_of_Greece.html (last visited on 23/7/2010). 
831 Those include the Hellenic Audiovisual Institute that is supervised by the SGC-SGI, three 
university-based institutes, as well as independent research companies. 
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3.2 The media regulatory framework 
3.2.1 Constitutional provisions  
The Greek Constitution provides for freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 
Whereas paragraph 1 of Article 14 safeguards the individual right to freedom of 
expression, including through means such as the press, paragraph 2 recognises 
freedom of the press as an institutional guarantee (thesmiki eggyisi).832 When read 
together, they impose a duty of non-interference on the state, namely of abstinence 
from censorship and the adoption of preventive measures, and a positive obligation to 
create an enabling environment for a free press to flourish. Although Article 14(1) 
specifically refers to the press, it is by no means limited to it. Freedom of expression 
also applies to broadcasting and all other media, including through the internet.833 
However, according to Article 15(1), broadcasting does not enjoy the higher 
constitutional guarantees that have been afforded to the press.  
During the constitutional revision of 2001, proposals were put forward by the 
two main political parties, PASOK and Nea Dimokratia (ND), in order to extend the 
protective provisions for the press to audiovisual media; however they did not gather 
the necessary political support.834 Consequently, radio and television remain under the 
“direct control of the state”.835 Reflective of the paternalistic environment in which 
Greek media operate, the exercise of state control, which exceeds the concept of state 
supervision, is under the exclusive competence of the NCRT and regards both public 
and private broadcasting.  
Important changes brought about by the 2001 revision are the constitutional 
recognition of freedom of information and of the right to participate in the 
information society (Article 5A),836 the constitutional safeguarding of the right of 
reply (Article 14(5)),837 and the introduction of two public duties imposed on 
broadcasters, namely the obligation to cover free of charge the sessions of Parliament 
and of its committees, and the electoral addresses of the political parties (Article 
15(2)). The 2001 constitutional revision also resulted in the modification of Article 
57(1)(c), rendering incompatible the duties of member of Parliament and those of 
owner/manager of an enterprise that either publishes a newspaper of country-wide 
circulation or engages in radio and television broadcasting.  
Undoubtedly, the most hotly debated amendment of the 2001 constitutional 
revision was that of Article 14(9), which deals with media ownership, transparency 
and pluralism. The provision formed the object of extensive discussion in Parliament, 
                                                 
832 P.D. Dagtoglou, Typos kai Syntagma [The Press and the Constitution] (1989), p. 31. 
833 I. Karakwstas, Dikaio kai internet [The law and the internet] (2009), p. 41-43. 
834 G. Kiki, H eleutheria twn optikoakoustikwn meswn [Freedom of audiovisual media] (2003), p. 110 
et seq. 
835 Art. 15(2) of the Greek Constitution.  
836 Restrictions on freedom of information may be imposed, provided they are necessary and justified 
by reasons of national security, combating crime and protecting the rights and interests of others. The 
right to participate in the information society creates an obligation for the state to facilitate access to 
electronically handled information, as well as to the production, exchange and diffusion thereof, in 
observance of Articles 9, 9A and 19 of the Constitution regarding the inviolability of one’s private and 
family life, the protection of personal data and freedom of correspondence and communication. 
837 According to Article 14(5), every person offended by an inaccurate publication or broadcast has the 
right to reply. The information medium has a corresponding obligation for full and immediate 
retraction. In the case of offenses by an insulting or defamatory publication or broadcast, the media are 
obliged to ensure immediate publication or transmission of the reply. The manner in which the right of 
reply is exercised is specified by law. 
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and was modified after having secured an impressive majority.838 It determines that 
“the ownership status, the financial condition and the financing means of information 
media shall be disclosed, as specified by law”, and mandates national legislation to 
designate “the measures and restrictions necessary for fully ensuring transparency and 
plurality in information”. The provision prohibits concentration of control of more 
information media of the same type or of different types, as well as concentration of 
more than one electronic media (i.e. radio and television) of the same type. A crucial 
point is that it also prohibits holding the capacity of owner, partner, main shareholder 
or management executive of both an information media enterprise and an enterprise 
that enters into public sector contracts, for the provision of works, supplies and 
services. The scope of application of this prohibition is extended to “all types of 
intercalated persons, such as spouses, relatives, financially dependent persons or 
companies”. Domestic legislation must set out the specific regulations and the 
sanctions to be imposed in case of non compliance. 
A series of provisions of a suppressive nature remains in the Greek 
Constitution which date back to the 1952 Constitution. Article 14(3) allows for the 
seizure of newspapers and other publications after circulation by order of the public 
prosecutor.839 Greek courts may also order the temporary suspension or definitive ban 
of a publication, and prohibit the practice of the profession of journalism.840 In fact, 
according to Article 14(8), the conditions and qualifications requisite for the practice 
of the profession of journalist are to be specified by law.841  
The Greek constitutional provisions relating to free speech and the media are 
complemented by the European Convention on Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Greece has signed and ratified. 
Domestic authorities are bound by their respective Articles 10 and 19 on freedom of 
expression and freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas. The state is 
also obliged to respect Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (EU) when implementing EU law. In 2009, the Freedom House 
Index rated the media in Greece as “free”, with a total score of 29 points, zero (0) 
being the best.842 Greece ranked above Italy and Turkey, holding the 23rd position out 
of 25 Western European countries.  
 
 
 
                                                 
838 265 out of 280 present Parliamentarians voted in favour of the amended provision. See E. 
Venizelos, ‘Oi eggyiseis tis polifwnias kai diafaneias sta MME kata to arthro 14 par. 9’ [The 
guarantees for pluralism and transparency in the media according to Article 14(9)], Nomiko Bima 
(2005) 425, at p. 430.  
839 Seizure of printed material may occur in case of: a) an offence against the Christian or any other 
known religion, b) an insult against the person of the President of the Republic, c) a publication which 
discloses information on the composition, equipment and set-up of the armed forces or the 
fortifications of the country, or a publication which aims at the violent overthrow of the regime or 
which is directed against the territorial integrity of the state, and d) an obscene publication which is 
offensive to public decency, in the cases stipulated by law.  
840 Pursuant to Article 14(6), after at least three convictions within five years for the criminal acts 
mentioned above, domestic courts may take such a decision.  
841 Note however that the provision was never put into practice.  
842 Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having “free” media. See Freedom House, Freedom of the 
press 2009, Press freedom rankings by region, available at: 
http://freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop09/FoP2009_Regional_Rankings.pdf (last visited on 23/7/2010).  
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3.2.2 Structural regulation 
Structural regulation of the Greek media market has mainly focused on licensing and 
ownership matters. Contrary to the press, which is not subjected to licensing 
procedures in line with the constitutional recognition that the press is free, detailed 
rules have been adopted to regulate the licensing of television and radio stations, 
although they have remained “dead letters”. Restrictions on mono-media and cross-
media ownership, combined with competition analysis and legislative action aimed to 
prevent integration of the media industry with business actors that are active in biding 
for the award of public work contracts, have also been broadly imposed.  
 
3.2.2.1 Licensing rules  
The liberalisation of the radio and television market in the late 1980s inaugurated a 
period of regulatory uncertainty, initially due to the state’s inability to cope with the 
deregulation challenge and subsequently perpetuated as a means to keep the 
broadcasting media in check, influence their content and hopefully secure positive 
coverage.843 The absence of a clear regulatory framework for the licensing of 
broadcasting operators, which characterises the Greek media scene even nowadays, 
has facilitated the anarchic entry of private broadcasters in the market, thus creating 
and progressively consolidating an atypical relationship between the state and private 
media interests. This relationship is not only founded upon interdependencies, but 
also upon mutual unease.  
When the socialist party, PASOK, was in power, broadcasting deregulation 
commenced through the radio frequencies with Law 1730/1987.844 Presidential 
Decree 25/1988 determined the procedure to follow for the allocation of local radio 
broadcasting licences.845 It is reported that around 230 licences, that were valid for 2 
years each, were granted to applicants filing an application with the media department 
of the Ministry of the Presidency.846 The liberalisation of the television market took 
place by means of Law 1866/89.847 National legislation made arrangements for the 
provision of seven-year licences to television broadcasters by the Ministry of the 
Presidency and the Ministries of Interior, Finance, Transport and Communication. 
The absence of prompt implementing action induced numerous operators of local and 
national range to start broadcasting illegally. The first television licences were granted 
only four years later, in 1993, just before the national elections that maintained the 
socialist party in power. Law 2181/94, which was subsequently enacted in order to 
facilitate “experimental” broadcasting,848 resulted in widespread abuse that was 
tolerated by the state, leading to increased numbers of operators active on the market. 
                                                 
843 See D. Charalambis, “Eleutheria tis ekfrasis, plouralismos kai diafaneia sto xwro twn ilektronikwn 
MME – H elliniki empeiria” [Freedom of expression, pluralism and transparency in the field of 
electronic mass media – The Greek experience], in A.D. Tsevas (ed.), Diasfalisi tou plouralismou kai 
elegxos tis sygkentrwsis sta mesa enimerwsis [Safeguarding pluralism and controlling concentration in 
the information media] (2006) 129, at p. 131. 
844 Law 1730/87, “Hellenic Radio-Television Corporation (ERT - S.A)”, FEK A’ 145/1987. 
845 Presidential Decree 25/88, “Terms and conditions for the establishment of local radio stations”, FEK 
A’ 10/1988.  
846 Hellenic Audiovisual Institute, ‘Radio in Greece’ (2006), p. 83, available at: 
http://www.iom.gr/inst/iom/gallery/ekdoseis/ruthmistiko%20plaisio.pdf (last visited on 23/7/2010). 
847 Law 1866/1989, “Establishment of the National Council for Radio and Television and provision of 
licences for the establishment and operation of television channels”, FEK A’ 222/1989.  
848 Law 2181/1994, FEK A’ 10/1994. 
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The solution that ensued this chaotic situation was the adoption of Law 2328/1995 
which laid down detailed rules for radio and television licensing.849 The newly 
introduced Ministry of Press and Mass Media became competent for the provision of 
four-year licences on the basis of competitive tendering, and the NCRT was assigned 
with tender evaluation.   
Repeated attempts to licence the TV sector on the basis of the newly adopted 
law did not materialise. An invitation to tender for the licensing of private television 
broadcasters was published in 1998, but the procedure was annulled since no operator 
was found to comply with the requirements of the tender. In 2003, the NCRT, which 
in the meantime had become solely responsible for licensing the sector,850 published 
three calls for tender, addressing national, regional and local television broadcasters. 
However, it did not succeed in concluding the process: several requests for annulment 
lodged with the Council of State on account of the complexity of procedures thwarted 
its activity. As to the radio sector, licences were only granted to the stations 
established in the prefecture of Attiki.851 Incapable of rationalising the market, the 
Greek state recognised and prolonged the “legal” status of the TV operators that had 
participated in the 1998 tender and the radio stations, active on November 1st, 1999, 
by means of various acts. 
The new government that came into power in 2007, ND, sought to streamline 
the rules governing licensing procedures and prepare the ground for the much desired 
switchover to digital terrestrial broadcasting. On July 19th, 2007 a new statute entered 
into force, Law 3592/2007.852 According to the revised framework, licences for 
analogue, radio and television broadcasting should be granted by the NCRT, 
following publication of an inter-ministerial frequency chart and specifications 
brought by the competent ministry for the media regarding the range, number and 
type of licences available. Licences should be valid for six years and could be 
renewed once. They would be allocated after an evaluation of the tenders received on 
the basis of various criteria, including, amongst others, the applicants’ “legal” 
experience in broadcasting, their economic viability, the quality and diversity of their 
programming and the absence of sanctions imposed by the NCRT.853 The law 
provided for the licensing of TV operators of national and local reach and of radio 
operators of regional reach; however it did not deal with local radio stations.854  
Regarding digital terrestrial radio and television services, Law 3592/2007 
offered little guidance as to the procedures to follow. Not only did it not indicate a 
specific timeframe for the digital switchover; it also left a series of crucial issues to be 
decided at a later stage. Licensing procedures and assignment of frequencies should 
be regulated by means of a presidential decree. Three inter-ministerial decisions 
should, in turn, define a frequency chart for the broadcast of digital terrestrial signal, 
the number, type and reach of the licences to be granted and the cost for their award 
                                                 
849 Law 2328/1995, “Legal status of private television and local radio, the regulation of radio and 
television and other matters”, FEK A’ 159/1995. 
850 Art. 19(2) and (3), Law 3051/2002, “Constitutionally established authorities, amendments and 
supplements to the recruiting system for the public sector and related arrangements”, FEK A’ 
220/2002. 
851 20 licences were granted in 2001, and 15 in 2002. The latter were annulled by the Council of State.  
852 Law 3592/2007. 
853 In the case of sanctions, negative rating would apply. 
854 This might explain why merged operators or applicants intending to merge would be favoured in the 
assessment procedure.   
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and exploitation. Delays in the adoption of these instruments have significantly 
undermined progress to digital terrestrial transmission, which presently undergoes an 
experimental, transitional period, also governed by Law 3592/2007. It is indeed 
almost certain that the Greek state will not succeed in licensing TV operators wanting 
to transmit their programmes in digital terrestrial mode before 2012. As for radio, it 
has been confirmed that operators will continue to transmit in analogue mode after 
2012.855 
Accounting for the above has mainly been the interruption and postponement 
of the preparation of the acts that are required for the start of the licensing process, 
due to the 2009 change in government and the coming into power of the social party 
PASOK. The presidential decree that is necessary for the organisation of the licensing 
procedure has not been issued yet, despite the fact that a first draft was prepared by 
ex-government, ND. The issuance of the frequency chart has also proven problematic. 
On August 20th, 2008, ND published a frequency chart, produced by the National 
Technical University of Athens, which determined the frequencies on which the 
existing television stations could digitally transmit their programmes.856 The chart did 
not deal with the so-called “digital dividend”, namely the reduction in the amount of 
radio spectrum required to deliver terrestrial TV services when the transmission 
technology will be definitely migrated from analogue to digital and the use of the 
released spectrum.857 The issue has turned into a key topic for the Greek digital 
switchover, as telecom and broadcasting operators compete fiercely for the allocation 
of the released frequencies.858 A new frequency chart will thus be produced, but only 
recently has the Greek state decided to commission a study in order to examine what 
the optimum use of the released frequencies could be.859  
Interestingly, the operators which have provisionally entered the digital 
terrestrial market are the public service broadcaster, ERT, and the private broadcasters 
of national range. No operator active at the regional or local level has started to 
broadcast digitally, despite the fact that many of them have had the quality of their 
programmes checked for that purpose by the NCRT, in line with the transitional 
provisions of Law 3592/2007.860 The considerable investment that is needed for 
digital transmission might thwart the ability of regional operators to enter the market, 
with serious implications for democratic politics. The position of local operators is 
even more uncertain, as no legal provision exists for local digital TV stations 
following the definite passage to digital terrestrial broadcasting.861 Moreover, market 
entry for new “comers” has been completely obstructed, as Law 3592/2007 has only 
                                                 
855 See the minutes of the Greek Parliament Special Permanent Committee on Institutions and 
Transparency, 20/4/2010.   
856 KYA 21161/2008, “Formulation of the frequency chart for the switchover to digital terrestrial 
television”, FEK A’ 1680/2008. 
857 The reduction arises from the ability for digital technology to deliver a greater number of TV 
stations in a given amount of spectrum bandwidth, compared to analogue. 
858 The digital dividend can be used to support a number of innovative services, including non-
broadcast services, such as mobile broadband communications, and new broadcast services, for 
instance high-definition TV. 
859 See the minutes of the Greek Parliament Special Permanent Committee on Institutions and 
Transparency. 
860 National Council for Radio and television, 2008 activity report, available at: 
http://www.esr.gr/arxeion-
xml/pages/esr/esrSite/list_docs?section=035516d6c0ab1e7683571826e98263e5&categ=716aa0d6d086
1e7683571826e98263e5&last_clicked_id=link6 (last visited on 23/7/2010), at p. 15-16. 
861 Art. 13(3) of Law 3592/2007. 
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allowed those operators that are considered to operate “legally” in Greece to make use 
of its transitional provisions.862 This could lead to a de facto foreclosure of the market, 
once the passage is completed. Long-established media players have been given the 
possibility to lead the digital revolution and consolidate their position in the digital 
arena. 
 
3.2.2.2 Ownership rules 
Greek media ownership rules have undergone significant changes over the years and 
have been subject to much debate in governmental platforms. Law 1866/1989 has 
been at the heart of moves to ensure the state’s stranglehold on the media.863 In an 
effort to appease owners of the print media that were willing to expand their activities 
in the field of broadcasting but at the same time prevent the emergence of powerful 
media conglomerates, Law 1866/1989 made provision for the granting of television 
licences to operators that were “solvent” and “trustworthy”, under the condition that 
shareholding in television companies did not exceed 25% of the company’s capital. 
Compliance was limited, and Law 2328/1995 introduced more restrictive rules,864 
prohibiting participation in no more than two types of media (i.e. television, radio and 
newspapers). The ‘two out of three’ model was supplemented by provisions 
precluding ownership of more than one TV and radio station and press ownership 
restrictions.865 Shareholding in a television enterprise was kept to a maximum of 25% 
of the company’s capital and a similar ceiling was introduced for foreign ownership in 
electronic media.  
The latest version of Greek mono-media and cross-media ownership 
provisions can be found in Law 3592/2007, which, distinguishes between electronic 
media (i.e. radio and television) and print media (i.e. newspapers and magazines). 
Ownership of an electronic media undertaking is permitted up to 100% but 
concentration of electronic media of the same type is prohibited.866 Ownership of 
electronic media does not preclude ownership of print media, yet it must not lead to 
                                                 
862 Art. 14(1)-(2) of Law 3592/2007. 
863 See P. Dimitropoulos, “Oi rythmistikes epembaseis tou kratous sti radiotileorasi” [The regulatory 
interventions of the state in broadcasting], in Oi ekselikseis sto xwro twn meswn epikoinwnias, 115, at 
p. 122-123. 
864 See Charalambis, “Eleutheria tis ekfrasis”, p. 136-137.  
865 Law 2328/95 determined that a natural or legal person and his/her relatives, deprived of business 
and financial autonomy up to the fourth degree, could own or participate in only: a) two daily political 
newspapers issued in Athens, Piraeus or Thessaloniki (a morning and an afternoon one); b) one daily 
financial newspaper and one daily sports newspaper issued in Athens, Piraeus or Thessaloniki; c) two 
daily and two non-daily provincial newspapers issued in different regions; and d) one Sunday 
publication. 
866 Article 1, read together with Article 3 of Law 3592/2007, defines concentration as the control 
enjoyed by a natural or legal person over more than one electronic media of the same type, that is, the 
exercise of substantive influence over media management and operation. Enjoying the capacity of 
owner, executive director, manager or member of the board of directors in more than one electronic 
media automatically denotes control. This is also the case with partners and shareholders which: a) 
hold at least 1% of the capital of more than one electronic media and figure amongst the ten most 
important partners or shareholders of the media concerned in terms of shares or voting rights; b) enjoy 
the right to appoint at least one member of the board of directors of the media involved. Media control 
can also be established via “intermediaries” (i.e. spouses, relatives, other intermediary persons and 
companies), provided that “unfair influence”, determined by a final judicial decision, is exercised over 
media management to the detriment of “pluralism, the objective provision, on equal terms, of 
information and competition”. 
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concentration in the media market. No particular press ownership restrictions apply, 
as is also the case with foreign media ownership.   
Law 3592/2007 discloses a notable shift of state policy towards a less 
restrictive approach to media ownership. Ownership rules have been considerably 
relaxed, both as regards mono-media and cross-media ownership. Ownership of more 
than one media of the same type is allowed, press ownership restrictions and the “two 
out of three” rule have been abolished, and no restrictions on media shareholding are 
imposed. Such softening of the rules has hardly been an endorsement of a free market 
paradigm; the intention was rather to legalise the problematic status quo. Disturbing 
signs that the 1995 provisions were utterly ignored and circumvented induced the 
Greek state to amend ownership legislation. To evade the restrictive provisions of the 
1995 act, media owners had broadly used intermediary persons and undertakings in 
order to expand their activity and gain control of various media outlets. Through Law 
3592/2007, the state recognised its failing policy and sanctioned the actual 
configuration of media ownership structures in the country. 
Whereas Law 3592/2007 amounted to a clear victory of private media 
interests, a more robust line was taken in relation to what became known as the “main 
shareholder” issue, that is, the enactment of rules against investment in and 
management of both media enterprises and enterprises that engage in public work 
contracts. Following the amendment of Article 14(9) of the Constitution in 2001, Law 
3021/2002 prohibited holding the status of owner, main shareholder or administrator 
of both a media undertaking and an undertaking entering into public contracts, and 
defined the concept of “main shareholder” as the natural or legal person which 
represents at least 5% of the total capital share of a media undertaking or holds 5% of 
the voting rights. The incompatibility was extended to “intermediaries” (i.e. spouses, 
relatives and other companies), unless these could prove their financial independence. 
Before issuing acceptance of a tender for the award of a public contract and in any 
event, before signature of the contract, the administration should apply to the NCRT 
and request a “transparency” certificate. To facilitate such a task, the NCRT was 
charged with keeping detailed records of media undertakings and their ownership 
structure. 
Law 3021/2002 was largely criticised by the then opposition party, ND, which 
argued for widening the concept of “main shareholder” and accused the government 
of PASOK for mitigating the effects of the prohibition. In adopting Law 3310/2005 
three years later, ND toughened the scope of the provisions.867 The party reduced the 
percentage of capital shares and voting rights to 1%, introduced an irrefutable 
presumption that relatives are by definition “intermediaries” and forbade shareholding 
of media undertakings by offshore companies. Additionally, it mandated the NCRT to 
maintain records of the undertakings concluding public contracts, together with the 
records kept on media enterprises.  
The amended legal framework was met with much concern and was deemed to 
be unconstitutional and in conflict with EU law.868 It was also perceived as a 
concealed attempt on the part of the government to favour specific media 
undertakings and disadvantage others through careful drafting of rules that only in 
                                                 
867 Law 3310/2005, “Measures to ensure transparency and avoid violations during public procurement 
procedure”, FEK A’ 30/2005.  
868 V.G. Tzemos, “O ‘basikos metochos’ kai to Syntagma” [The ‘main shareholder’ and the 
Constitution], 4 DIMME (2005) 533, at p. 537-538 
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appearance were neutral and enforceable.869 The modified legislation also caught the 
attention of the European Commission, which sent a reasoned opinion to the Greek 
government, questioning the compatibility of both Law 3021/2002 and Law 
3310/2005 with primary and secondary EU law.870 Following unfruitful attempts to 
justify the adopted provisions, the Greek government was forced to suspend Law 
3310/2005 and modify it via Law 3414/2005.871 The latter determined that media 
activity and engagement in sectors that bid for public work contracts would only be 
incompatible, should an irreversible judgment on corruption be issued against the 
media enterprise concerned. The European Commission remained unimpressed by the 
changes made and urged the Greek state to comply with EU rules; in default, the case 
would be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ).  
Eventually, it was the Council of State which resorted to the ECJ for 
guidance.872 The case originated in a dispute, referred for a preliminary ruling, 
concerning the interpretation of Council Directive 93/37/ECC on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public contracts,873 in light of the constitutional provision 
of Article 14(9) and its former implementing statute, Law 3021/2002.874 Completely 
disregarding the constitutional dimension of the case,875 the ECJ ruled in Michaniki 
that Member States enjoy discretion to maintain or adopt rules designed to ensure in 
the field of public procurement observance of the principle of equal treatment and 
transparency, and to protect media pluralism and independence. Moving however to 
examine the proportionality of the national measure, the Court ruled that Greek 
legislation went beyond what was necessary to achieve the claimed objectives. 
Domestic rules excluded an entire category of public work contractors “on the basis 
of an irrebuttable presumption that the presence among the tenderers of a contractor 
who is also involved in the media sector is necessarily such as to impair competition 
to the detriment of other tenderers”.876 The Court felt that the disproportionate nature 
of the Greek legislation was also evident in the very broad meaning of the concepts of 
“main shareholder” and “intermediaries”. Determined to settle for good issues of 
potential conflict with EU law, in 2007, the Greek state adopted an inter-ministerial 
decision (KYA 20977/2007), which practically rendered inapplicable the provisions 
concerning the delivery of “transparency” certificates by the NCRT. Law 3592/2007 
did not introduce any new provisions on the issue, and the matter was closed.       
 
 
                                                 
869 N. Alivizatos, “O basikos metochos kai oi afaneis kyvernitikes epidiwkseis” [The main shareholder 
and the obscure objectives of the government], Ta Nea, 10/1/2005.  
870 See in detail, S. Papathanassopoulos, H tileorasi ston 21o aiwna [TV in the 21st century] (2005), p. 
314-315.  
871 Law 3414/2005, “Amendment of Law 3310/2005, Measures to ensure transparency and prevent 
abuse in public procurement”, FEK A’ 279/2005. 
872 ECJ, Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, Ipourgos Epikratias, 
available at: www.curia.eu.int. 
873 Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the 
award of public contracts, OJ L 199, 9/8/1993, p. 53, as amended by European Parliament and Council 
Directive 97/52/EC of 13 October 1997, OJ L 328, 28/11/1997, p. 1.     
874 Council of State, judgment no. 3670/2006.  
875 On this see V. Kosta, ‘Case note: European Court of Justice, Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v. 
Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, Ipourgos Epikratias’, 5 European Constitutional Law Review 
(2009) 501.  
876 ECJ, C-213/07, para. 63.  
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3.2.2.3 Competition rules 
Competition law, often justified as maximising consumer choice via better quality 
products or products at better prices, can make a sufficient contribution to a varied 
media offering by guaranteeing an undistorted media market. The Greek competition 
rules enjoy a specific media component. Law 3592/2007 has complemented Law 
703/1977,877 the general Greek competition act, by laying down specific provisions on 
the notion of dominant position and concentration of companies in the media sector. 
Concentration is forbidden when one or more of the media undertakings concerned 
enjoy a dominant position or a dominant position is the result of the concentration 
itself. Specific notification requirements apply and precise “dominance thresholds” 
are established, ranging from 25% to 35%, depending on the number of the media 
markets involved. The abuse of a dominant position is prohibited.  
Although the aforementioned provisions illustrate a certain level of state 
sensitivity in the area, in light of the importance of the media for democracy and their 
contribution to public debate and an informed citizenry, it has been argued that the 
Greek state should have prohibited dominant position per se, not just its abuse.878 
Scholars have also drew attention to the fact that the exclusive use of economic 
criteria for the establishment of a dominant position, based on advertising expenditure 
and sales income, is inappropriate.879 They have claimed that the assessment of 
whether a media enterprise enjoys a dominant position in the market or not must also 
be based on criteria related to the influence it exerts on the public, usually reflected in 
audience shares. Article 4(10) of Law 3592/2007 stipulates that viewership, audience 
and readership measurements, carried out by private not-for-profit enterprises, must 
be communicated to the Hellenic Competition Commission on a monthly basis, so 
that the latter can take them into account. However, the law remains silent as to the 
weight that must be ascribed to such measurements, and emphasises in Article 3(4) 
the following criteria for the assessment of the establishment of a dominant position: 
advertising expenditure and sales income for the press, and advertising expenditure 
and revenues from the sale of programmes and other audiovisual services for the 
electronic media. The endorsement of a pure economic approach, coupled with the 
fact that concentration control follows and does not precede operators’ merging plans, 
could substantially undermine the ability of competition law and policy to support 
citizen access to a wide range of media outlets and voices. 
 
3.2.3 Content regulation  
A variety of legal provisions along with self-regulatory measures aim to regulate the 
content of the information supplied by the press and audiovisual media operators and 
ensure that they meet a level of quality, and standards of completeness and 
versatility.880 Content requirements also define when and how much time media 
                                                 
877 Law 703/1977, “On the control of monopolies and oligopolies, and on the protection of free 
competition”, FEK A’ 278/1977. 
878 Charalambis, “Eleutheria tis ekfrasis”, p. 152. 
879 Dimitropoulos, “Oi rythmistikes epembaseis”, p. 123. 
880 Media operators must include news broadcasting along with programmes on art and culture, sports 
and light entertainment, programmes of social and educational content, and programmes that promote 
the correct use of Greek language and their teaching to foreigners, among others. See in particular Art. 
6(13) and 7(6) of Law 3592/2007.  
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operators should devote to advertising.881 The overarching goal of content 
requirements and the relevant regulatory measures is to cater to the right of citizens to 
receive information while at the same time ensuring political and cultural pluralism 
and demonstrating social sensitivity. The state is obliged to inform its citizens about 
the events of public life, and the media can criticise public figures, as long as such 
criticism is not in conflict with other rights and social goods. As is probably the case 
in other democratic countries, the right to be informed is recognised and given greater 
weight when it concerns information that is directly relevant for the formation of the 
public’s political opinion, i.e. when it concerns party financing, public order, 
management of public funds, etc.  
Reflecting a broader tendency in many countries, the regulation of the press 
differs fundamentally from that pertaining to audiovisual media, a distinction that is 
constitutionally drawn. For reasons that historically rendered the press a bastion of 
democratic expression against state arbitrariness, content regulation in the press is 
defined by self-regulatory codes of conduct. Journalists have historically rejected state 
intervention in issues concerning the objectivity and impartiality of information, 
which are instead considered to be a matter of social responsibility on the part of 
journalists.882 On the other hand, journalists’ behaviour and programme content in the 
audiovisual sector is subject to state regulation and control through laws and 
administrative acts. The broader tendency that recognises the necessity for television 
to be subject to greater state-imposed constraints in comparison to the press is 
justified by the greater power that it arguably exerts over a “captive audience” in its 
daily life.883  
State regulation of the audiovisual media does not exclude self-regulatory 
measures such as codes of conduct. All radio and TV stations applying for permit to 
the NCRT must also submit a code of conduct, with which they vow to comply. Such 
codes of conduct must be approved by the NCRT, which may also take them into 
account when exercising its supervisory functions. Some codes of conduct are also 
adopted as regular laws, and thus hold a greater power.884 Alternatively, their 
enforcement is the responsibility of internal Ethics Committees (Epitropes 
Deontologias) that national television channels must form.885 However, such 
committees have been inactive and they have not imposed any sanctions, as it is noted 
by the NCRT in its 2009 annual report.886 
The quality of programme must exhibit social sensitivity towards sections of 
the audience that are considered to be particularly vulnerable to the overpowering, but 
also potentially detrimental influence of audiovisual media, such as minors. For 
instance, it is stipulated that both public (ERT) and commercial TV stations are 
obliged to refrain from showing programmes that can seriously injure the physical, 
mental or moral development of minors. Deemed equally unacceptable is the 
                                                 
881 Art. 5(3) of Presidential Decree 100/2000, “Harmonisation of the Greek legislation for radio and 
television to the provisions of Directive 97/36 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 
30, 1997”, FEK Α’ 98/2000. 
882 Ch. Anthopoulos, “H aftorythmisi twn meswn pliroforisis” [The self-regulation of information 
media], 3-4 To Syntagma (1999) 467, at p. 448-449. 
883 Anthopoulos, “H aftorythmisi”, p. 454. 
884 This is the case for instance with the “Code of conduct for news broadcasting and other journalistic 
and political programmes”, Presidential Decree 77/2003, FEK A’ 75/2003. 
885 Art. 8 of Law 2863/2000. 
886 National Council for Radio and Television, 2009 activity report, at p. 24. 
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dramatised representation of news broadcasting, or the presentation of real acts of 
violence, that are unnecessary for informing the audience about a particular event.887 
In addition, television channels must refrain from showing programmes or providing 
information that provokes hatred on the basis of race, sex, religion or citizenship.888   
The quality of content depends on the correct use of Greek language, which all 
public and private radio stations and TV channels must respect. They are obliged to 
semi-annually organise a series of at least 15 programmes of thirty minutes each that 
aim to highlight the correct use of the Greek language, or teach it to foreigners and 
those who are illiterate.889 At the same time, public and commercial TV channels are 
also obliged to devote at least 51% of their total transmission time to European works, 
that is, works that originate in EU member states and other European countries that 
participate in the European convention for cross-border television of the Council of 
Europe.890 
Deregulation and the advent of private television and radio have no doubt 
expanded the openness, diversity and pluralism in the content of broadcasting in 
comparison to the past, including that of state television that has been forced to 
compete with private channels.891 At the same time, the continuous disregard for the 
rules of operation of TV stations and for existing codes of ethics, has led the 
government to augment the powers of the NCRT in order to regulate and control the 
content of audiovisual programmes.892 In the context of its reinforced mandate, the 
NCRT has issued numerous recommendations and decisions, as well as imposed 
sizeable fines to radio and TV operators that were deemed to violate the rules. 
However, the way in which the NCRT has performed its regulatory role as such has 
been heavily criticised for bordering on censorship, if not outright imposing it. It has 
made highly controversial and dubious value judgments, sanctioning with fines, 
programmes that violate certain rules, such as overly projecting homosexuality or 
demonstrating how the porn industry operates, for instance. 
Up until now, there has been an uncertainty regarding the legal norms to 
regulate the content of information transmitted through the internet, including through 
blogs. There has also been uncertainty regarding how to strike a balance between 
freedom of expression and other social values such as respect for the private life, 
honour or personality of others. In part, the content of information transmitted through 
the internet (i.e. books in electronic form, e-newspapers, e-magazines, etc.) is 
considered to fall under the provisions for the press (Article 14(1) Const.). Insofar, as 
it concerns audiovisual content on the internet though, it is covered by the provisions 
pertaining to the media (Article 15(1) Const.).893  
 
                                                 
887 For instance, it is prohibited to present minors who are witnesses, crime offenders, or victims of 
crime and accidents, and this can only be done as an exception and on the condition of parental 
consent. 
888 Art. 4(1) of Presidential Decree 100/2000. 
889 At least 25% of their programme (typically more than this) must include shows that are originally in 
Greek. See Art. 3(18)-(19) of Law 2328/1995. 
890 Art. 10(4) of Presidential Decree 100/2000. 
891 Papathanassopoulos, “The politics and the effects of the deregulation”, p. 361-362. 
892 Panagiotopoulou, “20 xronia”, p. 12-13.  
893 Karakwstas, Dikaio kai internet, p. 46-47. 
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3.2.3.1 Rules to ensure impartial and objective information 
News broadcasting and other journalistic and political programmes must ensure a 
level of quality that is in tune with the social mission of the audiovisual media and the 
cultural development in the country.1 Regulation of content is based on general 
principles, such as the right of journalists to freely convey the news in order to inform 
the public. Meanwhile, they have the obligation to do so in an appropriate manner. 
For instance, the presentation of facts must be accurate and as complete as possible, 
without creating confusion, exaggerated hope or panic for the audience.2 The 
information that is conveyed must be cross-checked and must have been legally 
obtained (i.e. interception or secret cameras are prohibited). The journalist has the 
right not to disclose his/her source. It is prohibited to impart confidential information 
or pictures that can be damaging for the country’s territorial integrity, defence and 
security. In a controversial provision that can be seen as a vestige of censorship, the 
law also stipulates that the country’s constitution and the legal order in general must 
be respected when journalists criticise particular laws or institutions.3 
A most vocal assertion of the press’ obligation to convey impartial and 
objective information is contained in the various codes of conduct adopted by Greek 
journalists.4 By defining information as a social good, and differentiating it from a 
commercial product or medium of propaganda, the Greek journalists’ code of conduct 
considers their primary mission to be the revealing of truth. Journalists must 
communicate the truth with accuracy, objectivity, and without prejudice, while 
investigating a priori the facts and refraining from distorting or withholding 
information about actual events.5 Journalists must also collect and cross-check the 
accuracy of their sources and received information with appropriate methods and 
always by making known their journalistic profession. Content-related obligations 
that self-bind journalists include: the obligation to treat equally all citizens without 
discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin, sex, race, religion, political conviction or 
social status, to respect the personality and private life of individuals and responsibly 
use information pertaining to their private life or public role. In addition, they must 
respect the presumption of innocence while an individual is facing trial in court, 
among others.6  
Echoing the historical role of the press as a bulwark against state arbitrariness, 
existing codes of conduct proclaim the duty of journalists to vigorously defend the 
democratic polity and his/her freedom not to convey inaccurate information under 
pressure by his/her employer, as well as to denounce state authoritarianism and the 
abuses on the part of media owners. Finally, journalists acknowledge their cultural 
mission by undertaking the responsibility to improve the journalistic language, 
avoiding grammatical or syntactical mistakes, as well as vulgar language, in order to 
“protect” the Greek language from the intrusion of foreign terms. Consequently, they 
                                                 
1 See Art. 15(2) of the Constitution. 
2 Art. 5 of Presidential Decree 77/2003. 
3 Ibid., Art. 8 and Art. 2. 
4 See the “Rules of conduct of the journalists’ profession”, which have been adopted by the Association 
of Editors of Daily Newspapers of Athens (ESYEA) and by the Panhellenic Federation of Greek 
Editors (POESY). A similar set of principles is contained in abridged form in the “Statement of rules of 
professional conduct of the International Federation of Journalists”, which has been adopted by the 
Greek Association of Correspondents of Foreign Press.  
5 Art. 1 of POESY Code of Conduct. 
6 Art. 2 of POESY Code of Conduct. 
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thereby contribute to the national tradition and cultural heritage.7 Most of the 
principles contained in the codes of conduct binding journalists in the press, are also 
reiterated in more condensed fashion in the code of conduct pertaining to the content 
of news broadcasting and political programmes in the audiovisual sector (both public 
and private). Reflecting the fact that journalism in the audiovisual sector is subject to 
stricter limitations,8 this last code of conduct takes the form of a regular law.9 
 
3.2.3.2 Criticism of public figures and the right to redress and reply 
The constitutionally protected right to express freely through the media is especially 
underscored when it comes to criticism of public and political figures, which is 
justified by the need to ensure democratic dialogue. Individuals, such as candidates 
for elections, members of parliament, etc., who participate in political discussions and 
controversies are particularly exposed to unfettered criticism. At the same time, 
freedom of expression is subject to a series of limitations and requirements aimed at 
balancing it against a variety of other rights and social goods, such as respect for 
human dignity, personal data, and the right to privacy. Greek legal and judicial 
doctrine does not a priori determine whether freedom of expression or protection 
against various kinds of insult, libel and private life intrusion by journalists, is 
paramount. Instead the limits of journalists’ criticism are determined on a case by case 
basis. Some of the criteria that are considered in such assessments are the nature of 
insult or libel (statement of facts as opposed to an opinion or normative judgment), 
the motives, and the consent of the individual, whom a disparaging view or article 
concerns, among others.10  
In both public and commercial television, existing laws stipulate that any kind 
of programme must respect the personality, honour and dignity, family life and all 
activities (professional, political, etc.) of any person who is depicted in it (i.e. his/her 
picture, name, or various information that indirectly refers to him/her).11 This 
requirement also applies to individuals who are depicted in news broadcasting or 
participate in political programmes. The views that they express must not be distorted, 
i.e. by partially reporting their answers or through the use of audiovisual techniques.12  
At the same time, a number of legal provisions recognise the right to seek 
redress for those individuals whose personality, private life or professional, political 
or other activity are offended, or his/her reputation and business interest are injured by 
a television or radio programme. Such a right is also accorded to political parties and 
their members, as well as any professional or trade union association, when its views 
are silenced or distorted in a way that they create a false impression among the 
audience. It can be exercised within a particular timeframe of 10 days through a 
written text or live presentation in the same programme.13  
 
                                                 
7 Art. 7 of POESY Code of Conduct. 
8 Anthopoulos, “H aftorythmisi”, p. 453. 
9 Presidential Decree 77/2003. 
10 For a detailed discussion, see I. Karakwstas, To Dikaio ton MME  [Media law] (2005), p. 250-285. 
11 Art. 3(1) of Law 2328/1995.  
12 Art. 9 of Presidential Decree 77/2003. 
13 Art. 9 of Presidential Decree 100/2000. If the TV or radio station turns down the request for redress, 
then it is forwarded to the NCRT, which must decide within 3 days, and its decision is binding for the 
radio or TV station. 
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3.2.3.3 Rules concerning political and cultural pluralism 
The audiovisual media provides a platform for political contest during pre-election 
periods. Legal norms foresee the transmission (free of charge or charged with lower 
rates) of political party messages during the pre-election periods. Messages by 
candidates running for national or local elections, however, are not allowed to be 
communicated.14 In the organisation of their programme as a whole, TV stations are 
obliged to respect and ensure political pluralism by equally enabling all political 
parties represented in the Greek and European parliaments to access their programme 
and transmit their messages to voters.15 During pre-election periods, the presentation 
of political topics and the broadcasting of relevant news must be done with 
moderation and clarity, and in compliance with the principles of plurality, equality 
and respect for the democratic processes. News and other programmes that convey 
information about protests or violent events occurring in pre-election gatherings must 
refrain from the use of techniques that give misleading impression of the facts, as well 
as from inflammatory slogans that incite people to participate in violent and illegal 
acts.16  
This prohibition, which was introduced three years ago, served to restrict the 
political content of the media to publicise the results of polls fifteen days prior to 
election day.17 Premised on the view that polls are an important component of the 
political dialogue as an assessment of experts about election results, legal scholars in 
Greece have criticised such prohibition as going against the right to freely impart 
information. Those advancing this view are not convinced by the argument that poll 
results may influence the voters’ preferences in an unfair or illicit manner, at least not 
more so than other kind of electoral assessments that are routinely made by 
commentators in the media. Given that the prohibition does not apply to the 
conducting of polls but only to publicising their findings, it does not prevent leaks and 
rumours, often intentionally spread by political party campaigners in order to 
influence public opinion and debate.18  
News broadcasting and other journalistic and political programmes must also 
refrain from depicting individuals in ways that reinforce discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, nationality, religion and disability, conveying messages that are xenophobic 
and sexist or expressing intolerant views that offend ethnic and religious minorities.19 
Similar restrictions also apply to the content of advertising that should not 
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion or citizenship, or insult 
religious and political convictions, among others.20 
 
3.2.3.4 Rules concerning content regulation on the internet 
Given that the legal rules regulating the press also apply to the e-versions of 
magazines and newspapers, any person who is offended by something published on 
                                                 
14 Art. 3(13) of Law 2328/1995, which was inserted in Art. 3(9) of Law 1866/1989.  
15 Art. 3(22) of Law 2328/1995. 
16 Art. 16 of Presidential Decree 77/2003. 
17 Art. 7(1)(a)(b) of Law 3603/2007. 
18 For such a critique, see S. Tsakyrakis, “Antisyntagmatiki i apagorefsi” [The prohibition is 
unconstitutional], Kathimerini, 26/8/2007.  
19 Art. 4 of Presidential Decree 77/2003. 
20 Art. 5(3) of Presidential Decree 100/2000. 
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the internet has the same rights as a person offended by content in the press.21 A clear 
distinction, though, is drawn here with social networking sites: a person is not entitled 
to the protection of his/her honour, reputation or private life in content transmitted 
through the internet in such sites (such as facebook) in which s/he voluntarily 
discloses personal information to a wide circle of internet users. In this case, by 
voluntarily participating in such networking, an individual a priori deprives 
himself/herself of such protection by having made private information available to 
public use and display.22 
Regarding blogs, the regulation of content in order to protect the honour, 
reputation, personality or private life of persons has not been fully settled in Greek 
legal and judicial doctrine. Such uncertainty is also evidenced in other countries. A 
relatively recent decision of a court of first instance in Greece drew a distinction 
between the electronic media (internet versions of newspapers, TV and radio 
broadcasting) and blogs, on the basis that the latter is an interactive medium of 
communication, the content of which is shaped not only by an editor or journalists but 
by all readers-internet users.23 At the same time, because there is lack of legal 
provisions that specifically refer to blogs, the same court decision applied the 
provisions that pertain to the press in order to establish the responsibility of the 
blogger for content that was libellous or detrimental to the honour or reputation of 
others.24  
On the other hand, a contrasting legal and judicial approach dwells on the 
distinctiveness of the blog as a medium of communication rather than a channel of 
information for the public, which renders it incomparable with the conventional press, 
and thus the legal norms applying to the press cannot be enforced in the case of blogs. 
From this perspective, which is adopted in another recent court decision,25 the 
responsibility of the blogger, who is often an ordinary citizen, in cases of offence or 
insult, is not the same with that of a powerful media entrepreneur; therefore, it is not 
appropriate to extend to blogs the large sums of indemnification that are granted in 
cases of insult or libel in the press.26 From this latter perspective, some argue there is 
a legal gap regarding freedom of expression vis-à-vis protection of other social goods 
on the internet, which must be filled. Others, though, claim that such a gap could be 
filled by general rules for insult against one’s personality, which are contained in the 
Civil Code.   
Regardless of which approach prevails, it is generally conceded that insult of 
someone’s personality through libellous or false information in blogs is illegal and the 
targeted persons are in need of protection. At the same time, each approach has 
different implications regarding another controversial aspect, namely whether or not 
bloggers are obliged to reveal their true identity instead of hiding behind anonymity 
or a false name. Those who view the internet and blogs as a fundamentally distinct 
                                                 
21 Karakwstas, Dikaio kai internet, p. 56-58. 
22 Ibid., p. 60. 
23 Court of First Instance (Monomeles Protodeikio) of Rhodope, No. 44/2008. 
24 P. Kalogirou, “H anonymia sta blogs” [Anonymity in blogs], Sychnotites, October-December 2009, 
p. 21-22. 
25 Court of First Instance (Polimeles Protodeikio) of Pireus, No. 4980/2009. 
26 For this approach, see “O nomos peri typou den efarmozetai sta blogs’ [The law on press does not 
apply on blogs], published in the blog of a Greek lawyer V. Sotiropoulos, available at: 
http://elawyer.blogspot.com/search/label/Blogo%CE%BD%CF%8C%CE%BC%CE%BF%CF%82 
(last visited on 23/7/2010). 
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due to its interactive nature, medium of communication are ready to defend the right 
to anonymity. In contrast to a consultatory response (gnwmodotisi) issued by the 
public prosecutor of Greece’s Court of Cassation (Areios Paghos), the Hellenic 
Authority for Communications Security and Privacy (ADAE) has insisted that the 
internet and bloggers are entitled to anonymity and to the protection of personal data 
and privacy in communications.27 According to ADAE, the confidentiality of this data 
can only be lifted in order to investigate particularly grave crimes or for reasons of 
national security.28  
 
3.2.3.5 Rules concerning information gathering processes 
In accordance with Article 10(3) of the Greek Constitution, public authorities are 
“obliged to reply to requests for information and for issuing documents, especially 
certificates, supporting documents and attestations within a set deadline not exceeding 
60 days, as specified by law”. Article 5 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (Law 
2690/1999) safeguards citizens’ right to access administrative documents, and is thus 
of relevance and importance to media professionals.29 Administrative documents are 
defined as those produced by public sector entities, such as reports, studies, minutes, 
statistical data, circulars, administrative responses, opinions and decisions. Citizens 
with a legitimate right may also access private documents held by the public 
authorities. The right of access to documents cannot be exercised if the documents at 
hand concern the private or family life of others, or if their confidentiality is 
prescribed by specific legal provisions. Consideration must also be given as to 
whether the documents are protected under intellectual or industrial property 
regulations. Public bodies can refuse access if the documents concern discussions of 
the Ministerial Council or if access can seriously obstruct investigations of criminal or 
administrative violations, carried out by judicial, police or military authorities. 
Citizens may access the documents where they are held or obtain a copy at their own 
cost. Access can be denied, provided that refusal is reasoned and that it is 
communicated in writing within one month from the date of the submission of the 
request.  
Law 2472/1997 on the “protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data” was introduced in order to incorporate Directive 95/46/EC30 into 
Greek law.31 In principle, the law prohibits the collection and processing of sensitive 
data, that is, data “referring to racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, membership to a trade-union, health, social welfare and sexual 
life, criminal charges or convictions, as well as membership to societies dealing with 
the aforementioned areas”.32 However, an exemption is introduced for data pertaining 
to public figures, provided that such data are in connection with the holding of public 
office or the management of third parties’ interests, and that processing is carried out 
                                                 
27 Kalogirou, “H anonymia stab logs”, p. 23. 
28 See Art. 19(1) of the Greek Constitution. 
29 Law 2690/1999, “Code of Administrative Procedure”, FEK A’ 45/1999. 
30 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, OJ L 281, 23/11/1995, p. 31. 
31 Law 2472/1997 “on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data”, 
FEK A’ 50/1997. The law was amended by Laws 2819/2000 and 2915/2001. 
32 Ibid., Art. 2(b). 
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solely for journalistic purposes.33 In such cases, data processing, as well as the 
establishment and operation of the relevant file, are allowed on the basis of a permit 
that is issued by the Data Protection Authority. The Authority may grant such permit 
if processing is absolutely necessary in order to ensure the right to information on 
matters of public interest, as well as within the framework of literary expression and 
on condition that the right to protection of private and family life is not violated in any 
way whatsoever. The permit is granted upon request and may impose terms and 
conditions for a more effective protection of the right to privacy. It is issued for a 
specific period of time and may be renewed upon request. A copy of it is registered 
with the Permits Register kept by the Authority.        
 
4. Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment 
It becomes clear from the overview provided in this report that Greek media policy is 
characterised by a large number of legal norms and rules that often exhibit 
discontinuity, contradictoriness, and haphazardness. Far from paving the way for the 
emergence of a coherent regulatory framework, deregulation since the 1980s has 
actually led to a highly unregulated environment, a phenomenon that has been termed 
as “savage deregulation.”34 By European standards, Greek legislation for radio and 
TV licensing denotes a unique situation: dense regulatory rules exist, which yet 
remain largely inapplicable, not only because of their complexity and often 
contradictory character but also on account of the state’s inertia to take proper action 
to implement them.35 The epitome of such a contradictory and unenforceable legal 
framework that lacks overarching strategic (economic, social and other) goals is the 
fact that media operators in the private audiovisual sector function without valid 
licences (and they have done so for the past twenty years). The failure to adopt a 
sound legal framework for radio and TV licensing has important implications for the 
type and quality of broadcasting and the power relations that develop between the 
state and private media operators. This is because licensing procedures guarantee that 
broadcasting develops in line with specific content standards, in support of a variety 
of information reaching the public, at the same time ensuring a secure legal 
environment for operators to pursue their activities.  
The Greek licensing adventures of analogue broadcasting testify to the Greek 
state’s inability, or even unwillingness, to implement a thorough media licensing 
policy. Following initial surprise, a first set of licensing rules were introduced, which 
however were prepared in a rather cursory, amateurish manner and therefore did not 
prevent anarchic private market entry. The second attempt to regulate the market in 
1995 was similarly unsuccessful. Bad drafting of the rules enacted prevented the 
NCRT from proceeding with the allocations of licences. As a result, broadcasters 
continued to operate under a status of “semi-legality”, a situation which was 
maintained also after the adoption of Law 3592/2007. In a rather absurd manner, the 
2007 act directed attention to the allocation of analogue licences, when what was 
needed were adequate procedures for the licensing of digital terrestrial broadcasting in 
view of the 2012 deadline. Critical moments are coming with the imminent passage to 
                                                 
33 Ibid., Art. 7(2)(g). 
34 Papathanassopoulos, “The politics and the effects of the deregulation”, p. 359. 
35 A. Manitakis, “H anagki rythmisis tis radiotileoptikis arrythmias enopsei kai tis anathewrisis tou 
Syntagmatos” [The need to regulate the unregulated radio and TV sector in view of the revision of the 
Constitution], 3-4 To Syntagma (1999) 401, at p. 402.  
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digital terrestrial broadcasting, as, similarly to its precursors, Law 3592/2007 reflects 
lack of strategic planning. 
In order to understand the failure of successive Greek governments to grant 
proper and valid licences, we must focus our attention to the intensely politicised 
nature of the deregulation process already from its inception. Liberalisation in the late 
1980s was not a result of explicit government decision on the basis of a national 
strategy but a political act of the centre-right opposition. The latter was evidenced in 
the action taken by the municipal radio stations of Thessaloniki, which the centre-
right opposition controlled.36 Subsequently, deregulation was driven by the logic of 
antagonism among Greece’s main political parties competing for government power. 
For instance, in 1989, the government which was dominated by the centre-right 
awarded television licences only to media owners who had been critical of the 
previous socialist governments.37 Similarly, in 1993-94 the socialist government did 
the same for channels, which had been supportive of PASOK during elections.38  
Political parties often adopted contradictory stances depending on whether 
they were in government or in opposition. While they were in opposition, they 
advocated soft regulation. But when they acquired government power, they tried 
through various mechanisms (i.e. cancellation of fines or non-payment for use of 
frequencies) and restrictive legal rules to pressure the media to adopt favourable 
attitudes towards the government.39 In this intensely politicised deregulation process, 
and despite the fact that clear partisan lines no longer colour television broadcasting, 
it can still be discerned that in the attempts of political parties to direct and control the 
media, there is substantial continuity with the past. 
In effect, it seems that Greek licensing policy for broadcasting has 
inadvertently followed a “laissez-faire” approach, which, however, has been a result 
of political favouritism. The apparent reluctance to introduce comprehensive rules for 
the licensing of electronic media and guarantee their enforcement could be seen as a 
deliberate attempt on the part of successive governments not to antagonise powerful 
business interests in the press and broadcasting, in anticipation that these would in 
turn support government policies. The result is the absence of a coherent legal 
framework that can effectively delimit the boundaries of political influence that the 
media can exert, leading, in the end, to a media environment, which has become 
difficult, if not impossible to regulate.  
Evidently, the failure of the Greek state to licence the broadcasting sector for 
almost two decades has serious repercussions on the level of independence of the 
latter. It also creates and reinforces mutual dependencies between private media 
operators and the government, potentially undermining standards of objectivity and 
impartiality in news broadcasting. Given the legal ambiguity through which Greek 
broadcasters operate, one may not rule out the possibility of a certain degree of media 
self-censorship. Reactionary and averse responses to state action and policies may be 
sidelined or silenced, so as to refrain from upsetting (or upsetting too much) state 
bodies and organs that enjoy the capacity to roll back the legal status that has been 
“temporarily” conceded. On the other hand, media owners and broadcasting directors 
can exercise unfair and informal pressure upon government officials, which restrictive 
                                                 
36 Panagiotopoulou, “20 xronia”, p. 11. 
37 Papathanassopoulos, “Broadcasting, politics and the state”, p. 394. 
38 Papathanassopoulos, “The politics and the effects of the deregulation”, p. 358. 
39 Panagiotopoulou, “20 xronia”, p. 18-19. 
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legal rules have purportedly sought to curb, while also feeling free to operate without 
following the rules. The interdependencies between government and the media, not 
only in public service but also in private sector broadcasting, are difficult to tackle 
considering the weakness of an independent civil society active in the media, which 
could serve as a vehicle of mobilisation and political pressure. They also augment the 
impression among the public that the political system fails to ensure transparency and 
accountability, and to guarantee equality for all citizens in their ability to influence the 
democratic process.  
The most distinctive and controversial aspect of Greek media policy pertaining 
to the ownership structures in the media has no doubt been the restrictive rules known 
as the “main shareholder” (vasikos metochos). The concentration of media ownership 
in the hands of few conglomerates is a frequent phenomenon encountered in many 
European countries. In the Greek context, though, it has received particular attention 
insofar as it concerns media owners and shareholders who have entered the field since 
its deregulation, and who simultaneously own or manage enterprises that bid for and 
engage in public sector contracts. They may be involved in sectors such as 
construction and telecommunications or in sectors where the state is a significant 
customer (energy, shipping etc.). This distinctive concern with media investors who 
are involved in such sectors must be understood in reference to a national context like 
the Greek one, in which the state has historically been a major economic actor, and 
has traditionally awarded large public work contracts on preferential basis to 
businesses with political connections.40 Since the late 1980s, the entry of 
entrepreneurs into the media tremendously expanded the ability of business interests 
to influence and shape public opinion and attitudes vis-a-vis the political class. 
The deregulation of radio and television in the late 1980s was a watershed for 
established relations between the political elites and the economic interests that had 
established themselves until then. While until then the media had served as a terrain 
for competing political parties and interests vying for influence, deregulation greatly 
empowered the media and the business interests vested in it. It shifted the main axis of 
juxtaposition to one between the political elites on the one hand, and the business 
interests on the other. While the state and the political class had a reigning position 
over the media prior to deregulation, the balance of power following the latter shifted 
with the emergence and gradual expansion of business interests with considerable 
investment activity, in media outlets. This alarmed politicians. Concerns that public 
work contractors connected with media undertakings and persons owning or 
managing them could use the influence afforded by their position to enter into 
contracts with the state became widespread.  
In response to such concerns, restrictions applicable to the conclusion of 
public work contracts with persons and undertakings that were active or had interests 
in media enterprises, were first established by Law 2328/1995;41 however, they 
proved to be largely unenforceable.42 As a rare instance of cross-party consensus in 
                                                 
40 D. Charalambis, “To telos tou ‘basikou’ metochou’” [The end of the “main shareholder”], To Bima, 
21/10/2007. 
41 By adopting this law, the government at the time had arguably sought to circumvent the pressures 
that media owners exercised upon it regarding large public contracts that were awarded within the 
second and third Community Support Frameworks (CSFs) established by the EU to assist the less 
developed economies of the south. See Panagiotopoulou, “20 xronia”, p. 14. 
42 In case of non compliance, Law 2328/1995 did not render the signed public contracts void. It only 
made provision for the withdrawal of the broadcasting licence. Since no proper licensing procedure had 
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the highly politicised sphere of the media, the two main parties subsequently 
reinforced such restrictions and incorporated them in an unusually detailed set of 
provisions in the Greek Constitution when it was amended in 2001.43 The drafting of 
constitutional rules was driven by prevalent distrust towards ordinary legislation.44 
For the political forces of the period, an adequately revised constitutional text would 
place the legislator under significant strain, indicating the regulatory course to take. 
Notably, transparency in media ownership and public contract award procedures was 
also used as a pretext to improve the popularity of the political parties of the time. 
Political actors competed over who would condemn more fervently the use of the 
media to influence state conduct.45 The media was criticised for being a platform 
nourishing corruption and preventing true pluralism and transparency, and action to 
remedy the situation was presented as protecting democracy.   
The restrictions of the “main shareholder” placed upon media owners who 
were involved in public work contracts introduced much stricter limits than those 
previously defined by general laws that protect fair competition, and they were 
extensively criticised on a variety of grounds. First of all, they clearly went against the 
freedom of economic activity, and were incompatible with EU common market law. 
Additionally, a question was raised regarding the extent to which the purported illicit 
interweaving of political and media interests (diaploki), which they sought to curb, 
was in fact a widespread phenomenon and of a kind that had to be redressed in such a 
draconian manner.46 In any case, legal and communication scholars amply exposed 
the misguided assumptions regarding the nature of economic relations among family 
members and relatives, which underpinned the restrictions placed upon of media 
owners, but also the ineffectiveness of these restrictions to actually curb unfair and 
illicit influence.47 In the end, the existence of strict rules that were not enforced and 
did little to prevent cross ownership of media outlets and enterprises engaged in 
public sector contracts, only reinforced perceptions of unrestrained and unaccountable 
media interests, both among political elites, and also among the public.48  
The spectre of an increasingly empowered media vis-à-vis the political world 
has alarmed elites across parties and appears to have significantly driven the various 
legal and policy norms adopted by successive governments. The weakness of political 
institutions permeated by particularistic interests and their fledgling legitimacy 
                                                                                                                                            
taken place, enforcement was not possible. Moreover, obligations imposed on the undertakings 
entering into public work contracts to have registered shares (i.e. shares mentioning the name of their 
owner) could not be enforced with regard to companies established in the EU Member States. 
43 The relevant amendment was voted by 265 out of the 280 Members of Parliament who were present. 
See Venizelos, “Oi eggyiseis tis polifwnias kai diafaneias”, p. 430.  
44 Kiki, H eleutheria twn optikoakoustikwm meswn, p. 209, Venizelos, “Oi eggyiseis tis polifwnias kai 
diafaneias”, p. 428, N. Alivizatos, “Syntagma kai ‘diaploki’” [The Constitution and the interweaving of 
interests], 1 DIMME (2004) 16, at p. 19.  
45 Kiki, H eleutheria twn optikoakoustikwm meswn, p. 170. 
46 Tzemos, “O ‘basikos metochos’”, p. 538. 
47 Alivizatos, “Syntagma kai ‘diaploki’”, D. Charalambis, “Skepseis sxetika me ta zitimata tis 
diafaneias, tis “asimbibastes idiotites” kai ton “basiko metocho” [Thoughts about the issues of 
transparency, ‘the incompatible capacities’ and the ‘main shareholder’], 1 DIMEE 2004. 
48 For such perceptions among political elites, see the speech by N. Konstantopoulos (former president 
of the Coalition for the Left and the Progress, Synaspismos), “O rolos twn meswn enimerwsis stin 
anaptiksi tis dimokratias” [The role of information media in the development of democracy] and Y. 
Papakonstantinou (formerly press spokesperson for PASOK and currently Minister of Economics), “H 
sxesi twn paradosiakwn kai twn sygxronwn meswn me tin politiki” [The relationship of the traditional 
and new media with politics], in Oi ekselikseis ston chwro twn meswn epikoinwnias. 
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regarding the ability to represent citizens in a satisfactory and just manner has further 
bolstered the impression of an all-powerful and influential media with television 
having prime of place in this regard. Such an impression is shared by a large section 
of the Greek population, which believes that the national news media play a crucial 
role in political developments, and which at the same time appears deeply distrustful 
towards the media.49 Recent Eurobarometer data shows that the Greek public has low 
levels of trust in the audiovisual and internet-based media.50 Nonetheless, television 
remains the most preferred source of information. More specifically, this preference is 
found in 70% of the population aged over 15, while almost half the respondents 
(54%) reported watching television news on a daily or almost daily basis.51  
The widespread perception that the media (and television in particular) has 
emerged as a centre of power that is unaccountable does little to instil public 
confidence in the country’s democracy. More recently, the development of the 
internet as a medium, not only of information, but most importantly of interactive 
communication among users-readers, appears to hold the promise of democratising 
the media and its relations with the political system. The increasing use of the internet 
by Greek political parties and the government to communicate their positions on 
various issues and to directly reach citizens, can arguably bypass the ability of media 
operators and publishers to shape the flow of information and influence the political 
agenda.52 At the same time, online platforms increasingly create alternative 
information and communication channels with citizens engaging directly in content 
production and distribution, enhancing opportunities for political participation and 
democratic debate.  
 Arguably, digitalisation and the changes brought by new technologies offer an 
optimum occasion for a re-appraisal of long-standing media policy-making practices 
in Greece. In a period of profound reflection about the new environment in which the 
media operate, but also widespread concern about the effects of economic recession 
on the operation of the media, especially the press, there clearly appears to be a need 
to return to the real focus of media policy and regulation, that is, the key role played 
by the media in a democratic society. Considerations about the democratic functions 
the media should perform and the contribution they should make to democratic 
discourse must take a prominent position in government thinking and similarly guide 
the agenda of all those wanting to influence media policy, including journalists and 
the media themselves.      
                                                 
49 See, “Oi polites amfisvitoun entona tin aksiopistia twn MME” [Citizens question strongly the 
reliability of the media], Ta Nea, 1/3/2010.  
50 The TV is the least trusted news source (not trusted by 72% of the population, the highest rate in the 
EU), followed by the press (65%) and the radio (52%). Data also reveal low levels of trust in internet 
media too (64%), yet no distinction is made between news websites and blogs. See European 
Commission, Directorate General Communication, Eurobarometer 69, National Report, “Greece”, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69_el_exe.pdf (last accessed on 
23/7/2010).   
51 Public Issue, “Ethniki ereuna gia ta mesa mazikis enimerwsis stin Ellada - 2007” [National research 
on mass information media in Greece - 2007], available at: http://www.publicissue.gr/128/iom-media-
2007/#4 (last visited on 23/07/2010).  
52 See Papakonstantinou, “H sxesi twn paradosiakwn kai twn sygxronwn meswn me tin politiki”, p. 
102-108. In the same volume, see also P. Mandravelis, “Ta monastiria, h typografia kai to diadiktio” 
[Monasteries, printing and the internet], p. 76-80.  
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The case of Italy 
Federica Casarosa  
 
1. Introduction 
There has been a clear link between media organisation and regulation and the Italian 
political system since the Fascist period when, for the first time, the importance of 
media as a means to steer civic opinion was acknowledged and developed. The 
regulation of that period is an example of preventive control over the activity of any 
publisher, journalist or (radio) broadcaster able to verify ex ante the symmetry 
between the dominant party views and the information actually diffused to the 
public.946  
After the fall of the Fascist government and the subsequent end of World War 
II, the new government started a period of “normalising” the media system, amending 
and reforming the previous legislation in order to comply with the newly adopted 
Constitution,947 which included the freedom of the press as one of its fundamental 
pillars.948 Thus, the period between the end of World War II and the 1970s was 
mostly characterised by the birth, or rebirth, of the press system, with the possibility 
for the newspapers closed or strongly limited by the Fascist dictatorship to regain 
their role and importance in the market. The economic boom that characterised the 
aftermath of the War also comprised the initiation and diffusion of the television 
service that came into being in 1954.  
Only in the 1970s did the press market show signs of financial difficulties, 
while the same period is thought of as the start of commercial television, since the 
first private broadcasters emerged in the broadcasting market. The critical situation of 
the press system then opened the floor to a process that continued during the 
following decades: the increasing interest of powerful corporate groups in seizing and 
controlling the major newspapers and magazines, which was only slightly limited by 
legislative intervention.949 Nevertheless, the government’s concerns over the press 
crisis found positive results with the enactment of a financial subsidisation of the 
press that is still in operation now. If at that time such a decision was welcomed as a 
solution for the safeguard of the principle of pluralism since small and niche 
publications were saved from complete closure, the stabilisation of such governmental 
contributions to the press had strongly affected the system, reducing its capabilities to 
react to endogenous and exogenous factors, such as the increased internal competition 
through free press and, more importantly, the development of new technologies.  
Regarding the broadcasting system, the Italian situation can be seen as a 
continuous struggle to limit the politicisation of the national broadcasters, in particular 
the public service broadcaster which has always been strictly controlled by the 
government and political parties.  Indeed, the public service broadcaster 
                                                 
946 P. Caretti, Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione – Stampa, radiotelevisione, 
telecomunicazioni, teatro e cinema, [Information and communication law – Press, broadcasting, 
telecommunication, theatre and cinema] (2009), at p. 38; E. Barendt, Broadcasting Law – A 
comparative study, (1993), at p. 24.   
947 See Law 47/1948 that addressed many of the crucial issues of press regulation, from the liability of 
publishers and editors of newspapers to the abolition of the obligation to register for any publication, to 
the definition of the offences concerning the press.  
948 See below at par. 3.2.1. for the analysis of article 21 of the Italian Constitution.  
949  See Law 416/1981.  
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Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI) has never been truly independent from the major 
political parties, though on a few occasions legislation was enacted by the Parliament 
with the objective of ensuring RAI’s independence from the executive branch. 
However, neither these legislative interventions nor the repeated reference to this 
point in several judgements of the Constitutional Court were sufficient to achieve a 
complete separation between the public service broadcaster governance bodies and 
the executive power. This ended into the “parcelling” of the available channels to the 
major political parties, the so-called lottizzazione, which characterised public service 
broadcasting for the subsequent decades.  
When   commercial television began in the 1970s, thanks again to the 
intervention of the Constitutional Court, the media framework changed. Deregulation 
allowed private stations to broadcast at the local level. However, the newly-emerged 
market actors coordinated their activities by transmitting the same programmes 
nationwide, providing in practice a national broadcasting chain. This situation was not 
dealt with by the then government, paving the way for the rise of a corporate group 
which in the mid-1980s started to be seen as the major competitor of the public 
broadcaster, namely the Mediaset group. In fact, in 1984, because of financial 
difficulties, two of the national private channels (owned by two different press 
publishers) were bought by the Mediaset group, adding them to the successful 
commercial channel already owned, yet also present on the broadcasting network.  
The duopoly of Mediaset and RAI channels was then legalised by legislative 
intervention, showing the not-concealed alliance between politics and media. In 
particular, the law enacted in 1990 was clearly adapting both content and, more 
importantly, anti-trust regulation to the existing situation allowing both RAI and 
Mediaset to keep their channels and frequencies. This situation obviously limited 
opportunities for access and development of further competitors, thus limiting 
pluralism in the sources of information of citizens.950 This situation did not improve 
due to the results of the 1994 elections, when the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi, 
owner of the Mediaset group, won the elections becoming Prime Minister.  
The subsequent fall of the executive with the following elections, won by the 
left wing party, provided a small opening for a more pluralistic regime. In particular, 
in 1997 Law 249/1997 required the partial privatisation of RAI, the restructuring of 
the third channel of RAI into an advertising-free station and the dissolution of one of 
the private channels of the Mediaset group. However, none of the previous choices 
were put into practice, due to the resistance of the opposition party and parts of the 
coalition government. The fall of the left-wing executive, paved the way for a new 
victory for Berlusconi’s coalition in 2001. Again the position of Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi raised continuous debate during any legislative intervention regarding the 
media sector. The most important intervention during this legislature was Law 
112/2004 that attempted to stop the application of the aforementioned provisions of 
the 1997 law and the subsequent intervention of the Constitutional Court, saving in 
particular the interests of the Mediaset group and the existence of one of its 
broadcasting channels. The law also envisioned the possibility of a privatisation of the 
state-owned television, but this has not yet been carried out in practice. The 
promotion of digital terrestrial broadcasting was seen then as a solution to the “Italian 
anomaly”, being capable of opening up the market to new competitors and increasing 
                                                 
950 See G. Mazzoleni and G. Vigevani, “Italy”, in Open Society Institute (ed.), Television across 
Europe: regulation, policy and independence (2005) 865, at p. 876.  
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the level of pluralism as the number of available networks would be increased. 
However, the two major players have already seized a large quantity of frequencies, 
thereby perpetuateing their dominance.951  
An important element of the Italian framework, in light of this short historical 
analysis of the political and legislative framework, regards the role of the judiciary, 
and in particular the Constitutional Court, in steering and correcting the media 
regulation. The Constitutional Court did not only sanction with a declaration of 
unconstitutionality conduct which does not comply with the Constitution, but it has 
also developed a comprehensive jurisprudence in the broadcasting field, identifying 
the fundamental principles governing the media that could be used as guidelines for 
legislative action. Unfortunately, the reaction of the Parliament to the – not-so-subtle - 
requests has been almost non-existent, due to internal struggles in the major political 
parties and the fear of addressing sensitive issues that could result in reduced support 
in the elections.  
New media (such as digital television, broadband connection, Internet and 
satellite broadcasting) in the meantime has been diffusing all over the country, 
pushing for a change in the habits of the Italian audience. New technologies and the 
global media market may succeed in establishing the conditions for a free market that 
lawmakers have failed to create. However the approach that has been taken by the 
government for this new framework is to leave regulation almost completely to the 
logic of the market, which does not provide any guarantee of protecting and 
enhancing the level of democracy in this sector. 
The following paragraphs will analyse more deeply the current media system 
in Italy providing a general overview of  each market sector, namely press, 
broadcasting, radio and new media (par. 2), before introducing the legislative 
framework for the media  (par. 3). Finally, this contribution will identify the most 
critical issues that characterise the Italian media policy, providing possible hints for 
future trends in the country (par. 4).  
 
2. The media landscape in Italy 
The press sector is one of the most important business sectors in Italy, thought current 
trends show that the crisis has heavily affected this sector requiring the adoption of 
new strategies at the publishing level. The total number of publishers registered at the 
national registry for communication providers952 is 848, including electronic press 
publishers (6.3%), paper press publishers (53.9%) and press publishers that use both 
mediums (39.8%).953 The registration – though obligatory for the communication 
                                                 
951 See below in par. 2.  
952 The Registro degli operatori di comunicazione [Communication providers registry] (ROC) 
introduced by article 1 of Law 249/1997 (which substituted the previous Registro degli editori) for  
press publishers, extended to all communication providers including press agencies, advertising agents, 
and broadcasters. It is an obligation for any communication service and/or content provider to register 
with the ROC in order to distribute their content and/or services in Italian communication networks. 
See G. Corasaniti, “Il registro degli operatori della comunicazione tra problematiche definitorie e 
deleghe ai comitati regionali per le comunicazioni” [The communication providers registry between 
definition problems and delegation to the regional communication committees], 25 Dir. Informazione e 
Informatica (2009) 221. 
953 AGCOM, “Annual Report 2010”, available at: 
http://www.agcom.it/Default.aspx?message=viewrelazioneannuale&idRelazione=19 (last visited on 
19/10/2010). 
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content and/or service providers – does not imply that all the registered members are 
currently active on the market.  
The estimated number of newspapers in Italy is 200, also including the free 
press. The total is relatively high but it can be explained according to two factors: the 
geographical area of distribution (newspapers available at the national level are fewer 
in number, while the regional, inter-regional and provincial press count for more in 
total; however, looking at the number of copies sold the proportion is the opposite); 
and specific content (such as economic, sports and political, as many of them are still 
related to political parties).954 The most recent data reflects an overall negative 
situation either in terms of reduced revenues for all segments of press publishing, 
evaluated at 14% less than 2008 and almost 20% less than 2006. The only case in 
which the trend for the last year seems merely anti-cyclical is the electronic press, 
which in the long run provides the best situation, though its importance in value is still 
limited (see table 1).  
 
Table 1: Total revenues for press sector (ml. of Euro)  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Var. % 
08/09 
Var. % 
06/09 
Newspapers  2651 2627 2449 2135 -12.8 -16.7 
Periodicals 2162 2138 2020 1577 -21.9 -27.1 
Electronic 
press  
119 162 204 197 -3.3 65 
Other 
revenues  
833 813 765 774 1.2 -8.1 
Total  5765 5740 5437 4684 -13.9 -18.9 
Source: AGCOM (2010) and (2007) 
 
The reduction in total revenues flows from two sets of reasons: on the one 
hand, the economic crisis has negatively affected the purchasing habits of consumers 
and the investment strategies of enterprises; on the other hand, the diffusion of new 
media has developed a new approach to the sources of information. Concerning the 
former, it should be emphasised that the reduced sale of copies affected not only the 
traditional press but also the free press, which showed the larger decrease (-23.7%), 
with a concurrent general reduction in advertising expenditures of almost 1/5 as 
compared to the previous year. Concerning the latter, instead, the data about the 
average number of Internet users accessing the electronic version of the newspapers 
show the increasing importance of such source of information, moving from 3.4 
millions in 2008 to 3.8 in 2009.955  
                                                 
954 ACGM, Indagine conoscitiva riguardante il settore dell'editoria quotidiana, periodica e 
multimediale [Study on the dayly, periodical and multimedia publication sectors] (2006), available at: 
www.agcm.it (last visited on 19/10/2010). 
955 AGCOM, “Annual report 2010”, p. 102 and AGCOM, “Annual Report 2009”, available at:  
http://www.agcom.it/Default.aspx?message=viewrelazioneannuale&idRelazione=17 (last visited on 
19/10/2010).  
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It is worth noting, that in the press sector most newspapers are owned and 
controlled by a few financial trusts, namely RCS Mediagroup, Gruppo Editoriale 
L’Espresso, Gruppo Mondadori, IlSole24 and Gruppo Caltagirone. The first three of 
these comprise almost 60% of the press sector.956  
Since the end of World War II, the Italian government has subsidised the press 
sector with direct and indirect contribution to its activity. The justification has always 
been found in the need to eliminate any economics-based obstacle to pluralism, 
safeguarding the existence and development of smaller publishing enterprises and 
cultural initiatives. The recent legislation on the point, namely Law 230/1990, 
however, has been criticised since the criteria to access indirect contribution were not 
deemed  effective in terms of protection of pluralism; on the contrary they would only 
fund surreptitiously a specific type of companies (in the legal form of cooperatives) 
and political parties.957  
Due to the stratification of different regulation on media subsidisation, the 
current legal framework is under review in order to provide a reorganisation which 
could achieve a higher level of effectiveness in the light of the overall objective of 
promoting the so-called “external pluralism”.958  
The online distribution of printed content is growing and the online versions of 
newspapers are in the highest positions of rankings of the most visited websites.959 
However, their style and format are not yet satisfactory in view of the available 
interactivity potentiality of online distribution, as they are still more focused on 
textual articles with limited role given to multimedia and to user-generated content.960  
Current strategies of publishing groups attempt to increase revenues in the 
electronic market, building on the reputation of the offline publications, though at the 
moment the by-line sales are still insufficient to justify different business strategies. 
The current debate focuses on the challenge for publishers of newspapers to find ways 
to charge for content without alienating readers, identifying information products on 
which to levy additional fees for consumption. Tailored commercial services, such as 
those available in mobile communication, are currently deemed one possible solution.  
The Italian television sector is currently undergoing a wide transformation 
which is due, partly, to the recently-enacted legislative reform961 and, partly, to the 
current shift from analogue to digital television.962 In contrast to other media sectors, 
television has been more resistant to the effects of the economic crisis, as is shown by 
the lesser reduction in advertising revenues and by the increase in additional pay-per-
view services. Although analogue television is still the main player on the market, the 
increasing importance of satellite broadcasting and new communication providers of 
                                                 
956 AGCOM, “Annual report 2010”, p. 94.  
957 See Caretti, Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, p.  76.  
958 For the definition of external pluralism, see Constitutional Court, decision n. 474/1984.  
959 AGCOM, “Annual report 2010”, p. 92. 
960 R. Bertero, Il quotidiano online in Italia: Stato dell'arte e possibili evoluzioni [The online 
newspapers in Italy: State of the art and possible developments] (2009), available at: 
http://www.lsdi.it/wp-content/Lsdi-tesi_roberta_bertero.pdf (last visited on 19/10/2010).  
961 See the Testo Unico dei servizi media audiovisivi e radiofonici [Code of audiovisual and radio 
services] (TUSMAR), legislative decree 177/2005, with the recent amendments introduced by the 
legislative decree 44/2010, which implemented the AVMS directive in Italy.  
962 The total shift towards digital television is scheduled for 2012, and currently it seems that, after a 
long 'experimentation' period, the process will be completed on time.  
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pay-TV implies that the current position is but a moment in an ongoing process whose 
outcome is not yet definable.  
As mentioned, the available data concerning the television sector provides a 
positive picture of the sector, which registered an increase in overall revenues of 
1.7%. Looking at each source, the decreasing trend that affected the advertising 
revenues is clear, though it is still the most important source of funding for the 
television sector; a greater more role has been gained by the pay-TV component, 
comprising  1/3 of the overall revenues (see table 2).  
 
Table 2: Total revenues for television sector (ml. of Euro) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 Var. % 08/09 
Var. % 
06/09 
Fee 1491 1567 1603 1630 1.7 9,3 
Pay-tv 2145 2322 2677 2875 7.4 34 
Advertising 3825 3933 3906 3541 -9.3 -7,5 
Other 
sources 
156 245 267 548 104.9 251 
Total 7617 8067 8453 8594 1.7 12 
Source: AGCOM (2008) and (2010) 
 
Italy, like the other EU countries, has a mixed broadcasting system that 
provides for a public television provider, RAI, and a set of private broadcasters born 
during the unplanned period of deregulation in the 1970s. Among the latter, the most 
important is RTI-Mediaset, whose economic strength has become so large that the 
current situation in analogue broadcasting can be qualified as a duopoly, whose 
legitimacy is also questioned by the fact that the owner of the RTI-Mediaset group, 
the tycoon Silvio Berlusconi, currently occupies the position of Prime Minister.  
This perception changes if digital and pay-TV broadcasters are also taken into 
the picture. As a matter of fact, the main competitors are then three as they also 
include Sky TV, which is a pay-TV on satellite communication network. Altogether, 
these three competitors comprise more than 90% of the television market.963  
RAI represents the public pole of broadcasting. RAI controls three analogue 
television channels, thirteen digital channels, and seven satellite channels. It also 
provides three radio channels which almost replicate the audience targets of the 
analogue television ones. The broadcasting service is assigned to RAI by means of a 
renewable national contract lasting three years between the company and the 
Department of Communication, according to the guidelines adopted by the 
Department and the Italian Communication Authority.964  
                                                 
963 See that each of them has a different business strategy, which is based on the annual household 
license fee for RAI, while on pay-per-view services for Sky Italia and on advertising investments for 
RTI-Mediaset. See AGCOM, “Annual report 2010”, p. 76 ff. 
964 See below par. 3.1.  
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Concerning its legal form, RAI is a joint-stock company,965 whose internal 
governance has been reformed by the recent legislative decree 177/2005, the Testo 
Unico sui servizi media audiovisivi e radiofonici (TUSMAR), which attempted to 
overcome the strong connection between the board of directors and the political 
parties, which resulted in a polarised broadcasting system.966 The RAI board of 
directors is now elected by the assembly of the shareholders, giving the representative 
of the government (the Ministry of Economics and Finance) the possibility to present 
a set of candidates proportional to number of shares. Moreover, to improve the 
independence and autonomy of the directors, their mandate now lasts only three years 
with the possibility of only one renewal. The difficulties encountered in the recent 
election of the board of directors, however, show that it will be difficult to fully dispel 
the domination of major political parties over the governing body of RAI.  
The shift towards digital television is an ongoing process that has as its 
objective the full transfer to digital throughout the country by 2012. Currently there 
are already 40 national free channels and over 30 pay-per-view channels that transmit 
digitally. Since the initial development of this new broadcasting technique, the Italian 
legislator was keen to endorse it in order to improve the level of pluralism in the 
sector, overcoming the scarcity of frequencies that characterised analogue 
transmission.967 However, this optimistic interpretation was not shared by the 
Constitutional Court, which understood the improvement of pluralism only as an 
“uncertain event”, and required instead a set of specific monitoring interventions by 
the State.968  
Moreover, the technical development of digital broadcasting opened a debate 
concerning the general public service function of the broadcasting sector. In 
particular, it was proposed that, given the increase in the volume of the content being 
offered and in the potential number of content providers providing it, the model to be 
adopted should have been a universal broadcasting service.969 In this approach the 
general obligations of the public service broadcaster should have been applicable to 
all broadcasting providers. However, such an interpretation was contradicted by a 
judgement of the Constitutional Court which affirmed that the move from a public 
monopoly did not eliminate the need and constitutional rational for a public 
broadcasting service which still has its purpose of enhancing the participation of  
citizens in the cultural and social development of the country.970  
Most broadcasting channels, public or private, have also provided an 
electronic version of their programmes online, which comprises both free and pay-
per-view services. However, the quality of these experiences for the final user is still 
unsatisfactory. A recent survey focused on the online website of the public service 
                                                 
965 See article 49 of the TUSMAR. 
966 See that the previous system achieved the so called “lottizzazione” of the three broadcasting 
channels to the governing coalition (RAI 1), right wing parties (RAI 2), and left wing parties (RAI 3). 
See on this point, P. Mancini, Elogio della lottizzazione - La via italiana al pluralismo [Praise for 
lottizzazione – the Italian way for pluralism] (2009).  
967 The law that opened the doors to experimentation of digital broadcasting dates back to 2001, namely 
Law 66/2001. See A. D'Arma, “Shaping tomorrow's television: Policies on digital television in Italy 
1996-2006”, in M. Ardizzoni and C. Ferrari (eds), Beyond monopoly – Globalization and 
Contemporary Italian media (2010) 3, where the author emphasises the underlying economic rationals 
that caused the Italian government to endorse so quickly and efficiently the new broadcasting system.  
968 See Constitutional Court, decision n. 446/2002.  
969 Caretti, Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, p. 166 
970 See Constitutional Court, decision n. 284/2002.  
 281
broadcaster, on the one hand, emphasised the improvements of the interactive 
character of this offering, while on the other it pointed out the difficulties in providing 
a user-friendly website, which was perceived as difficult to navigate and always 
requiring additional external tools, such as search engines.971  
The radio sector mainly follows the distinction between public service 
broadcaster, the three RAI channels, and private networks which are individual radios 
or part of more general media groups. The negative trend in the average number of 
radio listeners and access to the market of competitors available on different devices 
(e.g. personal computers and mobile phones) imposes a redefinition of radio networks 
strategies.972 In practice, the major publishing groups have increased the development 
of multimedia activities as synergistic and complementary to the traditional radio 
service. In particular, web streaming and podcasting seem to be the major solutions 
attracting online listeners. In addition, mobile services are changing and widening 
their offerings in terms of content but also providing interactive services to final users, 
based on the convergence of mediums.  
Internet diffusion has reached almost half on Italian population.973 The wider 
availability of this new source of information both at home and in offices has changed 
the use of traditional ways of communication. A recent study of the national 
population showed that an increased percentage of people use the Internet not only 
passively (to search for information on education, purchase of goods, etc.), but also to 
participate in the so-called Web 2.0. The majority of people still have a low level of 
involvement, such as reading blogs and participating in chats, newsgroups, and 
discussion forums online, but the interest in user-generated content is beginning to 
take off also in Italy (see table 3).974  
 
Table 3: Internet communication activities (%)  
Phone calls  15,9 
Video calls  15,9 
Chat, blogs, newsgroups and discussion forums  22,3 
Instant messaging  21,3 
Read blogs  28,5 
Write or manage own blogs  7,8 
Total  100 
Source: ISTAT (2009) 
 
News agencies in Italy provide the majority information content to the media. 
After the experience during the Fascist period of a state-owned (and consequently 
controlled by government interests) news agency, the Agenzia Stefani, the following 
                                                 
971 AGCOM, “Annual report 2010”, p. 202. 
972 AGCOM, “Annual report 2009”, p. 83. 
973 ISTAT, Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie “Aspetti della vita quotidiana”, [Multiobjective analysisi 
on Italian families 'Dayly life elements'] (2009), available at: 
http://www.istat.it/dati/catalogo/20090312_00/ (last visited on 19/10/2010).  
974 Ibid,.  
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agencies have always been free from government influence in the governance 
structure. In particular, the oldest news agency Ansa is a cooperative company 
composed only of newspapers publishers. Many others are instead privately-owned 
companies, such as Italia, Adnkronos, Asca, Il Sole 24 ore Radiocor,975 which provide 
not only  coverage of national news but also  foreign news, in some cases with offices 
abroad (e.g. Ansa), or through connections with foreign news agencies.  
News agencies in Italy have improved their role and importance in the 
emerging ITC-based framework for media, as they have started to provide directly, 
without the intermediation of any other media provider, additional services to online 
users as well, such as short video news available on the website, teletext service and 
an SMS service for mobile phones. In this sense, it is no longer possible to 
characterise news agencies as mere sources of information for media operators, which 
have limited connection with the final recipients of such information; rather they have 
become competitors of other media operators for information provision.976  
The journalist profession in Italy is regulated by Law 69/1963 which defines 
journalistic activity as a professional intellectual activity, regulated specially under 
labour law, and imposes the obligation to enrol in the Ordine dei Giornalisti, ODG 
(journalists register) on any person that engages in such activity, including semi-
professionally. The ODG distinguishes between two types of categories: professional 
(who continually and exclusively work as journalists) and freelance journalists who 
can work in any communication network. The former category has just under 28 
thousands members, while the latter has over 64 thousands.977 In order to become a 
professional journalist, a period of practice of at least eighteen months is required 
after which the applicant must pass a professional qualification test.  
The law mentioned above provides for the self-regulation of the category of 
journalists (the ODG), which can elect their own representatives in internal 
governance bodies and eventually impose sanctions where there is non-compliance 
with rules.978  
In the last ten years the consumption of all types of media increased, at 
different rates (from 2% of TV to 26.9% of Internet), reaching a higher percentage of 
the total population (almost 100% in the case of TV diffusion, but not yet 50% in the 
                                                 
975 Note that many of them were linked to specific political orientations at their birth, such as the Asca 
to the Democrazia Cristiana political party, or  Italia to the social democrats . However, all of them 
have tried to comply with a pluralistic view of information. See S. Lepri, “Storia e funzioni delle 
agenzie di informazione” [History and function of the press agencies], in V. Roidi (ed.), Studiare da 
giornalista. Il sistema dell’informazione [Studying to become a journalist. The information system], 
vol. 1, (2003) 172.  
976 Note that the provision of complete articles or video reports immediately publishable by the media 
provider has become more and more widespread, without any further intervention. See A. Meucci, 
“Agenzie di stampa e quotidiani – Una notizia dall'ansa ai giornali” [News agencies and dayly news – 
News from ansa to newspapers], Università di Siena, Dipartimento di Scienze Storiche, Giuridiche, 
Politiche e Sociali, WP n. 42, 2001.  
977 Ordine Dei Giornalisti, “Annuario Giornalisti 2010” [Journalist yearbook 2010], available at:  
http://www.annuariogiornalistiitaliani.it/home.asp (last visited on 19/10/2010). 
978 The role of the ODG has also been questioned in front of the Constitutional Court, which did not 
define it as an institution that limits the freedom of the press because it regulates only the ways in 
which professional activity should be carried out, it does not impose any limit on the freedom of 
expression of those who do not wish to become journalists. See Constitutional Court, decision n. 
11/1968.  
 283
case of Internet diffusion).979 However, the overall trend showed a multiplication of 
media and expansion in their use without a general reduction of one type in favour of 
the others (see table 4).  
In more recent years, the data available shows a move from paid to free media 
services, in particular mobile phone diffusion increased in the basic use but it 
decreased in the more expensive Internet services; the same situation can be seen for 
the newspapers where the amount of regular weekly and daily readers has decreased 
considerably. Yet, online newspapers have also experienced a relatively smaller 
increase in their consumption. However in this case the rational is not an economic 
one; instead it related to a different approach to online surfing, and it should take into 
account the increase in alternative sources of information such as blogs, social media, 
etc.  
 
Table 4: Media consumption in Italy (percentage of people that have used the media with a 
frequency of almost once a week during the year)  
 2001 2009 Var. % 01/09 
Television  95.8 97.8 2 
Mobile phone 72.8 85 12.2 
Radio  68.8 81.2 12.4 
Newspapers 60.6 64.2 3.6 
Books  54 56.5 2.5 
Internet  20.1 47 26.9 
Source: Censis (2009)  
 
According to the European Commission report,980 Italy has a level of media 
literacy slightly under the average. Although Italy has a good availability of media 
and media literacy context, the individual competencies do not achieve a high result, 
both in use and communication abilities. This is due also to the fact that the current 
focus of the Ministry of Education objectives towards improvements of ICT skills for 
students does not have a wider mass media perspective, which could strengthen the 
interest in and interconnections between traditional education and new technologies. 
 
3. Media policy in Italy 
The regulation of the Italian media includes a number of regulatory interventions that 
have been developed since the end of the Second World War. The different 
interventions, however, did not result in a comprehensive regulatory framework that 
                                                 
979 See Censis/UCSI, I media tra crisi e metamorfosi – Ottavo rapporto sulla comunicazione [The 
media between crisis and metamorphosis – Eighth Report on Communication] (2009), available at:  
http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma/Dossier/rapporto_censis_2009/SintesiOttavoComu.pdf (last 
visited on 19/10/2010).  
980 European Commission, Directorate General Information Society and Media, “Study on assessment 
criteria for media literacy levels”, available at:    
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/media_literacy/docs/studies/eavi_study_assess_crit_media_lit_levels_euro
pe_finrep.pdf (last visited on 19/10/2010).  
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coordinates the different sectors. Only recently did the Italian legislator succeed in 
codifying the patchwork of legislation on media in a unique code, but without any 
modifications brought to improve its coherence.  
The following paragraphs will provide an overview of the most relevant 
institutional actors that regulate the media and define its policy; then, the existing 
regulatory framework will be sketched analysing, first, the constitutional provisions 
related to the freedom of expression principle, then structural regulation, 
distinguishing among licensing, ownership and competition rules, and finally content 
regulation, taking into account also the rules on political advertising and on specific 
media sectors.  
 
3.1 Actors in media regulation and policy  
After a long period of retained regulatory power, the government regained its primary 
role in the Italian media policy with Law 112/2004. The most important body in this 
area is the Ministry of Economic Development. The Ministry has received the remit 
of the previous Ministry of Communication981 covering, all communication networks. 
In particular, the newly-created Department for Communications is in charge of 
monitoring compliance with the obligations related to the allocation of digital 
broadcasting authorisations and/or licences. Moreover, during the previous years of 
the Ministry’s existence, it was a preferred reference for industry representatives and 
the facilitator in the drafting and approval of numerous codes of conduct, dealing with 
issues such as the protection of minors and specific methods of sales (i.e. home 
shopping).982  
Italy was among Europe’s first countries to introduce the “single” or 
“convergence” regulator in late nineties. The Autorità per la garanzia delle 
comunicazioni, AGCOM (Italian Communication Authority) is a powerful body with 
a remit for the whole communication sector. It is an independent body created by Law 
249/1997, with the competence to monitor the press, broadcasting, electronic media 
and telecommunications.983 AGCOM started its operational activities at the end of 
July 1998, also absorbing the functions of the former Authority of Publishing and 
Press,984 while one of its first activities was Italy’s first national television frequency 
plan.985 The current functions focus on monitoring the shift towards digital 
                                                 
981 Law 85/2008 merged the Ministry of Communication and the Ministry for Foreign Trade into the 
Ministry for Economic Development, creating a specific internal Department for Communications.  
982 However, part of the doctrine acknowledges this fact as potentially spoiling the role and functions of 
the Communication Authority, which have a similar remit concerning monitoring the compliance with 
general principles. F. Bruno and G. Nava, Il Nuovo ordinamento delle comunicazioni – 
Radiotelevisione, comunicazioni elettroniche, editoria [The new telecommunication system – Radio 
and broadcasting, electronic communications, publishing] (2006), at p. 138.  
983 This body was partly created in order to comply with European Community laws, such as Directive 
90/387/EC, and partly created in response to a political crisis in the 1990s, which led to the demand for 
a stronger role for independent regulatory authorities. See G. Mazzoleni and G. Vigevani, “Italy”, p. 
884.  
984 Created by Law 416/1981.  
985 Note that, on the one hand, the fragmentation of the broadcasting sector was a legacy from the 
liberalisation of 1976, which resulted in opening the doors to a large number of small and medium 
sized operators; and on the other, the national frequency plan was a pressing need as Italy has never 
developed cable and satellite television in parallel to analogue broadcasting.  
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broadcasting, the application of antitrust laws to the telecommunication sector,986 the 
monitoring of broadcasting services in terms of quality and compliance with rules on 
advertising, politics and the protection of minors.987  
The sanctions applied by AGCOM are proportional to the gravity of the 
violation, and range from administrative sanctions of a pecuniary nature to more 
severe sanctions such as withdrawal of the licence for up to ten days.988 
The internal structure is based on a set of bodies which include: the President; 
the Commission for infrastructure and networks; the Commission for services and 
products; and the Council. There are eight Commissioners: four elected by the Senate 
and four by the Chamber of Deputies. The President of the Communications 
Regulatory Authority is appointed by the Italian President upon proposal by the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Telecommunications. However, the independence of this 
body is not guaranteed by these rules, as the voting system for the selection of the 
members could end in a duplication of the political coalitions existing in Parliament. 
This is one of the examples where resistance to eliminating the tight connection 
between the legislative and executive branches and supervisory authorities is more 
than evident in practice. 
It is important to mention that the increasing role for AGCOM concerning the 
press sector was done at the expense of the body previously responsible for them, 
namely the Presidenza del Consiglio [Executive presidential committee]. The role of 
this body was more clearly defined by Law 400/1988, which created the Department 
for information and publishing that is now still in charge of the decision concerning 
the subsidies requested by press industries.  
Within the broadcasting sector, another important body should be mentioned, 
namely the Commissione Parlamentare per l’indirizzo generale e la vigilanza dei 
servizi radiotelevisivi [Parliamentary Commission for general guidance and 
monitoring of radio and broadcasting services] (CPIV). The CPIV was created by 
Law 103/1975 in order to define and monitor compliance with public broadcasting 
principles, such as pluralism, fairness, completeness and impartiality of information, 
but it only focuses on the public service broadcaster, RAI. It does not provide a very 
detailed definition of the objectives to be met by RAI annually, so as not to limit the 
freedoms of expression and of the press, and at the same time to enhance competition 
with private broadcasters. In this way the lack of any sanctioning power of the CPIV 
should also be characterised. However, the interventions of the CPIV have been very 
few and only in very exceptional cases, as its role has always been restrained by its 
very political nature. Moreover, the CPIV [also] has an important say over the list of 
                                                 
986 In collaboration with the Autorità Garante della concorrenza e del mercato, AGCM, the Italian 
Antitrust authority. See G. Montella, “La collaborazione dell’Autorità per le garanzie nelle 
comunicazioni all’attuazione della disciplina comunitaria” [The collaboration of the communication 
Authority in the implementation of the European regulations], in M. Manetti (ed.), Europa e 
Informazione [Europe and Information] (2004) 189.  
987 In collaboration with the Commissione Parlamentare per l'indirizzo generale e la vigilanza dei 
servizi radiotelevisivi, see below.  
988 Note that AGCOM's sanctions concerning breaches of antitrust regulation have been very few, and 
they were almost trying to safeguard the status quo in particular in the broadcasting sector. See the 
exceptions of the severe sanctions imposed on RAI, RTI Mediaset and Publitalia ‘80 in 2005. See 
AGCOM, “Posizioni dominanti: sanzionia RAI, RTI e Publitalia 80” [Dominant positions: sanctions 
for RAI, RTI and Publitalia 80] (2005), available at: 
http://www2.agcom.it/provv/d_226_03_CONS.htm (last visited on 19/10/2010). 
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candidates for RAI’s board of directors.989 The fact that the composition of the CPIV 
replicates the current majority in Parliament still has a strong influence over the 
decision on candidates, impairing the steering and monitoring functions allocated to 
the body. Again it is perceivable that, despite efforts to neutralise political control 
over the media by transferring the monitoring and enforcement functions to 
independent bodies, the confusing and complicated regulatory system still leaves a lot 
of control in the hands of politicians. 
As mentioned above, the main journalist body is the ODG which is 
characterised as a guarantee of the rights and autonomy of the journalists towards 
their employers and publishers in general.990 However, the traditional structure and 
approach of ODG has been criticised, and, in this regard, the role of the Constitutional 
Court in preserving such characteristics is deemed to be very relevant, limiting any 
attempt to modify this body.991 
Another organisation that is in charge of protecting the interests of journalists 
is the Federazione Nazionale della Stampa Italiana, FNSI. This is the unitary trade 
union for the journalism profession, which includes the regional trade unions existing 
all over Italy. The FNSI role is to negotiate collective labour agreements and provide 
union services to the members.  
It is worth noting that the autonomy and independence of journalists vis-à-vis 
their employers is only protected by “conscience clauses”  included in the 
employment contract, in order for the journalist to keep her retirement contribution 
also in case of voluntary unilateral conclusion of the contract due to a change in the 
editorial orientation of the publication. However, this is only a limited shield for the 
freedom of expression of journalists, while no support has been received by the 
government through legislative intervention on this point, in particular in the current 
framework where the merger and concentration of media industries could increase 
their already greater contractual (i.e. editorial) power.  
In order to encourage a tighter connection between AGCOM and civil society, 
the Law 249/1997 also provided  for a Consiglio Nazionale degli Utenti [Users 
national council], which has recently been changed into the Consiglio Nazionale dei 
consumatori e degli utenti [Consumers and users national council].992 In particular, it 
may formulate opinions and make proposals to AGCOM, Parliament, the government 
and other public or private organs. It is composed of experts appointed by consumers’ 
associations.  
Aside from this, the participation of civil society to media policy is very 
limited at least in the institutional setting. However, the recent reactions of public 
opinion to a legislative proposal concerning the new regulation of tapping and the 
publication on the media of data concerning existing investigations used in the course 
of court proceedings should be noted. The draft proposal was deemed to reduce 
excessively the freedom of the press, and consequently the appropriate level of 
information of the citizens.993 This triggered a large debate in society which was 
                                                 
989 The list of candidates is then approved by the Ministry of Finance and presented to the members of 
the assembly of the RAI company to vote on it. See article 49 of the TUSMAR.  
990 See Constitutional Court, decision n. 2/1971 and n. 113/1974.  
991 Caretti, Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, p. 60.  
992 See article 136 of the legislative decree 206/2005.  
993 Under the latest draft, publishers face fines for publishing reports on wiretapped conversations and 
leaks of police interrogations. Journalists who report on such material face prison sentences of up to 30 
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mainly amplified by social media and Internet, and the increasing social opposition 
had the effect of shifting the timing for the approval of the law, and eventually 
introducing modifications of its content.994 
 
3.2. The media regulatory framework 
3.2.1 Freedom of expression and information  
The Italian Constitution has overcome the limited dimension offered by the previous 
constitutional act (the Statuto Albertino) which regulated only the freedom of the 
press and provided wide powers to the executive in limiting such freedom. According 
to the current wording of Article 21 of the Italian Constitution:  
"1. All have the right to express freely their own thought by word, in writing and by 
all other means of communication.  
2. The press may not be subjected to any authorisation or censorship.[...] 
5. The law may introduce general provisions for the disclosure of financial sources of 
periodical publications. 
6. Publications, performances, and other exhibits offensive to public morality shall be 
prohibited. Measures of preventive and repressive measure against such violations 
shall be established by law".  
The main points of such an expansive definition of the boundaries of  freedom 
of expression can be summarised in the existence of a double relationship: one 
between the holder of the right and the public authority legitimately able to limit the 
right, and the other between the holder of the right and the receiver of the content of 
the freedom of expression, where the public authority is in charge not only of 
providing the best conditions for the fulfilment of the freedom of expression, but also 
the best conditions for achieving  complete and impartial information for the receivers 
(i.e. the citizens).995 The holders of such rights can be citizens or foreigners, either in 
the individual or collective legal form, with this interpretation being due to the need to 
provide a space also to opinions that concern collective interests.996  
The article, moreover, distinguishes between the content of freedom of 
expression and the means by which such content can be diffused. Although it 
mentions only the press explicitly, the Italian Constitutional Court has confirmed the 
application of Article 21 to the entire broadcasting sector.997  
                                                                                                                                            
days and fines. The use of tapping information will also be restricted for prosecutors: requests to order 
phone taps, based on ‘strong evidence of a crime’, will have to be presented to a panel of judges, for 
approval; such approvals will need to be confirmed every 3 days for the tapping activity to continue. 
994 According to Italian procedural rules, a double approval by the two Chambers of the Parliament on 
the same text is required for draft laws to be adopted. The draft law was scheduled to be voted on at the 
lower house of the Parliament by late July, but this has been moved to September. If also in this 
passage modifications are adopted, the text will once again require the Senate's  approval. 
995 To the latter objective was introduced by par. 5 of the article, which was not readily implemented by 
the Italian government in the first reforms after the fall of Fascism.  
996 See Constitutional Court, decision n. 126/1985. 
997 See Constitutional Court, decision n. 59/1960.  
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The limits to freedom of expression are to be found in public morality998 
(expressly defined in Article 21), but also in the right to privacy, in state secrets,999 
and the right to honour and the protection of reputation (that the case of breach could 
be qualified as slander or defamation). On this point, the Supreme Court established a 
set of requirements to be complied with in order to frame the expression within 
freedom of information: truthfulness, moderation, and public interest.1000 This 
clarification was particularly meaningful for journalists who could use such elements 
as a more authoritative defence in comparison to the previous situation’s lack of 
points of reference.  
Regarding the application of Article 21 to electronic content, Law 70/2003 
(implementing Directive 2000/31/EC) imposes on the publishers of electronic 
journals the same obligations as pertain to traditional publishers but only in case when 
these publishers wish to apply for subsidies provided by Law 62/2001. On this point, 
a very recent decision of the Supreme Court provided for the exclusion of the 
application of Article 21 (and in particular of the specific limitations in case of 
seizures) to online discussion forums.1001 The reasoning of the judges acknowledged 
that the equalisation of discussion forums etc to the press could provide advantages, 
such as a higher guarantee of the messages left on the platforms by any user, but at the 
same time it could impose excessive burdens on the managers or owners of the 
platforms, which should as a consequence register as a publisher and be subject to tort 
and civil liability in the role of editor-in-chief.1002 This consequence could indirectly 
impair the fulfilment of freedom of expression, as it would restrain the provision of 
online forums since it would be overly burdensome for an individual to comply with 
the standards imposed on the press.  
The Italian constitutional provisions are supported by the application of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Domestic authorities are bound by their respective Articles 10 and 19 
on freedom of expression and the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas. The state is also obliged to respect Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (EU) when implementing EU law. In 2009 the Freedom 
House Index rated the media in Italy as “partly free”, with a total score of 33 points, 
zero (0) being the best.1003 Italy ranked only above Turkey, holding the 24th position 
out of 25 Western European countries.  
 
                                                 
998 Note that this concept has been updated over time, and the Constitutional Court is the body that has 
from time to time interpreted such terminology; see Constitutional Court, decision n. 9/1965; and more 
recently decision n. 368/1992.  
999 The Constitutional Court limited the extension of this concept to a very detailed definition that 
includes only information that could damage the integrity of the state. See Constitutional Court, 
decision n. 87/1977.  
1000 See Supreme Court, decision n. 4/2000.  
1001 See Supreme Civil Court, decision n. 10535/2008.  
1002 M. Nisticò, “Un recente intervento della Cassazione a proposito della problematica sussumibilità di 
internet nel paradigma costituzionale della stampa (osservazione a Cass., 11 dicembre 2008, n. 10535)” 
[A recent judgment of the Supreme Court regarding the inclusion of internet in the constitutional 
conceptualisation of the press], available at: 
http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/giurisprudenza/oss_decrilcost/index.html (last visited on 
19/10/2010). 
1003 Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having “free” media. See Freedom House, Freedom of the 
press 2009, Press freedom rankings by region, available at: 
http://freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop09/FoP2009_Regional_Rankings.pdf (last visited on 19/10/2010). 
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3.2.2 Structural regulation 
Licensing rules  
The allocation of electromagnetic spectrum in Italy has been a never-ending process 
where regulation has always tried to catch up with the evolving broadcasting market, 
resulting in preserving the positions acquired by private broadcasters (at least the 
larger one), regardless of the existence of conflicts with the opinions of the 
Constitutional Court and, recently, the Commission.  
Historically, the opening of the broadcasting market to private companies 
dates back to 1974-1976, following two landmark decisions of the Constitutional 
Court which steered the political choices on this issue. The first decision focused on 
the monopolistic position of RAI in the market.1004 The important element of the 
decision is the fact that, while acknowledging the position of RAI as public service 
broadcaster, the Court required the legislator to create an internally pluralistic public 
broadcasting system not only based on the role of  RAI, implicitly opening the 
broadcasting market to private companies. Only in 1976 with a second intervention 
did the Court clearly acknowledge the possibility for private companies to access the 
local broadcasting market.1005 However, the requests of the Constitutional Court were 
not answered by the government, leaving the market to a complete lack of regulation 
concerning access and authorisations to broadcast at the local level. The effects of this 
evasion of governmental responsibility were the creation of a commercial 
broadcasting pole that was mainly based on advertising revenues.1006  
Only in early 1990s Law 223/1990 was adopted to regulate (by legally 
endorsing it) the public/private radio-television system.1007 The law covered many 
issues, as it was the first intervention that extended its scope to the communication 
system as a whole (including the press). In particular, the law provided the criteria for 
the assignment of radio and television frequencies, with a distribution of licences 
among RAI, private networks and local broadcasters. However, the criteria and the 
following licensing plans provided by the Ministry of Communications were not 
applied and the private broadcasters that had been occupying frequencies unlawfully 
succeeded in preserving their occupation. 
The first successful intervention is to be found almost a decade later, when the 
subsequent Law 249/1997 designated the newly-created AGCOM as the responsible 
body for this issue. The success was far from complete, however, as the licences were 
allocated without the assignment of the necessary frequencies, implicitly allowing   
                                                 
1004 Constitutional Court, decision n. 226/1974.  
1005 Constitutional Court, decision n. 202/1976. Note that in the 1980s the court changed its position, 
affirming that also private national networks could be admitted into the broadcasting sector provided 
the legislator enacted suitable antitrust laws to prevent the emergence of oligopolies (Constitutional 
Court, decision n. 148/1981).  
1006 A. Pace, “La radiotelevisione in Italia con particolare riguardo alla emittenza private” [Radio and 
broadcasting in Itay with peculiar attention to private broadcasters], Riv. trim. dir. pubbl. (1987) 615; 
A. Pace, “Il sistema televisivo italiano” [The Italian broadcasting system], Pol. dir. (1997) 97. 
1007 Note that this regulation was triggered not only by the need to implement the 1989 TVWF 
directive, but it was also the long-awaited reaction to the intervention of the Constitutional Court that, 
in 1988, gave its ultimatum on the repeatedly insufficient actions of the executive. See in particular 
Constitutional Court, decision n. 826/1988.  
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the unlawful occupation of the broadcasting frequencies to continue, at the expense of 
the licensed private networks for which no frequencies remained.1008 
The existing framework was then complicated by steps taken towards the 
switch-over to digital technology. Law 66/2001 provided for distribution of the digital 
broadcasting frequencies, without specifying any significant parameters either for its 
implementation or for the assignment of frequencies to operators. The subsequent 
Law 114/2004 clearly had the objective of translating the existing duopoly of the 
analogue broadcasting system to the digital one, in particular by granting the private 
monopolist Mediaset – still officially owned by the Prime Minister Berlusconi – both 
of the digital broadcasting licences: the lawfully assigned, and the unlawfully 
occupied analogue frequencies.1009  
The situation was not improved either by the aforementioned TUSMAR which 
tried to codify into a comprehensive legislative text the vast number of regulations 
enacted since the early 1970s. The situation of the market, with the low possibility of 
access for new operators and ongoing inequalities among the networks, induced the 
Commission to react with a formal infraction procedure concerning the incorrect 
implementation of most of the “Electronic Package” directives,1010 namely Directive 
2002/21/EC, Directive 2002/20/EC, and Directive 2002/77/EC, which provided the 
new framework for electronic communications Europe-wide.1011 
The current framework took into account the opinion of the Commission and 
reformed the existing legislation, opening the digital broadcasting market also to new 
                                                 
1008 This was the case of the private network Centro Europa 7, that after a contrary decision of the 
Administrative Tribunal in Italy presented its claim at the ECJ. On 12 September 2007, the ECJ 
Advocate General criticised the Italian situation and supported Centro Europa 7’s right to be granted 
frequencies. On 31 January 2008, the ECJ confirmed the opinion of the AG by ruling on the 
“discriminatory nature” of Italian frequency allocation. See on this decision L. Pace, “Il caso “Centro 
Europa 7” dinanzi alla Corte di giustizia: ampliamento del campo di applicazione dell'article 49 TCE, 
tutela della chance del prestatore di servizi e protezione del pluralismo “esterno”” [The case Centro 
Europa 7 at the ECJ: extending the field of application of article 49 TCE, protection of service provider 
and protection of ‘esternal’ pluralism], 53 Giur. Cost. (2008) 4000; and G. Fares, “La Corte di giustizia 
certifica la contrarietà al diritto comunitario delle modalità di attribuzione delle frequenze per 
l'esercizio di impianti radiotelevisivi: un caso di provvedimento senza oggetto” [The European Court of 
justice certifies the breach of community law in the methods of allocation of broadcasting frequencies 
rights: a case of a measure without object], 18 Riv. it. dir. pubbl. Comunit. (2008) 557.  
1009 The law was the solution provided for the unconstitutionality issue acknowledged by the 
Constitutional Court in 2002 which obliged the termination of the broadcasting activities of those 
networks exceeding the ownership limits set by law no later than December 2003, which in the case of 
Mediaset meant that one of the free channels, namely Rete4, should have been stopped. See 
Constitutional Court, decision n. 284/2002. See more deeply on these issues, O. Grandinetti, “Principi 
costituzionali in materia radiotelevisiva e d.d.l. Gasparri” [Constitutional principles in broadcasting and 
the d.d.l. Gasparri], Giornale di Diritto Amministrativo (2003) 1185.  
1010 See Reasoned Opinion of the European Commission sent on the 18th July 2007, n. 2005/5086, 
C(2007) 3339.  
1011 See Directive 2002/19/EC of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and associated facilities; Directive 2002/20/EC of 7 March 2002 on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services; Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services; 
Directive 2002/22/EC of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks, Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.  
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operators which did not have a previous licence for the analogue broadcasting service, 
as required by the precedent regulation.1012  
The current framework is now based on action from AGCOM and the 
Department of Communication.1013 The law gives AGCOM the right to formulate and 
approve a national plan for the assignment of the public frequencies. The Department 
of Communication has the right to grant the relevant broadcast authorisations for the 
content providers and the network operators.1014  
The authorisations are granted for a duration of twelve years, with the 
possibility of renewal, imposing also obligations and limits on the content providers, 
namely:  
a) compliance with European production quotas;  
b) respect for the laws regarding the protection of children; and  
c) a guarantee of the rights to reply and rectification.  
Furthermore, the networks operators are limited to a single authorisation, 
either national or local,1015 while one third of potential digital frequencies is to be 
assigned to local networks operators.  
These requirements are framed within a logic that aims to treat all broadcasters 
as public entities that provide a public service and have various obligations, including 
that of offering truthful information and events in order to promote the independent 
development of opinion.1016 At the same time, licences are granted by the Department 
of Communication, essentially the Ministry, and not by the AGCOM: this for sure 
creates an “enabling environment” for dependencies between economic and political 
actors. 
 
Ownership and competition rules  
The introduction of a regulation concerning an ownership quota in media companies 
was originally formulated as a restraint on the concentration trend that has 
characterised the Italian landscape since the 1970s. Although the first intervention 
was devoted to the press industries, the following legislation covered all media, in an 
attempt to overcome uncontrolled media concentration, particularly in the 
broadcasting sector.  
The objective of Law 67/1987 was mainly to create the conditions for free 
competition in the press market, while at the same time safeguarding the right of 
citizens to be informed. The law defined the case of abuse of dominant position, 
where the dominant position is qualified as a company that directly, or indirectly 
through controlled or parent companies, publishes newspapers whose circulation is 
more than 20% of the national total, or more than 50% of the referring inter-regional 
one. The law also covers the case of concealed grouping system, given that also in 
                                                 
1012 See Law 101/2008, article 8-novies and Law 88/2009, article 45.  
1013 See AGCOM, “Approvazione del regolamento relativo alla radiodiffusione terrestre in tecnica 
digitale” [Approval of the regulation concerning the terrestrial broadcasting through digital means], 
decision 435/2001/CONS and following modifications, available at 
http://www.agcom.it/default.aspx?DocID=2115 (last visited 19/10/2010).  
1014 See the distinction introduced by Law 66/2001 between network providers and media operators. 
1015 Only the public broadcasting service provider, RAI, is allowed to have both.  
1016 See Vigevani and Mazzoleni, “Italy”, p. 895. See below for content rules.  
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this case an indirect control by one of more firms can be exercised over others. In this 
respect, the reference to the hypothesis provided by Article 2359 of the Italian Civil 
Code should be considered, which includes not only the proprietary control over 
enterprises that are controlled or parent companies, but also indirect control in the 
case of an “informal group”.1017  
Supporting the same objective were the transparency requirements imposed on 
the press industries, which were required to reveal their annual balance in which 
advertising revenues and the financing bodies or relevant shareholders should be 
publicly disclosed.  
It is important to emphasise that the same obligations and requirements were 
also to be applied to advertising agencies. The reasoning for this wide field of 
application lies in the importance that these market actors have in gathering revenues 
that can support and, consequently, allow the persistence of publishing activity. The 
legislator took into account the case in which the advertising agency, though formally 
free from shareholder quota in its client companies, can exert a strong influence upon 
them due to its role as provider of their advertising revenues. Thus, not only are 
advertising agencies obliged to register in the ROC and provide their annual balance, 
but they also have the more stringent obligation where they work exclusively with the 
press industry. In particular, any advertising agency cannot work exclusively with a 
press publisher whose circulation covers more than 30% of the total, with this 
lowering to 20% where the relationship between the two is based on proprietary 
control.  
This very powerful regulation was then reformed by Law 223/1990 which 
provided for a single set of rules, applicable regardless of the type of media. As 
mentioned above, the law tried to contain the concentration trend that was 
increasingly evident in the media sector, yet this first anti-trust regulation did not 
determine the conditions for a stronger protection for pluralism, as was its objective, 
but it ended in endorsing the existing duopoly in the broadcasting sector.  
The rules focused on three main elements:  
− the maximum number of licences assignable to a national broadcaster and the 
ban on contextual licences at the national and local level;1018 
− the limit that publishers in control of more than 16% of newspapers in 
circulation were not allowed to receive broadcasting licences;  
− the limit on advertising agencies providing advertising to more than three 
national broadcasters (or two national and three local) where they are also in a  
relationship of proprietary control with any of them.  
These limits, however, were not in compliance with the indication received 
previously from the Constitutional Court, affirming clearly that “the pluralism at 
                                                 
1017 This case refers to the hypothesis of relationships among enterprises so that one or more individuals 
take strategic and conclusive decisions about the management of all of the enterprises. This power 
could come from the fact that the individual holds majority interests in the different enterprises, as well 
as from the existence of minority interests, agreements, or relationships of a different kind. See i.a. U. 
Tombari, Il gruppo di società [Corporate group] (1997).  
1018 The licences can be distinguished on the basis of their territorial coverage they have as either 
national or local. Originally the national coverage was assigned only to the public service broadcaster, 
while the private ones could only receive the local ones. See above the effect of the decision n. 
202/1976 of the Constitutional Court.  
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national level would not be achieved by the concurrence of a public pole and of a 
private pole represented by a single entity or an entity in a dominant position in the 
private sector”.1019 This was the reason why in 1994 the same court denied the 
constitutionality of the first of the aforementioned rules, asking for a reform of the 
anti-trust system in the media sector in order to achieve pluralism. According to the 
Court, “it is not sufficient that the whole media system is characterised by a plurality 
of initiatives, but it is needed that this principle should be achieved in each and every 
sector (press, analogue television, satellite television, etc.)”.1020  
The immediate reaction was to create a transitory regime applicable up to the 
enactment of a codification of the media sector regulation, initially defined by Law 
249/1997, and subsequently by Law 112/2004.1021  
The current antitrust rules are included in the TUSMAR that codifies the 
previous piecemeal legislation, from the perspective of convergent media. The 
rationalisation resulted in a single article1022 that provides for an ex ante limit of 20% 
of the total financial resources flowing into the market, the sistema integrato della 
comunicazione [integrated communication system] (SIC), where the radio and 
television activities, the production and distribution of radio and television content, 
the publishing in form of press, books and electronic media, and the advertising 
intermediation coincide. The legal cap is reduced to 10% where in one of those 
specific sectors the revenues are already over 40% of the sector total. 
In addition, the law regulates differently the possibility for cross-media 
ownership, as it eliminate the ban on press industries accessing the broadcasting 
sector, while it still prohibits, up to the end of 2010, the possibility for national 
broadcasting enterprises to access the press sector, extending the prohibition also to 
controlled or parent companies.1023  
The ex post monitoring activity is delegated to AGCOM, which should define 
the relevant markets, and in case of the acknowledgement of a dominant position in 
the SIC or in a single market the authority can sanction the relevant enterprises and 
eventually impose measures to restore pluralism.1024  
These provisions, however, have been criticised as the SIC seems to have an 
extremely wide reach, paving the way for a further, almost uncontrolled growth of the 
                                                 
1019 See Constitutional Court, decision n. 826/1988.  
1020 See Constitutional Court, decision n. 420/1994.  
1021 Note that the latter law should be read jointly with the Law 215/2004 concerning the case of 
conflicts of interests. The law forbids the Prime Minister and other officials’ direct involvement in the 
management of corporations, albeit allowing them to retain ownership. On the transitory nature of both 
laws mentioned in the text, see C. Pannacciulli, Pluralismo e mercato nell'attività radiotelevisiva. 
Profili costituzionali [Pluralism and market in broadcasting activity. Constitutional issues] (2005), at 
p. 193; G. Azzariti, “La temporaneità perpetua, ovvero la giurisprudenza costituzionale in materia 
radiotelevisiva (rassegna critica)” [The neverending transitoriness condition, in other words the 
costitutional caselaw on broadcasting (critical review)], 40 Giur. cost. (1995) 3037; M. Dogliotti, 
“Regime definitivo e transitorio del sistema radio-televisivo” [Final and transitory rules in broadcasting 
system],  45 Giur. merito (1993) 675. 
1022 Article 43 TUSMAR.  
1023 Note that the law still refers to article 2359 of the Civil Code for the definition of  proprietary and 
non proprietary control.  
1024 On the difficulties concerning the overlap of competence of  AGCOM and the Italian antitrust 
authority in the same sector see M. Conticelli and A. Tonetti, “La difficile convivenza tra regolazione e 
antitrust: il caso delle comunicazioni elettroniche” [The difficult coexistence of regulation and anti-
trust: the case of electronic communications], 58 Riv. trim. dir. Pubbl. (2008) 71.  
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existing major broadcasters, to the detriment of potential new media operators. In 
practice, the legislator seems to rely heavily on a large increase of the content 
provided by digital broadcasting, almost replicating in the new system the loose 
control enjoyed by private companies in the analogue television market.  
The decision of the Italian legislator to include the prejudice to pluralism as an 
autonomous criterion for the evaluation of significant market power has also been 
criticised. This goes further than the obligations imposed by the European regulations 
on electronic communications.1025 As mentioned above, AGCOM should define the 
relevant markets and verify whether in any of them there is a company with a 
dominant position, i.e.  a firm possessing more than 20% of market resources (par. 9, 
Article 43, TUSMAR).1026 Contextually, the legislator couples the hypothesis of the 
dominant position with those that are “prejudicial to pluralism” (par. 5, Article 43, 
TUSMAR), which could result in a sanction for the firm that, though complying with 
the anti-trust provisions, damages the legislatively-defined level of pluralism. 
Although this choice shows that the legislator takes into account the fact that anti-trust 
provisions could not provide an efficient safeguard for pluralism without favouring 
the quality of different sources of information, in addition to their quantity, the use of 
the aforementioned 20% quota of the SIC in order to evaluate the level of pluralism, 
could not be very effective. The rule was justified so as to prevent an undue amount 
of political persuasion that could be exerted through an extremely concentrated 
market. However, a mere anti-concentration rule and a case-by-case analysis of  
AGCOM within each sector could result in a confusing situation for market actors, 
that are not aware ex ante of the elements that could interpreted as prejudicial to 
pluralism. 
 
3.2.3 Content regulation  
Since 1960 the Constitutional Court has made repeated interventions concerning the 
tools and methods to achieve the best level of information for citizens in order to 
enhance their democratic participation.1027 This reasoning has always been framed in 
the terminology of the Constitutional Court as the protection of pluralism, using it as a 
justification for the existence of a public service function, and then as the catalyst for 
the opening of the market to commercial operators. Only in more recent times has the 
Court defined this concept in a detailed manner, emphasising its internal and external 
dimensions.1028  
                                                 
1025 F. Polettini, “Tutela della concorrenza e pluralismo dell'informazione del DDL Gasparri”  
[Protection of competition and information pluralism of ddl Gasparri], 12 Dir. Ind. (2004) 149; V. 
Zeno-Zencovich, “Motivi ed obiettivi della disciplina della televisione digitale” [Rationals and 
objectives of digital television regulation], 21 Dir. Informazione e Informatica (2005) 653; A. Frignani, 
“La concorrenza nella disciplina radiotelevisiva” [Competition in radio and broadcasting regulation], 
23 Dir. Informazione e Informatica (2007) 1005.  
1026 This is already far from the current interpretation of the European rules on competition, which at 
least impose an evaluation of the existing competitors in the market and the additional abusive 
behaviour. See A. Frignani, “L'abuso di posizione dominante” [Abuse of dominant position], in A. 
Frignani and R. Pardolesi (eds), Diritto della concorrenza comunitaria [European competition law],  
(2006), 267. 
1027 See Constitutional court, decision n. 59/1960.  
1028 See Constitutional court, decision n. 474/1984.  
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The numerous judgements of the Constitutional Court, though initially finding 
a limited positive reaction from the legislator,1029 resulted in the progressive 
endorsement of pluralism among those principles operating in the audiovisual sector. 
The principle of pluralism, together with the freedom of the media and the protection 
of the freedom of speech,1030 is now accepted as one of the fundamental principles 
included in the TUSMAR, which should permeate all the legislative and regulatory 
intervention.  
In the audiovisual sector the rules are appropriate and touch upon many issues. 
For instance, users are protected both in terms of access to different types of content, 
and in terms of access to free broadcasting channels, including quantity rules for a 
sufficient number of broadcasting programmes available for free at the national and 
local level, and quality rules concerning these programs, that should cover events with 
social relevance.1031 Moreover, the codification includes general rules concerning the 
protection of fundamental principles such as the respect of dignity, and the protection 
of specific vulnerable categories of users such as minors.1032 It should be emphasised 
that the codification refers to the co-regulatory instrument approved in 2002, namely 
the Codice TV e Minori [TV and minors code of conduct], drafted by the then 
Ministry of Communication and subscribed to by the public and private broadcasters 
and the relevant associations. The reference within the TUSMAR provides wider and 
deeper monitoring powers to AGCOM, which is in charge of verifying compliance 
with the code, including the possibility of imposing direct sanctions.1033   
The aforementioned rules are applicable to any media service provider in Italy, 
regardless of their public or private legal form. However, the public service 
broadcaster is still subject to a set of special rules aiming at the promotion of 
education, civil growth and social development, and of the Italian culture and 
language as well as the preservation of national identity. These objectives are 
specified in Articles 45 and 46 TUSMAR, and in particular require that the public 
service broadcaster allocate an appropriate number of hours, including prime time, 
devoted to education, information, cultural promotion through cinema, theatre and 
musical works; provide access to programming for political parties, trade unions, 
religious groups and other associations of social interest; include programming 
destined to be broadcast abroad to promote the knowledge of the Italian language and 
culture; and include programming in minority languages.  
Moreover, the public service broadcaster must comply with the obligations 
imposed by the service contract that is defined by the Department of communication 
with RAI’s board of directors, in which are included general and specific provisions 
regarding programme type and quality. 
                                                 
1029 Ibid,.  
1030 Note that article 3 TUSMAR includes as fundamental principles, additional to those mentioned in 
the text, the objectivity, completeness and impartiality of information, the protection of copyright, the 
openness to different opinions in political, social, cultural and religious fields, the safeguarding of  
ethnic differences and of the cultural, artistic, and environmental patrimony, both at the national and 
local level, the respect for freedoms and rights, in particular dignity, health and minors' physical and 
mental development that are granted by the Constitution, the European law and the international 
agreements applicable to the Italian state. 
1031 See article 32-41 TUSMAR.  
1032 See article 34 TUSMAR.  
1033 Note that AGCOM should report annually to the Parliament concerning the activities (and the 
eventual actions) carried out in relation to the co-regulatory action.  
 296
The service contract for the three year period between 2010 and 2012 sets out 
the detail of the public service remit. It takes the new way of assessing  compliance 
with the quality level introduced in the previous service contract (2007-2009), which 
is no longer based solely on viewing figures but also includes indicators that combine 
cultural and civil enrichment, respect for the feelings of audiences, innovation, 
pluralism, independence, balance, ability to entertain and originality. These criteria 
aim to ensure that public value will permeate all types of programmes on all platforms 
instead of being measured just in terms of the inclusion of certain type of programmes 
within the schedule.1034 
The service contract also defines the main quotas on programming, which 
oblige the public service broadcaster to allocate 15% of its total annual revenue to 
producing and co-producing films and cartoons, documentaries, drama, ballet, and 
classical and popular music. RAI must also reserve at least 20% of its total 
programming on the terrestrial analogue signal to European works by independent 
producers. It is not known whether RAI fulfils these quotas, as no reports are 
available from AGCOM or RAI on this topic. There have been no changes to the 
system of quotas in the new service contract. As before, the new contract also 
envisages programming for minorities, without imposing any quotas.  
 
Rules on information provision  
In general, regarding the information provision it should be noted that the legislative 
and self-regulatory interventions agree on the fundamental role of correctness, 
completeness, and impartiality of information.1035 When looking in particular at news 
broadcasting and other radio and audiovisual information provision the TUSMAR 
specifies that they constitute a service of general interest, thus they should ensure the 
truthful presentation of facts, in order to promote the free formation of opinions, 
prohibiting at the same time any use of methodologies or techniques to manipulate 
surreptitiously the content of information.1036  
The former principle should be read together with the article concerning the 
right to act for rectification,1037 and eventually redress, in case of lack of respect to 
one’s personality, honour and dignity, or in case of broadcasting untruthful materials. 
This right, originally introduced in Law 47/1948, then confirmed in Law 69/1963 for 
press publication, requires a quick reaction from the audiovisual operator (within 48 
hours) to correct the wrongful information provided to the public;1038 however, in 
addition to this, the audiovisual operator, and the journalist in particular, could be 
charged with a crime such as libel or defamation, where specific criteria are met. In 
order to clarify this issue, the Supreme Court provided a set of criteria to be evaluated 
in order to verify the existence of defamation: the information should be truthful, thus 
                                                 
1034 See I. Katsirea, Public broadcasting and European law: a comparative examination of public 
service obligations in six member states (2008) at p. 90.  
1035 See the aforementioned article 3 TUSMAR and the premise of the “Carta dei doveri dei 
giornalisti”, drafted and subscribed to by the ODG and the FNSI (available at: 
http://www.fnsi.it/Pdf/Carte_deonto/Carta_Doveri.pdf (last visited on 19/10/2010).  
1036 See article 7, par. 2 TUSMAR.  
1037 See article 32-quinques TUSMAR.  
1038 The “Carta dei doveri dei giornalisti” imposes an obligation of rectification on journalists 
regardless of any request by the interested subject as compliance with the right of the citizens to be 
correctly informed, in particular when her error could offend or damage individuals, associations, 
communities, etc.  
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requiring the journalist to verify the reliability of her sources; the information should 
be socially relevant; and the information should be provided in a correct manner, 
avoiding any aggressive and conceited style.1039  
The corresponding self-regulatory interventions are mainly made by 
journalists and their associations, and range from an ethical code (the Carta dei doveri 
dei giornalisti [Journalists ethical code]) to a code on data protection, a code on the 
protection of minors (the Carta di Treviso [Treviso Charter]),1040 a code on the 
television broadcasting of trials,1041 and a code on health information (the Carta di 
Perugia [Perugiaa Charter]),1042 etc.  
In particular, the ethical code is a comprehensive charter that includes all the 
principles that should permeate the journalistic activity, excluding the possibility for a 
journalist to provide his name, voice, or image for an advertising campaign, where 
such activity could limit the professional autonomy of the journalist. The 
incompatibility should also be appreciated in the case of concurrent functions that 
conflict with the rigorous and exclusive research of truthful information.  
The code on data protection instead is a co-regulatory instrument1043 that has 
been drafted by the Journalist Register in collaboration with the Data Protection 
Authority. After approval by the latter, the code has been introduced as annex to 
legislative decree 196/2003, the so called Data Protection code. The code has then the 
status of primary legislation and addresses the balance between freedom of the press 
and the protection of personal data of citizens. However, the legislator did not 
consider it sufficient with respect to publication of data concerning investigations 
within court proceedings. The draft law decree on tapping,1044 which has recently 
passed the vote in the Italian Senate, intends to modify the Italian Penal and 
Procedural Codes and introduces new clauses sanctioning the behaviour of 
magistrates, journalists and publishers in case of non compliance. In particular, the act 
takes a questionable interpretation of data protection,1045 in order to limit the quantity 
and timing of the publication of information gathered through telephone interception 
in addition to any data concerning existing investigations used in the course of court 
proceedings.1046 Although the draft should still require a double approval from the 
two Chambers of the Parliament, the ensuing debate raised by public opinion and the 
criticism by civil society and journalistic associations forced the executive to rethink 
                                                 
1039 See Supreme criminal court, decision n. 3287/2000. 
1040 Available at: http://www.fnsi.it/Pdf/Carte_deonto/Carta_Treviso.pdf (last visited on 19/10/2010).  
1041 Available at: http://www.mcreporter.info/normativa/deont/processi_tv.pdf (last visited on 
19/10/2010).  
1042 Available at: http://www.odg.mi.it/node/30170 (last visited on 19/10/2010).  
1043 Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, “Codice di deontologia relativo al trattamento dei dati 
personali nell'esercizio dell'attività giornalistica” [Deontology code regarding the treatment of personal 
data in journalistic activity], Provvedimento del Garante, 29/07/1998, G.U. n. 179 (1998) available at: 
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=1556386 (last visited on 19/10/2010). 
1044 See the provisional text of the decree, Senato della Repubblica, “Norme in materia di intercettazioni 
telefoniche, telematiche e ambientali” [Rules concerning digital, environmental wiretapping], available 
at: http://www.senato.it/leg/16/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/33809.htm (last visited on 19/10/2010).  
1045 See the intervention of the Italian Data Protection Authority on this point, “Intercettazioni, Garante 
privacy: ‘giustificato allarme libertà’”, Reuters Italia, 30/06/2010, available at:  
http://it.reuters.com/article/topNews/idITMIE65T07020100630 (last visited on 19/10/2010).  
1046 Under the draft, publishers would face fines of up to €450,000 for publishing reports on wiretapped 
conversations and leaks of police interrogations. Journalists who report on such material would face 
prison sentences of up to 30 days and fines of up to €10,000. 
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the proposal and in order to revise it in a format which is more respectful to the 
principle of freedom of expression.  
 
The ‘par condicio’ as equal access to media for political parties 
The so-called par condicio [equal conditions] law, Law 28/2000, subsequently 
amended by Law 313/2003, was not only adopted to define the rules applicable to 
broadcasting and the press during election periods in order to guarantee that citizens 
have the greatest amount of knowledge about the candidate political parties, but also 
to regulate comprehensively political communication in the media, in particular the 
broadcasting sector.1047  
The general rules distinguish between political communication, defined as all 
broadcasting programmes that provide the different political positions in a dialectic 
and discursive way (e.g. a debate with participants holding different positions), and 
self-managed political communication spaces, where the communication is unilateral. 
The former should be broadcast obligatorily by public and private broadcasters at the 
national level, while the latter should be broadcast obligatorily by the public 
broadcaster where requested; in case of commercial broadcasters this is only an 
optional decision.1048  
During the election period, the rules are stricter and more detailed. In 
particular national public television stations are obliged to allocate free airtime to 
political parties, while again commercial broadcasters do not have such an obligation. 
In any case, paid political advertising on national television is forbidden in Italy. 
Moreover, the rules also concern television programs such as debates, thematic round 
tables and press conferences that are not included in the political communication as 
defined above, providing for a set of limitations and rules of behaviour also for TV 
hosts.1049  
The law attributes the monitoring and enforcement function to CPIV and 
AGCOM respectively for public and commercial broadcasters. It is worth mentioning 
that the sanctions provided are mostly compensatory, as they allow the competent 
bodies to impose the broadcasting of political communications of those parties 
damaged by unbalanced scheduling. This is more suitable than economic penalties in 
order to achieve better access conditions for political parties to the broadcasting 
sector.  
A less stringent set of rules is applicable to the press in the same period, 
imposing as a general principle the obligation for the publisher to distinguish clearly 
in publication informative content from campaigning communications. Moreover, no 
further indications are given in terms of correctness and impartiality, this being due to 
                                                 
1047 See R. Borrello, “Stampa e par condicio: riflessioni critiche sulla vigente disciplina” [Press and par 
condicio: critical observations on the current regulation], 53 Giur. Cost. (2008) 2767.  
1048 Note that the self-managed political communication spaces are subject to specific rules in terms of 
duration and content in order to guarantee their integrity and value. For instance, their duration cannot 
last for less than one minute and no more than three, and they must allow a motivated exposition of the 
political programme of the interested party. They cannot be inserted during a commercial advertising 
break and may not interrupt a programme, but have to be included in specific slots together with other 
similar messages. See article 2, 3 and 4, Law 28/2000.  
1049 See article 5, par. 3 where the law provides that television hosts “are required to have a correct 
and impartial approach running the programme, so as not to influence surreptitiously the free choice 
of the citizens”.  
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the fact that the legislator relies on a greater number of sources of information 
available to citizens in the press market in comparison to the broadcasting one, which 
can also assist in granting visibility to all political parties.  
The level of invasiveness of the legislation in the broadcasting sector is higher 
than the average level in European countries, and it has been also questioned in terms 
of compliance to the constitutional principle of freedom of the press.1050 The 
justification for the level of detail that can be found in the Italian law should be found 
in the specificity of the Italian system, where the leader of one of the main political 
parties and currently Prime Minister is still the owner of the main commercial 
competitor in the broadcasting sector. Thus, the same person can directly or indirectly 
influence the editorial choices of the majority of the information sector. From this 
perspective, the degree of detail of political communication on broadcasting can be 
interpreted as a way of rebalancing this anomaly of the Italian system.1051  
 
Rules concerning Internet content 
The recent reform addressing the aforementioned TUSMAR in order to implement 
Directive 2007/65/EC introduced in the first article of the codification that the general 
principles are applicable to “the provision of audiovisual and radio media services, 
taking into account the convergence process among the different means of 
communication, such as electronic communications, electronic publishing and 
Internet in all its applications”. However, the definition of audiovisual media services 
provided in Article 2. a) TUSMAR, referring directly to Articles 56 and 57 of the 
Treaty limited the application of the rules contained in the codification to a specific 
category of audiovisual media providers, namely those that have the objective of 
informing, entertaining or educating the public through the use of an electronic 
communication network. The article then clearly excludes the provision of  services 
that are not mainly economic and not in competition with television broadcasting, 
such as  private Internet websites (e.g. blogs) and  services consisting of the provision 
or distribution of audiovisual content produced by individual users so as to share them 
(e.g. Youtube) or to exchange them in a specific community (e.g. Facebook); the 
same exclusion is applicable to exchange of emails or text messages, and to services 
which do  not have as their main objective the provision of audiovisual content, such 
as online games, search engines, electronic versions of newspapers and magazines, 
and online gambling.  
The choice of the legislator in this case was to exclude from the field of 
application of the TUSMAR all Internet-related services that could not be interpreted 
as an organised form of audiovisual information or entertainment service provision. 
The original draft of the amending regulation imposed the obligation to register for 
any internet user who provided video content or web streaming online, regardless of 
whether they were professionals, thus imposing heavy administrative burdens on 
those users which provided such content only occasionally. Moreover, this could have 
been interpreted as an equivalence between Internet websites focused on video 
sharing and broadcasting stations, which consequently could impose not only 
registration obligations but also a stricter liability regime conflicting with the position 
of the former as an Internet intermediary provider defined through Law 70/2003. The 
                                                 
1050 See Constitutional court, decision n. 48/1964.  
1051 Caretti, Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, p.  157.  
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choice to move away, yet not so unambiguously,1052 from this situation is to be 
welcomed as providing a more reasonable implementation of the provisions of the 
AVMS directive.  
Regarding blogs and discussion forums, as mentioned above, the 
jurisprudence has clarified that these forms of online communication should not be 
subject to the same regime as the press, and in particular  the obligations of 
registration to the ROC, and the exclusion of seizures or similar preventive 
sanctions.1053 This has been confirmed also in terms of the editorial responsibility of 
the blogger or moderator of the discussion forum, as a recent decision of the Court of 
Appeal of Turin, overturning the First Instance approach, acknowledged the 
responsibility of a blogger only concerning her own produced and uploaded content, 
without any obligation to monitor  comments and intervention coming from other 
users, thus excluding any equivalence between a blogger and an editor-in-chief of an 
online newspaper.1054   
However, this exclusion does not mean that the manager of the blog or 
discussion forum is exempted from compliance with the rule concerning the 
protection of honour, reputation, personality, and the private life of persons, which is 
also applicable to any content diffused online.1055 However, it should be noted that 
another just published decision of the Supreme Court addressed the monitoring 
function of editors of online newspapers, in particular where the online publication 
could be framed as defamatory.1056 The judges acknowledged the applicability of 
Article 57 of the Penal Code concerning defamation only to newspapers published on 
paper, due to the fact that the interactivity of the Internet medium can not impose the 
obligation to verify all the materials received in form of comments and reviews by the 
editor.  
 
4. Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment  
The analysis presented in the previous paragraphs shows with sufficient clarity that 
the Italian media system is still in a period of transition, and further developments 
both in terms of legislative interventions and new balances in the market power 
allocation are likely. This situation has been determined by the evolution of 
communications technologies that do not involve only the Italian state, but the whole 
European media in general. It is also possible to argue that the technological evolution 
                                                 
1052 See that the criteria of “not mainly economic” and “not in competition with the television 
broadcasting” have been criticised due to their lack of specificity and possible extended interpretations 
by many commentators, see “Decreto Romani, meglio ma non bene”, PuntoInformatico, 02/03/2010, 
available at: http://punto-informatico.it/2823280/PI/Commenti/decreto-romani-meglio-ma-non-
bene.aspx (last visited on 19/10/2010). Moreover, the definition of non-linear audiovisual media 
service could surreptitiously include the scenario of video sharing websites, as it is defined as 
“audiovisual media service provided to the vision of programmes chosen by the user, based on a 
catalogue of programmes selected by the provider”. See article 2, lett. m), TUSMAR.  
1053 See above, par. 3.1.  
1054 See Court of Appeal Turin, 23 April 2010.  
1055 See the recent case of Vividown v. Google, where four Google executives were convicted for 
violating data protection, in connection with the on-line posting of a video showing a disabled person 
being bullied and insulted. The Milan Tribunal, while acquitted all Google executives with regard to 
the charge of defamation, sentenced three  of  them  to  a  six-months  suspended  jail  for  violation  of  
the  data protection law. See Milan Tribunal, decision n. 1972/2010.  
1056 Supreme Court, decision 1907/2010.  
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has catalysed the existing trend of the internationalisation of the problems that 
characterise the media, requiring repeated interventions by the European bodies.  
The Italian regulatory framework was developed in three main phases. The 
first, dating back to the period between the two World Wars, was based on a public 
monopoly over the means of information, including the press sector being heavily 
controlled through the obligation for journalists to adhere to mainstream political 
thinking. In this period, the State was not only the regulator of the media, but it also 
started to be involved in the organisation of the broadcasting sector, due to the 
interpretation of the broadcasting activity as falling into the category of public 
service. The final outcome of this period was the affirmation of the monopoly of the 
state over broadcasting, creating the tight relationship between political power and the 
media that still exists today.  
The second phase in the evolution of media regulation coincided with the deep 
constitutional changes which came about after the recognition of new principles and 
rights in the relationship between the State and citizens. The time period of this phase 
dates to the 1960s and 1970s, when the model of public monopoly of the broadcasting 
media declined and the concentration trend that characterised the press required a 
comprehensive regulatory framework. The debate in that period was focused mainly 
on the social impact of the media and its capability to affect the cultural and political 
education of citizens. The main reference point was the principle of freedom of 
expression, read in light of the pluralism of sources of information, yet which should 
also take into account the technical limitations applicable to specific media. Thus, the 
legislator was asked to balance the monopolistic role of the state in the media sector 
with the unavoidable needs of free and independent media. The subsequent 
interventions can be seen as a set of corrections and amendments to the existing 
framework, focusing on three axes: the balance between the role of the Parliament and 
the executive in the regulation of the media system, and in particular their respective 
roles regarding the public service broadcaster; the definition of a closer relationship 
between  media networks and  local communities; and the introduction of new forms 
of the participation of social groups in the management and use of the media, for 
instance through the creation of new consultative bodies and the definition of an 
access right for specific social groups.  
The last three decades have seen the enactment of the “third generation” 
legislation.1057 The social context has changed, and the regulation has faced new 
challenges: the acceleration of technological innovation that has eliminated the 
rationale for the scarcity of resources in broadcasting networks, the increasing 
pressure from the entrepreneurial and advertising sectors for a liberalisation and 
privatisation of broadcasting, the need to embrace the media as a converged whole 
that is no longer compartmentalised into different market sectors. The opening of the 
broadcasting market also to private or commercial television was the first step moving 
into this new framework; however, the Italian legislator did not provide sufficiently 
defined rules  that could regulate access and activities of these new market actors. 
Attempts were made to correct market abuses, introducing both ceilings for 
advertising revenues, so as to monitor funding mechanisms, and anti-trust regulations, 
in order to verify the level of concentration in the sector.  
The main points that the current framework still has not resolved are, first, the 
role of the State, that shifted from the position of editor and deliverer of the 
                                                 
1057 Caretti, Diritto dell’informazione e della comunicazione, p. 186.  
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informative activity, to a subject that is regulating and monitoring the application of 
common principles in a sector were private actors now comprise the majority. 
Secondly, the increasing importance of the independent communication authority in 
terms of regulatory functions, which is able to be more impartial due to its distance 
from political parties. However, such independence is yet to be achieved completely. 
Thirdly, the difficulties in introducing effective anti-trust rules that can limit 
concentration trends and, at the same time, regulate the flow of financial resources 
among the different media. Finally, the role of the public service broadcaster in the 
new context, that is no more a pillar for the safeguard of the internal pluralism of 
information – a role which cannot be imposed directly over private actors – but is 
more a guarantee of access for the public to new communication technologies, in an 
attempt to avoid the risk of introducing new forms of social marginalisation.  
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The case of Romania 
Cristian Ghinea and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi 
 
1. Introduction  
Romania’s troubled political and economic transition from communism to democracy 
over the past 20 years has taken a heavy toll on its media landscape. The evolution of 
mass media from total state control to a free press has been strongly linked to political 
cycles, changes in government structure and economic development.  
The metamorphosis of the media since the 1989 anti-communist revolution can be 
traced through four fairly distinct periods, dominated in turn by the state, prominent 
journalists, multinational media companies and local investors. 
• 1990-1995: The state maintains control of public television, the main source of 
information for most Romanians. Other media outlets continue to be dominated by 
former supporters of communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, who was overthrown 
and executed in 1989. 
• 1995-early 2000s: ProTV, the first truly commercial and independent station, 
begins operation. In print media, old outlets change and new ones, including some 
quality newspapers, gain circulation and prominence.  
• Early 2000s: A mixed period in which journalists’ control of major media wanes 
and that of foreign and domestic media companies grows. 
• After 2004: Local “media moguls” begin to dominate. The state is openly hostile 
but impotent. Foreign media investors retreat. 
The symbolic end to these four stages of development came in July 2010, 
when the last foreign owner of a Romanian quality newspaper raised the white flag. 
Bodo Hombach, manager of the German WAZ media company, said WAZ was 
abandoning the Romanian market because it was “distorted” by the “massive 
investment made by people who make their money in other industries and invest 
million of euros in mechanisms that artificially increase the audience.”1058 With the 
withdrawal of WAZ, Romania now has virtually no foreign investment in mainstream 
quality media. 
The history of Romania’s media since the 1989 revolution is one of radical 
change. During the communist era, the country had no samizdat media and thus no 
alternative to the official press. The only attempt to publish an illegal newspaper, led 
by Petre Mihai Bacanu in 1989, ended when the three authors were jailed. They were 
freed only after the revolution. Then, in the enthusiastic aftermath of the revolution, 
journalists began editing, printing and even directly selling countless newspapers. Just 
as quickly, however, the old guard in the profession took advantage of this media 
frenzy, and people who had previously praised Ceausescu continued to control the 
major media outlets. 
                                                 
1058 “Bodo Hombach (Grupul WAZ): Ne retragem din Romania pentru ca piata media este 
distorsionata” [We retire from Romania because the media market is distorted], Hotnews, 03/08/2010, 
available at: http://economie.hotnews.ro/stiri-media_publicitate-7658216-bodo-hombach-grupul-waz-
retragem-din-romania-pentru-piata-media-este-distorsionata.htm (last visited on 10/10/2010).  
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So in 1990, one can hardly speak of an independent media in Romania. The 
troubled political scene that year split the media, as it did Romanian society. Former 
Communist Party apparatchik Ion Iliescu and his National Salvation Front (FSN) used 
autocratic methods to maintain power. FSN dominated public television, which most 
Romanians relied on for their information. That control allowed the FSN to gain an 
overwhelming majority in the new Parliament. The voters had been persuaded to fear 
instability and reject change. Public TV portrayed the democratic opposition as 
hooligans and traitors who wanted to sell off the Romanian economy. The few 
newspapers available to the opposition were as hysterical toward Iliescu and his 
regime as the FSN’s media outlets were toward the democratic opposition.  
At the huge cost of political violence and international isolation, Iliescu’s 
regime succeeded in maintaining power until 1996. It was a wrenching period for the 
country and a frenetic one for journalists. Economic reforms were slow and 
disjointed, benefiting only a small number of corrupt officials and businessmen with 
connections to the state. Iliescu became the symbol of stagnation and failure. State 
officials tried to maintain a firm grip on the media, but failed. The state was forced to 
retreat from the industry, and a number of journalists and editors filled the gap. 
Although 1995 was a defining year, the media landscape had begun changing 
before then. In 1991, the first independent TV station started broadcasting: SOTI TV. 
The station was an amateurish attempt supported by United States democratisation 
money, but that funding prepared the ground for the first truly commercial and 
independent station in 1995: ProTV.  
In print media, old outlets changed and new ones began to dominate the 
landscape. Scanteia, the newspaper of the former Romanian Communist Party, 
changed its name after the 1989 revolution to Adevarul – The Truth. In 1990, “the 
truth” was just a metaphor, because Adevarul was a mouthpiece of the Iliescu regime, 
and its editorial leadership was under the direct control of the government. The 
journalists at the paper later rebelled, deposed the editor in chief and elected their own 
leaders. Although this did not make Adevarul a respectable newspaper, given the fact 
that the new management had a shady relationship with the politicians, control at least 
appeared to have been wrested from the state.  
In 1993, an innovative newspaper took the market by surprise. Evenimentul 
Zilei combined an aggressive style with both quality and yellow journalism. The 
paper’s owners kept a low profile, but founding journalists (and minor shareholders) 
Ion Cristoiu and Cornel Nistorescu gave its editorial stance a high profile. Two years 
later, Pro TV succeeded in ending the dominance of the public television. By the mid-
1990s, all the important newspapers were run and dominated by journalists, and most 
of them played a significant role in the opposition victory in 1996. That ended 
Iliescu’s reign, a decisive moment that put Romania into the orbit of Westernisation. 
Over the next few years, until the early 2000s, journalists slowly lost ground 
to media investors, both national and foreign. Journalists lacked the financial means to 
develop their outlets, while the investors had the money and skills to do so. But the 
period when journalists dominated major media was far from a golden era in which 
heroic media professionals strived to serve the common good. It was actually the 
moral bankruptcy of the professionals that brought their downfall, in particular three 
factors.  
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• Personalisation of the press: The media outlets were less important than their 
directors or editors-in-chief. These were Popescu’s or Nistorescu’s newspapers. The 
media stars’ personal idiosyncrasies dictated editorial policies, often for no other 
reason than, “I don’t like this or that politician.” This also led to fragmentation, as 
any journalist who began to gain notoriety tried to start his own (almost never her 
own) newspaper.  
• Uncertain revenue: The media research, marketing and advertising industry was 
new to Romania, thus higher circulation did not assure higher revenue. Moreover, 
the fragmentation of the media meant that the total circulation of the top 12 
Romanian national dailies barely reached the numbers of, for instance, the top 
newspaper in Poland. This made each unsustainable financially, and their directors 
had to negotiate both with private companies and the state to obtain advertising or 
“special deals.” The entire market became easy prey for the businessmen and 
Western media companies that entered the Romanian market in the late 1990s. 
• Lack of professional ethics: Because the directors’ opinions were in fact editorial 
policy, the journalists dismissed any discussion about journalistic ethics as personal 
attacks. The many attempts by various NGOs to talk about rules of professional 
ethics were ignored, drew little reaction or were harshly criticised. 
In the 2000s, the arrival of powerful Western media companies and the rise of 
local “media moguls” ended this short period of dominance by journalists. 
Evenimentul Zilei was bought by the Swiss Ringier, Romania Libera by the German 
WAZ, and ProTV by a regional media company. The market became less fragmented, 
but the journalists were sidelined from their positions of power and influence. 
Conflicts broke out between journalists and owners at each of the three leading 
newspapers: Evenimentul Zilei, Romania Libera and Adevarul.  
The democratic coalition that led Romania between 1996 and 2000 started 
painful reforms of the stagnant economy. The economic difficulties that followed 
made the government unpopular. The permanent conflict among the four coalition 
parties gave the impression of chaos and instability, and many Romanians began to 
feel nostalgic about Iliescu’s stable stagnation. Nevertheless, the coalition succeeded 
in putting the country on a strong pro-Western track, which led to the EU’s decision 
in December 1999 to start membership negotiations with Romania.  
During the 2000 elections, the disarray of moderate right-wing coalition 
parties led to a run-off between Ion Iliescu and the neo-fascist Corneliu Vadim Tudor, 
leader of the Greater Romania Party. The same media outlets that contributed to the 
defeat of Iliescu in 1996 had no choice but to support him to avoid a Tudor victory, 
seen as a danger to Romanian democracy. It was a mostly spontaneous campaign 
oriented against Tudor that all mainstream media supported and justified because of 
the circumstances.  
Ion Iliescu regained power, and his party, now called Social Democrat Party 
(PSD), dominated a Parliament in which the opposition was split among the 
democratic right wing and Tudor’s extremist party. Because Iliescu preferred to keep 
a low profile this time, the new strongman was Adrian Nastase, prime minister and 
formal leader of the PSD. Nastase was a pragmatist who kept the pro-Western 
tendency and succeeded in completing negotiations with the EU in 2004, with 2007 
set as the accession date. Nevertheless, Nastase and his party’s strong position led to 
some setbacks for democratisation. The media felt this change directly.  
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Freedom House evaluated and downgraded the country’s press, calling it 
“partially free.” Though not openly, Nastase tried to revive the role of the state in the 
media market by concluding shadow deals with media owners and awarding 
preferential public money to friendly media. All major media outlets owed money to 
the state from unpaid taxes, and the government and the owners made under-the-table 
deals. Essentially, these deals bought positive coverage for tax delays. 
Another strategy was to buy advertising for public companies and institutions. 
Some of these were bogus ads, such as those for airports or national railway 
companies. A civic campaign against this practice gained the European Commission 
(EC)’s support. The EC wielded great power at that moment because of conditions the 
Romanian government was required to meet to complete EU accession negotiations. 
The NGOs involved in the campaign monitored the public money spent on advertising 
and revealed that the state was the biggest single buyer, at about €5 million each year. 
At least for the print media, these funds made the difference between profit and 
economic collapse. The problem worsened in 2003-2004, when some newspapers 
such as Evenimentul Zilei were forbidden to take public money. They later raised the 
issue on the public agenda.  
Content monitoring data from that period showed Nastase to be the main 
media star on television, receiving overwhelmingly positive coverage. His image was 
more balanced in print media, and some newspapers were even openly hostile.  
Facing the PSD’s dominance, the democratic opposition united. The Democrat 
Party (PD) and National Liberal Party (PNL) made a deal to compete on a common 
ticket called D.A. Alliance (“Yes” in Romanian but also the abbreviation for “Justice 
and Truth”). The PD’s leader, Traian Basescu, was to compete with Adrian Nastase in 
the presidential race (Iliescu had reached the two-term constitutional limit), and 
Liberal leader Calin Popescu Tariceanu was to be appointed prime minister. The 2004 
parliamentary elections showed PSD and the Alliance finishing neck and neck. It was 
then up to the new president to appoint a prime minister, each side being able to reach 
a majority with the support of smaller parties and the Hungarian minority 
representatives. In a dramatic run-off, Basescu narrowly defeated Nastase and 
appointed Tariceanu as prime minister, although their personal relations were rather 
cold. 
Basescu promised to reform the state and the economy and to fight corruption. 
But he is a divisive figure, openly attacking enemies and friends and criticising public 
institutions. He defends himself by claiming that the job of a directly elected president 
is to speak for the common people.  
Romania has a rather eccentric semi-presidential system. The president 
supervises security and foreign affairs but has limited formal power outside these 
areas. Though both of Basescu’s predecessors used their presidential powers to 
influence government and public institutions, Basescu’s combative style annoyed 
other politicians and estranged Prime Minister Tariceanu. The relationship between 
Basescu and Tariceanu began to deteriorate in 2006, but the chief of the executive 
decided to expel the ministers of Basescu’s party a year later, after waiting for the EU 
accession to be completed. Romania became an EU member in January 2007, and 
Tariceanu immediately excluded Basescu’s Democrats from the government. They 
included popular Justice Minister Monica Macovei, a reformer and anti-corruption 
activist who had an important role in convincing Brussels that Romania deserved to 
be an EU member.  
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Basescu accused Tariceanu of making deals with powerful businessmen in 
search of political patronage. The political conflict between the president and the 
prime minister lasted until the new parliamentary elections in 2008. Basescu was 
isolated in his palace, with limited influence over policies, except in cases when he 
picked the fights and used the presidential power to temporarily veto legislation. He 
succeeded primarily in protecting the National Integrity Agency, a bold institution 
that charged numerous politicians with corruption. Such charges are rare in Romania. 
The influence of the European Commission, which still monitors the Romanian 
justice system, also helped. During 2007-08, the government and the ad-hoc majority 
in Parliament tried to intimidate the prosecutors by changing the legislation and 
parliamentary controls over their cases.  
Tariceanu was the leader of a minority government supported by the Social 
Democrats. The new allies succeeded in keeping Tariceanu in power, as any change 
in the government leadership would have given an advantage to Basescu (the 
president appoints the prime minister). Romania became the second European country 
in modern times (after Lithuania) to impeach a president. The Parliament took this 
decision against the advice of the Constitutional Court, which decided that although 
Basescu was an unusually outspoken president, his behaviour was within the limits of 
the Constitution. Basescu was suspended from the office for one month until a 
referendum was organised in order to confirm the Parliament’s decision.  
Basescu campaigned as a defender of the people against the oligarchy and 
though the turnout was low, won with more than 70% of the votes. Though Basescu 
was back in power, this moral victory meant little for the government, which 
continued to have the support of PSD in Parliament. The cost of this opaque 
legislative majority was that Romania reached 2008 with a 5% budget deficit in the 
last year of economic growth. The sharp increase of public spending meant an 
increase in public sector wages and pensions – the PSD’s conditions to support the 
government. The global economic crisis caught Romania with empty pockets and 
limited possibilities to increase public spending for anti-crisis economic stimuli.  
During these years, the media followed the societal trend and split sharply into 
pro- and anti-Basescu camps. Many have argued that the media encouraged this 
division. Basescu continued to criticise the owners of TV stations (see below the 
description of media conglomerates in Romania). He faced a hostile media during this 
period, with limited support from some newspapers. He tried and partially succeeded 
in making the media seem less credible, helped by the poor image of media owners. 
Basescu called them “media moguls,” and the label stuck. A conflict rose among 
journalists, with Basescu’s enemies vigorously attacking any journalist who might 
have said a nice word about the president. At the same time, the other side called the 
anti-Basescu journalists puppets of their owners.  
The 2008 parliamentary elections failed to produce a convincing majority. The 
Liberal Party of PM Tariceanu took 20%. Basescu’s Democrat Liberal Party (the 
PDL, renamed after receiving some pro-Basescu liberal defectors) and the old PSD, 
led now by the former diplomat Mircea Geoana, again finished neck and neck with 
about 30%, and with PDL having only two more MPs. The agreement between 
Liberals and Social Democrats to force the hand of Basescu in appointing their prime 
minister failed, and a historic deal was made between PDL and PSD.  
Emil Boc, the formal leader of PDL and Basescu’s right-hand man, was 
appointed prime minister, and Geoana took the second state position as leader of the 
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Senate. The two parties shared the ministries equally, but this grand coalition lasted 
less than a year. The PSD left the government and a new party was created within the 
Parliament from Liberals and PSD defectors. This new party supported Emil Boc as 
prime minister and a new clear pro-presidential majority was created. Basescu finally 
saw his dream to control the government come true. But this came when a severe 
economic crisis hit Romania, and Boc had to cut public spending, including public 
sector wages and pensions.1059  
The new measures were unpopular, and the government’s popularity and 
Basescu’s personal rating dropped to historic lows. The hostility between the 
president and a large part of Romanian media had perverse effects for both. The 
president needed public support for the necessary measures to reduce public spending, 
but the media blamed him for all the country’s economic problems. The media was 
one of the industries most affected by the economic crises, but the political wars the 
media outlets were engaged in made them vulnerable.  
  
2. The media landscape in Romania  
2.1 The media market 
The print media 
More than 1,200 new titles flooded the market within a year after the Romanian 1989 
revolution. Twenty years later, there are still about 20 Bucharest-based daily 
newspapers, 14 of them with reliable circulation figures. The larger cities in the 
country have three to four local daily newspapers, although few are able to function as 
market-oriented outlets. Most are essentially covert public relations operations for 
local politicians and business circles. 
The Romanian Audit Bureau of Circulation (BRAT) was founded in 1998 as 
an independent, not-for-profit organisation to provide reliable circulation figures. It 
was a civic initiative that included big advertisers and the main newspapers, and it 
represented a significant step forward for the media industry. Most advertising 
agencies have set the existence of a BRAT certificate as a precondition for allocating 
any advertising contract. The system is largely functional but is still often perverted 
by the influence of the state and the powerful position of the intermediaries –
especially advertising agencies that give huge rebates, mostly for the personal benefit 
of some of the industry’s executives. BRAT also developed the National Readership 
Survey (SNA), a research tool that approximates the total number of readers for 
publications and establishes their demographic profiles. 
BRAT currently audits 14 national newspapers, 65 local and regional dailies, 
and 150 weekly and monthly publications.1060   
                                                 
1059 The Constitutional Court later rejected the decision to reduce pensions, which forced the 
government to increase the VAT. 
1060 Audit Bureau of Circulations (BRAT), official website available at: www.brat.ro (last visited on 
03/08/2010). 
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Table 1: Top 10 national dailies 
 Title Circulation Category of journalism 
1 Click 332,279 Yellow 
2 Libertatea 209,465 Yellow 
3 Adevarul 141,330 Quality 
4 Cancan 114,790 Yellow 
5 Jurnalul National 77,914 Quality 
6 Gazeta Sporturilor 69,145 Sport 
7 Romania Libera 59,685 Quality 
8 PRO Sport 54,713 Sport 
9 Evenimentul Zilei 40,635 Quality 
10 Gandul 26,733 Quality 
 Total 1,126,689  
 
Note that dailies in the yellow journalism category hold three of the top five 
spots. The only quality newspaper with more than 100,000 circulation is Adevarul, 
which has an aggressive promotional policy with permanent inserts (books, movies, 
DVDs). The numbers for Adevarul represent a mean for the audited period; without 
the inserts, its circulation is half of this figure.  
 
Table 2: Top 10 regional and local dailies 
 Title Circulation Region 
1 Gazeta de Sud 22,271 Oltenia, south west 
2 Unirea 21,255 Transylvania, west 
3 Jurnal Aradean 18,751 Banat, west 
4 Jurnal Bihorean 14,364 Western Transylvania 
5 Informatia Zilei 14,300 Northern Transylvania 
6 Bihari Naplo 13,420 Western Transylvania (Hungarian language) 
7 Renasterea Banateana 12,944 Banat, west 
8 Viata Libera 9,333 Southern Moldova 
9 Monitorul de Suceava 9,304 Northern Moldova 
10 Editie speciala 9,215 Oltenia, south west 
 Total 145,157  
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The print media’s distribution system is a continuing problem. Rodipet was 
once the state monopoly for press distribution, but it was inefficient, consistently 
delayed payments to media outlets, and often paid in a preferential order. Despite 
controversy, the company was privatised but remained inefficient, lost market share 
and in 2009 went bankrupt. This caused loses of about 300,000 to 400,000 euro for 
the major publishing companies. One of them, Adevarul Holding,1061 lost 1,000,000 
euro. Some of the media conglomerates started their own distribution services. 
Adevarul Holding is leading the way, after suffering the huge loss from Rodipet’s 
bankruptcy. But the distribution market is fragmented, with many local or regional 
players. A newspaper trying to cover the entire national territory has to deal with 
numerous minor players, with separate contracts and inefficient payment systems. As 
for the subscribers, the Romanian Post Company is notoriously inefficient and 
distributes the newspapers in the afternoon, which makes the subscription system 
unattractive. 
 
The broadcast media 
Besides the six public television channels, there are eight generalist TV stations in 
Romania, three sports-oriented stations and four news stations. Realitatea TV started 
in 2001 as the first news station, trying to follow CNN’s model. Limited resources 
forced it to offer a combination of news (mostly national, with limited interest in 
foreign affairs) and endless talk shows. Realitatea never attracted large audiences but 
it did make the politicians’ agenda. Thus the model was copied.  
Antena 3 was the second TV news station, and its more aggressive attitude 
attracted some attention. Antena 3 was also firmly anti-Basescu, and largely seen as a 
propaganda tool against the President. But after a conflict between Basescu and 
Realitatea TV’s owner, that station also turned against Basescu. The two now 
compete to see which can be more anti-Basescu. The President’s response was to try 
to create his own news station, Vox TV, formally owned by a business person seen as 
close to Basescu. But the new station failed to become an influential voice. In 2008, 
public TV launched its own news station, but because of a lack of investment it 
remains largely ignored.  
The way these TV news stations operate might be seen as a metaphor for 
Romanian media: extreme fragmentation, politicisation and preferential arrangements 
between the owners and the state.  
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Table 3: Top ten TV stations (in prime time, for 20081062) 
 TV station Thousands of viewers Profile 
1 Pro TV 719 Generalist, entertaining 
2 Antena 1 540 Generalist, entertaining 
3 Acasa 403 Women’s magazines 
4 TVR 1 270 First channel of public TV 
5 Prima TV 230 Generalist, entertaining 
6 Kanal D 201 Generalist, entertaining 
7 Realitatea TV 164 News 
8 OTV 162 Generalist, entertaining 
9 Antena 3 120 News 
10 National TV 112 Generalist, entertaining 
 
Public television and radio  
Romanian Television (TVR) has six channels, but its influence has faded in the past 
few years, with its audiences collapsing. Mismanagement and political influence over 
the company took their toll. TVR is far from the powerful political instrument it was 
in 1990s. It looks now to be a behemoth incapable of reform, losing the battle with 
private stations. The main problem seems to be the direct link between the electoral 
cycles and TVR’s management changes. Under a 1995 law, TVR’s board of directors 
is appointed by the Parliament, the President and the government.  Employees also 
elect their representative on the board. Although officially the board’s term of office 
is not linked to a change of the majority in Parliament, the legislature can dismiss the 
board. Each new government treats TVR as being among the victor’s spoils. 
Efforts were made to change the law, and after 2004 a draft was negotiated in 
Parliament with the media freedom NGOs. The groups had endorsed the final version 
prepared by Raluca Turcan, head of the Media and Culture Committee of Parliament. 
But political tensions killed the project. Turcan was among the liberals to defect in 
Basescu’s party, and she lost her position within the Parliament. Basescu refused to 
appoint his own representatives to the board of TVR until the law was changed. But 
PSD and the liberals went on, appointing their own people to the board and capturing 
TVR for the following years. Alexandru Sassu was named general director of TVR, 
coming directly from the position of PR chief executive of PSD. This was against the 
tradition of appointing professionals to lead TVR, although each party had its own 
preferred professionals. Sassu’s appointment was a direct recognition that TVR was 
an instrument for his party. During his term, TVR lost audience share and is now in 
the second tier of Romanian television. After the 2008 elections, Traian Basescu took 
his revenge. He ignored the plan to change the 1995 law, and his party now dominates 
TVR’s board. Sassu was replaced by Alexandru Lazescu. 
                                                 
1062 “Audiențe TV” [Number of TV viewers], Paginademedia.ro, available at: 
http://www.paginademedia.ro/audiente-tv/ (last visited on 12/10/2010. 
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But the way general directors are now appointed is only part of TVR’s 
problem. After years of politicisation and neglect, TVR has structural problems. First, 
the political parties negotiate among them the places in the board. The people thus 
appointed act openly as representatives of their parties. They see their role as making 
the president of the party look good on TVR news. Second, after politicisation came 
incompetence and a lack of accountability. In the second half of 2008, TVR launched 
two new channels, including TVR Info, a news station. But TVR Info mostly 
transmits live static images from several public locations. TVR is directly subsidised 
by Romanians through compulsory subscriptions for households and companies. 
Though it has this competitive advantage over private stations, it still lost viewers. 
Between 2004 and 2008, TVR registered a 73% decline in total audience and its 
financial deficit for 2007 totalled 8.8 million euro.1063 TVR’s management of human 
resources also is a problem, with its perverse system of incentives. Though wages are 
substantial, they do not depend on performance. After conflicts with the management, 
some pre-eminent personalities at TVR were sidelined but continued to receive their 
salaries, because their jobs are protected by law. The situation is further complicated 
by powerful unions (which are concerned only with salaries and benefits, not ethical 
issues) and highly restrictive rules for hiring, promoting, punishing and firing people.  
While less exposed to political scandals and pressure, public radio is in only 
slightly better shape.  Maria Toghina, the young reformist manager appointed in 2005, 
actually limited reform initiatives to surface changes in order to preserve the status 
quo. She was replaced in 2009 by a representative of the Hungarian minority party, 
part of a larger deal within the government coalition.  
 
Advertisement market 
In Romania, 2008 represented an advertisement market peak, with about 540 million 
euro spent, the lion’s share going to TV stations. The biggest advertisers are the 
multinational companies such as Procter & Gamble, L’Oreal, Unilever, and Coca-
Cola. 
 
Table 4: Total advertisement spending in Romania – 2006-20101064 (million euro)   
 Media category / Year 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
TV 209 222 337 306 229 
Print 27 37 82 79 71 
Radio 23 25 35 30 23 
Out-door 35 42 70 58 40 
Internet, Cinema 14 13 16 9 6 
Total 308 339 540 482 369 
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Note the sharp decline in 2009 and 2010 caused by the economic crisis. As the 
advertising budgets of companies decreased, they tended to concentrate on what they 
considered the most effective media – TV stations. Thus the print media was 
disproportionally affected. An independent analysis of the fiscal declarations of media 
companies indicated that the print media lost 50 million euro in 2009.1065 Comparing 
this figure with the above table, it is evident that in 2009 the print media lost more 
money than total advertising revenue. Two of the pre-eminent central newspapers – 
Ziua and Cotidianul – closed in 2009. All media companies were forced to lay off 
employees, cut wages, or both.  
 
Media online 
According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the leading United 
Nations agency for information and communication technology issues, 35.5% of 
Romanians have Internet access in 2010, and the pace of growth is significant.  
 
Table 5: Internet Usage and Population Statistics 
Year No. of Users Total Population % Pop. Usage Source 
2000 800,000 22,217,700 3.6 % ITU 
2004 4,000,000 21,377,426 18.7 % ITU 
2006 4,940,000 21,154,226 23.4 % C.I. Almanac 
2007 5,062,500 21,154,226 23.9 % ITU 
2010 7,786,700 21,959,278 35.5 % ITU 
   
The online outlets are growing fast and have begun to compete with 
mainstream media. The online news portal Hotnews.ro remained one of the few 
independent influential voices operating outside the major media conglomerates. It 
often succeeds in shaping the public agenda. The online outlet also hired some 
reputable journalists from radio and TV who had fallen out of favour with big media 
owners. All print newspapers have an online version, even the smaller ones, and they 
often gather more readers than their print versions. Because the online advertising 
market is still limited, the online success of newspapers only aggravates their 
economic troubles. Some of the print outlets that failed to survive the economic crises 
remained online only, hoping to maintain their core readers until the situation 
improves.  
In 2008, BRAT started to audit the websites’ audiences. The new service is 
contested in the industry, which is hesitant to accept a unitary monitoring system, as 
was the case with print media 10 years before.   
Facebook started later in Romania and still does not have its Code of Conduct 
translated into Romanian. It regained ground in 2009–2010, and now has more than 
1.3 million Romanian users, 10 times more than the previous year. Women represent 
52% and men 47% of the users. Most are 18-27 years old, and 24% of Romanians 
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who are 19 years old have a user account, with 22% of 21 year olds. Only 6% of 
people 30-40 years old have a Facebook account. In Eastern Europe, Romania is 
behind Serbia, Bulgaria and Hungary but ahead of Moldova and Ukraine in the 
number of users.1066 Facebook is often used to organise spontaneous protests, as in 
September 2010 when over 70 journalists organised a flash mob outside the Finance 
Ministry to protest changes in the tax system. Blogging was a trend in 2007–2009, 
sparking debate over whether blogs would replace traditional media. Several 
prominent bloggers maintained public sites, but only several succeeding in making a 
living from blogging. The number of active blogs is now decreasing, and twittering 
appears to be the latest fad.  
 
News agencies 
The most important news agency is the privately owned Mediafax, which has been the 
dominant player on the market for the past decade. The state-owned AgerPress is 
largely irrelevant, both for the general public and for the journalists, because of its 
poor reporting. AgerPress is formally controlled by the Parliament, but because it is 
powerless to influence the public agenda, the legislature shows no interest in it.  
Many editors complained that Mediafax’s dominant position led to high 
prices, and an important new player arrived in 2006. The media group owned by Sorin 
Ovidiu Vintu (see the section on media conglomerates) launched the NewsIn agency 
to compete with Mediafax. The competition forced Mediafax to decrease prices and to 
be more flexible in negotiating contracts. But NewsIn did not survive the economic 
crises and in 2009 became a limited online operation.  
Media concentration 
We described in the introduction the changes in Romanian media after 1989, from a 
phase in which the state and journalists were competing for power, to the current 
situation in which the main media outlets have become concentrated in the hands of 
powerful businessmen. There are five major media concentrations in Romania, and 
we will describe them starting with the person who controls them: 
• Sorin Ovidiu Vantu: A highly controversial businessman who prefers to keep a 
low personal profile. Though he had been convicted of common felonies during the 
communist period, Vantu built his fortune by organising a network of former 
Securitate agents. In the late 1990s, he organised an investment fund that was in 
fact a Ponzi scheme that benefited from protection within the state. The fund 
eventually deprived 300,000 Romanians of their life savings. Some of the managers 
were prosecuted, but not Vantu. The media savagely attacked him, but Vantu later 
began to build his own media empire. He bought the first Romanian news TV 
station, Realitatea TV, using an off-shore entity registered in Cyprus, though he 
later acknowledged that he owned the TV station. From 2006 to 2009, Vantu 
expanded his empire to 14 print outlets, three television stations and a radio 
network. He had a policy of aggressively attracting journalists from other outlets 
with high salaries, and ended up having on his payrolls most of the pre-eminent 
journalists. This venture was never profitable, and it collapsed in 2010 when Vantu 
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restructured his investments. He sold all publications to their employees, but most 
of the outlets later disappeared. He closed the radio network and kept only 
Realitatea TV, because of the station’s influence. Vantu was openly involved in the 
2009 presidential campaign, calling for the other parties to isolate Traian Basescu, 
whom he called dangerous. Basescu in turn attacked Vantu, calling him an example 
of the oligarchy that threatens Romania. Basescu’s opponent, Mircea Geoana, paid 
a controversial night visit to Vantu four days before the election run-off. Basescu 
asked about this visit in the final electoral debate, taking everybody by surprise, 
including Geoana, who did not have a reasonable explanation. Many think this 
incident cost Geoana the victory, since Basescu won by only several thousand 
votes. 
• Dinu Patriciu: Another highly controversial businessman and former liberal 
politician, Patriciu is the richest Romanian. He was involved in the oil industry and 
later was prosecuted for manipulating the stock exchange. He became involved in 
the media industry quite recently, buying the newspaper Adevarul and creating 
Adevarul Holding, a network of print outlets with an aggressive marketing strategy. 
Adevarul Holding now owns the top circulation newspapers in the yellow and 
quality segments (see table 1). Patriciu is an old enemy of Traian Basescu, and they 
often publicly attack each other with harsh remarks. 
• Adrian Sarbu: The only one among the so-called “media moguls” whose business 
is only in media. Sarbu created the first private news agency, Mediafax, in the early 
1990s and the first professional private TV station, ProTV, in 1995. He later sold 
them to CME, a regional media organisation, and remained as CEO of the 
company. CME has outlets in Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Sarbu controls five 
television stations (Pro TV remains the leading TV station in Romania), several 
Bucharest-based publications, one radio network, a network of local newspapers, 
and the main news agency. He has not been involved in politics except during the 
Nastase government. A persistent rumour at that time was that he made a deal for 
positive coverage of the prime minister in exchange for delaying some debts 
payment the company owed to the state. Pro TV and other outlets he owned then 
almost completely withdrew from reporting politics, concentrating on 
entertainment, which is still the case. In 2008,1067 the TV stations he controlled 
received 36% of the total TV advertising volume in Romania. 
• Dan Voiculescu: A former agent of Securitate (declared as such by the Romanian 
equivalent of the Gauck Commission), Voiculescu was said to have confiscated the 
shadow money that Nicolae Ceausescu owned in foreign accounts – an accusation 
he vehemently denies. Voiculescu made money in the early 1990s in foreign trade, 
an industry that was then still controlled by the state.  Later he made money on 
favourable deals with the state in the energy sector. He started his media empire by 
creating Jurnalul National, one of the first private newspapers, and later with 
Antena 1, the second private TV station. He controls five television stations, six 
Bucharest-based publications, and a number of radio stations. His TV stations 
received 18% of total TV advertising money in 2008.1068 Most notably, his 
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company launched Antena 3, the second TV news station, which takes sides openly 
in politics. In the late 1990s, Voiculescu founded the Conservative Party (PC), a 
small party that despite its name is left-leaning. PC never entered Parliament on its 
own merits, but made deals with the Social Democrat Party to receive eligible 
places on the tickets in exchange for positive coverage for PSD in Voiculescu’s 
media. He was vice president of the Senate and led the parliamentary committee 
(called the Voiculescu Committee), which started the prosecution that led to Traian 
Basescu’s impeachment in 2007. He is a fierce opponent of the President, and his 
media outlets have always been openly anti-Basescu.  
• Ringier: This foreign company based in Switzerland was the biggest foreign 
investor in Romanian media for many years. At one point, Ringier controlled the 
leading quality newspaper (Evenimentul Zilei), the leading sport newspaper, the 
leading yellow daily (Libertatea), and the leading economic publication (Capital). 
But its market share had declined, and it sold Evenimentul Zilei and Capital to the 
Paunescu family (see below). Ringier is seen now as a minor player, only owning 
Libertatea. Serious rumours suggest that the company will soon abandon its 
operations in Romania. 
• George Constantin Paunescu: He was a trader and banker during Ceausescu`s 
regime and thus always suspected of having connections with the former Securitate. 
He made a fortune in the 1990s by taking loans from the state-controlled banks but 
never paying back the money. His brother (a former official journalist during 
communism) founded Curierul National newspaper in the early 1990s. Later, the 
family founded B1 TV, a small station with limited influence. In 2009, the 
Paunescu family entered the big league of Romanian media by buying the 
influential Evenimentul Zilei. Since its TV station, B1, was the only one that 
supported Basescu in the 2009 presidential election, the move was largely seen as 
an attempt by the President’s party to develop a friendly media conglomerate to 
balance the hostile ones, using the Paunescu family as intermediaries.  
In 2008, the six conglomerates controlled about 90% of national newspapers 
in terms of circulation. They had 45% of the television audience market,1069 counting 
together the outlets now owned by Ringier and the Paunescu family. Property 
concentration seems to be a natural process, and having six conglomerates presents no 
obvious monopoly danger. Still, when these conglomerates tend to orchestrate their 
positions, a cartelisation occurs. This was the case in the electoral campaigns in 2007 
(the impeachment referendum), 2008 (parliamentary elections) and 2009 (presidential 
elections).  
Some disagreement existed among the big owners. In 2004, a media war broke 
out between Sorin Ovidiu Vantu and Dan Voiculescu, each using his own outlets to 
attack the other. Accusations of illegal acts by Vantu flooded Voiculescu’s outlets, 
and vice versa. But the old enemies were later united by their mutual antagonism 
toward Traian Basescu. 
 
 
                                                 
1069 I. Comanescu, “Cum s-a impartit presa la moguli in 2008” [How the press was split between 
moguls in 2008], available at: http://www.comanescu.ro/cum-s-a-impartit-presa-la-moguli-in-
2008.html (last visited on 10/10/2010).  
 323
2.2 Journalists’ background and education  
In Romania, there are no formal barriers to becoming a journalist. One of the leading 
journalists’ associations discussed the possibility of requiring licences to enter the 
profession, but the idea was dropped. Journalists do need accreditation to enter certain 
institutions. The Freedom of Information Act adopted in 2001 has a special chapter 
meant to protect journalists. This came after some abuses committed by Parliament 
against journalists who reported on the institution’s spending. The act specifies 
restrictive conditions in which accreditation could be withdrawn if a journalist 
seriously disrupts an institution’s activity.  
There are 20 university journalism programs in Romania, both public and 
private. The average number of students per class is 60, so a large number of young 
would-be journalists graduate each year. But professionals in the field have doubts 
about their practical skills. A focus group consisting of senior editorial staff 
concluded that less than 20% of those who enter the profession graduated from 
journalism programs.1070  
Work force legislation in Romania is inflexible and encourages collective 
bargains, but is seldom implemented. In each industry, trade unions and owners’ 
associations negotiate collective contracts that become compulsory for the entire 
industry. The negotiators often are not representative, as both union and owners’ 
organisations are fragmented. A trade union that represents the journalists (although 
few actually belong to the organisation) signed such a collective contract with an 
owners’ association that did not include media businesses. The contract nevertheless 
became compulsory, on paper, though it was largely ignored. After this contract, the 
minimum wage for the media industry is the national one plus 10%.  Between 2005 
and 2008, the media boom led to an inflation in journalists’ salaries, and those with 
experience usually earned five to 10 times the national average wage. The entry level 
wage in a national newspaper was about 500 to 600 euro, while at the middle level the 
average was 2000 to 3000 euro. A particular problem was the widespread practice of 
splitting these amounts among permanent working contracts (with the minimum 
wage) and paying the rest in temporary intellectual rights contracts to avoid paying 
benefits such as pension and health insurance. Successive governments accepted this 
situation, although it was illegal, and the practice was seen as an informal form of 
subsidising the media industry.  
In 2009 and 2010, with the decrease in advertising revenue, most media 
outlets fired people – up to 50% of the employees in Sorin Ovidiu Vantu’s company. 
Dan Voiculescu and Adrian Sarbu cut wages 20 to 30%. To make matters worse, the 
state suddenly became severe with the previously accepted practice of avoiding social 
taxation. It was found that at Vantu’s company, even drivers were paid using the 
intellectual rights contracts. Fiscal authorities later leaked information about 
journalists’ earnings to an obscure newspaper. In August 2010, the government 
changed the law, practically forbidding the intellectual property contracts, renaming 
them “independent activities” and imposing social duties on them. To pay the new 
taxes, each journalist (but also actors, painters, and others) had to go each month to 
three different institutions – pension, health and employment authorities. This 
infuriated the journalists, and a petition calling for a fiscal strike was signed by more 
than 6000 people in August and September. The government changed the payment 
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method, but the new taxation remained in place, further decreasing media industry 
revenue.   
 
2.3 Media literacy and media status in society 
Entertainment TV draws the top audiences for television and yellow journalism the 
top circulation for print media (see tables above). Yellow and sport print newspapers 
have about 80% of total circulation. The editors blame the public for this trend,1071 
saying they just provide what their readers and viewers want: stories about rapes, 
crimes and shallow lifestyles. One recent phenomenon became known as OTV-sation. 
OTV is a local station, started with limited resources by Dan Diaconescu, a journalist. 
Without money to buy or produce content, Diaconescu simply transmitted live shows 
with bizarre topics and characters, mostly involving crime. He approached politics 
only as a matter of conspiracy and populism. OTV had some success, and gained 
some legitimacy because Diaconescu often invited President Basescu to appear on air. 
The President said he accepted because he needed to communicate with the people, 
since the other television stations were hostile toward him. As Diaconescu seemed to 
attract audiences, his practices were copied by mainstream outlets. This created the 
OTV-sation trend, in which crime and lifestyle stories also dominate the main news 
programs of mainstream stations. Diaconescu built a personal fortune of 30 million 
euro by taking unofficial payments from everyone who wanted to appear on his 
shows. In 2010, the National Anti-Corruption Office arrested Diaconescu and accused 
him of blackmailing a local mayor. He was later released and claimed the case was 
politically motivated. He declared himself disappointed by the entire political class 
and announced the formation of Party of the People. OTV suddenly became a live 
show on how to create a new party. The party is estimated by some opinion polls to 
have attracted about 10% of voters.  
The war between President Basescu and the media owners had a collateral 
victim: journalists who try to maintain balance and independence in their reporting. 
The President often attacked journalists indiscriminately. This caused his supporters 
to react sharply to any criticism of Basescu, no matter how accurate. Because the 
other side also attacked journalists without making distinctions, some professionals 
abandoned journalism all together, saying the atmosphere had become too toxic. 
 
3. Media policy in Romania 
3.1 Actors of media policy and regulation 
No ministries or other executive branches of government oversee Romanian media. 
Public television is managed by a board whose members are appointed by the 
President, the government and the Parliament. The state-owned news agency, 
AgerPress, is under direct parliamentary control. But the regulations for print media 
and electronic media differ significantly. There are no legal rules for print media, 
other than general legislation, and there is no state body to control print media. But 
TV and radio have special legislation on licensing, monitoring and limits on content. 
The National Council of Broadcasting (NAC), which is formally an autonomous body 
subordinated to the Parliament, implements the rules. The eleven NAC members are 
appointed by the President, the government, and the Parliament. As in the case of 
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public television’s board, however, this formal arrangement does not prevent the 
politicisation and political wars around the institution. The current president of NAC 
was appointed at the same time as Alexandru Sassu at TVR (see the previous chapter) 
as part of a deal between liberals and social democrats. NAC went to liberals, public 
television to the social democrats. The institution was fiercely criticised for how it 
managed the licensing process.1072  Each company that wants to obtain a licence has 
to present a complete dossier on content. But the process of evaluating the dossier was 
subjective and political favouritism was alleged. Since 2008 there have been no more 
scandals about licences, since there were no more airwave licenses to grant.  
With all its problems, NAC plays an important role in maintaining minimal 
decency standards for TV stations. Its most prominent “client” is OTV. NAC imposed 
numerous fines against OTV and even ordered a three-hour interruption of its 
broadcasting. Despite its attempts, NAC seems too weak to fight the trend toward 
triviality on Romanian television. OTC fought back and launched a campaign against 
CAN, with the slogan “Hands off the people’s television.” Although it was in its legal 
right to remove the station’s licence, NAC did not take that step. CAN also has other 
permanent “clients,” such as Mircea Badea, a television host who uses injurious 
language and even threatens to physically assault people who annoy him.  
Both OTV and Mircea Badea are popular and have good ratings, which makes 
NAC an unpopular body. It is not helped in its attempts to regulate the media by the 
secrecy in which its collective decisions are made and the lack of an appealing 
president or spokesperson to represent the institution in public debates. Some of its 
members’ behaviour further weakens the institution’s position. For instance, a person 
appointed by the President of Romania to NAC was later openly involved in the 
President’s electoral campaign. NAC has also taken on some debatable cases, such as 
the fines it decided to levy against some radio hosts who mocked the poetry of the 
“national poet” Mihai Eminescu. But such actions are allowed under freedom of 
expression, without violating the decency principles, which should be NAC’s main 
focus. In another case, NAC forbade a television advertisement about a group of 
workers destroying some architectural artifacts, saying the public might follow their 
example. 
The Romanian Press Club (RPC) was once the most influential media 
organisation in Romania. Its history provides a good illustration of how the Romanian 
media has changed since the 1990s. The club was created in late 1990s as an 
association of powerful editors and journalists who were in control of the media at 
that time. It was led by Dumitru Tinu, the leader of Adevarul newspaper. Tinu was 
himself a controversial figure. After the privatisation of the newspaper, the shares 
were distributed among the journalists. Tinu bought the shares from his colleagues, 
but the source of the money was never revealed. Tinu died in 2001, and the 
newspaper was bought from his family by Dinu Patriciu, who created the current 
Adevarul Holding around it. Under Tinu’s leadership, the club behaved as a close 
circle of powerful insiders who wanted to influence the government to their benefit. 
One of the informal rules that was rumoured to be in effect during that period said that 
members of the RPC would not hire a journalist who resigned (or was ousted) from 
another media outlet member of the club as the result of a conflict with management. 
After 2001, the club was led by Cristian Tudor Popescu, a charismatic journalist who 
worked with Tinu at Adevarul but left the newspaper after Tinu’s death to create his 
                                                 
1072 Media Sustainability Index 2005, 2006 and 2007 “Romania”. 
 326
own publication. Popescu was more respected by the community and tried for several 
years to open up the club, forming partnerships with the media specialised NGOs. But 
the club itself had to change because the media industry changed. All the powerful 
editors who controlled the newspapers sold them to investors, either foreign 
companies or local business persons. Thus, the club was led formally by a journalist, 
but the majority of its members were now corporate representatives of media 
conglomerates. The new media moguls were able to strike a deal with the politicians 
on their own and did not need the club. After he sold his newspaper to Adrian Sarbu, 
Popescu tried to rally the journalists against the owners. He split the club into two 
separate organisations. The old club remained a representative of the owners and is 
now led by a low-profile person working for Sarbu. Under Popescu’s plan, the 
journalists who formerly belonged to the club were supposed to create the Association 
of Professional Journalists to represent them. The association was created but is 
largely dormant. The rise and fall of the Romanian Press Club reflects the short story 
of the decline of the journalists’ power and the rise of the owners’ influence.  
Journalists in Romania remain generally sceptical of joining a trade union. 
MediaSind union started as a marginal voice, became more vocal during the economic 
crisis, but still was unable to do anything about the layoffs and salary cuts. Few 
journalists belong to the union, which is mostly based in the public outlets. In 2004, 
MediaSind signed a collective contract for the media industry with an association of 
owners that did not include media businesses. The companies represented in the 
Romanian Press Club rejected the contract and never fully implemented it.1073 The 
contract also established “the clause of conscience” as one of the fundamental labour 
rights for journalists, although the clause was not used by the journalists in their 
conflicts with the owners.   
The Association of Local Publishers (APEL) gathers the most important local 
newspapers in terms of circulation, mainly those audited by BRAT, the circulation 
auditing office. APEL represented its members in some important conflicts, especially 
with the Romanian Post Office, which tried to increase its fees on the distribution 
contracts. APEL also supported some training and best practices projects for members 
who are interested in dissociating themselves from the majority of local newspapers, 
which do not have reliable circulation numbers.  
Broadcasters have their own organisation, called the ARCA, which acts as a 
typical lobbying group in the interests of the industry. It is not involved in editorial 
matters. There are about 40 journalists’ associations organised as NGOs, but most are 
low-profile, inactive or ineffective.  There are some traditional media watchdog 
NGOs. Most important are the Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ), Media 
Monitoring Agency, and the Romanian Helsinki Committee. They were traditionally 
financed by money from international donors supporting democratisation. After 2007, 
when Romanian entered the European Union, the groups began to face financial 
difficulties because the country is now considered a mature democracy, and donors 
shifted their attention to other regions. The NGOs act as an informal coalition on 
political issues involving the media, for example, on legislation before the Parliament. 
They also try to create legal precedents by focusing on controversial cases involving 
freedom of expression. 
 
                                                 
1073 The contract is compulsory for the industry under the law, but the state showed little appetite for 
enforcing it. 
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3.2 The media regulatory framework 
3.2.1 Freedom of expression and information  
Most experts agree1074 that there are no problems with the legal framework in 
Romania, but enforcement is often defective. Social and political attitudes threaten 
freedom of expression more than the laws and public institutions. The Romanian 
Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and of speech. Parliament also 
changed the penal code after pressure from the European Commission during 
accession negotiations. An article in the code against spreading false information that 
could damage the country’s national interests was abandoned. In 2004, the burden of 
proof provisions were aligned with those of the European Court of Human Rights. In 
2006, after much resistance, Parliament passed a law eliminating prison terms for 
libel. The Constitutional Court later ruled that the new law was unconstitutional, 
because a person’s honour cannot be repaired with money and treated as a 
commercial matter. The court’s decision should be followed by a revised law from 
Parliament, but lawmakers did not act upon it. Legal experts debate what is the 
current situation: should Romanian judges stop sentencing people to jail after the 
court’s decision or should they fine them, following the law? Fortunately, no 
journalists have been sent to jail because of this provision, and the case seems to be 
tacitly settled in favour of abandoning jail terms.  
But journalists have been fined large amounts as damages for their reporting. 
The mayor of Constanta, Radu Mazare, won a case against journalist Feri Predescu, 
who wrote about connections between the mayor and some controversial 
businessmen. Although her article was solidly documented, Predescu was ordered to 
pay 20,000 euro to the mayor.   
  
3.2.2 Structural regulation 
The National Council of Broadcasting (NAC) is the body charged with issuing 
broadcast licences. NAC began operating in 1992 and distributed all available 
licences until 2008. There are now 387 television licences and 704 radio licences 
granted by NAC (national TV stations usually use local or regional licences to cover 
the national territory).1075 The granting process was controversial and politically 
influenced, because the media groups competed fiercely for them. In recent years, 
NAC has made some positive steps, becoming more transparent. Its website 
periodically publishes information about licence holders, including their shareholding 
structure. But NAC adopted a passive stance, publishing official information it 
receives from the broadcasters, even though there have been cases in which powerful 
people use intermediaries as formal owners. For example, Sorin Ovidiu Vantu 
controls a media empire without formally owning it.  
The transparency of the ownership is not a serious problem in Romania, 
however, because everybody knows who owns what. The political war between the 
major media owners and President Basescu raised the visibility of the ownership. The 
owners are often the real media stars of their outlets, more so than the journalists. 
                                                 
1074 Conclusion of the focus group organised for the Media Sustainability Index 2008 and 2009, 
“Romania”.  
1075 National Council of Broadcasting (NAC) official website, available at: http://www.cna.ro/-English-
.html (last visited on 30/08/2010). 
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Print and Internet outlets have no legal requirement to disclose their ownership, 
although this information is widely available.  
The broadcasting law (art. 44) contains a provision meant to prevent media 
concentration. The article states that no broadcaster should have more than 30% of a 
certain market. But it is unclear whether this is about audience, advertising or another 
indicator. It may also be the case that none of the six media conglomerates has such a 
dominant position, but this should be determined by NAC with a measuring 
instrument tailored to the provisions of Article 44.  
There are no other restrictions on ownership. Local or international 
companies, associations or religious groups may start a media business in Romania.  
 
3.2.3 Content regulation 
In order to obtain a licence from NAC, each broadcaster has to complete a dossier 
with details about the programs. The law contains no specific provisions, other than 
requiring a minimal amount of European production to balance American movie 
production. NAC is not active in monitoring the content, and there have been cases 
when broadcasters changed the content on which they obtained the licence. To protect 
children, there are provisions against pornography.  Each TV program also has to 
specify the ages it addresses, and the programs for those older than 16 must be 
broadcast later in the night.   
NAC created some special regulations to maintain the political balance of 
news and talk shows. This began in 2004, when the overwhelmingly positive 
coverage of the Nastase government triggered protests. NAC then required at least 
30% of coverage be of the opposition’s opinions. This regulation was ignored during 
the conflict between Basescu and the government, and it was difficult to determine 
who was in opposition. The major media’s hostile coverage of Basescu also was 
ignored, because the NAC was dominated by representatives of the liberals and social 
democrats.  
In 2008, liberal MP Iona Ghise and nationalist Gheorghe Funar co-sponsored a 
law that required television and radio stations to ensure that half of their news 
coverage consisted of “positive news.” The exact definition of what is “positive” 
would have been determined by NAC, but the council publicly protested against the 
law, saying it was impossible to implement. Parliament nevertheless adopted the law, 
but it was later vetoed by President Basescu.  
Various organisations have developed professional and ethics codes for 
journalists, but none has been consistently implemented. They are not even followed 
within the industry. The Romanian Press Club has its own ethics code but was not 
active in implementing it. The media companies have no internal codes and tend to 
solve problems on a case-by-case method.  
Some high-profile scandals have occurred in recent years involving journalists 
breaching elementary ethics standards. Bogdan Chireac was the first journalist in 
Romania to resign because of a conflict of interest. He was deputy director and a 
shareholder of Gandul newspaper, which was founded and led by Cristian Tudor 
Popescu. Chireac was also a daily presence on TV screens as a security and foreign 
affairs analyst. At the same time, however, he secretly owned a company that sold 
communication equipment to the Romanian secret services – the same people he was 
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analysing on TV. Another newspaper published this information, and Chireac was 
forced to resign from the newspaper. He was later involved in a case in which, 
together with another controversial journalist, Sorin Rosca Stanescu, he blackmailed 
the president of the National Integrity Agency to obtain information about some 
ministers’ foreign bank accounts. The Romanian Press Club and other media 
organisations protested his behaviour. After several months out of the public eye, 
Chireac is now a daily presence as a political pundit on Realitatea TV talk shows. His 
personal friendship with owner Sorin Ovidiu Vantu might explain his public survival 
despite the scandals.  
 
4. Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment 
The flowering and then the decline of Romanian media in the 20 years since the fall 
of communism seems to be a classic story of grandeur and decadence. The current 
domination of the industry and of the public agenda by a few media moguls also 
reflects the moral bankruptcy of several ideas that have shaped debates about the 
media for two decades: 
1) The state is bad: The communist state’s total dominance over society left 
deep marks in the collective memory. For a majority of Romanians, the state is bad on 
principle, even when it makes small attempts to regulate. Nevertheless they continue 
to expect jobs and social security from the state, as was the case with the communist 
state. “Give me all I want, but do not regulate me at all” is a common attitude. To be 
sure, the media’s consistent stand against state regulation is grounded in the early 
1990s, when journalists had to fight hard to win and maintain their autonomy from the 
state. By the late 1990s, the state had little influence over the rapidly expanding media 
industry. Since then, politicians have made numerous attempts to regulate media, but 
most in response to personal frustrations and were in fact attempts to restrain freedom 
of speech. A certain senator wants to forbid journalists from taking pictures of the 
official’s villas. Two deputies want to force television stations to broadcast positive 
and negative news in equal proportions. A minister wants the newspapers to be 
obliged to publish replies in the same space and the same fonts and characters as the 
original article. These are only a few of the ideas that became draft laws over the 
years, creating tensions and raising protests from journalists before in the end being 
abandoned.  It’s not surprising that Romanian journalists see each new proposal by a 
politician concerning media as meant to create problems for them.  
These two factors – the anti-statist mood inherited from the communist era and 
the early 1990s, and the unfortunate regulatory attempts in recent years – explain 
journalists’ opposition to the idea that the state could be helpful at all.  
We have argued that Romanian media’s evolution after communism began as 
a fight between the state and journalists and now has resulted in the domination of the 
media industry by several local investors. The journalists have maintained the 
assumption that the state is bad, and state regulations are always mere attempts to 
curtail their freedoms. This actually paved the way for the dominance of the media 
moguls. The multinational media companies that were expected and welcomed in 
1990s were unable to compete with local investors who were in search of political 
protection through the media. The state lost the battle but so did the journalists.  
2) Self-regulation works: This was the mantra of the media NGO 
community, to which both authors of this paper belonged. Given the bad image of the 
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state and the negative expectations of the authorities, self-regulation was the only 
acceptable solution to the media’s problems. But this proved to be an illusion. The 
story of the many ethics codes adopted by various associations and organisations, 
none of them properly implemented, is telling. The fragmented media market created 
fragmented professional authority. What one journalist found unacceptable, others 
found acceptable, and this created a race to the bottom in terms of ethics, principles 
and good journalistic practices. Quality journalism succumbed to the pressure of 
yellow journalism. Although the latter has bigger audiences all over Europe, in 
Romania basically no quality editorial operation functions as a sustainable business. 
You have to practice yellow journalism to survive economically. 
3) Private property is always good: To be sure, a free market in Romanian 
media created some positive results. The big media companies that invested here 
(WAZ, Ringier, Sanoma Hearst) brought sound rules and protected their journalists. 
But they did not last. They lost the battle over private property, which came with 
strings attached. 
These three false expectations are blocking attempts to find solutions to the 
Romanian media’s problems. State intervention is suspect, self-regulation does not 
work, and relying on the free market made the media little more than an instrument 
for other economic and political interests. A moment in September 2010 is 
particularly relevant. Sorin Ovidiu Vantu, one of Romania’s media moguls, was 
charged with helping a fugitive escape, and was arrested. Vantu made his fortune by 
organising an investment fund that functioned in fact as a Ponzi scheme. He acted 
using intermediaries, and Nicolae Popa was one of them. Popa was convicted of fraud 
and sentenced to 15 years in jail, but before being arrested he left Romania and was 
living as a fugitive in Indonesia. During all of this time, Vantu provided him money. 
Popa was finally arrested in Indonesia and was to be extradited to Romania. The 
Romanian prosecutors provided recordings in which Vantu is talking with Popa about 
money and strategies to avoid prosecution. Although the case was quite clear, Vantu’s 
media outlets attacked the prosecutors and debated conspiracy theories about 
Basescu’s interest in arresting Vantu. Many eminent journalists paid by Vantu 
defended him. The general impression was that a media owner is “more equal” than 
regular citizens, and that a case against them represents an attack on media freedom.  
The only sustainable solution for Romanian media is to go back to basics. 
Relationships between the state, journalists and media owners need to be redefined. 
The state should be more active in enforcing the anti-concentration rules that already 
exist but are poorly implemented. Instead of proposing and supporting measures 
meant to punish journalists, Romanian politicians should debate with their 
organisations about how to regulate the industry intelligently. The main problems of 
the profession, which now is threatened more by the owners than by the state, need to 
be addressed. Serious rules against cross-ownership and media concentration, as well 
as enforcement of the journalists’ rights as employees, could be acceptable forms of 
state regulation. But they must be openly negotiated with the journalists. Self-
regulation still must prove its benefits, but it is the only solution for improving ethical 
standards. The state and its decision-makers should accept that ethics cannot be 
enforced by authorities’ decisions. The state should support media NGOs and 
professional journalists’ associations working to make self-regulation more effective.  
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The case of Slovakia 
Andrej Školkay and Mária Ondruchová Hong with contributions by Ivan Brada and 
Ľubica Gállová 
 
1. Introduction 
The architects of the post-communist transformation in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) did not see liberal democracy as a utopian concept. However, as one of the 
revolutionists, Adam Michnik, later admitted, there was one utopian motif after all: 
the utopia of the west.1076 After 1989, Slovakia started its democratic transition under 
these utopian circumstances as part of Czechoslovakia. Unlike its more successful 
counterparts, this first utopian stage was followed by some rude awakenings1077 (in 
1993 and after 2006) and more putative utopias (1998). Slovakia suffered every 
imaginable growing pain of a new democracy (after 1989), as well as of a newly 
constituted state (1993). These perhaps unique circumstances make the Slovak case 
one of the most interesting democratic transitions in CEE, especially in the media 
sector.1078 As we shall demonstrate in this study, its media policy is no exception to 
this audacious claim. 
Media policy changes and the roles of the mass media in Slovakia were 
incongruous – particularly in the case of public service media. Two generations had 
never experienced the three most important features of the new social order:  liberal 
democracy, a market economy and a free media. This had been a major contributing 
factor to the persistent lack of political consensus concerning the financial and 
political independence of the public media from the governing political parties. 
Consequently, suspicious – and indeed, confrontational – attitudes of some Slovak 
politicians towards the criticism of the government in the media were not anomalous 
(especially in the years 1992-1998 and 2006-2010). Formally promised and legally 
guaranteed independence of the public service media has de facto never been 
accomplished. The Slovak public at large, however, accepted the watchdog role of 
journalists already by the mid 1990s.1079  
  Media policy development in Slovakia was also affected by the size of the 
country and the composition of its inhabitants. Slovakia’s population is only 5,4 
million, of which, up to 20% are estimated to be minorities. The two largest 
minorities are Hungarians (500,000) and Roma (estimated 350,000 to 400,000). While 
members of both minorities typically understand the Slovak language, most do not 
read nor buy Slovak language press.1080 Hungarians in Slovakia tend to watch foreign 
                                                 
1076 A. Michnik, “The rebirth of civil society”, public lecture at the LSE as part of the Ideas of 1989, 
Public lecture series (1999), available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/PublicLectures/PL10_TheRebirthOfCivilSociety.pdf 
(last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1077 K. Jakubowicz, Rude awakening: Social and media change in Central and Eastern Europe (2007). 
1078 A. Školkay, “Slovak government tightens its grip on the airwaves”, 8 Transition, No. 72 (1996) 18, 
and A. Školkay, “The role of the mass media in post-communist transition of Slovakia”, in S. 
Szomolányi and J. Gould (eds), Slovakia. Problems of democratic consolidation. The struggle for the 
rules of the game (1997) 187. 
1079 Ľ. Šrámek, “Verejnosť a etická samoregulácia” [The public and ethical self-regulation], 36 Otázky 
žurnalistiky No. 1 (1994) 53, at p. 53-56. 
1080 The Roma minority members in Slovakia have been socially and educationally underserved for 
years. The average literacy of Roma is lower than the national averages, thus the consumption of 
printed media in this minority is almost non-existent. 
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(Hungarian) broadcast media and buy newspapers and magazines in their native 
language.1081 Moreover, Slovaks usually also watch and read foreign Czech-language 
media.  
All these particularities of media consumption place a clear limit on the 
advertising market size and its potential for growth. Small media markets employ 
fewer journalists, and opportunities for high-level professional education and self-
development are also limited. Considering the relationship between journalism and 
politics, small countries with relatively closed cultures – such as Slovakia – run higher 
risks of nepotism and favouritism based on personal connections. 
Slovaks’ primary source of information has historically been through radio 
and television. People prefer to watch television, but significantly regard radio as 
being more trustworthy. For decades, the Public Service Radio (PSR) Slovenský 
rozhlas (SRo) has held the highest levels of public trust and, until the early 2000s, 
popularity.1082 More than 75% of Slovaks older than fourteen years listen to broadcast 
radio on a regular basis; it is the second most popular medium after television and has 
played a vital role in politics and cultural life in Slovakia. Numerous public opinion 
surveys show that throughout the 1990s, as well as in the early 2000s, Slovak radio 
was one of the most trusted institutions, compared not only to other media, but also to 
other institutions like armed forces, police, government, etc.1083 
The most popular medium in Slovakia is television. Programmes of the Slovak 
Public Service Broadcaster (PSB) Slovenská televízia (STV), as well as the news 
content of Markíza, the most influential private owned broadcast, used to be heavily 
influenced by politics. This continued throughout the late 1990s. Privately-owned 
electronic media are still critical of the government, but they have shifted from 
criticising policy substance to uncovering politicians’ encounters and scandals. Since 
2000, the influence of market forces on the daily work of the journalists has 
grown.1084 Already in 2001, Martin M. Šimečka, then editor-in-chief of the daily Sme, 
noticed a general shift from a political to an economic influence: “The power of the 
media has moved from the world of politics to that of economics. Now the world of 
business threatens the independence of the media much more than any politician 
does”.1085 
Most recently, editors’ decisions about news content have been largely shaped 
by market rules. Viewership preferences, considerable production costs, potential 
legal costs, political pressures and business interests do not favour investigative 
                                                 
1081 ENRI EAST 2008-2011, FP7-SSH collaborative research project (2008-2011), available at: 
http://ff.ucm.sk/Slovensky/Katedry/politologia/doc/machacek/strucna%20sprava%20%20ENRI%20EA
ST.pdf (last visited on 23/10/2010), at p. 6.  
1082 “ÚVVM: Najviac dôverujeme hasičom, armáde a verejnoprávnym médiám’” [IPOR: We trust 
firemen, the army and public service media most], slovakradio.sk, 2/06/2004, available at: 
http://www.slovakradio.sk/inetportal/web/index.php?lang=1&stationID=5&page=showNews&id=1655
8 (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1083 See European Commission, Directorate General Communication, Eurobarometer 72, at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/slovensko/news/eurobarometer_72_sk.htm (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1084 Z. Krútka, “Postavenie novinára v spoločnosti” [The position of the journalist in society], 49 
Otázky žurnalistiky No. 3-4 (2006), at p. 236. 
1085 M. M. Šimečka, “Ten years after: The case of Slovakia”, in P. Bajomi-Lázár and I. Hegedűs (eds), 
Media and politics (2001), at p. 201. 
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journalism.1086 In short, the long-term experience of private television networks has 
suggested that it is simply not profitable to produce such programmes. It is significant 
that in recent years and months, most investigative programmes have disappeared 
from the private networks. Watchdog journalism has become the almost exclusive 
domain of a few mainstream broadsheet newspapers and weeklies. While 
investigative programmes by the PSB could balance the entertainment focus of the 
private television networks, because the PSB is informally controlled by the 
government, it has not been courageous enough to showcase scandalous cases 
involving the governing political parties and politicians. Political investigative 
journalism by the PSB has usually been supported by superintendents only where 
opposition political parties were concerned. The most scandalous affairs of the 
governing political parties gained only minimal coverage, especially in the years 
2006-2010. There was at least one publicly known case, when the PSB was hesitant to 
televise an investigative report. In October 2009, a reporter criticised the 
government’s funding of a social enterprise in Bardejov.1087 The report was stopped 
through the personal intervention of the director just hours before the scheduled 
broadcast. The report finally aired later, but the employment contract of its author 
expired in January 2010 and has not been renewed. The PSB’s regulatory council 
found no professional impropriety on the part of the author.1088  
The ownership of the media in Slovakia is mostly foreign, but domestic media 
are present in the market as well. Three important media are still co-financed by the 
state: the public service broadcaster STV, public service radio SRo, and the news 
agency TASR. Media owners are mostly joint-stock companies, independent from the 
government. Nevertheless, the distance between the business actors and the political 
sphere has been narrowing. The nature of this new relationship lies in economics 
rather than in politics.  
The financial groups behind the media own diverse business assets and are 
keen to influence policy outcomes. In the past, this influence took quite overt forms. 
For a short period in 1997-1998, the founder and co-owner of the first independent 
television network in Slovakia (Markíza), Pavol Rusko, granted exclusively positive 
coverage to the opposition fighting against the authoritarian government of Vladimír 
Mečiar. In the early 2000s, the same owner of Markíza established a political party 
and used his network for the political promotion of this party. Rusko became the 
Minister of Economy, but his fragile party with no grassroots support survived only 
one parliamentary term (2002-2006). Even though Rusko did not have a broadcasting 
monopoly, this short development has been labelled by some Slovak scholars as 
                                                 
1086 J. Glovíčko, “Kauzy na obrazovkách skončili” [Causes on the screen are over], SME, 2/08/2010, at 
p. 5, and I. Nagyová and E. Žitňanský (eds), Korupcia na Slovensku a jej spracovanie v médiách 
[Corruption in Slovakia and its presentation in the media] (2001).  
1087 This report criticised the use of EU funds for financing social enterprises, which were under the 
purview of the Ministry of the Labour and Social Welfare.  
1088 “List Reportérov STV Rade Slovenskej televízie” [The letter of reporters of the Slovak Television 
to the Council of the STV), medialne.sk, 12/10/2009, available at: http://medialne.etrend.sk/televizia-
tlacove-spravy/list-reporterov-stv-rade-slovenskej-televizie-2.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
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Italianisation1089 or, perhaps even more precisely, Berlusconisation or 
Gaullisation.1090 
The relations between the government and journalists have been very diverse, 
depending on the preferred political style of the governing political parties. Slovakia   
became famous for its “media war” between 1993 and 1998, when the government of 
Vladimír Mečiar openly fought against most of the independent media and did not 
mind using the PSB as a government propaganda channel. The situation changed 
radically in 1998, when the reformist government of Mikuláš Dzurinda assumed 
power. Initially, the press almost exclusively supported the government. The 
popularity and the positive coverage of Dzurinda’s government gradually waned after 
the country entered the European Union (EU) in 2004. In recent years, government 
hostility towards the media returned under the auspices of the Prime Minister Robert 
Fico (2006-2010). Dissatisfied with its negative coverage and the rise of tabloid 
journalism, the government introduced strict regulation of the right to reply and the 
right to correction for print media. At the same time, the Fico government’s decision 
regarding the digital switchover practically closed the market for any new major 
broadcasting station. The new government of Iveta Radičová, who became Prime 
Minister in July 2010, promised some changes to Fico’s Press Law and radical 
changes in public service media financing. Critics of the Press Law say it establishes 
more obligations than it offers rights to the journalists. The vague formulations led 
requests for reply and corrections from hundreds of politicians and business people, 
most of them refused on formal grounds.  
Slovakia has developed most of the necessary features of an established 
democratic media landscape, as defined by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan.1091 This has 
happened in spite of insufficient media policy strategies from almost all governments 
in power since 1989. The media market has been privatised and deregulated, 
commercialised, initially de-monopolised and lately partly once more concentrated 
especially in the television sector. The depoliticisation of the selection of the public 
service media’s leadership and supervisory boards remains an issue to be resolved. 
Journalists themselves are facing a fight for higher editorial independence, better 
labour conditions, and consequently professionalisation promoted by their employers. 
 
2. The media landscape in Slovakia 
Slovakia’s media market is relatively small and limited by advertising market size.  
 
2.1 The media market 
The most popular medium is television with three main networks (including three 
channels of public service broadcasting, two major television channels with their two 
                                                 
1089 Slovenian communication Professor Slavko Splichal introduced this term. He defined the 
Italianisation as a rapid re-nationalisation of the media combined with a direct political control and 
monopoly over broadcasting. See S. Splichal, Media beyond socialism: Theory and practice in East-
Central Europe (1994).  
1090 A. Školkay, “Research on mass media in Central/Eastern Europe and Southern Europe” in M. 
Glowacki and B Ostrowska-Dobek (eds), Comparing media systems in Central Europe (2008) 27.  
1091 J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation. Southern Europe, 
South America, and post-communist Europe (1996).  
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subsidiary channels with lower viewership owned by two independent owners), one 
news television, and a number of local (municipal) and regional stations.  
There are about thirty radio broadcast channels, in addition to nine stations of 
public service radio, Slovenský rozhlas.  
The print media landscape is represented by over 1,100 titles, but circulation 
and readership surveys confirm a long-term decline. Only about 55% of adults read 
the daily press and even fewer (52%) read weeklies on a regular basis.1092 According 
to another source, almost 28% of the population read printed newspapers and more 
than 14% read online newspapers.1093  
Online media are still limited to younger generations, with the Slovak online 
community preferring entertainment instead of democratic participation.   
Untypically for such a small market, Slovakia has two newswire agencies 
(TASR, SITA).  
The print media market is the most developed media segment in Slovakia. 
While there were many attempts to establish party (or partisan) daily newspapers in 
the past, today all dailies claim to be independent from the political parties. All major 
Slovak language newspapers have different (mostly foreign) owners and there is a 
relative ideological and content competition. Two tabloid papers are market leaders 
with a combined readership of about 32% of the adult population and four remaining 
regular newspaper titles share a 22% readership.1094 The most popular paper in 
Slovakia is the tabloid Nový Čas (New Time) with a daily circulation of between 
135,000 and 150,000 copies. Almost one in every four adults in Slovakia reads this 
daily regularly, but its readership has significantly declined.1095 Its main focus is 
entertainment and sensationalism, not excluding politics. Its main competitor is one of 
the few surviving latecomers (founded in 2006), the tabloid Plus Jeden Deň (Plus One 
Day) with a circulation of approximately 60,000 copies. The third and fourth most 
popular newspapers are Sme (WeAre) and Pravda (Truth) with variable circulations 
between 50,000 and 55,000 copies and readerships of about 7-8 %. Their main 
difference is in their ideological orientation. For almost twenty years, Sme has been a 
proud fighter for liberal democracy with fiscally conservative views. Pravda, the 
successor of its communist namesake, started as a social democratic paper before 
going  through a mainstream family newspaper phase,  only to become a leftist daily 
again in 2010.1096 Both Sme and Pravda have uncovered important political 
                                                 
1092 “Čítanosť tlače a sledovanosť televízií podľa prieskumu MML-TGI” [Print readership and 
television viewership according to MML-TGI survey], medialne.sk, 4/11/2009, available at: 
http://medialne.etrend.sk/tlac-monitoring/citanost-tlace-a-sledovanost-televizii-podla-prieskumu-mml-
tgi.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1093 P. Rankov, “Slovensko a paradigmatické zmeny súvisiace s komunikáciou” [Slovakia and 
Paradigmatic Changes Related to Communication], 1 Knižnica (2009), available at: 
http://www.snk.sk/swift_data/source/casopis_kniznica/2009/januar/03.pdf (last visited on 23/10/2010) 
at p. 3-6. 
1094 V. Polakovičová, “MML-TGI: Jeseň 2009 a jar 2010 sa niesli v znamení televízií”, [Autumn 2009 
and spring 2010 were marked by televisions], StrategieONLINE, 28/05/2010, available at: 
http://www.strategie.sk/sk/sedy/prieskumy/media/mml-tgi-jesen-2009-jar-2010-niesli-v-znameni-
televizii.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1095 See “Čítanosť tlače (MML + OMV)” [Readership of the Press (MML + OMV], available at: 
http://www.strategie.sk/sk/reklama/data/media/citanost_tlace/ (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1096 G. Šipoš, “Pravda si zo svojich čitateľov robí dobrý deň”, [Pravda makes fun of its readers], Slovak 
Press Watch, 24/08/2010, available at: http://spw.blog.sme.sk/c/239202/Pravda-si-zo-svojich-citatelov-
robi-dobry-den.html#ixzz0xbkeGW5V (last visited on 2/10/2010), and T. Czwitkovics, “Denník sa 
 337
controversies and are considered leaders of watchdog journalism in Slovakia. The 
business daily Hospodárske noviny (Economy News) sells around 18,000 copies. It 
targets business and political elites and its readership is around 3%. Rather than 
covering political scandals, it provides political and business leaders with a platform 
for rational discussion and exchange. There are also special types of daily 
newspapers: the advertisement-only paper Avízo (10,000), the regional (East 
Slovakia) daily Korzár (23,000), the Hungarian-language daily Új Szó (23,000) and 
the sports daily Šport (est. 23,000).1097 
Slovakia has around thirty privately owned radio broadcasters and a network 
of public service radio (PSR) stations.1098 The Slovak PSR network has nine stations 
with the three newest broadcasting digitally only. In contrast to the past, most people 
listen to the privately owned radio stations. In the early 1990s, PSR broadcasting was 
an important agenda-setter and this still remains the most important function of radio 
broadcasting in Slovakia. The most popular radio station is Rádio Express (traffic 
updates and music) with 21-22% listenership, followed by the first PSR channel 
Rádio Slovensko with 17-18% of all listeners. Fun Rádio is in third place with 14-
15%. The music station Jemné Melódie has a listenership of 7-8%, the PSR channel of 
regional reports Rádio Regina 6-7%, and Rádio Europa 2 5-6%.1099 
There are three major television broadcasting players in Slovakia, two of them 
in private hands and one a public service broadcaster Slovenská televízia (STV).1100 
Privately held Markíza is the market leader with a 26-27% market share and about 
60% viewership. It is trailed by another private broadcaster Joj with 18% market 
share and about 35-38% viewership. The first PSB channel Jednotka is third in the 
rankings (13% market share and 25% viewership), followed by the second PSB 
channel Dvojka (6,6% market share and 3,2% viewership).1101 One specialized TV 
outlet is the news television channel TA3 with a market share of only 2%. However, it 
plays an important role in shaping elite discourse and serves as a valuable source of 
breaking news in crisis situations.  
In spite of many legislation and financing changes, Slovak PSB remains a 
politically contested terrain. In 1993-1998, it served as a propaganda channel for 
Vladimír Mečiar’s government. During the next governments of Mikuláš Dzurinda 
(1998-2006), it was perhaps less critical than desired, but stayed far away from any 
governmental propaganda. It did not return to its propagandist past during Robert 
Fico’s government (2006-2010), but it tried to ignore or to minimise the social and 
                                                                                                                                            
konečne začal správať marketingovo a smeruje na 40-percentnú cieľovku. Tá sa pri stánkoch zatiaľ 
nezbiera” [The daily has finally started to behave in a marketing way and it heads toward 40-percent 
target group. However, it does not gather at newsstands], medialne.sk, 10/09/2010, available at: 
http://medialne.etrend.sk/tlac-clanky/ako-sa-zmenila-pravda.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1097 StratégieONLINE, “Audit nákladov tlače” [Print costs audit], April 2010, available at:  
http://www.strategie.sk/sk/reklama/data/media/audit_nakladov_tlace/ (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1098 There were 48 licence holders for radio broadcast, including 15 for digital broadcast, at the end of 
2009, but not all of them actually broadcasted. See Board for Broadcasting and Retransmission, 
“Správa o stave vysielania” [Report of the state of broadcasting], available at: http://www.rada-
rtv.sk/sk/spravy/?aktualitaId=1048 (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1099 StratégieONLINE, “Počúvanosť rádií (MML + OMV)” [Radio Listenership MML + OMV], 
available at: http://www.strategie.sk/sk/reklama/data/media/pocuvanost_radii/ (last visited on 
23/10/2010). 
1100 There were 149 licence holders for TV broadcast at the end of 2009, including 16 for digital 
broadcasting. See “Správa o stave vysielania”.  
1101 Medialne.sk, “Sledovanosť TV (MML + OMV)” [TV Viewership MML + OMV], available at: 
http://www.strategie.sk/sk/reklama/data/media/sledovanost_televizii/ (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
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economic consequences of major government scandals. In addition Prime Minister 
Fico was granted far more airtime than his predecessors.1102  
Data about the broadcasting forms in Slovakia have undergone dynamic shifts 
recently. It is assumed, that satellite broadcasting (with 35% share) has been picking 
up and is now slightly ahead of the cable television (33%). About 18% of viewers use 
terrestrial (over-the-air) television broadcasting.1103 The first digital terrestrial 
multiplex started in Slovakia in December 2009. It includes most popular television 
stations and is available to 93% of the population1104. There already started analogue 
broadcast switch-off in some regions of Slovakia. 
Internet media usage is determined by lower penetration than in other 
countries in EU. In 2009, internet penetration was comparable to Bulgaria and 
Hungary, i.e. under 50% of population. Broadband penetration in Slovakia was 
similar to Bulgaria or Romania - around 10%.1105 The number of internet users 
however, has been growing steadily by 5-7% yearly since 2008. The newest data 
show that in 2010 almost 60% of the population used internet1106, most of them at 
home1107. Still, the internet gap is clear, considering that almost 30% of the population 
have never used Internet with internet users being mostly younger people (18-39 years 
old) and people with higher levels of education.  
The primary function of internet use in Slovakia seems to be information 
(primarily related to work) and entertainment. Less than a half of internet users are 
involved in chatting, blogging or online communities.1108 Approximately one third 
participate in major social networks. Internet played an important role in the 
informational campaign concerning the introduction of the Euro in 2008 and 2009. 
                                                 
1102 G. Šípoš, “Rybníček vs Nižňanský: za koho bola STV pred voľbami provládnejšia?” [Rybníček vs 
Nižňanský: Who made the Slovak Television more pro-governmental before elections?], Slovak Press 
Watch, 5/06/2010, available at: http://spw.blog.sme.sk/c/231156/Rybnicek-vs-Niznansky-za-koho-
bola-STV-pred-volbami-provladnejsia.html#t2#ixzz0vXjhHtiW (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1103 I. Krasko, “Satelit útočí na káblovku. Podľa prognóz Towercomu sa satelit tento rok stane 
rozšírenejším ako káblová TV” [Satelite attacks the cable TV. Towercome forecasts that satellite will 
become more widespread than the cable TV this year], Trend (2010), available at: 
http://www.etrend.sk/trend-archiv/rok-2010/cislo-15/satelit-utoci-na-kablovku-2.html (last visited on 
23/10/2010). 
1104 Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications, “Prvý multiplex v prevádzke”, [The first 
multiplex in service], 8/01/2010, available at: http://www.digimedia.sk/?IDe=68161 (last visited on 
23/10/2010). 
1105 P. Šebo, “Do you CEE? Internet v strednej a východnej Európe” [Internet in central and Eastern 
Europe], StratégieONLINE, 26/02/2010, available at: 
http://www.strategie.sk/files/casopis/2010/februar/Strategie02_2010_35.pdf (last visited on 
23/10/2010). 
1106 “Internetová populácia rastie, internet využívajú vyše 2 milióny Slovákov” [Internet population is 
growing; Internet has been used by more than two million Slovaks], Sme.sk, 9/05/2010, available at: 
http://pocitace.sme.sk/c/5364624/internetova-populacia-rastie-internet-vyuzivaju-vyse-2-miliony-
slovakov.html#ixzz0vpIJlQXU (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1107 TNS SK, “Počet aktívnych používateľov internetu sa medziročne zvýšil” [The number of internet 
users has increased annually], 20/05/2010, available at: http://www.itnews.sk/spravy/internet/2010-05-
20/c133687-pocet-aktivnych-pouzivatelov-internetu-sa-medzirocne-zvysil?ref=rss (last visited on 
23/10/2010). 
1108 “Podľa prieskumu TNS aktívne využíva internet 53.7 % Slovákov,” [According to the TNS survey 
the internet has been actively used by 53,7% of Slovaks], itnews, 31/03/2009, available at: 
http://www.itnews.sk/spravy/prieskumy/2009-03-31/c80720-podla-prieskumu-tns-aktivne-vyuziva-
internet-537-slovakov (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
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For 11% of the population, it was the most efficient source of Euro zone accession 
information and ranked as second in all media (after television).1109  
 All daily newspapers and most magazines have their own internet websites. In 
general, online news media takes four different forms. First, the online-only news 
websites (Aktualne.sk); second, print media websites with similar but not identical 
content and separate editorial staff (Sme and Sme.sk since 1999, Nový Čas and 
cas.sk); and third, online news based mostly on already printed content (Hospodárske 
noviny and its Hnonline.sk). Finally, the daily newspaper Pravda allows access to its 
printed version online only after 9:30 a.m.  
There is a slow but growing trend toward pay-per-read services for 
copyrighted content as well as for archives. Some print media have gone online only – 
for example the leftist weekly Slovo in July 2010. Most of the attempts to create 
online-only newspapers or cultural weeklies have suffered from a lack of advertising 
revenues and consequently ceased publication. However, there are two successful 
news websites with their own editorial staff (aktualne.sk, aktuality.sk). Both the 
public service news agency TASR and its privately held competitor SITA publish a 
limited selection of their news releases online. 
All electronic media offer limited versions of their content online. Some of 
them have created specialized news-only websites (Markíza has Tvnoviny.sk) and 
most of them have chosen to grant online access to full-length versions of their 
programmes. They include mainly news and current affairs programmes (as a result of 
copyright). 
The most successful online news portal is Sme.sk, established by the daily 
newspaper Sme. It ranks third among all internet portals and is the leader as far as 
news is concerned. In addition to its written content, Sme.sk introduced a video news 
section Tv.sme.sk and the website features many interactive tools to attract visitors. 
The most interesting of these is zajtrajsie.sme.sk which is a betting platform for 
predicting future news events. Sme.sk also features social bookmarking 
(vybrali.sme.sk) and blogging services (blog.sme.sk). The best readers’ blog entries 
are occasionally published in the printed paper. 
The second most popular news website is Topky.sk, originally co-founded by 
the market leader tabloid newspaper Nový Čas. Today, Topky.sk is a branch of the 
portal Zoznam.sk.1110 In third place is the online-only news website Aktuality.sk, a 
mixture of tabloid news with rather conservative commentaries. The top fifteen 
internet websites in Slovakia also include online news websites of major newspapers 
and television broadcasters such as Pravda (Pravda.sk), Markíza (Tvnoviny.sk) and 
Joj (Joj.sk).1111 In order to engage with its viewers, TV Markíza created a special 
section Somreporter.sk (I report), which allows its viewers to upload their news 
photos and videos for the use of TV news producers. 
                                                 
1109 “Euro: Internet bol v infokampani dôležitejší než v iných štátoch” [Euro: The internet in 
information campaign was more important than in other countries], Živé, 4/05/2009, available at: 
http://www.zive.sk/euro-internet-bol-v-infokampani-dolezitejsi-nez-v-inych-statoch/sc-4-a-
282473/default.aspx (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1110 Topky.sk (also known as Bleskovky.sk) started as a joint venture of Nový Čas and the internet 
company Zoznam.sk. Zoznam.sk unilaterally ended the cooperation with Nový Čas in April 2008 and 
took over the popular news website.  
1111  Mediaresearch and TNS, “Návštevnosť internetu” [Internet popularity], May 2010, available 
at: http://www.strategie.sk/sk/reklama/data/media/navstevnost_internetu/ (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
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Slovakia has almost 1.5 million Facebook users, dominated (82%) by younger 
generations (16 – 34 years).1112 Only a few Slovak media have established a presence 
on Facebook. The leaders are Sme with more than 39,000 fans, and the television 
news programme TV Noviny Markíza with 31,000 fans.1113 The microblog website, 
Twitter.com has only 3,080 users in Slovakia1114 and the Slovak Twitter community 
has been growing at a much slower pace than the Facebook community. Similarly to 
the situation on Facebook, Sme and TV Noviny Markíza have gained the most Twitter 
followers.1115 
Rather than social networks, personal and institutional blogs seem to be of 
greater importance as far as democratic and racist/xenophobic discussion and civil 
society development are concerned.  
Following its transformation, TASR made some of its content available online. 
Its financing, through subsidies from the Ministry of Culture, has been considered 
controversial and the new government has already undertaken to change the agency’s 
status. 
 
2.2 Journalists’ background and education 
The journalism profession in Slovakia was reborn after the fall of communism in 
1989/1990. Political elites starting the democratic transition in Slovakia preferred a 
poetic transformation, i.e. they believed professionalism would develop from the 
ethics and veracity of the writers. There have never been formal requirements for the 
journalism profession and many of the most respected journalists did not study 
journalism or indeed humanities, but technical specialisations. The lack of regulation 
also opened the gates for lower professionalism standards, a trend typically connected 
to commercialisation. Today, it is not unusual to find high school graduates or first 
year journalism students writing for the mainstream media. More than a quarter of 
journalists do not have college degree and in the group under thirty years old this 
figure is almost 40%.1116 The reason for hiring young and inexperienced writers has a 
clear monetary and (un)ethical basis: the salary costs of these journalists are lower 
than the salary expectations of professionals with relevant experience, and these 
young journalists are more willing to follow unethical orders from their superiors. 
Some observers suggest that these market pressures1117, giving preference to lower 
levels of education and experience, are major contributors to the journalism 
controversies found in Slovakia.1118 Unfortunately, the expected levels of 
professionalism and ethics have never been achieved and  this has made it much 
                                                 
1112 Facebook, “Statistics Slovakia”, available at: http://www.facebakers.com/countries-with-
facebook/SK/ (last visited on 27/09/2010). 
1113 As of 27 September 2010. 
1114 According to the auditing webpage SlovakiaTwitter.com. 
1115 As of 27 September 2010. 
1116 Krútka, “Postavenie novinára v spoločnosti”, p. 236. 
1117 R. Sťahel, “Etika v médiách” [Ethics in media], 45 Otázky žurnalistiky No. 1-2 (2002) 108, at p. 
108. 
1118 A. Školkay, “Teória a prax žurnalistiky na Slovensku” [Theory and practice of journalism in 
Slovakia], 44 Otázky žurnalistiky No. 3-4 (2001), at p. 161.  
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easier for various vested interests and lobby groups as well as public relations 
agencies to influence  media output.1119 
Journalism education in Slovakia started off with one Department of 
Journalism at Comenius University in Bratislava, established in 1952. A wealth of 
new educational opportunities have arisen since 1989, but the quality of education for 
journalists has not improved, in fact the opposite has often been the case.1120  
The Utopia of democratic media development in Slovakia faced its first threat 
in 1993, when Slovakia became an independent country. Prime Minister Vladimír 
Mečiar wanted to use the media to ‘‘build the state and nation’’. Criticism of the 
government was considered treasonous and unpatriotic, and inspired from abroad. The 
decimated press, which had only just started its professionalisation, was clearly 
divided on political lines and has never been reunited, despite journalistic supporters 
of national populism becoming marginalized. After 1998, the journalists’ enemy was 
gone and the process of professionalisation began, as did the second utopia in 
Slovakia. This lasted only about two years until it was forced out by the liberal 
market. Simply put, professionalisation was outrun by commercialisation. Decent 
progress has been made in subsequent years, but the profession is still far from being 
established and unified around a common set of journalistic standards. According to a 
survey of the non-governmental organisation Slovak Press Watch and its partners 
from 2008, almost 75% of Slovak journalists themselves claimed low professional 
levels and 56% of respondents noted low ethical levels among their colleagues.1121 In 
journalists’ own words, these two issues were the most important problems facing 
their profession. 
The problems described above originate at least partially in market pressures. 
Summarized by Z. Krútka, the chair of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists, less than 
one fifth of journalists are protected by any form of union contract. In addition, one 
third of journalists are formally freelancers, even though they actually work 
permanently for a specific outlet.1122 The total annual income of journalists is only 
slightly above the national average.1123 In the words of M. Kollár, director general of 
the newswire agency SITA: ‘The journalists’ quality and the (in)ability to pay them 
appropriately, is the first and the key reason for (lack) of quality in wire 
agencies…1124’ 
The nature of politics and business requires the use of all available tools for 
maximizing political and business power respectively. As a consequence of the 
absence of professionalisation and the strong push for commercialisation, neither 
                                                 
1119 R. Sťahel, “Etika v médiách”, p. 109, and J. Glovičko, “Rybníček: Televíziu treba resuscitova” 
[Rybníček: The television must be resuscitated], SME, 27/07/2009, available at: 
http://www.sme.sk/c/4949987/rybnicek-televiziu-treba-resuscitovat.html#ixzz0zmMQX3LI (last 
visited on 23/10/2010). 
1120 A. Školkay, “Chaos v textoch, chaos v hlavách” [Chaos in texts, chaos in heads], 16 Fórum No. 2 
(2006), at p. 3 and 11. 
1121 Slovak Press Watch et al., “Názory slovenských novinárov na vybrané otázky mediálneho 
prostredia” [Views of Slovak journalists on selected issues of the media environment] (2008), available 
at: http://www.dbm.cz/pfile/2Vysledna%20sprava.pdf (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1122 This way the employers save on tax and benefits. 
1123 Krútka, “Postavenie novinára v spoločnosti”, pp. 235-237. 
1124 K. Sudor, “Prekáža mi, že existuje TASR” [I mind the existence of TASR], SME, 31/07/2008, 
available at: http://www.sme.sk/c/3998846/miroslav-kollar-prekaza-mi-ze-existuje-tasr.html (last 
visited on 23/10/2010). 
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journalists in public service media nor those in the private media are sufficiently 
protected from these pressures.1125   
 
2.3 Media literacy and media status in society 
Considering media literacy assessment, Slovakia fares at the threshold of ‘basic’ and 
‘medium’ levels. It is not far from more developed countries like Slovenia or Poland, 
but it is fifth from the bottom among twenty-seven European Union countries.1126 The 
primary information source is television, followed by radio, print outlets and internet. 
In contrast to the first decade of democratic transition in Slovakia, modern media 
consumers choose passive roles and consume entertainment rather than analytical 
news. Mainly in the last six years, news content has shifted from substantive 
description to reporting focused on personalities, scandals and sensationalism. 
Numerous TV networks have introduced special news formats informing solely about 
crime (Kriminoviny) or showbusiness (Prominoviny, Smotánka). 
Internet use in Slovakia is focused mostly on quick information gathering, 
communication and entertainment. There is only one webpage - Azet.sk – where the 
users spend on average more than twenty minutes. In other cases, the time does not 
exceed five to six minutes. Internet discussions are usually anonymous and thus 
emotionally laden and lacking sophistication.1127 Aktualne.sk features a blog section 
designed for political and social celebrities and Trend weekly features economists’ 
opinions on its Blog.eTrend.sk. The most popular platform available to all internet 
users is Blog.Sme.sk with over 12,000 individual blogs. Estimates suggest Slovakia 
has over 20,000 bloggers.1128 
Interestingly, the 72nd Eurobarometer opinion poll from November 2009 
suggested that Slovaks had comparatively higher media trust than citizens of other EU 
countries. Approximately three out of four Slovaks trusted radio (17% above EU 
average) and television (25% above EU average) the most. The press scored lower, 
with 55% (but still 13% above EU average).1129  Refined data ranked television 
Markíza as the most objective news source for 26,4%. Second was PSB with 19,7%, 
third news broadcast TA3 with 16,5%, and  fourth Joj with  the trust of 14,9% of 
viewers. Approximately 20% of respondents did not answer the question.1130  This 
data reflect a preference for a particular television news rather than anything else. 
However, historically, the levels of trust in broadcasting reflected a bias and 
politicisation (or lack thereof) in the programming. This can be assumed from the fact 
                                                 
1125 Ľ. Rešovská, “Mestské noviny: aké sú?” [Municipal newspapers: what are they?], 19 Fórum, No.4, 
(2008), available at http://www.ssn.sk/source/np_forum/000202.pdf (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1126 European Commission, Directorate General Information Society and Media, “Study on assessment 
criteria for media literacy levels”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/media_literacy/docs/studies/eavi_study_assess_crit_media_lit_levels_euro
pe_finrep.pdf (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1127 A. Školkay, “Challenges of Regulation of the Blogosphere”, in B. Klimkiewicz (ed.), Media 
freedom and pluralism. Media policy challenges in the enlarged Europe (2010) 157. 
1128 “Koľko blogov je na sieti?” [How many blogs are on the web?], Blogovanie.net, 30/05/2009, 
available at: http://www.blogovanie.net/2009/05/kolko-blogov-je-na-sieti.html (last visited on 
23/10/2010). 
1129 See Eurobarometer 72. 
1130 “Najobjektívnejšie je spravodajstvo TV Markíza” [The most objective news is on TV Markíza], 
Tvnoviny, 28/12/2009, available at: http://tvnoviny.sk/spravy/domace/najobjektivnejsie-je-
spravodajstvo-tv-markiza.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
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that when the PSB was highly politicised, its trust sank to or below 50%. 
Traditionally, the less politicised PSR has enjoyed high trust levels in the last twenty 
years.  
Lower levels of trust for print media must be assessed in a broader context. 
First, newspaper readership is only about 50% of the population. Second, the audience 
predominantly prefers tabloid journalism. Therefore, it can be argued that all daily 
press readers (more or less) trust their paper, but that at least a section of the readers 
do not take tabloid information for granted. This seems to be a rational explanation 
for the lower trust of   print media.  
 
3. Media policy in Slovakia  
If we define policy as a course of actions adopted and pursued by a government, it 
seems that Slovakia has till 2006 not really had a proper media policy. There was only 
one well-planned media policy, drafted and implemented by Robert Fico’s 
government in 2006-2010. However, Fico’s controversial media policy decisions have 
been criticized for their reflection of the government’s distrust of independent media 
reporting as well as their compliance with the business interests of the major private 
broadcasting players (or at least some of them). The new government of Iveta 
Radičová has also set clear media policy targets. However, only the next three years 
will show how many of these political promises will be developed into real policies. 
 
3.1 Actors in media regulation and policy  
Slovak media policy is influenced primarily by governmental and, in a limited 
manner, by non-governmental institutions. While the Ministry of Culture is the most 
important actor in formulating media policy, its implementation is mostly in the hands 
of specialised councils. Further regulation is carried out through a number of other 
state and semi-state agencies. Even though the regulation of the media rests with the 
government (through legislation and personnel policy), some non-governmental 
actors are also involved with media policy in Slovakia.  
The Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic is responsible for drafting 
almost all media regulation. The Slovak parliament has significant powers to amend 
drafts or propose new regulations. The Broadcasting and Retransmission Board 
(BRB) and the Press Council (PrC) are the key players in media policy 
implementation. The BRB is a semi-state body supervising electronic media only. By 
contrast, the PrC is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) established by the major 
publishers’ and journalists’ associations and has no right to take legal actions. The 
PrC only monitors compliance with its Code of Conduct on a moral basis. Its 
decisions are not legally binding and the PrC can not sanction those who refuse to 
comply with its rulings. Due to some of its controversial decisions,1131 the credibility 
of the PrC among journalists has suffered somewhat. This situation has contributed to 
a new trend, where the courtrooms have become a major venue for the 
implementation of media policy concerning (not only) the press. As experience 
shows, this shift has given enormous advantage to politicians willing to gain revenge 
against media criticism. 
                                                 
1131 See 17 FORUM, No. 10 (2006), available at:  http://www.ssn.sk/source/np_forum/000143.pdf (last 
visited on 23/10/2010). 
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The Slovak Television Council (STC) and the Radio Council (RC) supervise 
the activities of public service electronic media. Financial arrangements are 
supervised internally by the Supervising Council and externally by the Ministry of 
Finance, and by the Parliament. Technical issues concerning digital broadcasting and 
frequency spectrum monitoring are usually under the Ministry of Transport, Post and 
Telecommunications and the Telecommunication Office. The Anti-Monopoly Office 
monitors ownership concentration and checks unfair dominance of the market. 
Non-state bodies are significantly less powerful in media policy drafting, 
implementation and assessment. The Slovak Syndicate of Journalists (SSN) with over 
2,000 members is the largest organisation. However, many of its members are only 
occasional writers and freelancers and the organisation does not seem to represent 
journalistic community at large. Its main actions in the field of media policy are 
statements and drafting of print media regulation. It creates draft legislation proposals 
and creates policy statements and papers involving both self-regulation documents 
and also ‘hard law’. Nevertheless the organization has been strongly criticised by 
some of its peers for weak leadership and its inability to fight against the unpopular 
Press law, passed in 2008. Most directly involved in the fight against the controversial 
2008  media law has been a local branch of the International Press Institute and 
Association of Publishers of Periodical Press. 
The aforementioned actors are mostly involved with policy-making. However, 
informal supervision is carried out by a few important NGOs. The independent 
Slovakpresswatch (SPW) project, carried out by the INEKO NGO, focuses on fact 
checking and suspicions of business dependency in reporting. SPW has become very 
popular for its instant revelations of factual mistakes, plagiarism or of corruption 
suspicions.1132 Important political bias reports in the media are occasionally published 
by the NGO MEMO´98.1133  
Slovakia’s journey towards a free and depoliticised media has taken a little 
longer than originally expected. In the first phase of legislative changes (after 1989) 
the process was driven internally and introduced basic principles of a free press. A 
common feature of almost all subsequent Slovak administrations has been that they 
usually lacked a comprehensive media policy strategy. Even if they had some plan, it 
was mostly vague and rarely pursued. It can be stated that Slovak political elites 
typically did not seem to be genuinely interested in the development of strategic 
media regulation and most media policy changes were products of special conditions 
under which they were created. These conditions reflected for example the accession 
process to the European Union (Law on Broadcasting and Retransmission), personal 
dissatisfaction of policy-makers with the press (Press Law), or a desire to introduce 
better governance (Laws on public service media passed in 2003 and 2004). 
 
3.2 Freedom of expression and information 
A short journey through the history of Slovakia demonstrates a strong tradition of 
censorship. In fact, there was almost no tradition of either a free media or the rule of 
law in post-communist Slovakia. 
                                                 
1132 See www.spw.blog.sme.sk (last visited on 23/10/2010).  
1133 See www.memo98.sk (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
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Fundamental changes in media legislation in Slovakia started as a result of the 
political and constitutional changes after the fall of communism. This process 
consisted of dismantling the “socialist” legal system on the one hand and 
unsuccsessful attempts at rearranging an asymmetrical constitutional federative 
system on the other hand. The former issue was reflected in the liberalisation of print 
media publishing and distribution, partial decriminalisation of writing and speech, and 
in the slower emergence of a dual media system, including attempts to denationalise 
the state-owned electronic media. The latter issue was reflected in a national push to 
separate Czech and Slovak public service media as opposed to a pressure to defend 
federal radio, television and some daily newspapers, supported by the federal 
Czechoslovak government. 
The freedom to publish, which re-emerged de iure in 1990 with changes in the 
Press Law, was, however, already present de facto in December 1989. The law failed 
to address editorial secrecy and sanctions for state organisations (including 
authorities) refusing to provide requested information. The modification of the 
Criminal Code abolished the criminalisation of activities labelled as “provocation”, 
“subversion” or “press carelessness”. However, a controversial paragraph regarding 
“defamation” remained in force for a couple of the next years. Defamation against the 
state under communism and up until the early 1990s was a crime, but this paragraph 
had never been applied and was completely removed later. Personal defamation 
including defamation of members of the government on the other hand, has been 
utilised on a number of occasions, with some success, including criminal charges, to 
muzzle journalists.  
Changes in the Civil Code have further strengthened the personal rights of 
citizens, including the right to privacy and the right to financial compensation for 
illegal interference in their private life, honour and dignity. An amendment to the 
press law allowed foreign capital entry to the print media market. The Constitution of 
the Slovak Republic, passed in 1992, established media freedom and freedom of 
expression at a constitutional level. The Constitutional Court and the European Court 
of Human Rights have proven to be very important institutions of last appeal. 
Federal Act No. 136, passed in 1991, divided the rights and duties in 
broadcasting between the federal government and the two national governments. The 
national Acts No. 254 and Act No. 255, also adopted in 1991, legalised the (de facto 
already functioning) national public service media institutions: Slovak Television and 
Slovak Radio. These were the first laws in CEE establishing public media institutions, 
based on the experiences of Austria and Germany. This regulation, however, 
established partial dependency of the media on the state budget, which was later 
politically abused.1134 The public service media were financed through obligatory 
fees, yet until 1995 there were no legal sanctions against those who did not pay. A 
viable effort to enforce the law and to collect these fees occurred only in the 2000s.  
A dual broadcasting system was introduced in 1991 through Law 468/1991. 
Although amended in several instances, this principal regulation remained in effect 
for nine years, until its replacement in 2000 (by Law 308). A regulatory licensing 
body, the Council of the Slovak Republic for Radio and Television Broadcasting 
(later renamed), was established in 1992 under Act No. 294.  
                                                 
1134 A. Školkay, “The fight over public broadcasting in the first year of Slovak independence”, 3 South 
East European MONITOR No.5 (1996) 23. 
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Amendments in 1992 and 1993 changed the method of selection and election 
of supervisory council members in the public service media. What had initially started 
as independent bodies, changed in 1993, when the councils began to become 
politicised. To date this trend has not disappeared. Almost all members of the three 
supervisory councils (the Radio Council, Council of Slovak Television and Board for 
Brodcasting and Retransmission) are political nominees, elected by simple 
parliamentary majority. Informal rules, developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
however, require some members to be nominated by the political opposition. 
Formally, there are often so called civic candidates but these are de facto political 
candidates. The election of all these candidates depends on parliament. For all these 
reasons, public service media have never gained full financial, managerial, and 
consequently editorial, independence. 
Generally speaking, successive administrations in Slovakia have mostly 
lacked any media strategy. After 1998 the government of Mikuláš Dzurinda took 
power, and its new Government Council for Mass Media initiated the replacement of 
the 1991 laws. Parliament passed new media regulations for the PSR in 2003 (Act No. 
619) and PSB in 2004 (Act No. 16). Under the modified legal framework, a new 
body, the Supervisory Council, should monitor the financial and business operations 
of public service media. A slight depoliticisation of electronic public service media 
was achieved with the introduction of a system for the selection of the director 
through media councils rather than parliament.  
In the following years, discussion about the need for a comprehensive media 
law started for the first time in Slovak history. However, a lack of political consensus 
made it impossible to enact such new legislation. Unfortunately, Slovak political 
elites have never really solved the question of what a public service institution is 
as far as the media are concerned.1135 Merging of broadcasting regulation and 
telecommunication regulation, traditionally separated and governed by two 
independent regulatory authorities, was part of the national discussion. While the two 
have not as yet merged, this adjustment may nevertheless happen in future. 
Changes in media regulation have been made in the light of the acquis 
communautaire. A set of new laws, passed in 1999-2000, and later amendments 
created the current legal media framework in Slovakia. Although the new regulations 
were triggered by EU accession, the adoption of new legislation also gave an 
opportunity to make media policy changes not necessarily required by the EU.1136 
One of the laws adopted was the EU Television without Frontiers (TWF) 
Directive, which was introduced into the Slovak legal system through Law 308/2000 
On Broadcasting and Retransmission. Since 2000, the act has been amended fourteen 
times1137 and it is the most important media law for electronic media. It contains a set 
                                                 
1135 A. Školkay, “Komentár k  návrhu zákona o verejnoprávnych organizáciách” [Commentary on Draft 
Law on Public Institutions], Stratégie (2003), manuscript published previously at strategie.sk. 
1136 O. V. Johnson and A. Školkay, “Media legislation and media policy in Slovakia: EU accession and 
the second wave of reform”, 11 Media Research (2005) 73, at p. 73-75. 
1137 This law also adopted major part of Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 June 1997 amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the 
pursuit of television broadcasting activities, OJ L 202, 30/07/1997, and Directive 2007/65/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination 
of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, OJ L 332, 18/12/2007.  
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of comprehensive rules for television and radio broadcasting, retransmission and since 
2009, for audiovisual services on demand as well. The law is a result of the 
liberalisation process undertaken at the EU level1138 and, in part, of technological 
change.  
A new legal framework for public service electronic media was introduced 
almost simultaneously with Slovakia’s accession to the EU. The Slovak Television Act 
(2004) with its six amendments and the Slovak Radio Act (2003) with seven 
amendments defined public service media as national, independent, informative, 
cultural and educational institutions, providing their programme services to the public. 
In practice however, Slovak Television in particular has been subjected to occasional 
manipulation of its primetime news, political discussions and investigative reporting. 
This manipulation has been an issue for over twenty years, but it has lately become 
more sophisticated, less frequent, indirect and more subtle.  
The Press Act from 2008 spurred considerable controversy and criticism 
among journalists and publishers.1139 The main reason for their protests was the 
introduction of three controversial rights: the right to correction, the right to reply and 
the right to additional announcement. Non-compliance can be sanctioned with 
financial fines of up to EUR 4,979. The Press and News Reporting Act (the official 
title of the legislation) limits the absolute freedom of the press because it recognizes 
rights that force media to publish reactions of the individuals involved in journalists’ 
stories. Proponents of the law argue that this access to alternative opinions creates a 
more equal situation in the media space. Previously, it was difficult to get a quick 
reaction to media reports published. On the other hand, the Press Act has introduced 
a new right for the publishers, broadcasters and news agencies (and all their 
representatives) to obtain truthful and comprehensive information from public bodies 
in time. The new law, however, has not set sanctions for non-compliance.  
As far as the three controversial rights are concerned, research has confirmed 
that the feared flood of requests for corrections, replies and additional announcements 
only partially materialised.1140 As a consequence, however, journalists face stronger 
pressure for self-censorship or double fact-checking, and the media have additional 
costs for legal counselling in deciding the eligibility of correction requests. 
Nevertheless, the new Slovak administration has already announced its plan to abolish 
the right to reply for public figures.1141  
                                                 
1138 H. Nieminen, “Towards democratic regulation of European media and communication”, in B. 
Klimkiewicz (ed.), Media freedom and pluralism. Media policy challenges in the enlarged Europe 
(2010) 3. 
1139 “Nový tlačový zákon: Takto môže zmeniť noviny!” [The new Press Act: This is the way it can 
change newspapers!], Topky.sk, 27/03/2008, available at: http://www.topky.sk/cl/10/229028/Novy-
tlacovy-zakon-Takto-moze-zmenit-noviny-?from=bleskovky (last visited on 23/10/2010), and Slovak 
Syndicate of Journalists, “Pripomienky SSN k návrhu zákona o periodickej tlači a o zmene a doplnení 
niektorých zákonov (tlačový zákon)” [SSN comments on a draft law on periodicals and about changes 
and amendments of some acts (Press act)], 19/06/2007, available at: 
http://www.ssn.sk/source/document/000115.doc (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1140 L. Kočišek, “Noviny plné opráv a odpovedí? Obavy z tlačového zákona sa nenaplnili, tvrdí štúdia” 
[Newspapers full of corrections and answers? Fears of the Press Act have not been fulfilled, study 
says], 11/05/2009, available at: http://medialne.etrend.sk/tlac-spravy/noviny-plne-oprav-a-odpovedi-
obavy-z-tlacoveho-zakona-sa-nenaplnili-tvrdi-studia.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1141 Platform of the Government “August 2010”, available at: 
http://www.vlada.gov.sk/data/files/6257.pdf (last visited on 23/10/2010), at p. 36. 
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The new government also plans to transform public service media and to 
change their financing rules. So far, fees for public service media are regulated by the 
Act on Payment for Services to the Public Provided by Slovak Television and Slovak 
Radio. The primary financial source of both institutions is the compulsory monthly 
fee paid by households and employers as defined by law. For its calculation, 
consideration is given to the number of employees and electricity accessibility. 
Traditionally, citizens were reluctant to pay these fees and the regulatory bodies had 
difficulties in collecting. Under the new plan, these fees should be abolished. Sceptics 
agree that the current system is far from guaranteeing editorial freedom1142 but they 
also acknowledge that public service media would be even less independent without 
these fees. The European Broadcasting Union has urged the Slovak government to 
retain the licence fee as the means of financing Slovak Radio and Slovak Television 
rather than shifting to direct government subsidy.1143  
The Act on Digital Broadcasting, adopted in 2007 and amended twice1144 
regulates the digital broadcasting of programme services but does not apply to content 
services accessible through the internet if these services are not accessible via another 
manner of transmission. As a result of this law, Slovakia was obliged to undertake a 
digital switch-over. The technical conditions set by this legislation caused some 
controversy because it became almost impossible for new major television stations to 
enter the Slovak market. As put by Ondrášik: ‘It only strengthened the competition of 
current players.’1145  This politically motivated setting of standards (to the advantage 
of a few major established terrestrial broadcasting operators) and its follow-up actions 
led to politically motivated personnel changes at the Telecommunication Office. Its 
chief, Branislav Máčaj, was dismissed by the government for his criticism of the 
unfairness of these rules, in particular since he did not agree with the strong indirect 
involvement of the major television broadcaster, TV Joj, in the selection of multiplex 
providers. Máčaj identified clear private business interests in the new regulation, 
followed by a public tender: ‘The success of the Towercom company in the public 
tender was expected, in the way the cards were dealt’ (i.e. manipulated in favour of a 
concrete company). The reason for this alleged manipulation of the tender was the 
ownership connection between Towercom as a provider of digital multiplexes and 
television channels Joj and TA3 as broadcasters, with the political support of the 
major political party (then in power) Smer-SD.1146 While the private sector did not 
want any additional business competition, the major governing political party wanted 
to avoid a new broadcaster, with possibly critical content, entering the media 
                                                 
1142 See for example: D. Jancová, “Zrušenie poplatkov nie je všeliek” [The abolition of fees, however, 
is not a panacea], 26/06/2010, available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/zrusenie-poplatkov-nie-je-vseliek-
drx-/sk_domace.asp?c=A100626_110111_sk_domace_p29 (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1143 European Journalism Centre, “EBU urges Slovak government to retain licence fee”, 05/10/ 2010, 
available at: http://www.ejc.net/media_news/ebu_urges_slovak_government_to_retain_licence_fee/ 
(last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1144 This act adopted parts of Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
June 1997 amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC and Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 
1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright 
applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, OJ L 248, 6/10/1993. 
1145 B. Ondrášik, “Media ownership, regulation, concentration, and competition in the Slovak republic”, 
in M. Glowacki, B. Ostrowska-Dobek (eds.), Comparing media dystems in Central Europe. Between 
commercialization and politicization (2008), at p. 210. 
1146 “Šéf Telekomunikačného úradu rozpráva na Fica” [Chief of the Telecommunications Authority 
tells on Fico], Etrend, 27/11/2008, available at: http://ekonomika.etrend.sk/ekonomika-slovensko/sef-
telekomunikacneho-uradu-rozprava-na-fica.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
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landscape before the 2010 parliamentary elections. Indeed, a later report stated that 
shortly before the elections, the owners of TV Joj blocked at least one news report 
criticising the political party Smer.1147  
After Máčaj’s dismissal, the Telecommunication Office immediately cancelled 
the first multiplex provider tender with an official explanation related to changes in 
the frequencies spectrum.1148 In other words, allleged changes in technical conditions 
were offered as an excuse for the cancelled tender. Towercom subsequently won a 
new tender, but both Towercom and its owner J&T (a major investment group 
involved in various business operations with sometimes controversial background) 
rejected any accusations of involment in this manipulation.  
Private broadcasters were also successful in postponing the digital switchover 
by one year, arguing they were unprepared to accept unclear conditions for this 
process.1149  
The European Commission openly criticised Máčaj’s dismissal and launched 
legal proceedings against Slovakia.1150 Under this pressure, the parliament changed 
the procedure for the dismissal of the director of the Telecommunication Office and 
the Commission ended its action.1151 
General rules for audiovisual production in Slovakia were introduced through 
the Audiovisual Act of 2007.1152 The Act on Audiovisual Fund was passed a year later. 
It established a much-needed grant scheme for Slovak film-makers and thus was very 
welcome. The first selection of the beneficiaries, however, was strongly criticised. 
About 20% of the available sources were given to the chair and the vice-chair of the 
Council of the Audiovisual Fund. 
In 2008, the Slovak parliament passed the Act on Press Agency of the Slovak 
Republic and finally transformed the state-owned newswire TASR into a public 
service media with its own independent regulatory board. The act literally demands 
balanced, pluralistic and objective coverage. Interestingly, with the exception of short 
periods, TASR has always been reasonably balanced in political coverage. However, 
the indirect contract-based subsidy from the Ministry of Culture which constitutes a 
major financial source for the agency has become arguable. Financing matters as well 
                                                 
1147 M. Tódová, “J&T v Joj stopla reportáž o financovaní Smeru” [J&T stopped a coverage on 
financing of Směr on TV Joj], SME, 20/05/2010, available at: http://www.sme.sk/c/5383939/jt-v-joj-
stopla-reportaz-o-financovani-smeru.html#ixzz10RYI0EQ5 (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1148 “Výhrady TÚ k digitálnej stratégii po odvolaní predsedu zmizli” [TA´s reservations about the 
digital strategy disappeared after the President´s withdrawal], Živé, 12/01/2009, available at: 
http://www.zive.sk/vyhrady-tu-k-digitalnej-strategii-po-odvolani-predsedu-zmizli/sc-4-a-
280891/default.aspx (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1149 A. Školkay, “DTV in Slovakia”, in W. Van den Broeck and J. Pierson (eds), Digital television in 
Europe (2008), at p. 181-186.  
1150 “Máčaj sa bojí o budúcnosť slovenského televízneho vysielania”, Tvnoviny, 15/05/2009, available 
at: http://tvnoviny.sk/spravy/ekonomika/macaj-digitender-vyhra-towercom-udajne-spojeny-s-j-
t.html?ar= (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1151 “EK uzavrela konanie proti Slovensku pre odvolateľnosť šéfa TÚW [European Commission closed 
the case against Slovakia for revocability of the chief of the TA], Itnews, 25/05/2010, available at: 
http://www.itnews.sk/spravy/telekomunikacie/2010-06-25/c134411-ek-uzavrela-konanie-proti-
slovensku-pre-odvolatelnost-sefa-tu?ref=rss (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1152 Act on Conditions of Evidence, Public Dissemination and Storage of Audiovisual Works, 
Multimedia Works and Sound Records of Artistic Output. 
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as other issues have thus motivated the new government to announce changes to this 
law.1153  
Freedom of expression and information in Slovakia has been assessed by 
many institutions and could be characterised as fluctuating and relatively inconstant. 
This is a result of regulatory changes, media market development, as well as the 
political style of governing politicians.  
The World Audit Democracy Report suggested in November 2009 that 
Slovakia ranked 25th among 150 countries in the Press Freedom Index.1154 Thus, 
Slovakia was situated not only geographically, but also normatively, in between 
Hungary and Poland, which is a fair observation. Interestingly, a correlation can be 
observed between the freedom of the press index and the level of corruption 
perception. Taking this into account, the allocated level of press freedom seems to be 
rationally justified.  
The 2009 Reporters sans Frontières  report ranked freedom of the press in 
Slovakia in 44th place (together with Spain) and with eleven negative points among 
173 countries.1155  The fluctuation in Slovakia’s ranking is best seen in this report. 
Only a year earlier, Slovakia was in seventh place, together with countries like 
Sweden and Switzerland. Since the index is based on journalists’ personal 
assessments, the dramatic change most likely mirrored journalists’ frustration with the 
passage of the new Press Act, verbal attacks from the government and the growing 
number of defamation cases.  
According to Freedom House, Slovakia was a free country in 2009, along with 
eighty-nine of 194 countries examined.1156 However, the International Press Institute 
in its World Press Freedom Review for 2009 strongly criticised Slovakia’s passage of 
the Press Act.  
All these evaluations and rankings seem to reflect the difficult situation of 
press freedom in Slovakia.1157 A survey among journalists in Slovakia conducted in 
2008 presented some interesting results concerning political and financial pressures in 
the media. Almost half of the journalists surveyed (48%) claimed to have faced 
political pressures from state authorities and/or advertisers and about the same 
number (51%) from media owners. Significant pressures from editors were also 
reported (47%).1158  
Historically, the most difficult time for press freedom was the period 1993-
1998, when the government was headed by Vladimír Mečiar. This was also confirmed 
in the surveys of Holina and Brečka in 2006, conducted with 313 and 374 journalists 
respectively. The worst journalists’ rating was recorded for Vladimír Mečiar (1993-
                                                 
1153 Platform of the Government, “August 2010”, p. 36.  
1154 World Audit, “Democracy table November 2009”, available at: 
http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1155 Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index 2009”, available at: http://en.rsf.org/press-
freedom-index-2009,1001.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1156 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2010 Survey Release”, available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=505 (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1157 For comparison with earlier analyses on similar issue see A. Školkay, “Sloboda masmédií na 
Slovensku a vo svete v roku 1994” [Freedom of media in Slovakia and the world in 1994], 37 Otázky 
žurnalistiky No. 4 (1995) 275. 
1158 Slovak Press Watch et al., “Názory slovenských novinárov na vybrané otázky mediálneho 
prostredia”, at p. 8. 
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1998), followed by Robert Fico (2006-2010), and the second government of Dzurinda 
(2002-2006). The lowest level of political anxiety between the press and the 
government was observed during the first government of Mikuláš Dzurinda (1998-
2002). The journalists also confirmed that Mečiar and the political style of his 
government was one of the most traumatic moments in the history of the Slovak 
media. Back in 1997, 64,3% of journalists felt political pressure, while in 2005 this 
number had decreased to 49,5%.1159  Obviously, this trend was reflected in the media 
policies of the governments in question. 
 
3.3 Structural regulation 
Structural regulation of the Slovak media market has mainly focused on licensing and 
ownership matters. The print media are not subjected to licensing procedures, but 
television and radio licensing is regulated in detail. PSB and PSR are not subject to 
licensing but their broadcasting is specifically defined in exclusive laws.  
3.3.1 Licensing rules 
The licensing process in Slovakia started in times of strong political polarisation and 
was thus heavily politicised. Since then, the situation has changed. Generally 
speaking, licensing standards in Slovakia are now similar to those in other EU 
countries. The following examples, however, illustrate the heavy politicisation of 
licensing procedures in Slovakia in the mid 1990s. 
The first licence for nation-wide terrestrial television broadcasting was only 
awarded in 1995. Before that, the Slovak Parliament twice refused to approve licences 
for private nation-wide television broadcasting. With the tacit approval of the then 
Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, the first nation-wide privately held terrestrial 
television station went on air in late August 1996 and, contrary to expectations, 
provided airtime for criticism of the government. The introduction of private nation-
wide television required not only foreign financial aid but also domestic political 
backing.  
Another case of political intervention happened in the case of the Radio Free 
Europe (RFE) broadcast to Slovakia. The Slovak Ministry of Telecommunications 
tried to cancel the right to use the frequency spectrum for its Slovak language 
broadcast on AM frequencies in 1993/1994. The official explanation was that those 
frequencies were required for Slovak Radio broadcasts in the future. Ironically, the 
managment of public Slovak Radio publicly denied such needs. The unofficial 
reasons were related to open criticism of the Slovak government in its broadcasts. 
Finally, the government reluctantly agreed to extend RFE´s broadcast rights for 
Slovak AM frequencies.1160  
The Licensing Council was under strong pressure in 1998, when the Minister 
of Culture Ivan Hudec (a member of Mečiar’s government) strongly criticised the 
                                                 
1159 B. Ondrášik, “The Slovak press law: History and its mmpact on free media”, available at: 
http://www.branoondrasik.sk/research-reply.pdf (last visited on 23/10/2010), at p. 8. 
1160 A. Školkay, “Journalists, political elites and the post-communist public: The case of Slovakia”, 12 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics No.4 (1996) 73, at p. 73-77. 
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licence given to Radio Twist in Eastern Slovakia.1161 Radio Twist was considered 
a key antigovernment radio outlet.  
Since then, licensing processes have been depoliticised. Today, the BRB 
awards licences without the involvement of parliament whereas previously, nation-
wide licences issued by the BRB had to be approved by parliament. There has never 
been a condition to pay high fees for frequency utilization in Slovakia. Frequency use 
requires only a standard administration fee and a reasonably set (one could actually 
argue very low) additional fee, defined by the geographical size of the area to be 
covered by the broadcaster. The process is regulated by two almost identical laws: the 
older Act on Broadcasting and Retransmission and the recent Act on Digital 
Broadcasting. After Slovakia’s digital switchover, scheduled for 2012, analogue 
terrestrial broadcasting will no longer exist.  
The licensing conditions are very detailed, but in principle, each beneficiary 
can be granted only one licence valid for eight years for a radio programme and 
twelve years for a television programme service. In the case of digital broadcasting, 
one subject can get additional licences only for the digital broadcasting of monotype 
television (for example, an exclusively advertising channel). Unsuccessful applicants 
as well as holders of a revoked licence have the right to appeal within fifteen days. A 
negative appeal decision may be appealed at the Supreme Court.  
In the case of print media, the owner or publisher has an obligation to register 
with the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic. In the event of no official reply 
being provided in due time, this is considered as an approval. 
 
3.3.2 Ownership rules 
According to domestic legislation, the broadcasting licence is not transferable to 
another legal or natural person, not even if the company or parts of it are sold. One of 
the biggest controversies in recent Slovak media history has been the campaign called 
Let’s Rescue Markíza, triggered by a failed attempt to transfer the broadcasting 
licence indirectly. In the summer of 1998, only a few months before the parliamentary 
elections, an alleged new owner (backed by court ruling) entered the premises of the 
television network Markíza with a group of security guards and tried to take over the 
station. Back then, Markíza was the only national terrestrial broadcasting not 
controlled by the government, and its news programmes heavily criticised Mečiar’s 
government. There were rumours that even the official state secret service was 
involved in this case.1162 Opposition politicians took this opportunity to portray 
themselves as the rescuers of free media.  
Current law also bans mutual ownership of a TV broadcaster by an 
independent TV producer. A periodical publisher, who publishes a title at least five 
times a week and distributes it to at least half of the Slovak territory, is also banned 
from owning a multi-regional or nationwide broadcasting licence. Further, one legal 
or natural person may not be connected via ownership rights with more than one 
multi-regional or nation-wide broadcaster of either radio or television programme 
services. In addition to this, there is a ban on any ownership connection with 
                                                 
1161 J. Fűle, “Médiá” [Media], in G. Mesežnikov and M. Ivantyšyn (eds) Slovensko 1998-1999. Súhrnná 
správa o stave spoločnosti [Slovakia 1998-1999. The global report on the state of the society] (1999) 
590, at p. 599. 
1162 Fűle, “Médiá”, pp. 590-591. 
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publishers of nationwide periodical press. A legal or natural person can be connected 
via property rights with more broadcasters – licence owners – for local and regional 
television or local radio programme services. However, there is a 50% limit on the 
total size of the population that can be covered by this joint broadcast. 
In all other cases there is a general ban on property ownership and personal 
connection between radio broadcasters, television broadcasters and publishers of 
nation-wide press. As far as the owners’ origin is concerned, the BRB is obliged by 
law to take into account “an adequate property participation of Slovak persons and 
their representation in company bodies”, in the event that a licence seeker is a legal 
person with foreign ownership participation. In other words, it is impossible to have 
an exclusively foreign owned and foreign managed broadcasting station in Slovakia. 
Print media companies are legally required to disclose their ownership 
structure relations to the publisher, any shareholder with a voting rights share at or 
above twenty percent, and anyone owning at least a twenty percent interest in 
property rights. Ownership records are published on the website of the Ministry of 
Culture and in the first issue of each periodical in a calendar year. Broadcast media 
must register with the Company Register’s Office, whose records are public 
documents, available online.  
In reality, however, the identification of media owners is quite challenging. 
For example, recently, after a change in its ownership structure, the editors of the 
daily newspaper Pravda could not figure out the paper’s actual owners.1163  
There are no rules prohibiting media ownership by specific organisations, 
political parties or religious associations. In reality, all attempts by political parties to 
establish their own daily newspapers have failed. There are, however, some marginal 
weeklies, bi-weeklies and monthlies which claim open, or at least tacit, support for 
some parties or their ideologies. 
 
3.3.3 Competition rules 
Ondrášik argued that a lively competition can be seen among the large print outlets 
but a higher concentration prevails in various market segments in Slovakia. In his 
view, large media chains dominating the market threaten the diversity of the local 
press.1164 According to him, television broadcasting is in fact a virtual oligopoly.1165 
This means that there are two major players in the television market, TV Markíza and 
TV Joj. To keep their oligopoly at the dawn of the digital era, both stations 
established ‛sister’ stations: TV Doma and TV Joj Plus. 
Perhaps ironically, the development of a free media market in Slovakia was 
purposely slowed down by the public service media in 1990/1991. Their leadership 
was afraid of private competition and demanded time for market adjustments. 
Currently, the Act on Broadcasting stipulates that broadcasters can join their resources 
and broadcast joint programes only if their audience does not surpass fifty percent of 
the inhabitants. The Licensing Council and the Antimonopoly Office are obliged to 
                                                 
1163 G. Šípoš, “Pre novinára je principiálna vec vedieť, pre koho píše” [It is the principal thing for the 
journalist to know for whom he writes], 8/09/2010, available at: http://spw.blog.sme.sk/c/240658/Pre-
novinara-je-principialna-vec-vediet-pre-koho-pise.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1164 Ondrášik, “Media ownership, regulation, concentration, and competition in the Slovak republic”, p. 
210. 
1165 Ibid, p. 224. 
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prevent the abuse of a dominant position by any player in the market. However, only 
in rare cases has the Antimonopoly Office sanctioned the media for unfair 
competition (such as TASR and some print media in the case of unfair conditions 
given for commercial use of their electronic databases by data processing 
companies).1166  
As has already been discussed, the current major television players de facto 
closed the market for any new nation-wide television in 2007-2008. In short, although 
it may seem that competition rules are fair, in reality there are means of preventing 
any relevant competition from emerging. 
Government subsidies for the smaller (non-profit) media in Slovakia are not 
unusual. In the past, however, state authorities often selected the beneficiaries 
arbitrarily. Such practices were common throughout most of the 1990s and were 
driven by the division of publishers into government ‘friendly’ or ‘unfriendly’. To 
ensure some intellectual quality and plurality, the Ministry of Culture subsidises 
a number of marginal intellectual journals without detailed quality criteria for aid 
allocation.  
A new feature of Slovak public service media was introduced in 2009. These 
media were offered the opportunity to sign Contracts with the State, which allocated 
financial resources for non-commercial public service mission programmes (e.g. 
educational programmes for children). Clearly, state media policy includes many 
measures to guarantee production for minorities and children in public service 
broadcasting which otherwise may not be of interest for private television or radio 
businesses.  
There are no known recent cases of competition problems in the print sector. 
The Antimonopoly Office is monitoring the market situation, but it should be noted 
that its actions are rather reactive. The office does not approve mergers before they 
happen. Mergers are only controlled in cases where the global turnover of the 
implicated parties is set to reach at least forty million EUR annually, with at least two 
participants having an annual local turnover (in Slovakia) of around 12 million EUR, 
or one participant having a local turnover of 16.6 million EUR and another having a 
global turnover of 40 million EUR.1167 The Antimonopoly Office follows the financial 
dictum of antimonopoly regulation and does not cover such criteria as content 
diversity. 1168 
Recently, there have been some concerns about television ownership 
concentration. According to the BRB, it transpires that the first level of ownership 
(official owners) did not show any signs of concentration (i.e. everything seemed to 
be according to legislation). However, this agency is not authorised to investigate 
second and third level ownership connections.1169 In other words, the law does not 
                                                 
1166 See “Protisúťažná praktika” [Anticompetitive practices], Article 39 of the Act No. 136/2001 Coll., 
Verdict of the office: fine, available at: http://www.antimon.gov.sk/480/3475/rok-2009.axd, and 
“Protisúťažná praktika” [Anticompetitive practices: infringement], Article 39, Verdict of the office: 
300,000 SKK, http://www.antimon.gov.sk/480/3398/rok-2008.axd (last visited on 23/10/2010).  
1167 B. Ondrášik, “Slovakia’, 53 Otázky žurnalitiky No.1-2 (2010) 126, at pp. 126-127. 
1168 Personal telephone conversation with V. Ferko, Press secretary of the Antimonopoly Office, 
Bratislava, 23/09/2010. 
1169 Personal telephone conversation with the director of the Office of the Council for Broadcasting and 
Retransmission, Bratislava, 23/09/2010. 
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allow an in-depth search for real owners, and thus for possible cross-ownership or 
other illegal behaviour. 
 
3.4 Content regulation  
Content regulation is usually most controversial area of regulation because it is a 
‘visible’, and at the same time, morally-laden isssue. In fact, content regulation causes 
controversy at two major levels: political and moral. All Slovak governments since 
1989 have been notoriously dissatisfied with the media. Their criticism has varied 
from a standard and often justified accusation of unprofessionalism or unethical 
behaviour due to incorrect claims and accusations, through to criticism of 
overwhelmingly negative coverage and to various forms of media conspiracy, usually 
suggesting that journalists’ motivation to criticise the government was paid for from 
abroad.1170 Consequently, there were various attempts to regulate the content of the 
media. Some were legal and soft, but there were some case of personal intimidation as 
well (e.g. during Mečiar's governments in 1993-1998 in one journalist’s 
neighbourhood somebody distributed leaflets accusing him of homosexuality1171). 
Paradoxically, it was Mečiar’s government that first called for ethical self-regulation 
of journalists. The controversial government’s coalition members even drafted a 
Declaration on Ethics in Journalism in 1993. 
Another form of criticism—moral—fought against the sudden flood of 
pornography and sexual topics after 1989. Later, it focused on personal offences 
against moral integrity and honour (libel and defamation cases), and the protection of 
minors. Only quite recently, in the last ten years or so, has there been discussion about 
open and latent racism in media reporting. Previously, only the English language 
newspaper, The Slovak Spectator covered racism and discrimination cases in 
Slovakia. A study by Vitaliya Bella from early 2003 suggested that most articles 
about Roma published in four Slovak daily newspapers were factually correct and 
professional. However, the most read tabloid paper Nový Čas was found to report in a 
negative and incorrect way on Roma relatively frequently. At the same time, the 
overall representation of Roma in selected Slovak daily newspapers reflected typical 
negative stereotypes (or negative realities) of Roma.1172  
So far, Slovakia has not particularly addressed the issue of copyright 
protection in the media sector. Nevertheless, some bloggers have discovered 
numerous cases of copyright infringement and plagiarism.1173 One of the most 
debated cases of copyright breach was, ironically, related to a member of the BRB 
(the media supervisory board), Pavol Dinka. He was accused of false attribution of 
                                                 
1170 A. Školkay, “Úlohy médií v politickom diskurze na Slovensku” [The roles of media in the political 
discourse in Slovakia], in J. Vopálenský (ed.), Médiá na prahu tretieho tisícročia [Media on the 
threshold of the third millennium] (2003), at pp. 95-112. 
1171 “Neznámi páchatelia spustili diskreditačnú kampaň voči redaktorovi Rádia Twist Karolovi 
Lovašovi” [Unknown criminals started libel campaign against journalist from radio twist, Karol 
Lovaš], SME, 15/05/1998, available at: http://www.sme.sk/c/2152772/neznami-pachatelia-spustili-
diskreditacnu-kampan-voci-redaktorovi-radia-twist-karolovi-lovasovi.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1172 V. Bella, “Obraz Rómov v slovenských denníkoch” [The depiction of Roma in Slovak media], 47 
Otázky žurnalistiky No. 1-2 (2004) 17, at p. 17 and 23. 
1173 See for example, G. Šípoš, “Nový prípad plagiátorstva z archívu TRENDU: obeťou Financial 
Times” [A new case of plagiarism from the archive of TRENDS: the victim is the Financial Times], 
25/01/2007, available at: http://spw.blog.sme.sk/c/78800/Novy-pripad-plagiatorstva-z-archivu-
TRENDU-obetou-Financial-Times.html (last visited on 23/10/2010).  
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another blogger’s study to (Dinka) himself.1174 Interestingly, Dinka had written books 
on media considered as propaganda for Robert Fico´s government.1175 
Media content issues were raised in many regulatory decisions of the BRB. As 
these examples demonstrate, controversies with respect to content regulation in 
Slovakia are not linked with the laws themselves, but rather with their interpretation 
by the BRB. For example, in November 2007, the Board issued a verbal punishment 
and ruled that PSR had broken the law with respect to objectivity and impartiality of 
news and current affairs programmes. The reasoning of the board was that in a 
political discussion, both the opposition as well as the government should be 
represented. The broadcast in question featured an opposition parliament member and 
an NGO representative, without a representative of the government. The Board 
declared this was not impartial even though it was a fair approach because Slovak 
radio had actually invited a government representative and made numerous (failed) 
attempts to secure government representation on the programme. The Board’s 
decision was confirmed in the Regional Court and later in the Supreme Court. It was 
the Constitutional Court which cancelled the previous rulings (of lower courts, 
confirming that the Board decision was correct) on formal and substantial grounds.1176 
In other words, the Constitutional Court has accepted the arguments of Slovak Radio 
that, firstly, the Board had not  followed formal procedural rules, and, secondly, the 
Supreme Court as well as Regional Court  had not sufficiently dealt with the issue of 
genuine efforts and achieved results guaranteeing objectivity and impartiality. The 
Constitutional Court called this Regional Court ruling (which was accepted by the 
Supreme Court) ‘vague and fuzzy’. 
Similarly, the BRB sanctioned Slovak Television for non-impartiality in 
September 2009. The case involved Robert Fico, the then prime minister. Fico was 
the sole guest on a regular political broadcast, known for its typical discussion format 
involving two guests. However, the absence of a representative from the opposition 
was Fico’s requirement. 
Just recently, the BRB penalised TV Markíza with a 10,000 EUR fine for 
“intervention into the human dignity of the social group of pensioners”.1177 This 
sanction concerned a primetime news report about the rising costs of social welfare, 
quoting an expert who argued that there are more pensioners due to better health 
care.1178    
Previously, there was some controversy regarding the content of public service 
media. The public service broadcaster must ensure a heterogeneous programme 
                                                 
1174 See http://bella.blog.sme.sk/c/179515/Pavol-Dinka-spisovatel-publicista-plagiator-zlodej.html, and 
http://www.sme.sk/c/4272054/kritik-medii-pise-ako-plagiator.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1175 O. Bardiovský, “Ideologické písačky” [Ideological writings], 17/08/2010, available at: 
http://bardiovsky.blog.sme.sk/c/238435/Ideologicke-pisacky.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1176 Ruling of the Constitutional Court, IV, ÚS 245/09-42, available at: 
http://sk.vlex.com/vid/194622327or http://www.concourt.sk/search.do?id_submenu=c (last visited on 
23/10/2010). 
1177 Board for Broadcasting and Retransmission, “Zápisnica č. 14/2010 zo zasadnutia Rady pre 
vysielanie a retransmisiu, ktoré sa konalo dňa 31.08.2010 o 09:30 hod. v sídle Rady pre vysielanie 
a retransmisiu” [Minutes of the meeting of the Board for Broadcasting and Retransmission held on 31 
August 2010], available at: http://www.rada-rtv.sk/sk/spravy/index.php?aktualitaId=1046 (last visited 
on 23/10/2010). 
− 1178 M. Kernová, “Licenčná rada vidí koalične” [The Licence Board sees in the coalition way], 
SME, 17/05/2010, available at: http://www.sme.sk/c/5378318/licencna-rada-vidi-koalicne.html (last 
visited on 23/10/2010). 
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selection with a majority of public interest programming. Obviously, the question has 
been what constitutes programming in the public interest. For example, when the PSB 
channel broadcast a local version of the international reality show Pop Idol in 2005, 
most critics pointed out (in contrast to our opinion) that this was not a programme of 
public interest.1179  Two years later, PSB introduced a similar home-grown 
programme, based on a selection of the most popular Slovak songs. This show, even 
though it had a clear commercial target, was easier to defend and to label as a “public 
service programme”. Consequently, it did not cause any controversy.1180 
Finally, to illustrate the Slovak heterogeneity of issues related to media 
content, in the past, there were suggestions of creating a group of non-commercial 
print media, approved by the Ministry of Culture and subject to lower taxes. By 
contrast, media outlets with large foreign investments were planned to be taxed three 
to five times more than locally owned outlets. This idea extends back to 1995 but has 
never been turned into a regulation. 
 
3.5 Rules regarding media publishing and broadcasting 
Slovakia has witnessed dozens of harsh or controversial court decisions regarding 
publishing and broadcasting. Troublesome cases are related to excessive damage 
awards in civil cases, sometimes to the use of criminal charges, as well as to some 
bizarre justifications for court rulings.  
For example, the private Radio Twist (later renamed Radio Viva) broadcast a 
press conference of the Minister of Interior in October 2004. The minister announced 
that the police had accused a local judge of criminal acts. The radio journalist 
recorded and broadcast the minister’s own words, combined with her commentary. 
Even though the judge’s name was never mentioned, the judge later sued the radio 
and won 33,194 EUR. It turned out that the acts he was accused of had happened, but 
they were not of a criminal nature. Two rulings stated that it was the media who was 
responsible for broadcasting, even in cases of politicians’ speeches.1181   
The second case shows the burden of criticising a judge. A controversial 
political figure, the chairman of the Supreme Court and later Minister of Justice, 
Štefan Harabín, sued the newspaper Pravda in seven cases. Just to exemplify the 
unreasonably high payments, in the case of a cartoon, the paper was ordered to pay 
100,000 EUR and cover legal costs. The case is still pending at the Constitutional 
Court. Not only is the requested amount questionable, but so too is the issue of 
whether cartoons can be a subject of non-material damages related to dignity and 
honour.  
In the third case, the daily Sme was ordered to pay 100,000 USD to the 
government and apologise to all its members who requested it for the following 
                                                 
1179 T. Popovič, “Analýza: muzikant o SuperStar” [Analysis: A musician on SuperStar], 21/05/2005, 
available at: http://zaujimavosti.sme.sk/c/2019811/analyza-muzikant-o-superstar.html (last visited on 
23/10/2010). 
1180 Z. Uličianska, “Sledovanosť STV ťahali staré hity” [Viewership of the Slovak TV was pulled by 
old hits], 9/07/2007, available at: http://www.sme.sk/c/3385518/sledovanost-stv-tahali-stare-hity.html 
(last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1181 M. Tódová, “Bývalý Twist parafrázoval Palka, dostal miliónovú pokutu” [The former Twist 
paraphrased Palko, and received a million fine], 14/11/2008, available at: 
http://www.sme.sk/c/4175212/byvaly-twist-parafrazoval-palka-dostal-milionovu-pokutu.html (last 
visited on 23/10/2010).  
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sentence: “These are the first casualties of a political cold war waged by the 
government against the citizens of Slovakia”. The statement was published at a time 
of high political polarisation. The son of the President of Slovakia had been 
kidnapped and in a chain of events, a man who was helping him – the first casualty – 
had blown up in his car.  The case is still pending. 
It was estimated that over 430,000 EUR was awarded in non-material damage 
compensation to Slovak politicians in 2009 alone.1182 The aforementioned ex-Minister 
of Justice and currently Chief Justice sent a pre-trial notice to a number of media 
outlets, asking them to pay him 200,000 EUR each for alleged libel in 2009.1183 The 
PSB was involved in eighteen libel cases for its investigative programmes in 2004-
2007. Five cases have been decided already, two in PSB’s favour and three against it, 
with a total in reimbursement charges of 10,000 EUR.1184 
 
3.6 Rules regarding social media publishing  
Social media publishing in Slovakia is almost exclusively restricted to the 
blogosphere. The most popular service, the blog section of the daily Sme, created its 
own Code of Blogger, which has been regularly updated. The code is somewhat 
similar to the Code of Ethics of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists. Sme bloggers 
have to give “proper” space to all affected sides of any conflicting topic. Journalists, 
in addition, should pursue this writing etiquette even in non-conflicting materials. Sme 
bloggers are not allowed to use personal correspondence without permission and after 
publishing their articles, they can only make small grammar or typo corrections. 
 
3.7 Rules regarding information gathering processes  
There is absolutely no regulation of search-engines in Slovakia.1185 Slovakia has a law 
granting access to all public information for any person. Although designed primarily 
for regular citizens, it has become one of the practical tools for investigative 
journalists. However, there are two controversial legal rules regarding information 
gathering processes, both relating to the Penal Code. 
First, it is illegal to publish top secret or classified information. This rule says 
that anyone publishing this kind of information can be imprisoned for up to three 
years. However, in order to sanction this behaviour, there are other (softer) measures 
available, too. For example, the National Security Authority (NSA) sanctioned the 
weekly Žurnál (Journal) for publishing select sensitive secret information in 2007. 
Even though journalists argued that they did it in the public interest, which is 
supposed to override the classified information regulation, the NSA decided to 
sanction them with the harshest non-court (financial) punishment.  
                                                 
1182 L. Kočišek, “Úloha sa obrátila. Spoločnosť 7 Plus žaluje Fica” [The role changed. Spoločnosť 7 
Plus is suing Fico], 13/01/2010, available at:  http://medialne.etrend.sk/tlac-spravy/uloha-sa-obratila-
spolocnost-7-plus-zaluje-fica.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1183 M. Vagovič, “Harabin píše ľuďom, ktorí o to nestoja” [Harabin writes to people who do not care 
about it], SME, 13/05/2009, at p. 3. 
1184 Rady Slovenskej Televízie, “ZÁPIS č. 2/2008 z riadneho zasadnutia Rady Slovenskej televízie 13. 
februára 2008” [Minutes No. 2/2008 of the regular  meeting  of the Council of the Slovak Television on 
13 February 2008], available at: www.stv.sk (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1185 E-mail from Jana Lajdová, Legal Department of Telecommunication Office, 20 May 2010.  
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The second rule concerns the intimacy of oral speech. Publishing illegal 
recordings and thus causing damage to other people can lead to up to a five year 
prison sentence. The introduction of this measure was triggered by the threat of 
publishing scandalous private telephone conversations of politicians or/with business 
people. The Slovak media provided numerous recordings of this kind. 
 
3.8 Supervision 
News reporting requires a balance of sometimes conflicting constitutional and legal 
interests. In Slovakia, this is done either by NGOs (such as the Press Council), semi-
governmental bodies (such as the BRB, STC, RC), governmental bodies (such as the 
Ministry of Culture) and independent bodies created by the state, such as courts, 
prosecutors, the police, etc. Major Slovak journalism organisation also adopted a 
Code of Ethics in 1990. Many editorial offices have their own codes of conduct. 
These formal codes often lack acceptance or even knowledge among ordinary 
journalists. 
Until 2002, Slovakia did not have any public authority dealing with ethical 
complaints in the print media. Today, this has become the main responsibility of the 
Press Council. The council has declared its right to deal with all ethical issues related 
to the journalists (journalistic profession), but it has only dealt with issues related to 
print media and, more comprehensively, with issues related to press freedom and 
access to information. It can deal with some ethical issues on its own initiative too. 
The plan is to include electronic and online media in its portfolio in the future. 
As has already been mentioned, supervisory bodies for electronic media have 
been strongly politicised. The collapse of their independence already started in 1993 
and became infamous during the Mečiar era in 1992-1998. The liberal government of 
Mikuláš Dzurinda attempted to reverse this negative development. Nevertheless, after 
all those years, these councils are still politically dependent. The former Prime 
Minister Robert Fico (2006-2010) openly acknowledged a political agreement on 
influence division: ‘We said to each other in which proportion we would propose 
these candidates’.1186 The Prime Minister meant by this an internal discussion among 
the then leaders of the coalition parties on the issue of selection and election of the 
media councils’ members. 
 
4. Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment 
The media landscape in Slovakia consists of a fully liberalised print and a regulated   
broadcast market. Formally independent supervisory bodies control public service 
media. Along with democratisation and liberalisation, the media landscape has been 
shaped by commercialisation. The relatively small size of the Slovak media market 
limits the media’s financial resources for elaborate reporting and hence negatively 
impacts the quality of the media output.  
Slovakia has attempted to adopt an idealised western European democracy 
media policy by creating a playing field for privately held media and the de-
monopolisation and de-etatisation of public service media. This process has never 
                                                 
1186 “Koalícia si delila médiá” [The Coalition has divided media], SME, 19/12/2007, available at: 
http://www.sme.sk/c/3643114/Koalicia-si-delila-media.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
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been straightforward and has taken a few sharp ideological turns depending on the 
politicians in power. The media policy developments of the past twenty years in 
Slovakia could be characterised as lacking strategy, inconsistent, motivated by 
political conflicts and charged with politicians’ personal animosities. Ironically, 
although Slovakia (as part of former Czechoslovakia) was the first country in CEE to 
introduce ‘public service media’, in general, the media policy decision makers lacked 
broader expertise as well as perspective.  
Slovakia started its democratisation in Huntington’s third wave,1187 as a part of 
the Czech and Slovak federation. The transition of Slovakia’s media policy can be 
analysed in three different phases. The first phase (1989-1992), the abrupt dismantling 
of communist media, naive or poetic pluralisation,1188 explosion of freedom of speech, 
and media de-monopolisation was interrupted in 1993, when Slovakia declared 
independence. The country was acknowledged as a special democratic transition case, 
a defective democracy1189, a late developer1190, an awkward state1191, or a reform 
laggard1192, just to name a few of the academic literature labels. During this second 
phase (1992/1993 to 1998), the Slovak administration led by the authoritarian Prime 
Minister Vladimír Mečiar made controversial media policy decisions, contradictory to 
the ideals of liberal democracies. Those years of semi-democratic political regime, or 
illiberal democracy1193, were followed by a phase of new democratic consolidation 
and media commercialisation, starting in 1998. Mečiar’s era, however, had a 
tremendous impact on the legal, financial and professional environment of the mass 
media in Slovakia. The legacy of this short period contributed to higher levels of 
political parallelism, delayed media marketisation and froze the process of journalists’ 
professionalisation. 
After the split of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia inherited a mostly de-monopolised 
and pluralist printed press, except for the state controlled newswire agency TASR. 
Following a political request from Prime Minister Mečiar, TASR founded a 
completely state owned and government biased daily newspaper Slovenská 
republika.1194 Mečiar also took over the popular youth daily Smena. However, its core 
editorial staff left it and established what is now one of the leading daily newspapers, 
Sme. Mečiar financed Smena using governmental subsidies until it went bankrupt 
within a year. Mečiar’s administration did not hesitate to use economic instruments 
(e.g. state and political party advertising) or personal intimidation in the fight against 
a hostile press.1195 This delayed public service broadcast depoliticisation and in 
                                                 
1187 Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington defined waves of democratisation. They occur in specified 
period of time, when a significant group of nondemocratic countries choose to become democratic. S. 
Huntington, The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (1991). 
1188 K. Jakubowicz, Business as usual: Continuity and change in Central and Eastern European media, 
(2003), at p. 26.  
1189 K. Henderson, “The Slovak Republic: Explaining defects in democracy”, 11 Democratization 5 
(2004) 133.  
1190 World Bank, World development report 2002: Building institutions for markets (2001). 
1191 H. Field, “Awkward states: EU enlargement and Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia”, Perspectives on 
European politics and society (2000) 123.  
1192 C. Gati, “If not democracy, what? Leaders, laggards and losers in the post-Communist World”, in 
M. Mandelbaum (ed.), Post-Communism: Four perspectives (1996) 168. 
1193 F. Zakaria, “The rise of illiberal democracy”, 76 Foreign Affairs 6 (1997) 22. 
1194 Slovenská republika [Slovak Republic] was later sold to a private company with ties to Mečiar‘s 
HZDS. The last issue was published in November 2000. 
1195 G. Šipoš, “Vlastníctvo médií a jeho dosah na nezávislosť a pluralitu médií. Prípadová štúdia: 
Slovensko” [Media ownership and its impact on media independence and pluralism. Case study: 
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contrast to its neighbours, completely closed the market for independent nation-wide 
broadcasters until 1995/1996. During the Mečiar era, PSB news and current affairs 
programmes were heavily biased. The government tried to legitimise its propagandist 
actions by emphasizing the media’s role in “building the new state”.1196 The political 
control of the broadcast content was maintained both through extra-legal measures 
(delaying payment of approved subsidies) as well as through political nominations of 
senior PSB staff in news and current affairs departments and in supervisory bodies. 
However, it was difficult to find competent propagandist and manager at the same 
time. Consequently, there were eight personnel changes in the position of PSB 
Director General within eight years (1990-1998).1197  
Even today, each new administration (at least) considers senior leadership 
changes in public service media. Generally speaking, legislative reforms in Slovakia, 
similarly to other countries in CEE, have failed to replace ‘state’ or ‘government’ 
control of the PSB with ‘public’ control; indeed ‘public’ has been interpreted almost 
exclusively in terms of political representation.1198 Most Slovak politicians have never 
given up their attempts to secure favourable media coverage. However, to get their 
messages across, today they prefer to use modern publicity methods rather than direct 
political pressure or threats.  
Since the Mečiar era, broadcast market conditions have changed 
tremendously. Growing competition and strong commercialisation have challenged 
public service media in Slovakia. This development seems to have been a helpful 
factor in gaining more autonomy from political influence. However, there is a sharp 
distinction between public television and public radio. The public service radio and 
the newswire TASR seem to be better adjusted to these new conditions than 
television, although both of them receive direct and indirect subsidies too. Their 
success in finding solution from budget cuts is that both institutions adjust their 
performance to their real budgets, not to the exaggerated income expectations and 
promises.  
In general, the extensive commercialisation of television broadcasting has led 
to failures in providing not-for-profit based content. This has weakened the role of 
PSB in its normatively assigned role of democratic and civic cultivation. However, 
this PSB identity crisis is certainly not unique to Slovakia.1199 
                                                                                                                                            
Slovakia], paper presented at the INEKO conference Media, Ownership and its impact on 
independence and pluralism, 29/10/2004, available at: 
http://www.ineko.sk/files/konf29102004_sipos.pdf (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1196 As Andrew K. Milton suggests, this is a typical product of new democratically elected governments 
in the Czech and Slovak Republics. The roots of this explanation can be traced back to the First 
Czechoslovak Republic, where an ‘institutional architecture was created’ to help build the new state. 
See A. Milton, “Bound but not gagged: Media reform in democratic transitions”, 34 Comparative 
Political Studies (2001) 439. 
1197 See http://www.stv.sk/stv/o-stv/riaditelia-slovenskej-televizie/ (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1198 A. Mungiu-Pippidi, “Complementary vision of economic and democratic philosophies on public 
TV, From state to public service. The failed reform of state television in Central Eastern Europe”, in M. 
Sũkősd and P. Bajomi-Lázár (eds), Reinventing media, media policy reform in East - Central Europe 
(2003) 43, at p. 43. 
1199 A. Wyka, “In search of the East Central European media model – The italianization model? A 
comparative perspective on the East Central European and South European media systems”, in M.  
Glowacki, B. Ostrowska-Dobek (eds), Comparing media dystems in Central Europe. Between 
commercialization and politicization (2008) 55. 
 362
The playing field for political parallelism in public service media has been left 
open through the supervisory councils’ membership selection. Members of all four 
media regulatory boards – broadcasting, public radio, public television, and 
newswire1200 - are elected by parliament. As has been shown, albeit with some 
exceptions, the professional experience of the government’s nominees after 1998 has 
risen and their political and ideological ties have been significantly weakened. 
Nevertheless, Fico’s era again brought more political nominees to the councils. Their 
political ties were disclosed during the 2010 parliamentary election when some of 
them became candidates for the former coalition parties.1201 
Persistent content politicisation of (mainly) broadcast networks supported the 
existing political polarisation in the country and the (somewhat later) 
commercialisation as well as de-polarisation from 1998 onwards led to a declining 
interest in politics and political participation as well as in 'hard' news among citizens. 
Due to politically charged polarisation among journalism professionals and the fragile 
media market in 1992-1998, the establishment of professional journalism standards 
was outpaced by marketisation and commercialisation. Today, not only political and 
economic sympathies, but also the editors’/owners’ interests impact the selection of 
news items. Entertainment and the pursuit of increased market share have become the 
dominant functions in the majority of the media. The evidence can be seen in the 
relatively stable circulation of tabloid daily papers in contrast to the decreasing 
circulation of the mainstream broadsheet papers.  
The legacy of Mečiar’s era also changed the way of creating media content. 
Karol Jakubowicz made a general observation in CEE countries and stated that the 
journalists tend to seek leadership, guardianship and prefer conviction-driven 
journalism.1202 In Slovakia, this tendency was in many cases intensified. The political 
divisions, or rather divisions based on a different approach to liberal democracy itself, 
together with confrontational attitudes of the political elites, were mirrored in 
journalists’ work. As one journalist claimed in an interview almost ten years after 
Mečiar’s era, ‘natural developments in the field stopped because journalists did 
politics’.1203 The positive influence of the media on citizens’ political participation, 
together with the campaign of nongovernmental organizations, was so strong that the 
election turnout in 1998 was the second highest in Slovak history1204. This high 
turnout has not been repeated and probably never will be. The canvassing journalism 
against the government in power disappeared, but positive information about any 
government policy also became rare. Most journalists adopted a defensive 
occupational ideology and it has become fashionable to blame the government and its 
members for all the failures of society.  
 With the entry of foreign investment and resulting access to additional 
resources, this situation might have changed, but the parallel influx of tabloid 
                                                 
1200 Newswire TASR was only changed to a public service agency in 2008. Until then, it was 
financially and strategically controlled by the government through the Ministry of Culture. 
1201 See “Mediálny výbor nepodporil odvolanie členov Rozhlasovej rady” [The Media Committee did 
not support withdrawal of the Radio Council members], Medialne.sk, 10/09/2010, available at:  
http://medialne.etrend.sk/radia-spravy/medialny-vybor-nepodporil-odvolanie-clenov-rozhlasovej-rady-
3.html (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1202 Jakubowicz, Rude awakening. 
1203 L. Waschková- Císařová, “Report on news cultures in Slovakia”, unpublished report, Project 
EMEDIATE (2007). 
1204 In the parliamentary election of 1998 voter turnout was 84,12% of the registered voters. Higher 
turnout was achieved only in the first democratic elections in 1990. 
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journalism and commercialisation prevented journalists from consolidating their 
profession and establishing unified codes of conduct. Journalists’ salaries are only 
twenty-two percent above the national average and that this is in many cases far 
below their expectations.1205 Moreover, there are almost no labour guarantees not to 
mention cheap competition from young students. In this environment, representatives 
of the business and political sectors use various techniques of soft corruption, such as 
foreign trips, special treats or small presents for journalists in exchange for positive 
media coverage. Due to the lack of transparency in ownership structures, it has 
become extremely difficult for a regular audience to distinguish vested interests from 
independent coverage. 
The third and so far final phase of media policy development in Slovakia 
followed the 1998 election of the reformist government of Prime Minister Mikuláš 
Dzurinda. The main goal of his coalition government was to consolidate democracy 
and speed up Slovakia’s accession to the European Union and NATO. The 
administration had to adjust to EU regulations in many policy areas and these 
adjustments included some changes in media regulation. From the point of view of 
democratic politics, following Slovakia’s EU accession in 2004, the media adopted a 
trend of more or less general criticism. This has contributed to the dominance of 
negative reporting – a typical media system of reporting. However, the problem is that 
even in quality media, regular political disagreements are often reported as sensations 
and serious policy changes typically do not make it through the editors’ filters. The 
tabloidisation of political coverage in the media can be considered as one of the 
factors contributing to the decreased political participation and political disinterest of 
the general public in Slovakia in the early 2000s. 
Dzurinda’s government, just like its predecessors, did not have a media policy 
strategy. There was an intention to draft new media policies,1206 but Dzurinda’s 
government never fulfilled this promise. Furthermore, the government did not manage 
to introduce digital broadcasting or transform the state owned and poorly managed 
newswire agency TASR.  However, it passed new laws on public service broadcasting 
and public service radio prepared by the Ministry of Culture in 2003 and 2004 
respectively.  
The governing period of the two Dzurinda administrations did not bring major 
changes to the media environment, but manipulation of the press disappeared. The 
only significant state intervention into public service media content was the official 
awareness campaign about the EU accession in 2004, which was co-financed by the 
European Commission. Generally speaking, Dzurinda’s administration improved the 
government’s communication with the media. It started to publish all government 
proposals online and provided explanatory media kits for key government decisions. 
In 2006, the new Prime Minister Robert Fico ended this atmosphere of 
cooperation (1998-2002) and tolerance (2002-2006) between the government and the 
media. Robert Fico was personally hostile and rude to journalists and his government 
was met by a furious press and angry print media publishers. Nevertheless, it was his 
                                                 
1205 The national average monthly salary in the 1st quarter 2010 was 725 euro. According to the latest 
data of the Professional Salary Monitor Merces the average monthly salary of a journalist in Slovakia 
was 889 euro. The salary range of the survey respondents, who were looking for a job, was 608 – 1142 
euro. 
1206 M. Šmatlák, “Komentár k návrhu Deklarácie o ochrane a zabezpečení rozvoja mediálneho 
prostredia” [Comments on the draft of the Declaration on the protection and security of media 
environment development], 45 Otázky žurnalistiky No. 1-2 (2002) 112, at p. 111-112. 
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government that introduced a new media policy. This included radical changes in the 
indirect regulation of content of the printed press, a push for broadcast digitalisation 
and the transformation of the TASR newswire service. With the exception of the law 
concerning TASR, the new regulations put some limits on the press and constrained 
market access for new broadcasting players. 
The Press Law has been strongly criticised by many journalists, publishers, 
and international organisations.  Critics were mostly concerned with the vague 
formulations and strict regulation of the right to reply to any statement of fact that 
affected one’s integrity, dignity or privacy.1207 This has caused a rise in self-
censorship (as put by critics) or higher levels of fact-checking (as put by supporters) 
in print outlets. The media also spend more on lawyers, who must decide if the 
conditions for a published reply are met. Within the first ten months of the new 
regulations, the three main broadsheet newspapers received over one hundred 
requests.1208 However, only a handful of them were actually printed. 
During Fico’s government, the conflict between politics and the media entered 
Slovak courtrooms at an intense level. A growing number of politicians filed civil 
charges against the media and its publishers. Even more importantly, many politicians 
requested high compensation payments.1209 The deputy Director of the International 
Press Institute Alison Bethel McKenzie, harshly criticised the growing number of 
libel and defamation lawsuits in Slovakia: ‘We are concerned at the repeated use, in 
Slovakia, of civil defamation cases, accompanied by disproportionate fines targeting 
the media… Such a trend creates an environment in which independent media may 
feel pressured and intimidated, and acts as a restriction on investigative 
reporting.’1210 The controversy of these cases is typically a product of an awkward 
legal interpretation rather than insufficiency in the formal protection of journalists. 
Again, this is further evidence of the outdated education of (even younger) judges and 
legal practice traditions of courts in CEE.1211 Fortunately, numerous libel and 
defamation cases have failed in higher courts. The threat of a civil lawsuit, but 
possibly also of criminal charges, however, has taken a toll on media freedom in 
Slovakia. 
Finally, there seems to be a growing trend of association between the media 
and political clientelism in Slovakia.1212 A tradition of advocacy, the 
instrumentalisation of privately owned media, the politicisation of PBS and 
broadcasting regulation, the limited development of journalism and high corruption 
                                                 
1207 The Law introduced three forms of reactions: the right to reply, the right of correction and the right 
of supplemental information. 
1208 Ondrášik, “The Slovak press law: History and its impact on free media”. 
1209 In one case in May 2010, the Superior Court’s president, Štefan Harabín, threatened to sue two 
media outlets (daily Pravda and Radio Expres) for defamation and requested 400,000 EUR. The charge 
was based on a claim that the remodelled bathroom in the president‘s office cost over 33,700 EUR. The 
president argued that the published price referred to the cost of the renovation of the entire office. 
1210 N. Jayarajan, “Slovakian Supreme Court president and former justice Minister sues radio station for 
damage to reputation”, 7/05/2010, available at: http://www.freemedia.at/site-services/singleview-
master/4929/ (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
1211 I. C. Kaminiski, “Applying western media law standards in East Central Europe, in M. Sũkősd and 
P. Bajomi- Lázár (eds) Reinventing media, media policy reform in East - Central Europe (2003) 67. 
1212 D. C. Hallin, S. Papathanassopoulos, “Political clientilism and the media: Southern Europe and 
Latin America in comparative perspective”, 24 Media, Culture and Society (2002) 175. 
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levels1213 are all present in Slovakia and constitute a harmful trend for a democratic 
media system.1214  
It has been twenty one years since the fall of communism and the rebirth of a 
free and independent media. The present media landscape consists of both 
commercial as well as partially transformed public service media. Slovakia aspired to 
adopt the western European ideal and elusive public service media model, but this 
proved to be difficult due to concurrent global trends of commercialisation and media 
liberalisation.  Yet just as in the media in CEE, Western European mass media have 
been hugely impacted by commercialisation and the rise of sensational journalism. 
Non-commercial public service broadcasting seems to be challenged by these market 
and technological developments. De-politicisation of PSB seems to be by and large an 
impossible ideal even in Western Europe.1215 Yet, in Slovakia, the financial situation 
of PSB is critical. At the time of writing, the senior management forecast and then 
abruptly denied PSB’s early financial collapse. The new country’s leadership has 
announced that it has finally found long-term solutions for public media policy.1216 
The new Prime Minister Iveta Radičová has already promised to change the 
controversial Press Law and stressed the importance of moral self-censorship by 
journalists.1217 The Minister of Culture has announced that both Slovak Television 
and Slovak Radio will merge and their number of channels will be cut down. This 
decision should, theoretically, at least, offer a solution to the long-term financial 
problems of Slovak Television, as well as to the possible legal and practical 
difficulties in dismissing the current director of STV. 
 
5. Conclusion 
If Central and Eastern Europe has been an exciting social laboratory for the rebirth of 
liberal democracy in the 1990s, then Slovakia has become one of its most challenging 
cases. It started its democratic path together with all other central European third 
wave countries in 1989, fell back to the semi- or illiberal democracy of national 
populism in 1992-1998, started a new phase of liberal democracy in 1998, and risked 
the corrupted manners of nationalist politicians again in 2006-2010. There has never 
been an overall political consensus on the role of the media in a democratic society, 
especially on the merits of public service media, and all changes in media policy have 
reflected the values and principles of those who drafted them.  Slovakia has a fully 
liberalised print and fairly, though not sufficiently (at practical level), regulated 
                                                 
1213 Slovakia in 47th place, see NationMaster.com, “Government statistics, Corruption by country”, 
available at: http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/gov_cor-government-corruption (last visited on 
23/10/2010). 
1214 K. Jakubowicz, “Finding the right place on the map: Prospects for PBS in post-communist 
countries”, in K. Jakubowicz and M. Sũkősd (eds), Finding the right place on the map, Central and 
Eastern European media change in a global perspective (2009), at p. 111. 
1215 Mungiu-Pippidi, Complementary vision of economic and democratic philosophies on public TV, 
From state to public service. The failed reform of state television in Central Eastern Europe”, 31-62. 
1216 “Krajcer má riešenie pre STV, chce rokovanie koalície” [Krajcer has a solution for STV, he wants 
negotiations of the coalition], SME, 7/10/2010, available at: 
http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/5582646/krajcer-ma-riesenie-pre-stv-chce-rokovanie-koalicie.html (last 
visited on 23/10/2010). 
1217 M. Terenzani – Stankova, “Slovakia to get luckier with its press code” Slovak Spectator, 
20/09/2010, available at: 
http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/40152/2/slovakia_to_get_luckier_with_its_press_code.html (last 
visited on 23/10/2010). 
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broadcast market, a network of relatively independent public service media and 
decent media freedom assessments. As demonstrated in previous sections, the issues 
of the Slovak case are linked to previous political parallelism, current malicious court 
rulings against the media, journalist fragmentation, and growing pressure from 
commercialisation and vested interests. 
Long-term political parallelism used to be the key issue for Slovak media 
development. If we look at the possible levels and forms of political vs. media 
dependency, as defined by Hallin and Mancini,1218 in Slovakia we can identify all of 
these. Media content used to be heavily influenced by the politicians, especially in 
public service broadcasting. Media personnel tend to be active in political life and the 
career paths of journalists are traditionally shaped by their political affiliations. 
Professional movement between journalism and political public relations is also 
common.1219 Another sign of political parallelism in Slovakia used to be the 
partisanship of media audiences. This polarisation dates back to the Mečiar 
government, when the media were clearly divided along ideological lines and their 
support or opposition to the government. The governments’ attempts to manipulate 
coverage are notoriously linked to the public service broadcaster Slovenská televízia 
and its news programming. Complete editorial independence of PSB in Slovakia will 
require changes in the supervisory council selection procedures and the creation of a 
new financing framework. 
More recently and importantly, the courts seem to be increasingly impacting 
press freedom in Slovakia. The fact that in 2009 alone, the media were ordered to pay 
over EUR 430,000 to Slovak politicians can mean only one of two things: either the 
journalists are extremely unprofessional or the politicians demand outrageous 
compensation which the courts approve. Numerous controversial rulings seem to 
suggest that the latter is more likely correct. 
Generally, the politicians’ choice to go after a medium is dependent on their 
political party culture and personal style. Governing politicians of the last four years 
(2006-2010) used civil lawsuits extensively. This behaviour has created an impression 
that courtrooms can be used for content regulation, exorbitant compensation requests 
and publicity stunts. Obviously, the issue here is not the existing law. The controversy 
arises mostly over the awkward interpretation and relatively weak protection of the 
defendants which is also related to illiberal (continental) interpretation of freedom of 
speech.. 
A serious issue for Slovak journalism has also been its lower 
professionalisation level. The autonomy of journalists is weak, professional norms are 
de facto not required and public service orientation has become obscure. As Liehm 
explained, our society found itself in a moral vacuum after 1989.1220 And this vacuum 
also applied to journalism.1221 Furthermore, this moral vacuum was replaced by 
immoral market pressures. Contrary to general belief, the quality of journalism does 
                                                 
1218 D. C. and P. Mancini, Comparing media systems. Three models of media and politics (2004), at p. 
26. 
1219 Just recently, the columnist for Sme and former controversial editor-in-chief of economic weekly 
Trend, Rado Baťo, has become a spokesperson for the new government. 
1220 A. Liehm, “The role of culture under the communist and post-communist eras”, in H. Garner (ed.), 
Central and Southeastern Europe in transition, (2000), at pp. 43-47. 
1221 E. Lauk, “How will it all unfold? Media system and journalism cultures in post-communist 
countries”, in K. Jakubowicz and M. Sũkősd (eds), Finding the right place on the map, Central and 
Eastern European media change in a global perspective (2009) 193. 
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not result from the (correctly identified) low quality of higher education in Slovakia in 
general and in journalism in particular. It is the primary market that determines the 
quality of journalism in Slovakia in the private sector and, to a large degree, politics 
in the public sector. 
Additionally, Slovakia has suffered from the strong politicisation of the public 
sphere. Thus, before journalists were able to formally professionalise, they would 
become strongly polarised. To make things even more challenging, after 1998, when 
polarisation weakened and the possibility of professionalisation re-emerged, media 
owners were already engaged in a new fight, that being the fight for increased market 
share and lower production costs. The political pressures from the past were 
substituted by these new economic pressures and numerous studies show how media 
commercialisation has impacted on the public sphere. As Hallin and Mancini put it, 
“commercialisation is the most powerful force for homogenisation and 
globalisation.”1222  
In line with global trends, the aforementioned commercialisation also 
impacted media content in Slovakia. This trend has been especially significant in 
television broadcasting. Substance and issue-focused news programmes have been 
superseded by new formats covering personalised conflicts, crimes and showbusiness. 
This shift has already been linked to citizens’ growing cynicism regarding politics and 
politicians,1223 which seems to be happening in Slovakia too.1224 However, trust in 
politics and politicians seems to be related in part to often exaggerated expectations 
towards a new government.1225 
The influence of media owners, politicians (and their utilisation of public 
service media), high levels of corruption, unreasonably high compensations in libel 
and defamation cases and often bizarre justifications of courts´ and regulators´ 
decisions and rulings, journalists’ professional fragmentation, and global commercial 
trends seem to be the key determinants for the future of media policy and democracy 
in Slovakia. 
In spite of all the criticisms and drawbacks, the Slovak press, with all its 
weaknesses, has been one of the strongest players in the democratisation process in 
Slovakia since 1989. Through sometimes rough interactions with the public as well as 
the political sphere, beyond any doubt it has helped Slovakia to become a democratic 
transition success story. 
                                                 
1222 D.C. Hallin and P. Mancini, “Americanization, globalization and secularization”, in F. Esser and 
B.S Pfetsch, Comparing political communication. theories, cases, and challenges (2004), at pp. 38 – 
44.  
1223 D. Swanson, “Transnational trends in political communication. Conventional views and new 
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1224 “Prieskum: Dôvera vo vlády a parlamenty v Európe prudko klesá” [Survey: Confidence in 
governments and parliaments in Europe has plummeted], SME, 20/05/2010, available at:  
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and economic reforms], available at 
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1225 European Commission, Directorate General Communication, Eurobarometer 68, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_en.htm (last visited on 23/10/2010). 
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The case of Spain 
Susana de la Sierra, Emilio Guichot, Marina Mantini, Sara Medina, Irene Sobrino 
 
1. Introduction  
Spain is a young democracy, compared to other long-established regimes, as the 
Constitution drafted after Franco’s dictatorship dates from 1978. Whilst it would be 
too theoretical a debate to discuss here whether or not it is a federal state, Spain is a 
territorially decentralised country. It is divided into seventeen decentralised entities 
called Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Communities), which have their own 
basic political norms: the Autonomy Statutes (Estatutos de Autonomía). The 
Autonomous Communities have all some legal competences and, therefore, their own 
policies concerning the media. It should also be noted that Spain is a medium-size 
country, with nearly 45 million inhabitants, and some asymmetries between regions. 
This implies that, even if all the Autonomous Communities are in principle able – 
from a constitutional point of view - to develop their own media policy, in practice 
this is not the case. That is indeed a reflection of what happens also in other areas, as 
there are some Autonomous Communities that push forward their own policies more 
than others. And it is an interesting research question that could be the object of a 
case-study in the future. Also, the per capita income of Spanish citizens very much 
varies from region to region and from city to city. And there are still differences in 
access to certain services between those living in cities and those in rural 
environments. As a result, the relationship between media and democracy should be 
addressed bearing in mind that many inequalities still exist in the country.  
The report, whose purpose is to provide a background of the situation of media 
policies in Spain, is divided into the following parts. Firstly, a thorough historical 
review will be set out. The reason for its length is the fact that history has played a 
decisive role in the framing of today’s media law in Spain. In other words, it could be 
argued that historical and cultural influences are too strong in Spanish law for it to 
adapt to new contexts. Secondly, the legal framework will be discussed. The focus 
will be on the constitutional provisions that recognise freedom of expression and 
information, and the limits on their exercise. An explanation will also be given of how 
the Central State and the Autonomous Communities are granted competences to act in 
the media sector. Then, thirdly, more specific sub-constitutional norms will be 
explored, focusing on the main legal bases for the development and functioning of 
each type of media. The analysis will proceed with the discussion of specific content 
regulations, such as the legally-protected conscience clause for journalists, the 
protection of certain rights such as honour or privacy, access to public documents and 
copyright rules. Finally, an assessment of the relationship between democracy and the 
media will be provided. It will then become clear that the structural conditions of the 
Spanish media market, resulting from history and from recent legal frameworks, pose 
some difficulties in guaranteeing a market that is really free and competitive and 
which allows consumers to truly choose products and journalists to exercise their 
activity in an environment that is protective but also free.  
 
2. The media landscape in Spain  
The Spanish Constitution entered into force in December 1978, definitively 
concluding the authoritarian regime that had been imposed by General Francisco 
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Franco after his military rising against the Republic in July 1936. During the 
dictatorial period, no rights and freedoms were guaranteed as they would have been in 
a democratic country. Even less so, of course, the freedom of expression or freedom 
of the press, as these would endanger the regime. This authoritarian system lasted for 
almost forty years but it was not homogeneous throughout that time period. In the 
1960s, the regime opened up slightly,1226 and this allowed for a revision of some laws 
concerning the media, which at that time were mainly the press and radio. From this 
period is the Press Statute, passed in 1966 which – paradoxically - is still in force.    
It is indeed therefore not possible to understand the current situation of the 
mass media in Spain without looking back at the historic evolution of the Spanish 
state and its society, from the civil war through the Dictatorship to the period of 
transition to democracy. The pillars of the current system were laid between 1975 and 
1990. However, the regulation has changed recently, a new Statute on Audiovisual 
Communication has been passed (implementing the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive – hereinafter AMSD - in Spanish law) and a new media landscape is being 
shaped, naturally not only due to internal factors but also to international dynamics. 
Market pressures have led communications groups to merge, and new information and 
communication technologies are forcing the traditional media to go with the flow and 
constantly evolve.1227 At the same time, society is changing, migration movements 
cause fluctuating and changing situations in the audience, whereas the contemporary 
hyper-exposure to informational messages causes a continuous need to a reciprocal 
adaptation between the transmitter and the receiver. This means that several 
communication channels are used at the same time, the relationship between 
transmitter and receiver is not bidirectional, and the contents of the message are 
constantly renegotiated.1228 In order to understand the current mass media market it is 
necessary to place it in its cultural and social context, which is in turn the result of a 
historical evolution that greatly influences present processes.  
The following lines will be devoted to presenting a brief history of the mass 
media in Spain, focusing on the birth of the main mass media (the press, radio, 
television and new online media services) and their development up to now. In this 
section the contemporary media landscape will receive detailed and thorough 
attention.  
The historical review of the media communication system will be divided into 
the following stages: the evolution of the printed press and radio during the Second 
Republic (1931-1936); political advertising and propaganda in the Spanish Civil War 
                                                 
1226 On this, see mainly E. Chuliá, El poder y la palabra. Prensa y poder político en las dictaduras. El 
régimen de Franco ante la prensa y el periodismo (2001) and, by the same author, ‘La Ley de Prensa 
de 1966. La explicación de un cambio institucional arriesgado y de sus efectos virtuosos’, 2 Historia y 
política: ideas, procesos y movimientos sociales (1999) 197. See also, as a written testimony of 
scholars during the dictatorship, G. Dueñas, La Ley de Prensa de Manuel Fraga (1969); M. Fernández 
Areal, Libertad de prensa en España, 1938-1971 (1971). See also J. Terrón Montero, La prensa de 
España durante el régimen de Franco. Un intento de análisis político (1981). A bibliography for the 
study of the history of the press in Spain can be found in J. Altabella, Historia del periodismo español. 
Programa y fuentes (1987). 
1227 An updated study on the situation of the media in Spain is the yearly report of the Advertising 
Agency Zenith. See the 2010 report on http://www.zenithmedia.es/zenithlibrodemedios.pdf (last visited 
on 12/10/2010). 
1228 For the concept of “flow”, in the context of communication, see A.  Semprini, La società di flusso 
(2003); for the processes of negotiation and renegotiation in communication theory see J. Lozano, C. 
Peña Marín and G. Abril, Análisis del discurso. Hacia una Semiótica de la interacción textual (1989). 
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(1936-1939); and the Franco Dictatorship, i.e. when the bases of the mass media 
system that still exists in Spain today were founded. This period was characterised by 
governmental control and censorship (with a distinction between the first period, 
1939-1966 and the second period, 1966 until the death of the dictator in 1975); the 
transition to democracy (1975-1990), during which the mass media played an 
important function; and the current years of democratic government, a time in which 
democracy is being consolidated and the mass media system undergoes profound 
changes.  
This division is coherent with the historical analysis and the opinions of 
scholars and experts in Spanish mass media history. Historians have noted how the 
press, radio and television influenced events and promoted important changes in the 
course of history, thus contributing also to framing democracy. The relationship 
between politics and broadcasting was very close throughout the Franco period, so 
that the phases used to study the dictatorship usually coincide with those established 
for television.1229 It is also useful to note that newspapers and the press in general 
were born as political and ideological expressions of political parties and trade unions. 
Therefore, they performed the same function as “house organs” do today in 
companies.1230 Indeed, throughout Spanish history, the printed press has assumed 
more ideological and radical opinions than the political parties themselves, and has 
played an important role in different crucial historical changes (the Second Republic, 
the Franco dictatorship and the transition to democracy). As argued by Fuentes 
Aragonés,  
Possibly one could formulate a historical rule that, with exceptions, then 
became more or less generalised: that newspapers and magazines linked to one 
ideology or other kept more radical and partisan views than those of the 
political parties or trade unions to which they were attached.1231  
 
2.1 The Second Republic (1931-1936) 
The Second Republic lasted from 1931 until the military uprising of 1936. Some 
authors prefer to consider its course extended until 1939, the year in which the civil 
war ended. It actually succeeded another dictatorship, namely that of General Primo 
de Rivera (1923-1930), which contained no relevant elements for today’s 
understanding of the relationship between media and democracy. The Republic had a 
brief [but eventful] history,1232 and some facts that need to be highlighted from the 
point of view of freedom of expression and democracy. First, it should be noted that 
press distribution and consumption during this period were widespread. Secondly, 
radio took its first steps. Thirdly, it can be assumed that the Republic was designed 
also to protect rights and freedoms, and, indeed, a specific court was established to 
guarantee the enforcement of the Constitution (Tribunal de Garantías 
Constitucionales). Yet at that time mechanisms to ideologically and politically control 
                                                 
1229 See E. Bustamante, Storia della radio e della televisione in Spagna (1939-2007) (2007), at p. 2. 
1230 A house organ is a magazine or periodical published by a company in order to promote that 
company's products. 
1231 J.F. Fuentes Aragonés, “De la confrontación al consenso: el papel de la prensa en la Segunda 
Républica y la Transición” in R. Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz (eds), Prensa y democracia. Los medios 
de comunicación en la Transición (2009), at p. 68. 
1232 A. Pizarroso Quintero, De la Gazeta Nueva a Canal Plus. Breve historia de los medios de 
comunicación en España, (1992). The same author has published Historia de la prensa (1994). 
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the press were still recurrent. Fourthly, the role of the press in the Second Republic 
can be compared to the active one it has played in other periods of history, such as the 
transition to democracy starting around 1975. Notwithstanding this, even if it can be 
argued that the press led the Primo de Rivera dictatorship to the Second Republic, i.e. 
towards a liberal regime, it also contributed to the establishment of another 
dictatorship, that of General Franco, with the consequent censorship and media 
control.1233  
This was an exciting time for the mass media, especially for newspapers, 
considering that all were politically engaged. Due to their influence on public opinion, 
the term “Paper Parliament” (Parlamento de Papel) was created. However, a strict 
censorship control gradually started to appear, as an aggressive and violent climate 
built up in society and later culminated in the military coup d’état by General 
Francisco Franco. This is the time when the political polarisation of media began, a 
polarisation that can be identified even today. Also significant was the role of news 
agencies, which began to take their first steps at this period. Additionally, the radio 
became consolidated as an important broadcasting medium. The Government of the 
Second Republic pushed through the adoption of several statutes and regulations 
concerning radio broadcasting, and created the first Ministry of Communications 
(Ministerio de Comunicaciones).1234 Nevertheless, if we compare the Spanish 
situation with that of England or Germany, the development of Spanish radio was less 
extensive than in other European nations.1235 This was clear from the European 
Lucerne Plan of 1934, which divided and assigned waveband frequencies – where 
radios had to operate - to European states. The licences assigned to Spain exceeded 
the real necessity of the country.  
 
2.2 The Civil War (1936-1939)  
The Civil War1236 was a relevant period for the initiation of the propaganda system, 
which was later used for political purposes during General Francisco Franco’s regime. 
It was also relevant for the development of a new type of media, sound cinema, in 
particular, with reference to news (propaganda) documentaries. One of the first and 
main concerns of the Franco side from the beginning of the Civil War was the control 
of the press and other media. The basic architecture of what would subsequently be 
the regime’s propaganda apparatus, for nearly four decades, was forged during the 
                                                 
1233 As pointed out by Fuentes Aragonés, “De la confrontación al consenso: el papel de la prensa en la 
Segunda Républica y la Transición”, the Spanish press in these two periods was characterised by 
tension and political radicalisation. Thus, indirectly, it contributed to disseminating the opinion of a 
need for a "strong hand" that could restore order. 
1234 The first National Plan on Radio Broadcasting dates back to 1931, whereas the Statute on Radio 
Broadcasting, from 1934, established a state monopoly of this activity. Moreover, in this very same 
year of 1934, the central State gave the competence on broadcasting services to the regional Catalan 
government (evidently to be exercised in its territory only). Yet the Catalan government never took 
advantage of this new power, due to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. It should be noted 
that in 1934, some important riots took place in different parts of Spain, thus showing the discontent of 
certain sectors of the population.   
1235 See Pizarroso Quintero, De la Gazeta Nueva a Canal Plus. Breve historia de los medios de 
comunicación en España. 
1236 Cf. in general Pizarroso Quintero, De la Gazeta Nueva a Canal Plus. Breve historia de los medios 
de comunicación en España; L. Díaz, La radio en España, 1923-1997 (1997); A. Pizarroso Quintero, 
“La guerra civil española: un hito en la historia de la propaganda”, 2 El Argonauta Español (2005). 
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war. In 1938, Franco’s faction passed the Press Statute (Ley de prensa),1237 which 
came into being on a provisional basis, but lasted until 1966. The Statute conceived 
the press as a public service and provided that public institutions could participate in 
the management of newspapers and also in determining the content of information. 
State interference was thus institutionalised. It is also interesting to underline the 
existence of extensive foreign press presence.1238 Moreover, many foreign 
correspondents (as well as international cultural personalities, such as Ernest 
Hemingway or Henry Cartier Brésson) came to write and describe the dramatic events 
in Spain. Numerous documentaries and films testifying to the increasing role of the 
new mass media were produced, even though they were mostly propaganda voices. It 
should be added that the anarchist and the communist groups also took advantage of 
propaganda. The phenomenon of disinformation or black propaganda (propaganda 
negra) that exaggerated or distorted facts and news also dates from this period. This 
technique was used equally by both parties, the groups sustaining the legitimate 
Republic and those against it.   
Clearly, the strict relationship and interdependency between the mass media 
and public institutions in Spain, or more precisely, the symptoms of the lack of 
independence of the media in Spain with regard to public power, became apparent. At 
the same time the printed press experienced severe censorship, regulated by the 
aforementioned Press Statute of 1938 and conditioned by the news agency EFE, 
which was created in 1939 and which still exists today as the major Spanish news 
agency. Public Radio, Radio Nacional de España, was created in 1937, in Salamanca.  
It is difficult to assess the relationship between media and democracy during 
this war period, as, by definition, strictly speaking no state whatsoever exists and, 
therefore, no political regime, either democratic or authoritarian, can be identified. 
Notwithstanding this, it is important to understand the dynamics that were created, as 
they greatly influenced the landscape in later years. Indeed, during the Civil war, the 
information media became increasingly politicised and polarised, something that will 
emerge as a characteristic of the mass media that led to social division and which still 
exists even today. Like the other mass media, even local radios became a propaganda 
tool.  
 
2.3 The dictatorship of General Francisco Franco (1939-1975) 
As already mentioned the period of Franco’s dictatorship made a considerable mark 
on the evolution of the mass media in Spain and produced the lowest level of freedom 
of expression and information.  
Historians divide this time into two periods: the first one stretches from 1939 
to 1966 and is usually called “The dark years” (Los años oscuros).1239. During this 
period the dictatorship slowly evolved and consolidated itself. The second period, 
from 1966 to 1975, is characterised by a certain opening-up of the regime, both 
domestically and internationally, and it laid the foundations for the future transition to 
                                                 
1237 22 April 1938 (BOE/Official Journal 23/04/1938). 
1238 The Italian Dictatorship led by Mussolini created a especial task force for its propaganda in Spain, 
directly dependent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda della Missione 
Militare in Spagna, instituted in Saragossa in 1937). 
1239 A. Pizarroso Quintero, De la Gazeta Nueva a Canal Plus. Breve historia de los medios de 
comunicación en España, at p. 159. 
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democracy.1240 This does not mean, though, that there was an intention to undertake 
such a transition at the time. This division of the dictatorship applies perfectly well to 
media development, as 1966 was indeed a crucial year for the freedom of expression 
and information.  
The dictatorship saw the consolidation of a mixed-service radio system (public 
and private, the only case in Europe), which characterised Spanish radio from its 
beginning in the early years of the twentieth century.1241 Then, between 1953 and 
1962, the regime was internationally consolidated and integration into the 
international economy started, thus putting an end to autarky. This led to the setting-
up of a Spanish Public Television (TVE) that still exists today. An important change 
was the arrival of Manuel Fraga Iribarne to the leadership of the Ministry of 
Information and Tourism, in 1962. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, who still serves for his 
political party, the Popular Party (now in the opposition), has been a controversial 
figure, as he was in charge of the censorship system run by the aforementioned 
Ministry and he later formed part of the democratic institutions.1242 He was the author 
of the Press Statute of 1966, which – amazingly, in the new democratic framework - 
is still in force.1243 Even if it is impossible to talk of freedom of expression at that 
time, the difference between the 1938 and the 1966 law lies in the lack of compulsory 
prior censorship after 1966. As the Spanish writer Miguel Delibes put it: “Before, they 
forced you to write what you did not feel, now they are satisfied with forbidding you 
to write what you feel; at least something has been gained”.1244  Until 1966, indeed, it 
could be argued that there was a monopoly system, whereby the State provided 
information, this being, of course, of a propagandistic nature. Yet from 1966 on, with 
the new Statute fervently advocated by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, the Minister of 
Tourism and Information, there was a partial opening towards greater freedom, thanks 
also to the rapid spread of television, which had started to broadcast on a regular basis 
in Spain (although initially only in Madrid) on 28 October 1956. This situation did not 
mean, of course, that the freedom of expression and information was recognised, as 
only once the Dictator had died in 1975 could a real – and therefore non-
programmatic – discourse on rights and freedoms be politically and legally 
implemented.   
The propaganda system which was established in 1938 and consolidated in the 
1950s cohabited with extensive censorship.1245 Those media that did not respect 
censorship would be sanctioned and this was, among others, one of the reasons for the 
slow development of the press in Spain, which was below the European average. This 
                                                 
1240 As will be explained later, 1966 was a landmark for the history of the media in Spain.  
1241 Spanish Radio organised itself both on the public and on the private initiative and private stations 
operated by frequencies assigned by the State.  
1242 He has published several books – not academic ones, certainly – that may enlighten those interested 
in getting to know that period better. See, for instance, his memories: M. Fraga Iribarne, Memoria 
breve de una vida pública (1980). E. Chuliá interviewed him for her research on the Press Statute of 
1966, as stated in her publications already quoted. 
1243 Statute 14/1966, 18 March, Print Press and Printing (Ley de Prensa e Imprenta), BOE/Official 
Journal 19/03/1966. 
1244 M. Delibes, La censura de prensa en los años 40 (y otros ensayos) (1985), at p. 5. 
1245 In order to control news and texts, a system of instructions (consignas) was established and, as a 
consequence of this, the bodies of the authoritarian regime felt free to send texts to newspapers and 
magazine editors so as to have them published. This is similar to the “Veline” system in Italy, used 
during the dictatorship of Benito Mussolini. 
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may be seen as the reason for the Spanish disaffection to newspapers which 
characterised society until the early 1980s (and in part, even today).1246 
From 1969 onwards, Franco’s control of radio and television was absolute 
even if incipient attempts to fight against the regime began to emerge, precisely when 
the public television broadcaster reached a certain maturity. At that time one of the 
peculiarities of the National Radio and Television (Radiotelevisión Española: RTVE), 
which is still operating, was the military presence on the boards of the broadcasting 
system, alongside journalists and professionals.1247 Indeed, like in other fascist 
regimes, there was a particular ideology, which in this case was that of National-
Catholicism, but not a highly-structured propaganda system (like, for example, the 
ones developed under the authorities of Hitler or Mussolini). It worked with official 
speeches, but did not have its own public propaganda space. This does not mean, 
however, that it was not aggressive or repressive. On the contrary: for instance, the 
profession of journalist was fully controlled by the State and access to it could be 
denied if the opinions of the individual concerned were not in accordance with the 
official doctrine.  
As stated above, television broadcasting in Spain started on 28 October 1956, 
although at the very beginning it only reached the city of Madrid. Television coverage 
gradually expanded and reached all regions in Spain in 1964, the year in which the 
Canary Islands also received the signal. Until 1988, there was only public television 
in Spain, and therefore private enterprises were not allowed to broadcast. The 
television which was established in 1956 used a modulated frequency (FM) radio 
system and its contents – as was the case with radio – suffered from the same 
mediocrity as the rest of cultural life in Spain, in contrast to the creativity experienced 
in the Second Republic.1248 At the same time, we should remember the collaboration 
of RTVE managers and professionals with the Spanish regime, something which 
negatively affected the plurality of the contents. Concerning radio, though, it should 
be added that a certain sector of the Spanish population was eager to receive plural 
information and many would secretly listen to foreign radio broadcasters. This was an 
increasing phenomenon that worried the regime greatly and which reputedly helped to 
open it up slightly. This is so because it provided the means to slowly build up a 
critical public opinion, at least regarding a certain sector of the population, i.e. those 
listening to foreign radios.1249  
During 1962 and 1969, the maturity period of the dictatorship, spectacular 
economic growth took place along with the first protests by social movements. This is 
the setting in which the broadcasting system expanded dramatically. The regime never 
ceased its repression of dissidents and, indeed, the opening-up of the system was not 
really due to the regime’s will, but to internal and external pressure by the citizenship, 
social movements and international actors.  
One of the major “legacies” of Franco’s dictatorship concerning the media 
and, in particular, journalism is the regulation established regarding the profession of 
journalist. Not only did an Official Register of Journalists exist, but also specific 
                                                 
1246 See the Yearly Informe Annual de la Comunicación [Communication Report] coordinated by B. 
Díaz Nosty from 1989 to 1992. 
1247 Bustamante, Storia della radio e della televisione in Spagna, at p. 12. 
1248 See Pizarroso Quintero, De la Gazeta Nueva a Canal Plus. Breve historia de los medios de 
comunicación en España. 
1249 See F. Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco (1976) p. 343-344. 
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schools were created at Universities to provide training. The Faculties of Information 
or Communication date from this period and are still the norm today, although they 
are not compulsory, for gaining access to the profession. Clearly, even if a basic 
knowledge of certain subjects may be advisable, having everybody follow identical 
steps to become journalists could impede a real development of pluralism and, thus, 
of democracy.  
The State Press Agency, EFE, as we mentioned before, was created in 1939 
and is still functioning today.1250 It quickly became the most important press agency 
all over America, too, with bases in capital cities such as Buenos Aires, Lima, 
Asunción, and even in New York City and Manila, where EFE installed its first bridge 
to the East (historically, the weakest) in 1977. During this time, crucial technological 
changes were experienced, such as satellite connections or computers.  
The final years, from 1969 until the death of the dictator in 1975, coincide 
with the crisis of the regime. This was not provoked by the physical decline of 
General Franco alone, but also and, more importantly, due to the ever-growing 
popular rebellions, frequent workers’ and students’ strikes, as well as a clear 
opposition to the dictatorship. There were no legal or structural changes on television 
or radio, and these media simply consolidated their position. The printed press 
(newspapers and magazines) also experienced, as already stated, the hesitant opening-
up permitted by the Press Statute of 1966.  
 
2.4 The transition to democracy (Transición: from 1975 onwards)  
To conclude this historical journey, it is necessary to devote a few lines to the period 
of the transition from dictatorship to democracy, especially because of the existence 
of controversial opinions regarding this period. According to some, the mass media 
played an important role in accelerating the transition to democracy. Yet many 
academics and historians consider that radio and television did not undergo any 
remarkable change in this period.1251 As far as the printed press is concerned, it played 
a similar role to the one played in the Second Republic. It acted as a driving force to 
create a critical public opinion and to foster the implementation of rights and 
freedoms. Indeed, these years were characterised by the growing relevance in quality 
and impact of the daily newspapers and magazines. Nevertheless, contrary to what 
was typical in the republican period, the Transition was inspired by a model that did 
not accept radicalisation or policy “brutalisation”. The dominant thought was 
“freedom without rage”, and even the leader of the Communist Party,1252 Santiago 
Carrillo, said, “No Dictatorship, not even the dictatorship of the proletariat”. 
Newspapers echoed these views, and the word consensus was a trigger and a 
leitmotiv. Therefore, even if pluralism was slowly acquired in the press, radicalism 
was out of the system. 
As in the previous phases, there was a close relationship between political 
events and the evolution of radio and television. The climate of political instability, 
violence and economic problems was not the ideal framework for a change in the 
model of government control over radio and television. Nevertheless, some important 
                                                 
1250 See EFE official website, available at: http://www.efe.com (last visited on 13/10/2010).  
1251 See in particular J.M. Baget, Historia de la televisión en España 1956-1975 (1993); E. Nicolás 
Marín, La libertad encadenada. España en la Dictadura Franquista 1939-1975 (2005).  
1252 The Communist Party in Spain was legalised during Easter 1977.  
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events should be highlighted. In 1977, the “Spanish Radio and Television” 
(Radiotelevisión Española: RTVE) public body became autonomous – and thus more 
independent, although not entirely. This was one of the results of the “Moncloa 
Agreements” (Pactos de la Moncloa), which were crucial for establishing a legal 
framework for the future democratic system.1253 On 29 December 1978 the Spanish 
Constitution was published in the Official Journal and thus a new political and legal 
framework for the media was also established. Article 20 of the Constitution 
recognised the freedom of speech and freedom of information. On the basis of this 
article, a Statute on Radio and Television was passed in 1980,1254 and was 
complemented by a Statute allowing the Autonomous Communities to have their own 
television channels.1255 The Statute on Radio and Television was first applied in 1981 
and it included elements that did not really permit the development of a system 
independent of political control. This was so because only one public television 
broadcaster (and no private ones) was allowed and the political party in power still 
conditioned very much its activities. Later on, in 1988, the first steps were taken 
towards allowing private broadcasters to enter the Spanish arena.1256 
Finally, it should be noted that in the 1980s and 1990s, under the socialist 
governments (from 1982 to 1996), Spain was pierced by a movement of renewal and 
cultural experimentation, often promoted by public institutions (known as movida). 
This cultural innovation spread to television programmes too. At the same time, a 
peculiar phenomenon that characterises broadcasting in Spain, and which started 
during the transition to democracy, was regional television. The Autonomous 
Communities (or at least some of them) started to create and run their own channels. 
Their functioning was rather heterogeneous and did not necessarily mirror the 
national system until 1983, the year in which – as already stated - a Statute on the so-
called “third channel” was passed. This Statute allowed Autonomous Communities to 
actually create their channels, but subject to certain legal conditions. The Federation 
of Autonomic Radio and Television Organisms (Federación de Organismos de Radio 
y Televisión Autonómicos: FORTA) also dates from this period.  
In conclusion, the transition to democracy implied the loss of an opportunity 
to create a broadcasting system free of state control, something which is a necessary 
condition for a democratic and independent mass media system. It is not by chance 
that one of the Spanish specialists in communication has argued that  
The history of Spanish radio and television during the last years of Franco and 
the transition, but also largely during democracy itself and at least until 2006, 
cannot be understood without taking into account the early framework created 
by the dictatorship and applied to television from its beginnings.1257 
                                                 
1253 See Bustamante, Storia della radio e della televisione in Spagna (1939-2007).  
1254 Statute 4/1980, 10 January 1980, De Estatuto de la Radio y de la Televisión, BOE/Oficial Journal 
11/1980, 12/01/1982. 
1255 Statute 46/1983, 26 December 1983, on the Third Television Channel (Del Tercer Canal de 
Televisión), BOE/ Official Journal, 4/1984, 5/1/1984. 
1256 Statute 10/1988, 3 May 1988, on Private Television (De Televisión Privada), BOE/ Official Journal 
108/1988, 5/5/1988. 
1257 E. Bustamante, “Radiotelevisión en España: entre el franquismo y la democracia”, in R. Quirosa-
Cheyrouze y Muñoz, (ed.), Prensa y democracia… (2009) at p. 307. The year 2006 is mentioned, 
because a new Statute was passed then, Statute 17/2006, 5 June 2006, on Radio and Television 
belonging to the State (Radio y Televisión de Titularidad Estatal), BOE/Official Journal 134/2006, 6 
June 2006, repealing the abovementioned 1980 Statute.   
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With regard to the printed press, as underlined by Seoane and Sáiz, “neither 
the opening-up brought on by the 1966 Press Statute nor the expectations awakened 
by the democratic transition and the conquest of freedom of expression resulted in a 
significant increase in global diffusion”.1258  
As stated above, the press played an important role in the transition, as it 
furthered this process, but this was not translated into greater enthusiasm on the part 
of readers. 
 
2.5 The media landscape under various governments 
Early socialist governments (1982-1986; 1986-1989; 1989-1993; and 1993-1996) 
were unable to put a definitive end to Franco’s legacy in the topic we are dealing 
with. Broadcasting was still considered in this period a public service, with the 
intrinsic limitations that this concept in its classical version usually brings with it in 
relation to free competition. Indeed, the delay in the admission of private operators to 
this market hampered competition between broadcasters, a competition that almost 
only existed for the sake of competing for advertising spaces. This led to a “private 
commercial” programming model as qualified by Enrique Bustamante. In 1995, a new 
Statute was passed, regulating satellite and cable television.1259 
Under the governments of the Popular Party (1996-2000 and 2000-2004) the 
broadcasting system did not receive the boost it should have been given in this period, 
when liberalisation and deregulation were key concepts. In fact, the broadcasting 
system reached a situation of financial collapse.1260 The willingness to apply 
European regulations and to allow private broadcasters to act with greater freedom in 
a liberalised market was indeed clear.1261 Yet in practice this did not work and 
broadcasting remained a highly regulated sector, with few operators active in the 
market and with many constraints. In part three of this report a presentation will be 
made of how the liberalisation of the broadcasting sector is now intended to become 
more real, thanks to a new Statute passed implementing the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive. The Spanish Statute does not only implement the Directive, but 
goes further and regulates aspects which were not envisaged in the European norm.  
As far as the printed press is concerned, the 1980s and the 1990s were 
important decades, as newspaper sales took off. Yet they generally remained below 
the European average.  
                                                 
1258 M.C. Seoane and M.D. Sáiz, Cuatro siglos de periodismo en España (2007), at p. 309. 
1259 Statute 37/1995, 12 December 1995, On Satellite Telecommunications (De Telecomunicaciones 
por Satélite) , BOE/Official Journal 297/1995, 13/12/1995, and Statute 42/1995, 22 December 1995, 
On Cable Telecommunications (De Telecomunicaciones por Cable), BOE/Official Journal 306/1995, 
23/12/1995. The latter was later repealed by Statute 32/2003, 3 November 2003, General de 
Telecomunicaciones (General Statute on Telecommunications), BOE/Official Journal 264/2003, 
4/11/2003.  
1260 A recent Statute has been passed precisely on the financing of public broadcasters: Statute 8/2009, 
28 August 2009, On the financing of the Public Corporation of the Spanish Radio and Television (De 
financiación de la Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española), BOE/ Official Journal 210/2009,  
31/8/2009. The main novelty is the fact that no advertising is allowed on public television channels and 
a tax has been imposed on telecommunication companies to contribute to RTVE’s budget. This was 
something private broadcasters had been demanding for a long time.  
1261 It should be remembered also the relationship between José María Aznar, Spanish Prime Minister 
at the time, and Silvio Berlusconi, Italian Prime Minister and owner of the private broadcaster 
Telecinco in Spain. 
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2.6 Mass media in Spain: the contemporary landscape 
A crucial moment has now arrived for the mass media in Spain, as the whole 
environment is rapidly changing. The most obvious example of this is the Internet, 
with its new format – compared to other more classical media -, social networks, and 
especially the interface between different media. Also the integration between 
telephone systems, computers and television characterises the current changes. 
Television in particular is undergoing many transformations: the analogue switch-off, 
the possible merger between channels, the disappearance of advertising on public 
television and pay-digital terrestrial television (DTT).  
These changes will have an impact both on consumption and on programming, 
and there will be a possible fragmentation of the audience and therefore a change in 
advertising funding, given the general situation of economic recession.1262 
The main characteristic of the media in Spain is that they continue to meet 
certain ideological logic, although commercial ideology is very much present 
(especially in the case of large international media groups). In the mind of consumers 
buying this or that newspaper or watching certain television news symbolises a 
sharing of ideas or membership in a certain political party.  
There were five multimedia groups in 2009 (Prisa, Vocento, Godó, Unidad 
Editorial, Planeta), although the trend is for this figure to increase. There are five 
national daily newspapers (El País, ABC, El Mundo, La Razón, Público) and, so far, 
four free national newspapers (Qué, ADN, 20 Minutos, Metro), which have become 
very popular. Daily sports newspapers are also very popular and two of them exist on 
the national scene (AS, Marca). As far as radio is concerned, there are 6 public radios 
(Radio Nacional de España, Radio 3, Radio 4, Radio 5, Radio Clásica y Radio 
Exterior), as well as regional and local radios. Concerning the private ones, the 
following can be mentioned: Cadena Ser, M80, Los 40 Principales, Cadena Dial (all 
of them owned by Prisa Group); Unión Radio; Punto Radio; Radio Marca; OndaCero 
and COPE (owned by the Conferencia Episcopal, i.e. the Catholic Church). In 2009, 
there were six national analogical TV channels (TVE 1, La 2, Cuatro, Telecinco, La 
Sexta, Antena 3), all of which have now turned digital. On the digital scene, five of 
the national channels are public (TV 1, TV 2, 24h, Clan, Teledeporte), and there are 
many more private ones.1263 Concerning satellite TV, there is one operator, Digital +, 
which was the consequence of a merger between the two previous operators (Via 
Digital and Canal Satélite Digital). Telecable, Ono and Euskaltel were the three cable 
operators, and Imagenio, Orange and Jazztel were the ADSL providers. 
 
2.6.1 Printed press 
Today, the situation of the print press is delicate, as new technologies (in particular, 
the Internet) have caused a general stagnation common to all countries in the Western 
world. In Spain, circulation is high due to the specialised sports press and to regional 
newspapers, even if the number of outlets has been reduced. In addition, newspapers 
                                                 
1262 See Zenith, “Los medios de comunicación en España y Portugal 2009” [Media in Spain and 
Portugal 2009]. ZenithOptimedia is part of the world's largest media services group.  
1263 See the full list: Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, “Operadores TDT”, available at: 
http://www.televisiondigital.es/Terrestre/OperadoresTDT/Paginas/OperadoresTDT.aspx (last visited on 
13/10/2010). 
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and magazines have embarked on a race, competing amongst themselves by offering 
promotions of all types of products, such as DVDs, books or even mugs.1264 With 
regard to magazines, in particular, there is a shortage of good-quality small press in 
Spain. Another peculiar phenomenon, that of the yellow press (prensa del corazón), 
which is also abundantly present in television and radio programmes, remains 
strong.1265  
The newspaper readership in Spain has not varied substantially in the last 
decade, but its percentage remains remarkably lower than that of other EU 
countries.1266 The free press is reaching large audiences and is gaining remarkable 
commercial strength. The most widely-read newspaper is 20 Minutos, a free 
newspaper of national scope launched on 3 February 2000, with an average of 
2,889,000 daily readers (in 2008). The second most widely-read paper is the sports 
newspaper Marca (2,597,000) and the third one is El País, with a readership of 
2,218,000. They are followed by two other free newspapers (Qué, 2,255,000, and 
Metro, 1,823,000). El Mundo comes only in 6th place, with 1,348,000 daily readers. 
Newspapers, as stated above, maintain their income rates thanks to product 
distribution, advertising and merchandising. Women’s magazines lead the magazine 
market, but even this is also stagnated. Most readers are female, despite the prevailing 
daily intake for men. The highest rate of readership is among persons (both female 
and male) between 25 and 44.  
 
2.6.2 Television 
Television is still the most-consumed media, even more so with the wide range of 
channels and obviously due to a great extent to all major sporting events, despite their 
being broadcasted – in many cases - on pay channels. Average daily consumption of 
television is 227 minutes per person (2008). Most consumers are women between 35 
and 54, who prefer Tele5 and Antena3, while men tend to prefer La Sexta, Cuatro and 
TV1.  
The television market is increasingly fragmented, and there is a public entity 
for radio and television, Radiotelevisión Española/RTVE, which broadcasts through 
two generalist channels of national scope: La Primera or TV1 and La 2 or TV2. In 
addition, twelve other similar public bodies are grouped around the aforementioned 
Federación de Organismos de Radio y Televisión Autonómicos (FORTA). Each of 
these regional public broadcasters traditionally had one or two analogical television 
channels. The transition from analogue television to the digital system – the so called 
“analogue switch-off”– concluded on 2 April 2010.1267 The analogical networks 
belonging to private television companies were Antena 3, Telecinco, Cuatro and La 
                                                 
1264 El País, newspaper leader, joined in 2005 127.8 million Euros. Source: Seoane and Sáiz, Cuatro 
siglos de periodismo, p. 312. 
1265 Hola, the most famous and prestigious, started its publication in 1944. 
1266 Data sources for all types of media: Gabinete de Análisis Demoscópico (Demoscopic Análisis 
Office: GAD), El Informe 2010: Medios de comunicación españoles en las redes sociales [2010 
Report: Spanish media in social networks]; Zenith, “Los medios en España y Portugal 2009”; 
Asociación para la Investigación de Medios de Comunicación, Estudio General de Medios, Audiencia 
de Internet, Abril-Mayo 2010 [Internet Audience, April-May 2010]. 
1267 There is an official Spanish government website, where the digitalisation process could be followed 
and updated information can still be found today. See Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, 
“Televisión Digital Terrestre”, available at: 
http://www.televisiondigital.es/Terrestre/Paginas/Index.aspx (last visited on 13/10/2010). 
 390
Sexta, and they have all turned digital, accompanied by Veo TV and Net TV, which 
were already digital. With regard to local television stations, there are no precise data, 
since the map of local television and radio companies is very fragmentary. The 
penetration of cable television is very low compared to other (former) analogical and 
digital television formulas.1268 With regard to Internet television (IPTV), Telefónica, 
the most powerful and widespread telecommunications company, has been promoting 
ADSL technology not only by offering Internet connection, but also including 
interactive television services. It started to offer a new ADSL television service in 
2005, called Imagenio.  
 
2.6.3 Radio  
Radio is still fairly widespread, in particular in the morning timeslot and in big cities 
(probably because of the time needed to commute by car). The Autonomous 
Communities of Castilla La Mancha and Madrid are the ones that consume the 
highest number of minutes of radio listening (between 105 and 116 per day), together 
with Asturias, Cantabria and La Rioja. So far, DAB radio broadcasting technology 
has failed totally. Very few people have purchased digital radio devices.1269 
Meanwhile, cheaper Internet radio and, more recently, podcasting have gained great 
popularity as new digital alternatives to analogical broadcasting. Moreover, radio won 
the fight for popularity on social networks.1270  
 
2.6.4 Press agencies 
The leadership is held by the public news agency EFE. Founded in 1939, as already 
indicated, it is present in more than 100 countries today. The EFE agency is the 
worldwide leader in Spanish. In addition to EFE, there are fifty other agencies of 
diverse characteristics. Some of them, such as Europa Press, the second biggest news 
agency, are of national scope, while many smaller and specialised news agencies are 
regional.  
 
2.6.5 Internet  
The Internet continues its growth in Spain. In April-May 2010,1271 52.9% of people 
(43% male and 56% female) between 25 and 44 years old used the Internet. 86% of 
the Spanish population have Internet access at home, and, in a decreasing order, for 
the following ends: mail (87%); information, news and chat (53% and 51%); social 
networks, videos and music (37% and 31%, for both video and music).  
                                                 
1268 On cable television see, for instance, M. Calvo Charro, La televisión por cable (1997); G. Escobar 
Roca, “La televisión por cable en España: estado de la cuestión”, 5530 Diario La Ley (24 April 2002) 
1; J. Esteve Pardo, “Viejos títulos para tiempos nuevos: demanio y servicio público en la televisión por 
cable. Comentario a la Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional de 3 de octubre de 1991 (Cuestión de 
inconstitucionalidad núm. 2528/1989)”, 74 Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo (1992) 257; 
T. De la Quadra-Salcedo, “La Ley del Cable y la televisión local”, 1 Anuario del Gobierno Local 
(1996) 59.  
1269 On digital radio cf. M. Fernández Salmerón, La radiotelevisión digital terrestre (2009), at p. 40. 
1270 See GAD, El Informe 2010: Medios de comunicación españoles en las redes sociales.  
1271 Asociación para la Investigación de Medios de Comunicación, Audiencia de Internet, Abril-Mayo 
2010. 
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The most-visited traditional mass media websites were Marca, El País, and 
AS. Internet penetration is greater in Madrid and Catalonia than in other regions.  
There is an interesting relationship between the traditional mass media and 
new social networks. According to the 2010 Report Spanish Mass Media on Social 
Networks (GAP), 720,000 people follow some mass media on Facebook; 665,000 do 
so on Twitter and 92,000 on YouTube. Television channels are consumed mostly on 
YouTube, while radio is the media with the best position on Facebook (335,000 
followers). Moreover, the printed press maintains its old leadership on Twitter. In the 
opinion of experts from the Demoscopic Analysis Office, this is because of Twitter’s 
capacity to broadcast events like sport competitions, elections or demonstrations in 
real time. 
 
2.7 Journalists’ background and education 
Journalists during the last years of the dictatorship came from the University Schools 
of Information or Journalism, as stated before. The Schools traditionally had three 
areas of specialisation: Journalism, Audiovisual Communication and Advertising and 
Public Relations. Now new forms of specialised journalism have been included in the 
official studies (Social Communication, Green Journalism, Advertising etc.) and also 
numerous Masters’ and other courses exist. The official journalists’ association is 
FAPE (Federación de Asociaciones de Periodistas en España), created in 1922, 
which now has 48 member associations and 13 others linked to it, even if they are not 
strictly speaking part of the federation.1272 All of them represent more than 19,000 
associates. As recently as 20 September 2010 the FAPE issued the Pamplona 
Declaration, in which they demand a more professional exercise of journalism, 
arguing that high-quality journalism makes for high-quality democracy.1273 
 
2.8 Media literacy and media status in society 
Spain has a low media literacy development at institutional level, even if some 
activities do exist and are currently on the increase. These activities originate from 
civil society, mainly from associations related to the world of education.  
There are no educational programmes in the most important media with the 
exception of some newspapers that promote the connection between schools and 
media - or in public television. The development of “Audience Offices”, whereby 
readers and viewers are given a platform to express their opinions regarding the 
treatment of news in the major mass media, is mainly symbolic. However, users are 
becoming increasingly more active. Some Audience Protection Associations exist, 
such as the Communication Users Association [Asociación de Usuarios de la 
Comunicación/AUC].1274 Only in very recent years has media literacy become a 
transversal goal in education, but only following the ICT’s impulse and forgetting the 
mass-media. Moreover, regional development of educational policies on media 
                                                 
1272 See Federación de Asociaciones de Periodistas en España, official website, available at: 
http://www.fape.es (last visited on 24/09/2010).  
1273 See FAPE, “Declaración de Pamplona”, available at: 
http://www.fape.es/ptr/vista/vptr002/post.html?D.k=1244301 (last visited on 13/10/2010).  
1274 Asociación de Usuarios de la Comunicación, official website, available at: http://www.auc.es/ (last 
visited on 13/10/2010).  
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literacy varies considerably: good in some regions, poor in others, almost absent at 
State level.  
With regard to the Spanish Educational System, the compulsory school 
curriculum (primary and secondary) contains digital literacy and media literacy as 
part of the skills that students must attain, but currently there are no specific subjects 
for this area. The annex to Royal Decree 1513/2006, of 7 December, establishes the 
incorporation of eight basic competences in the curriculum of primary education to 
emphasise those skills considered indispensable. They refer, amongst others, to the 
regular use of available technological resources and also to the evaluation and 
selection of technological innovations, depending on their utility, in undertaking 
specific tasks. Article 3 of the Royal Decree 1631/2006, of 29 December, establishes 
that secondary education should contribute to the development of students and their 
abilities, so as to allow them to develop basic skills in the use of information sources 
and to acquire new knowledge with critical judgment. This should help them to 
acquire basic preparation in the field of technologies, particularly in information and 
communication.1275  
 
3. Media policy in Spain  
3.1 Media regulation and policy actors 
In Spain media regulation and policy1276 have been traditionally led by the Ministry of 
Industry and, coherently, by the Commission of Industry in the Spanish Lower 
Chamber or Chamber of Deputies (Congreso de los Diputados). Yet in some cases 
there is a different allocation of competences. The General Statute on Audiovisual 
Communication, for instance, which will be discussed later, was passed in the Lower 
Chamber by the Constitutional Commission. The fact that, in general, the media are 
understood as an “industry” from a policy point of view illustrates that they are 
treated more as a tool than as contents. This may explain why regulations have 
focused mainly on technicalities, leaving aside other issues, related for instance to 
fundamental rights. For the protection of those rights one needs generally, though not 
always, to have recourse to other general norms. Independence, pluralism or 
democracy do not lie at the centre of those policies.  
                                                 
1275 This paragraph is a synthesis of: “Media literacy: study on the current trends and approaches to 
media literacy in Europe”, Country Profile Spain V.4.0 (2007), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/media/literacy/docs/studies/country/spain.pdf (last visited on 13/10/2010). 
1276 See in general, on the relationship between media and democracy itself, from a regulatory point of 
view, J. Barata i Mir, Democracia y audiovisual. Fundamentos normativos para una reforma del 
regimen español (2006). There are other works on television, discussing its traditional consideration as 
a public service: L. Abad Alcalá, El servicio público de television ante el siglo XXI (1999); C. 
Chinchilla Marín, La radiotelevisión como servicio público esencial (1988); J. Esteve Pardo, Régimen 
jurídico-administrativo de la televisión (1984); G. Fernández Farreres, El paisaje televisivo en España 
(1997); E. García Llovet, El régimen jurídico de la radiodifusión (1991); C. Gay Fuentes, La televisión 
ante el Derecho Internacional y Comunitario (1994); S. González-Varas Ibáñez, “El sector 
audiovisual, ¿servicio público o mercado?”, 110 Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo (2001) 
215; J.M. Herreros López, El servicio público de televisión (2004); J. M. Souvirón Morenilla, Derecho 
público de los medios audiovisuales: radiodifusión y televisión (1999).  A more recent discussion on 
the characterisation of television and radio as public services, referring also to the funding of public 
television and radio in the framework of competition law and state aids, can be found in S. Medina 
González, Ayudas públicas y libre competencia en el sector audiovisual (2006). For radio specifically 
as a public service, see M.A. Martín-Caro Sánchez, La radio del siglo XXI, un servicio público en la 
economía global (2000). 
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As far as independent agencies are concerned, three bodies should be 
mentioned: the State Council on Audiovisual Media (Consejo Estatal de los Medios 
Audiovisuales),1277 the National Telecommunications Commission (Comisión 
Nacional de las Telecomunicaciones)1278 and the National Competition Commission 
(Comisión Nacional de la Competencia). All three have different competences 
regarding the media, from various perspectives, something which can give rise to 
discrepancies amongst them. Since all of them are independent bodies, it is difficult to 
find any coordination or guidance on the exercise of their respective competences. A 
mechanism to solve conflicting positions would be more than desirable.  
Besides State bodies and organs, other actors might contribute directly or 
indirectly to the framing of media policies. Public opinion, NGOs and other private 
associations exist in Spain (such as, for instance, the Communication Users 
Association that was previously mentioned), but they do not – by any means – 
exercise the type of influence they wield in relation to policy formulation in other 
parts of the world. Some of these actors are mentioned, when appropriate, in other 
parts of this report.  
 
3.2 Constitutional provisions and legal implementation  
The freedoms of expression and information are recognised in the Spanish 
Constitution (hereinafter, SC) in Article 201279 and are therefore framed within the 
constitutional category of the so-called “fundamental rights”.1280 As such, 
extraordinary constitutional safeguards are bestowed upon the protection of these 
rights for citizens through a preferential and summary procedure before the ordinary 
courts, and additionally by an appeal for protection (recurso de amparo) before the 
Constitutional Court (Art. 53.2. SC). 1281 
                                                 
1277 The State Council on Audiovisual Media will be subject to a detailed explanation later in this 
report. See on this type of bodies, which also exist in some Autonomous Communities, J. Tornos Mas, 
Las autoridades de regulación del audiovisual (1999). 
1278 See information on this Commission, Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones, official 
website, available at: http://www.cmt.es (last visited on 13/10/2010). Some bibliographical references 
where questions of interest for this report are discussed are the following: J.Mª. Baño León, “La 
ordenación del mercado de la televisión y el papel de las autoridades españolas de la libre 
competencia”, in S. Muñoz Machado (ed.), Derecho Europeo del Audiovisual. Actas del Congreso 
organizado por la Asociación Europea de Derecho Audiovisual (Sevilla, octubre 1996) (1997) 747; L. 
Castejón Martín (ed.), Competencia y regulación en los mercados de las telecomunicaciones, el 
audiovisual y el Internet (1998); E. Gómez-Reino y Carnota (coord.), Telecomunicaciones, 
infraestructuras y libre competencia (2003); J.J. Montero and H. Brokelmann, Telecomunicaciones y 
televisión. La nueva regulación en España (1999). 
1279 Article 20: “1. The following rights are recognised and protected: a) the right to freely express and 
disseminate thoughts, ideas and opinions by word, in writing or by any other means of communication; 
(…) d) the right to freely communicate or receive accurate information by any means of dissemination 
whatsoever. The law shall regulate the right to invoke personal conscience and professional secrecy in 
the exercise of these freedoms”. Paragraphs b) and c) of Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution 
respectively envisage “the right to literary, artistic, scientific and technical production and creation”, 
and “the right to academic freedom” and have been considered by the Spanish Constitutional Court as 
specific projections of the freedom of expression (Decision 153/1985, 7 November 1985). 
1280 The fundamental rights are listed in Articles 15 to 29 of the Spanish Constitution. 
1281 In general, on the constitutional limits for TV legislation, see J. García Roca, “Límites 
constitucionales al legislador de la television”, 24 Revista Andaluza de Administración (1995) 11; J.A. 
González Casanova, “Razones constitucionales de una Radiotelevisión del Estado”, in J García 
Jiménez (ed.), Radiotelevisión española y la Constitución (1981) 19, J.J. González Encinar, 
“Televisión y democracia”, in J. Asensi Sabater (ed.), Ciudadanos e instituciones en el 
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According to settled case law, beyond the evident link between both rights as 
guarantees of “free public communication”,1282 it is conceptually necessary to 
differentiate between their contents: while the freedom of expression protects the 
emission and dissemination of opinions, the freedom of information focuses on the 
protection of processes of transmission of data and certain facts, as long as the 
existence of those facts has been proved, i.e. the facts exist and are real.1283 The 
autonomous exercise of the freedom of expression has led to constitutional conflicts, 
but its most conflictive projection usually unfolds when it interacts with the freedom 
of information - i.e. when the opinion has been disseminated through the media.  
Freedom of information does definitively constitute one of the most relevant 
rights of the ones envisaged in article 20 SC for the very existence of a real 
democracy. It has a dual character, formed by the right to receive information and the 
right to inform.1284 Specifically, the actual content of the right to receive information 
is conditional upon the scope of the right to transmit the information.1285    
Constitutional case law has steadily argued that the right to inform must meet 
several criteria acting as limits to its exercise, such as veracity and public relevance of 
the information, whereas the exclusion of all type of humiliating, insulting or 
offensive expressions would pertain to the realm of the limits to freedom of 
expression.1286 
One of the main consequences of the fact that freedom of expression and 
information belong to the constitutional category of “fundamental rights and public 
freedoms” relates to the type of legal instrument that can be used for their 
implementation at the legislative level. According to Article 81 SC, such function is 
incumbent on the procedures of the so-called “Organic law” (Ley Orgánica), whose 
main specificity lies in the qualified majority voting (i.e. absolute majority in the 
Spanish Lower Chamber or Chamber of Deputies) that is required in order for it to be 
passed. From the very beginning the Spanish Constitutional Court has developed an 
extremely restrictive interpretation of what should be understood by the “legislative 
implementation” of a fundamental right that would require, therefore, an “organic” 
law, instead of following the “ordinary” law procedure. Statutes concerning 
fundamental rights should only follow the more demanding procedure in order to be 
passed, according to the Constitutional Court, when the legislator is undertaking a 
direct regulation of a fundamental right or freedom (e.g. Decision 6/1982, of 22 
February 1982). Otherwise it could be considered an “attack” on democracy, as future 
parliaments would find it difficult to overcome the burden of changing a statute that 
has been passed by an absolute majority.  
Actually, it was on the occasion of its decision on the constitutionality of the 
“Statute on Private Television” of 1988, that the Constitutional Court developed its 
                                                                                                                                            
constitucionalismo actual (1997) 387; L. Parejo Alfonso and M. Bacigalupo Saggesse, “El art. 20.3 
CE. El control parlamentario de los medios de comunicación del Estado”, in O. Alzaga (ed.), 
Comentarios a la Constitución Española de 1978, vol. II (1997) 555; F. Sáinz Moreno, “La regulación 
legal de la televisión privada en la jurisprudencia constitucional”, 2 Revista Española de Derecho 
Constitucional (1981) 159. 
1282 Constitutional Court Decision 6/1981, of 6 March 1981. 
1283 Constitutional Court Decision 6/1988, of 21 January 1988. 
1284 Constitutional Court Decision 105/1983, of 23 November 1983. 
1285 Spanish Supreme Court Decision, 17.313/1988, of 9 November, 1988. 
1286 See, for instance, the following constitutional Court Decisions, 165/1987, of 27 October 1987; 
171/1990, of 12 November 1990; 172/1990, of 12 November 1990, and 52/1996, of 26 March 1996. 
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most restrictive doctrine on the Ley Orgánica.1287 The Court argued that a direct 
regulation of the freedoms in Article 20 SC should only be understood as that which 
aims to establish a comprehensively global, essential and exhaustive regulation 
comprising all the possible constitutional and technical modalities for a specific 
communications medium (Decision 127/1994, of 5 May 1994, 4th legal reasoning). As 
a consequence, the regulation of a specific technical possibility of dissemination for a 
broadcast communications medium (e.g. private television) would not be 
constitutionally required to follow the organic law procedure. It is interesting to note 
that the recent General Statute on Audiovisual Communication, which came into force 
on 1 May 2010, is far more ambitious that the Statute on Private Television. It refers 
not only to television – both public and private – but also to radio. Yet no 
constitutional concern regarding its being an ordinary – and therefore not an “organic” 
– Statute was raised.  
Furthermore, as a politically decentralised country, the Spanish system rests 
on the constitutional allocation of legislative competences between the political levels 
of government. As regards the territorial “translation” of freedoms in Article 20 SC, 
the central state level has exclusive power over “telecommunications” and “radio-
communication” (Article 149.1.21 SC), as well as of the “basic legislation on press, 
radio, television and, in general, all means of social communication” (Article 149.1.27 
SC)1288. According to this pattern, the sub-national levels of government (Autonomous 
Communities/Comunidades Autónomas) have power over the legislative 
implementation and execution of the basic state laws for the second group of 
competences.1289 
The delimitation of territorial boundaries as regards the media sector has been 
a highly controversial matter. One stable parameter applied by the Constitutional 
Court regarding this question has consisted in arguing that those sets of norms whose 
regulatory object had a prevailing focus on the technical support or instruments used 
for media dissemination should be comprised within the exclusive competence of the 
central state (Art. 149.1.21 CE). However, where the prevailing interest of the given 
law is not in the instrument itself, but in the nature of the media as a social 
communication and diffusion service directly connected to the exercise of the rights 
and liberties of article 20 SC, it should then be framed within the shared legislative 
pattern between territorial levels as per Article 149.1.27 SC.1290  
                                                 
1287 An early assessment of what was then still the draft of a future Statute on Private Television can be 
found in G. Ariño Ortiz, El Proyecto de Ley sobre Televisión privada (1987). On private television in 
Spain see also F. González Navarro, Televisión pública y televisión privada (1982); E. García Llovet, 
“El Estatuto de RTVE y la Ley de Televisión Privada”, in J. Cremades (ed.), Derecho de las 
Telecomunicaciones (1997) 413; J.C. Laguna de Paz, Régimen jurídico de la televisión privada (1994); 
E. Malaret i García, “La financiación de la televisión pública y privada”, in El régimen jurídico del 
audiovisual (2000) 153; S. Muñoz Machado, Público y privado en el mercado europeo de la televisión 
(1993) and Servicio público y mercado, vol. III: Televisión (1998); T. De la Quadra-Salcedo, “La 
televisión privada y la Constitución” 15 Revista de Derecho Político (1982) 37. 
1288 The Constitutional Court has constantly held that cinema/film is not a mean of social 
communication. See S. De la Sierra, Derecho del Cine. Administración Cultural y Mercado (2010).  
1289 Cf. M. Carrillo López, “Las televisiones públicas en el Estado compuesto”, in Régimen Jurídico del 
Audiovisual (2000) 225; G. Escobar Roca (ed.), El derecho de la televisión. Situación y perspectivas en 
la Comunidad de Madrid (2004); F. Sáinz Moreno, “Las televisiones públicas en el Estado 
compuesto”, in Régimen Jurídico del Audiovisual (2000) 243. 
1290 See, for all, the Decision of the Constitutional Court 168/1993, 27 May 1993, passing sentence on a 
constitutional appeal against the General Regulatory Law on Telecommunications, 31/1987 (in 
particular, its 4th legal reasoning). 
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3.3 Structural regulation 
The principle of free market recognised in Article 38 of the Constitution is valid for 
all kinds of media. General competition rules without a particular media component 
are applied to the media. There are no cross-media rules, but specific ones for each 
type of media. Thus particular licensing, ownership and competition rules exist for the 
audiovisual media, as we shall see over the following lines.  
The general regulation of radio and television is contained in the recent Statute 
7/2010, of 31 March 2010, General de la Comunicación Audiovisual (General Statute 
on Audiovisual Communication: hereinafter, LGCA). There are other state and 
regional rules governing public media (including those belonging to the state, 
regional, and local authorities) and different regional norms relating to regional and 
local private media.  
The new LGCA considers audiovisual media to be services of general interest. 
Nevertheless, there is a distinction depending on the medium used for transmission: as 
a rule, operators simply need to communicate their intention to begin their activity to 
the authorities. However, when these services are provided by terrestrial waves (the 
means by which most of the Spanish people access radio and television), the operators 
need a prior licence granted by the competent audiovisual authority (the state or 
regional one depending on the territorial scope at issue). On the state level, licences 
are granted by the Government. As for the regional or local level, it depends on the 
provisions of each regional regulation. Tenders for licensing are governed by the 
principles of publicity and equality. Licences are granted for a period of fifteen years 
with automatic renewal unless a third party makes a request at least 24 months before 
the expiry date. This being the case, a competition process takes place. Licences can 
be transferred and leased.  
The activity of social, non-profit-making audiovisual media services – other 
that public service media - is subject to licence, which cannot be transferred or leased. 
Advertising (including sponsoring) is not allowed. Unless authorised by the 
audiovisual authority, annual expenses may not exceed 100,000 Euros for television 
outlets and 50,000 for radio outlets.  
The LGCA has (minimally) regulated mobile television. This activity requires 
a licence. A criterion to be taken into account for granting licences is the previous 
experience of the candidates as providers of audiovisual media services, which may 
be deemed arguable from the point of view of competition rules. In addition, the 
LGCA also refers to high-definition television, only to allow its release. In both cases, 
the LGCA states that the transmission and reception must fulfil the standards 
established by the European Union.  
According to the LGCA, the licensee must be a national of (individuals) or be 
domiciled in (legal entities) an EEA1291 State or in a third country under a condition of 
reciprocity (i.e. those countries should accept also that Spanish nationals or entities 
have access to their broadcasting market).  In addition, individuals or legal entities 
from third countries may not accumulate more than 25% and 50% of shares in one 
media company respectively.  
Other limits aim to guarantee a certain pluralism of information. In television, 
the initial rule, under the aforementioned Statute on Private Television (Statute 
                                                 
1291 EEA stands for European Economic Area.  
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10/1988, of 3 May 1988) did not allow the same person to own more than 25% of 
shares in a private channel, or to accumulate shares in more than one private channel. 
Later, when the conservative governments were in power (from 1996 to 2004), these 
limits were relaxed by successive changes in the law, allowing for greater 
concentration.1292 Now the LGCA allows for the simultaneous ownership of shares or 
voting rights in different private licensees, yet with some limits. Regarding state-wide 
private television, any natural or legal person can acquire a significant stake in more 
than one station, if the subject fulfils three conditions: the average audience of all the 
channels in question has been below 27% of the total audience during the twelve 
consecutive months prior to the acquisition (there is no consequence if this maximum 
is exceeded a posteriori); the stations in question do not occupy more than two 
multiplexes; and there are at least three different private stations left. In the case of 
region-wide private television, the only limit is the prohibition of the accumulation of 
more than one multiplex. As for the private state-wide radio, the same individual or 
legal entity is not allowed to control, under any circumstances, directly or indirectly, 
more than 50% of the licenses granted to operate through terrestrial signals in the 
same area of reference and, in any case, it is not allowed to own more than five of 
such licenses. On the regional level, no individual or legal entity may control more 
than 40% of the licences. Moreover, no individual or entity may directly or indirectly 
control more than one-third of all terrestrial broadcasting licences with full or partial 
coverage throughout the state territory.  
 
3.4 Content regulation 
3.4.1 General norms applicable to all media regarding media publishing and 
information-gathering processes  
As mentioned earlier, the freedom of information and the freedom of expression, 
included in Article 20 of the Constitution, constitute the constitutional framework for 
both professional and non-professional communication activity. The Constitution 
refers to the so-called “conscience clause” and to the protection of journalists’ sources 
in the exercise of these freedoms, to be regulated by the law. The relevant statute is 
the Ley Orgánica 2/1997 of 19 June 1997, Reguladora de la cláusula de conciencia de 
los profesionales de la información [Organic Statute on the Conscience Clause of Information 
Professionals].1293 It is intended to ensure independence in the exercise of journalism. 
It gives information workers the right to ask for the termination of their contractual 
relationship with the media company when a substantial change in orientation or 
ideological position of the company takes place, and when the company transfers the 
journalist to another media belonging to the same enterprise if its genre or ideological 
position involves a clear break with the professional career of the journalist. The 
exercise of this right entails compensation. In addition, journalists may refuse to 
participate in the drafting of information which is contrary to the ethical principles of 
communication, without penalty or prejudice.  
                                                 
1292 On media concentration both in Spanish and in former Community law, see F.A. De Abel Vilela, 
La concentración de los medios de comunicación social en los Derechos español y comunitario (2002); 
and A. Pérez Gómez, El control de las concentraciones de medios de comunicación. Derecho español 
y comparado (2002).  
1293 Cf. prior to the adoption of such a clause T. De la Quadra-Salcedo, “La cláusula de conciencia: Un 
Godot constitucional”, 22 Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional (1988) 53, and part II in 23 
Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional (1988) 45. 
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The second paragraph of Article 20 of the Constitution prohibits prior 
censorship in the exercise of the freedoms of information and expression, and the fifth 
section provides that the seizure of publications, tapes and other records can only be 
decided by the judiciary. Consequently, Article 538 of the Criminal Code punishes by 
disqualification for six to ten years the authority or public official that has exercised 
prior censorship, except in the cases permitted by law. The measures that can be taken 
also include the collection of editions of books or newspapers or the suspension of its 
publication or the dissemination of any radio and television broadcast.   
The third paragraph of Article 20 states that a law shall regulate the 
organisation and parliamentary control of the media dependent on the state or any 
public entity and shall guarantee equal access to the media of significant social and 
political groups, respecting the pluralism of society and the various languages of 
Spain. This is discussed in the section devoted specifically to audiovisual 
communication.  
The fourth paragraph of Article 20 stipulates that the freedoms of information 
and expression are limited by the respect for constitutional rights and in particular the 
right to honour, privacy and reputation and the protection of youth and childhood. In 
this regard, Ley Orgánica 1/1982, 5 May 1982, de protección civil del derecho al 
honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y a la propia imagen [Organic Statute on the 
civil protection of the right to honour, to personal and family privacy, and to personal 
image] defines the intrusions that are considered legitimate and illegitimate. When an 
intrusion is proven, moral damage is presumed to have occurred. Judicial protection 
includes all measures “necessary to end the trespass”, such as provisional measures, 
the right to disseminate the ruling in the media and compensation for damages. 
Under Ley Orgánica 2/1984 of 26 March 1984, reguladora del derecho de 
rectificación [Organic Statute on the right to rectification], any person or entity is 
entitled to correct information disseminated through any media that he or she 
considers inaccurate and the disclosure of which may cause injury. The law provides a 
fast procedure with prior formal notice to the director of the specific medium and 
subsequent legal action. This process is compatible with the exercise of civil or 
criminal legal action in the form of different lawsuits as a result of the same facts.  
Ley Orgánica 15/1999, of 13 December 1999, de Protección de Datos de 
Carácter Personal [Organic Statute on Data Protection], which regulates data 
protection, applies the same general rules to the use of personal data in journalism, 
disregarding the possibility offered by Article 9 of the Directive 95/46/EC to grant 
some exemptions to this kind of activity.  
Finally, with regard to the right of honour, the Criminal Code (Articles 205-
216) regulates crimes against honour (insults –“action or speech that injures the 
dignity of another person, or undermining his or her reputation or attacking the esteem 
of that person” - and slander –“accusation of a crime knowing of its falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth”). The penalty for grave slander (i.e. with publicity) ranges 
from 6 months to 2 years’ imprisonment, which has been criticised by journalists and 
academics excessively. The penalty for the rest of the cases, that it to say, for non 
grave slander, is a fine.  
Article 105.c) of the Constitution recognises the right of citizens to access 
government information under the terms established by law. The general statute 
concerning this subject is Statute 30/1992 26 November 1992, which concerns the 
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functioning of Public Authorities and administrative procedure [Ley reguladora de las 
bases del regimen jurídico de las Administraciones públicas y del procedimiento 
administrativo común]. Section 37 of the statute deals with access to public 
information in an unsatisfactory manner: access is restricted to documents relating to 
procedures completed and filed; it can be refused when the public or the private 
interest prevail; it is not regulated in procedural terms; and its exercise is not 
monitored through an independent supervisory authority. Along with this regulation, 
there are other relevant norms, including those related to access to environmental 
information, the re-use of information for commercial purposes or official secrets. 
The latter dates from 1968, i.e., prior to the Constitution’s entry into force, but 
underwent a major reform in 1978. 
Regarding copyright issues, the relevant legal text is the Real Decreto 
legislativo 1/1996, of 12 April 19961294, approving the revised text of the Copyright 
Act. The most controversial issues today focus on printed journalism and the Internet. 
In particular, journalistic work is considered to be “collective work” and as such the 
intellectual and economic rights belong to publishers, not to journalists, as the work 
has been produced under the direction of the publisher. Publishers have to deal with 
search engines, newspaper clipping enterprises and news aggregators. They argue that 
the law requires them to obtain approval from the owners of this information and to 
pay a fee to use it. Real Decreto 1/1996 allows articles on current affairs broadcasting 
by the media to be reproduced, distributed and publicly communicated by any other 
media of the same category, but the source and the author must be mentioned. This 
right applies only if the author has not explicitly excluded this possibility, and without 
prejudice to the author’s right to receive the remuneration agreed upon or, failing 
agreement, as deemed equitable. The unauthorised use of television show excerpts by 
other television channels or Internet pages has also formed the object of dispute in 
courts. The sentences have always affirmed the right to exclude such an unauthorised 
use and ordered such practices to cease and compensation for damages to be paid. 
 
3.4.2 Newspapers  
Hardly any regulations exist on the printed press in Spain. The existing one is pre-
constitutional and is reduced to some provisions of doubtful validity integrated in the 
aforementioned Printed Press Statute of 1966. In addition, codes of conduct have been 
adopted in different geographical areas. At the state level reference must be made to 
the Código deontológico de la profesión periodística (Ethics Code of the journalistic 
profession), signed by the Federación de Asociaciones de Periodistas Españoles 
(Federation of Spanish Journalists’ Associations) and approved in 1993. The Code 
lays down general principles of professionalism and ethics, such as respect for truth 
and honour, privacy and the image of others, the protection of minors and the more 
vulnerable members of society and respect for the presumption of innocence. It refers 
to the status of the journalist, independence and fairness in the exercise of the 
profession, safeguards against external influences, confidentiality, the promotion of 
free access to governmental information and respect for copyright. Finally, it 
establishes a set of guidelines, such as dignity in the means of obtaining information, 
respecting the right not to provide information, confidentiality of information sources, 
the distinction between information and opinion, between information and 
                                                 
1294 “Decretos Legislativos” are legal norms issued by the Government following a Parliament’s 
delegation. Therefore their legal value is equivalent to that of Statutes.  
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advertising, the refusal of fees or gratuities, and the prohibition of the use of 
privileged information of which the journalist has knowledge as a result of his or her 
profession for personal gain. 
Political advertising is not banned in the printed press. As for campaign 
advertising, the law forbids newspapers to raise ordinary rates in election period and 
requires all media to offer the same contractual conditions to all parties.  
 
3.4.3 Audiovisual 
The general rules applicable to any broadcaster whether national, regional or local, are 
contained in the LGCA. Further, there are specific regulations for each level of 
government. At state level two Statutes should be mentioned: Ley 17/2006, 6 June 
2006, de la radio y la television de titularidad estatal [On radio and television 
belonging to the State] and Ley 8/2009, 28 August 2009, de financiación de la 
Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española [On the financing of the Public Corporation of 
the Spanish Radio and Television], which have already been mentioned.  
The LGCA empowers political entities (State, Autonomous Communities and 
local entities) to own and provide their own broadcasting service. Public service 
obligations include the production, publication and dissemination of a set of radio and 
television channels and online information services for all audiences, covering all 
genres, designed to satisfy the information, culture, education and entertainment 
needs of society and to preserve pluralism in the media. The norms governing the 
public broadcaster in each region specify the content of its public service mission. In 
addition, the Act establishes a control model of public service, based on rules 
determining the overall objectives for a period of nine years and developing more 
concrete and specific provisions in the so-called “contratos-programa” [“framework 
contracts”] between the respective governments and managers of public broadcasters. 
The LGCA provides for the control of the fulfilling of these public service missions 
by the representative state, regional or local assemblies as well as by the respective 
independent supervisory authority. Other limits are the following: (a) the public 
broadcasters are not allowed to own shares in private broadcasters; (b) the criteria 
guiding their editorial direction must be developed by a body whose composition 
reflects the political and social pluralism of the scope of coverage; (c) at state level, 
the state may not reserve or assign to public broadcasters more than 25% of the radio 
spectrum available for television, or more than 35% for radio.  
As for funding, as a general principle, public funding cannot sustain 
operations or content outside the public service mission. Each political entity can 
institute a public service broadcasting system and arrange its funding mechanism, 
which in any case must be compatible with current legislation on competition. At state 
level, Statute 8/2009 (mentioned above) on the financing of the Spanish Corporation 
on Radio and Television has eliminated advertising from the public state broadcaster 
(RTVE), a decision which has been endorsed by the LGCA. According to the new 
system, contributions from the national budget and the revenues from its own 
productions (i.e. those of RTVE) and sponsors are accompanied by a percentage of 
the tax on the usage of radio spectrum, the contribution made by private television 
stations (3% of the gross income for free televisions, 1.5% for pay televisions, not 
exceeding 20% of RTVE’s budget), and telecom operators (0.9% of gross income, 
without exceeding 25% of the budget of RTVE). This is an import of the current 
French model. Compatibility with market rules and state aids is being checked by the 
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European Commission, which has already considered that the French model implies 
illegal state aid. So far, regional regulations have not eliminated advertising from their 
public broadcasters.  
The LGCA contains provisions to reconcile the freedoms of information and 
expression and the freedom to conduct a business with the protection of the rights of 
users, especially the more vulnerable ones. Thus, the rights and freedoms that are 
recognised in this framework are the following: a) the right to receive a pluralistic 
audiovisual communication consistent with constitutional values; b) the right to 
receive transparent audiovisual communication, identifying the content provider; c) 
the rights of children, including the establishing of the period of the day in which 
broadcasts which might harm them are prohibited, the classification of programmes 
by age and limits to the kind of advertising aimed at the minors’ audience; d) the 
rights of persons with disabilities, under the principle of universal accessibility, with 
obligations of a predetermined ratio of subtitling and audio description, and a ban on 
using degrading or stereotypical images of disabled people; and e) the right to 
participate in the control of audiovisual content, with the possibility of complaining to 
the audiovisual supervisory authority.  
Quota rules and obligations to invest in content production in order to promote 
the European and Spanish content industry also have a place in the Spanish 
regulation, and in the LGCA. European quota rules imply the obligation to reserve al 
least 51% of transmission time for European works, excluding the time conferred to 
news, sports events, games, advertising, teletext services and teleshopping (following 
Article 4 of Directive 89/552/EEC). At least 50% of that quota is reserved for 
European works in any of the official languages in Spain.1295 At least 10% of 
transmission time shall be reserved for independent producers and al least 51% of that 
10% must be works produced in the last five years.  
The financing obligation implies the duty to contribute annually to the funding 
of the European production of films, documentaries, television cartoons and series 
with 5% of the income earned in the previous year. This obligation is only imposed on 
channels that broadcast these products if they are less than seven years old in relation 
to the date of production. For public television broadcasters this duty is set at 6%. 
Under the previous rules only cinematographic works should be financed. The 
inclusion of series was a traditional demand of private television stations, which have 
their own producers. In any case, this obligation has been widely questioned, as it 
may conflict with the freedom to conduct a business, and is currently before the 
courts.  
As far as advertising rules are concerned,1296 according to the LGCA 
(following Article 18 of Directive 89/552/EEC), the proportion of television 
transmission time devoted to all kinds of publicity is limited. Following the Directive, 
there are rules relating to the forms and moments of interruption of broadcasts to 
ensure differentiation between content and advertising and the integrity of the work. 
In addition, the LGCA establishes a series of prohibitions and restrictions concerning 
                                                 
1295 This system has been inherited from previous norms and the European Court of Justice has already 
declared its conformity with Community Law. See ECJ, Case 222/07, UTECA v Administración 
General del Estado, delivered on 5 March 2009. 
1296 See, in general, on the relationship between advertising rules in television and fundamental rights, 
L.Mª. Díez-Picazo, “Publicidad televisiva y derechos fundamentales”, in S. Muñoz Machado (ed.), 
Derecho Europeo del Audiovisual. Actas del Congreso organizado por la Asociación Europea de 
Derecho Audiovisual (Sevilla, octubre 1996), vol. I (1997) 649. 
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the advertising of certain products (like tobacco, alcoholic drinks or medical products 
or treatments). The LGCA prohibits political advertising on public or private radio 
and television. During election periods, public radio and television stations have a 
duty to give free airtime to all political groups. The allocation of time and duration is 
distributed by the administration in accordance with the results obtained in the 
previous election. Broadcasters also have the obligation to act with neutrality in their 
reporting of elections.  
Spanish law (through the LGCA) has recognised the so-called “right to self-
regulation” (in fact, “co-regulation”). It seems strange for the voluntary nature of self-
regulatory codes and the existence of their own control mechanisms, but the LGCA 
empowers independent supervisory authorities to verify the legality of a code, and 
even to impose financial penalties for non-compliance. Before the existence of this 
norm, various self-regulatory codes on contents and advertising had been signed. The 
main codes are the Código de Autorregulación de contenidos televisivos e infancia 
(on television contents and children), adopted in 2004, and the Código de 
Autorregulación de la Publicidad dirigida a menores (on advertising aimed at children), 
adopted in 2005.   
The LGCA recognises the right of operators to contract for exclusive 
broadcasting, again with some limits. The main one relates to the freedom of 
information with regard to the so-called events of major importance for society. The 
state’s supervisory authority, the Consejo Estatal de Medios Audiovisuales (State 
Council of Audiovisual Media), is in charge of the establishment of a biennial 
catalogue of the events of general interest to society to be broadcast on free television 
and with state coverage. However, each event needs to be chosen from a closed list, 
which contains popular sports events, including the Spanish “Liga de fútbol 
professional de Primera División” (Premier league) football match every week. 
Exceptionally, with a two-thirds majority, the State Council of Audiovisual Media 
may include other events of major importance for society in the catalogue. The 
catalogue and the measures for its implementation must be notified by the State 
Council of Audiovisual Media to the European Commission. This regulation has its 
origin in the very controversial Statute 21/1997, of 3 July 1997, regulating the 
broadcasting of sports competitions and events (Ley reguladora de las Emisiones y 
Retransmisiones de Competiciones y Acontecimientos Deportivos, better known as the 
“Football Statute”) adopted under a conservative government. In practice it was 
designed to nullify exclusive contracts to broadcast the professional football league 
matches that favoured a TV operator close to the socialist party. This controversial 
statute was taken before the Constitutional Court, which in its judgement 112/2006, of 
5 April 2006, considered that it did not violate freedom of information or the right to 
property or free enterprise. The new LGCA, adopted under the socialist government, 
has maintained the regulation.  
 
3.4.4 Internet  
There is no specific regulation of the Internet as a medium of communication, and 
indeed the courts have refused so far to bestow this status on the Internet as a 
whole.1297 
                                                 
1297 See, for instance, the decision of the criminal court nº 16 of Madrid adopted on 18 December 2009 
(decision nº 531/2009). 
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3.4.5 Supervision 
A new independent supervisory authority of audiovisual media at state level is due to 
be created soon, following the mandate of Article 44 LGCA: the Consejo Estatal de 
Medios Audiovisuales (CEMA) with important advisory, regulatory, executive and 
sanctioning powers, licensing excluded.1298 The CEMA is composed of nine members 
elected by the Congress of Deputies by a three-fifths majority from amongst persons 
of recognised expertise in matters related to the audiovisual sector and appointed by 
the Government by Real Decreto [regulation]. The members are elected for a six-year 
term and cannot be removed other than for predetermined reasons to ensure the 
council’s independence. The CEMA is assisted by an advisory committee in which 
civil society is represented. Some Autonomous Communities (Catalonia, Navarra and 
Andalucía) had already created their own Audiovisual Councils prior to this.   
 
4. Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment  
This report on media policies in Spain from a democratic theoretical point of view has 
explored the most relevant questions under discussion today. The role of history in the 
framing of media policies is clear. Nevertheless, it seems that this role has been 
particularly more decisive in the Spanish case for a number of reasons that have been 
discussed above. The long Franco dictatorship had obvious negative consequences for 
the exercise of fundamental rights, such as those of expression and information, which 
are among the most relevant here. Whereas all media were affected by that context, 
this situation was particularly dramatic with regard to television. This media type 
came into being precisely during the dictatorship and was then legally (and culturally) 
shaped in a way that has made it very resistant to changes. The authoritarian 
environment was, certainly, not homogeneous. Dissident voices slowly found their 
place in various legal and illegal ways, but it is clear that those almost forty years had 
a negative impact on the development of a critical public opinion that could contribute 
to a quality democracy. This might explain, for instance, why Spain is still amongst 
those countries with a low newspaper readership rate. Stronger policies on media 
literacy, for instance by increasing the critical approach to media in the school 
curriculum, may be good instruments for remedying that. Also, citizen participation in 
decisions concerning media policy should be fostered.  
Recent history also explains the approach of the public powers (i.e. the various 
public bodies and the legislator) to media policy. It could be argued that the Spanish 
public powers and, as a consequence, the Spanish media law, are fairly 
interventionist. The level of interventionism has evolved over the years and differs 
from one medium to another. By definition, due to the constitutional context since 
1978, the exercise of journalism is well protected, even if this professional sector still 
raises complaints, some of which have recently – on 20 September 2010 - been set out 
in the aforementioned Pamplona Declaration. The Declaration is based on the 
                                                 
1298 Very critical with this Council is A. Boix Palop in this legal blog “bloc jurídico”. Cf. the following 
entries: http://www.lapaginadefinitiva.com/aboix/?p=267 and 
http://www.lapaginadefinitiva.com/aboix/?p=281. See also, by this author, Transformaciones en el 
ecosistema mediático y nuevas pautas de regulación administrativa del hecho audiovisual, 29 
Quaderns del CAC (2007), available at: 
http://www.cac.cat/pfw_files/cma/recerca/quaderns_cac/Q29_Boix_ES.pdf. 
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concept of quality journalism as an intrinsic element of a quality democracy. Among 
other claims, it includes the need to protect information sources and the enactment of 
a Statute on Access to Public Documents. As stated above, a draft for such a Statute 
has been prepared, but for the moment it lies stagnant. Journalists also claim that an 
Official Association (Colegio Profesional), structurally similar to Bar Associations 
for instance, should be created, in order to defend not only the particular interests of 
its members, but also, and above all, the general interest of an adequate exercise of the 
journalistic profession. This could, of course, have a dark side, as according to some, 
corporatism may be considered contrary to the essential freedoms that are inherent in 
the journalistic profession and, furthermore, it could also be seen as an attempt to 
control private initiatives on the Internet under the heading of “illegal practice of a 
profession” or “poor quality journalism”. Journalists also propose to put an end to the 
practice of requiring a Master’s degree in job offers for journalists. On the one hand, 
it is true that the days when specific training was required to become a journalist are 
now over. On the other hand, it seems incoherent to argue that an Official Association 
would guarantee an adequate exercise of the profession and not provide any definition 
of the educational background for that profession. 
As far as television is concerned, interventionism has been more acute, due to 
the fact that the technical possibilities of broadcasting were very limited in the past. 
This justified the definition of broadcasting as a public service, even if private 
companies were admitted to the market in 1988. Today, after the passing of the 
General Statute on Audiovisual Communication in 2010, the public mission of public 
broadcasters has been better defined, even if there are still many critics who consider 
this statute to be a mere “Counter-Reformation”1299 of the socialist government now 
in power. Some obligations imposed on private broadcasters discussed in the report 
may seem more problematic, and may suggest that even if their activities are no 
longer conceived under the category of public service, a closer look at the contents of 
the regulation could lead us to conclude otherwise. Scholars and interest groups have 
long argued that a clarification of the concept of public service with regard to 
broadcasting is required. This would also imply consequences for advertising (only 
those broadcasters that do not receive public funding should be entitled to contract 
advertising companies), as is the case with recent legislation passed in Spain (2009) 
and accepted by the European Commission. It should also be added that public 
television has played a vital role in fostering the welfare state in Spain, a line of 
research that still needs to be followed up.1300  
Political parties and media groups are closely linked to each other in Spain. 
Even if it is the courts that ultimately decide on conflicts arising in this sector, there is 
an overwhelming suspicion that every public decision concerning the media will be 
biased. There are two independent bodies, the National Telecommunications 
Commission and the National Competition Commission, that have so far dealt with 
cases related to conflicts arisen in the media market. A third one is expected now, 
after the entry into force of the General Statute on Audiovisual Communication, 
                                                 
1299 See E. Bustamante, “La contrarreforma audiovisual socialista”, 172 Le Monde Diplomatique (in 
Spanish), 02/2010.  
1300 Among the very scarce references about this topic in Spain, see J.L. Manfredi, La televisión pública 
en la transformación del Estado de Bienestar (2004). The same author has critically revised the history 
of television in Spain in another book, focusing precisely on some of the problems that have been 
discussed here, such as the influence of history in today’s media landscape, or the problems existing in 
this country concerning digitalisation. See La television pública en Europa (2008). 
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namely the State Council on Audiovisual Media. This was a long-standing demand of 
certain groups, including scholars, as a way of reducing the government’s 
discretionary power over the media. Notwithstanding this, it should not be forgotten 
that institutions operate in a certain cultural and social environment. To date the 
independence of similar bodies has not always been an asset in the practice of certain 
reputedly autonomous bodies in Spain. Also, the powers that were finally granted to 
this Council include, for instance, the possibility of banning the broadcasting of 
certain ads. This has been criticised, as it might be considered a modern form of 
censorship, for it is not a judge, but a public body, that fulfils these functions. 
The conclusions drawn from the analysis conducted in previous sections help 
to identify some of the key issues that require further exploration. First, 
implementation of the General Statute on Audiovisual Communication is a priority, as 
many of the problems that have been listed in the framework of media and democracy 
are related to this very statute and, of course, to the underlying media policy rationale. 
Secondly, the development of broadcasting in the new digital environment still has 
some deficiencies. Audiences have not responded as expected to the new digital 
terrestrial offer, which is wider than the classical one provided by the analogue 
signal.1301 This is so possibly because the offer is not as innovative as it should be. 
Interactive components are still at a very low level of development. This poses the 
question of possible inequalities amongst the Spanish population, depending on their 
access to the new channels and the new services, in particular if some of them are 
only provided after prior payment. The keywords would be net neutrality, digital 
breach and pluralism. Thirdly, journalism has to face new realities. A comprehensive 
survey of those realities, including mechanisms to obtain input from public opinion, 
would contribute to a clarification of what journalism is today and what role it plays 
in today’s democracies. And, fourthly, in direct relation to the former issue, media 
literacy is also one of the weaknesses of Spanish public policies today. Well-prepared 
citizens and a critical public opinion familiar with the new media processes will make 
democracies worthy of their name. 
                                                 
1301 Cfr. Contenidos digitales para la nueva televisión, Telos (Fundación Telefónica), nº 84, July-
September 2010. 
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The case of Turkey 
Esra Elmas and Dilek Kurban 
 
1. Introduction 
Mass communication studies have gone through three different periods according to 
their focus of study. The period from 1910 to 1940, the media studies concentrated on 
the “bullet effect” of the media on the masses. According to the media studies of the 
time, media had an absolute power in manipulating the agenda and shaping the 
passive members of the society. Under the influence of WWI, the media was used by 
totalitarian regimes as a propaganda tool. During the second period from 1940 to 
1960, field research that was mainly carried out in the USA showed that the media 
impact on the masses was limited. However in the third period from the 1960s until 
present day, the studies have tried to clarify the ideological features of the media 
power in relation to its economic structure. Today, as a result of the rapid change in 
the communication technologies we are in an era that is generally named as the 
“digital era”. The media ecology has deeply reshaped according to the dynamic that 
came with the emergence of the internet. The internet has had a destructive effect on 
traditional horizontal relations between the “sender” and the “receiver” as well as on 
inequalities in society. Personal blogs and interactive internet sides of the traditional 
media allowed citizens to become visible and have the chance to speak up, increasing 
citizens’ participation in the production of media content. Traditional media which 
consists of large media companies and which usually is dependent on 
government/state subsidies has lost its monopolistic position in the sector when it 
could no longer control news content. So the digital age has been named as the 
“uncontrollable age” and the increase of citizen participation is taken for granted as a 
gain in the way of democratisation. On the other hand, any effort towards 
understanding the relationship between media and democracy in a given society, as 
Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini put it, needs to dwell upon several dimensions, 
including the political, social, legal, economic, demographic and cultural traits of the 
country in question. This is because these dynamics influence the development of the 
media and democracy as well as the interdependent relationship between these two. 
So Turkey, as a transition country both in geographical and socio-political terms and 
in which journalism emerged as tightly attached to the state politics with the mission 
of modernising society, needs to be handled in the way that Hallin and Mancini 
suggest.       
The media structure in Turkey falls under the “Mediterranean or Polarised 
Pluralistic Model” in accordance with the analytical and theoretical framework 
proposed by Hallin and Mancini that is based on four major dimensions and three 
media models,1302 namely: (1) the development of media markets, in which they 
particularly focus on the development of the mass circulation press; (2) political 
parallelism, or “the extent to which the media system reflects the major divisions in 
society”; (3) the development of journalistic professionalism; and (4) the degree and 
                                                 
1302 Based on the variation on these dimensions they develop three models for the comparison of media 
systems in Western Europe and North America: (1) Polarised Pluralist or Mediterranean Model (for 
Southern European countries, like France, Greece and Italy); (2) Democratic Corporatist or 
North/Central European Model (Germany, Netherlands, Scandinavian countries); (3) Liberal or North 
Atlantic Model (United States, Great Britain, Canada). 
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nature of state intervention in the media system.1303 According to the Mediterranean 
Model, “the media in southern Europe share some major characteristics: low levels of 
newspaper circulation, a tradition of advocacy reporting, instrumentalisation of 
privately owned media, politicisation of public broadcasting and broadcast regulation 
and limited development of journalism as an autonomous profession.”1304  
Today as a typical example of the Mediterranean Model, Turkey has a quite 
low level of newspaper circulation, while the media is occupied with state or 
government politics which result in advocacy journalism. On the other hand, the 
media sector in Turkey is structurally divided into congregations. The owners of the 
biggest media groups are also involved as investors and shareholders in different 
sectors of the economy, such as health, education, construction, telecommunication 
and distribution. Although all these media groups may have different ideological 
stands and political positions as well as conflicting economic interests, they share the 
same “mindset” in upholding the “interests of the state” and “national security” above 
democracy, human rights and media freedom. Thus, the seeming diversity of the 
media due to the multitude of media companies is misleading. Journalism or any kind 
of position in the media field is not suitable for professionalism. Moreover, suchlike 
structure which carries multiple conflict of interests, results in a “mass” in terms of 
media policy. There are multiple institutions and regulations that shape the media in 
Turkey which are mainly designed for the state interest rather than guaranteeing the 
media freedom, a result of specific historical and political reasons. So this report deals 
with the historical and cultural ruins that result in existing media policy in Turkey.        
 
2. Historical background  
This section will provide a brief overview of the political context in Turkey, with a 
particular focus on the historical development of the state-media relations. The section 
will discuss the evolution of the media and democracy in Turkey on the basis of the 
national and international anchors of political and social change: the foundation of the 
republic and the evolution of multi-party democracy (the national level) and the 
ongoing democratisation process as part of Turkey’s EU accession (the international 
level). The evolution of the press, radio and television will be examined during three 
principal periods (excluding the military regime between 1980 and 1983 during when 
all means of communication were under the control of the military): the single party 
regime from 1923 to 1950, the multi-party regime from 1950 to 1980, and the 
“liberalisation process” between 1983 and 1990. Finally, the impact of the 
international dimension will be examined on the basis of legal and political 
developments introduced in the media sector as part of Turkey’s economic 
liberalisation process in the 1990s and the EU accession process in the 2000s.   
In both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, journalists played an 
important role in the introduction of Western values and institutions to society. From 
1923, when the republic was proclaimed, until 1945 when a multi-party system was 
installed, journalists have been instrumental in propagating the modernising reforms 
                                                 
1303 E. Özcan, “The role of the state in Turkish media in light of Hallin and Mancini’s comparative 
media systems”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication 
Association, TBA, San Francisco, CA, 04/06/2010, available at: 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p170690_index.html (last visited on 29/10/2010). 
1304 R. Barış, “The Turkish media landscape”, in G. Terzis (ed.) European media governance: National 
and regional dimensions (2005) 289, at p. 292. 
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of the one-party regime.1305 Journalists were both the object and the subject of the 
state-driven modernisation movements in Turkey.    In this sense, the press has 
traditionally dealt “discussions” rather than “news”.1306 On the other hand, because of 
their crucial role in the modernisation project journalists were the potential targets of 
state/government repression, harassment or pressure. While the dissident press has 
always been under the pressure of the power, the statist-elitist faction of the press was 
by and large free of such intimidation. From the outset of the establishment of the 
state, journalists have always been in a close relationship with politicians and state 
institutions. In the early-Republican era, most of the journalists were also writers and 
their literary writings influenced their journalistic reporting. The first journalists of 
Turkey can be described as “self-thought journalists” and today although there are 
some media members in the sector who are coming from journalism schools or 
communication departments, this feature is still valid.  
The establishment of the print media in Turkey predates that of the republic. 
The first paper was founded during the Ottoman times, in the final years of the empire 
when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk pioneered a war of independence against the Allied 
powers. The independent movement which culminated in the foundation of the 
republic in 1923 was based on two primary principles: battle and correspondence. In 
the transition from a decaying empire to a modern nation state, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and his staff prioritised print media, the only widespread medium of 
communication at the time, as a form of reaching out to the masses. The Hakimiyet-i 
Milliye (National Sovereignty) newspaper was established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
himself in Ankara on 10 January 1920. Later renamed as Ulus, the paper aimed at 
publicising Mustafa Kemal’s major decisions during the War of Independence. The 
Anadolu Ajansı (Anatolian Agency), created on 6 April 1920, shared the same goal. 
The main objective behind the foundation of Anadolu Ajansı was to disseminate to the 
national and international “true” public news about the Turkish Independence War. 
Another example of the instrumentalisation of the media during the years of 
state formation was Mustafa Kemal’s national tours, which sought to rally support in 
favor of the Independence War and instill the spirit of nationalism across the country. 
These trips continued after the Republic was founded, with the aim of consolidating 
the regime, overcoming educational, health and economic problems, and laying the 
groundwork for forthcoming reforms. The press was always invited to Ataturk’s 
appearances, which were joined by military and civilian experts. The creation of the 
republic was primarily a top-down project, and the press was a vital element for the 
founding elite to proclaim the republican values. While Mustafa Kemal and the 
founding elite created their own media networks, they were careful to also establish 
good relations with the existing media. Soon after the first years of the republic were 
over, however, state-media relations began to change. One principal reason for this 
change was the breaking away of a group from Halk Fırkası (People’s Party), the 
political party founded by Atatürk, to launch their own party under the name of 
Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Developmentalist  Republican Party) in 1924. 
The support from both the people and press of Istanbul for Terakkiperver 
Cumhuriyet Fırkası as the first opposition party in the history of Turkey began to be 
                                                 
1305 T. Demirel and M. Heper, “The press and the consolidation of democracy in Turkey”, 32 Middle 
Eastern Studies, No. 2 (1996) 109, at p. 113. 
1306 E. E. Bilgiç, The role of the press in the construction of national identity 1934-1937, unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Bosphorus (2010), at p. 27. 
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perceived as a threat to the regime. Under the pretext of suppressing the Kurdish 
Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, martial law was declared in the southeastern region of 
Turkey. The Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu (Law on the Maintenance of Order) was enacted, 
which stifled the freedom of the press and quashed any kind of opposition in the 
country.1307 In accordance with this law, 13 oppositional journalists along with rebels 
and dissenting politicians were tried in the Independence Courts (İstiklâl 
Mahkemeleri) and most were exiled. Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası and 15 
newspapers critical of the government were shut down and only those newspapers that 
had supported the law were allowed to operate. 
The 1928 Alphabet Reform which replaced the Ottoman script with the Latin 
alphabet radically changed Turkish society’s relation to its past and is largely 
responsible for the historical lack of an independent media in Turkey. The transition 
to the Latin alphabet rendered useless the existing technology that media owners had 
at the time. The state provided financial support to publishers who were forced to 
change their technological infrastructure to adjust to the new lettering system. The 
publishers’ financial dependence to the government created an opening for the 
monitoring and control of ideas.1308  
During the 27 years Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party - 
CHP) ruled the country in a single-party government, all forms of opposition were 
silenced. In 1927, just two years after the first radio broadcasting had started in the 
world, two public enterprises co-founded a media company and launched Ankara-
and-Istanbul-based radio broadcasting. These two enterprises were Anadolu Ajansı 
and Türkiye İş Bankası, in the latter of which CHP was a shareholder. The company 
followed BBC as a model for its modus operandi and made a 10-year contract with 
the government.    
In 1936, the company’s request for contract renewal was rejected on the 
grounds that its programming did not live up to the standards of contemporary radio 
broadcasting. Through an edict issued in the same year, radio broadcasts began to be 
carried out by the state itself. The company’s transmitters were transferred to the 
Postal, Telephone and Telegraph Authority (Posta, Telefon ve Telgraf Genel 
Müdürlüğü- PTT). In 1939, the Ankara Radio began to broadcast news bulletins in 
foreign languages for the use of other countries. In its broadcasting about the Second 
World War, this radio emphasised Turkey’s neutrality policy.  
Law no. 3837 of 22 May 1940 established –what is today called – the 
Directorate General of Press and Information (DGPI), a public body which is 
presently under the Office of the Prime Ministry. Atatürk wrote the preamble to this 
law, where he defined the purposes of this public body as follows: “On the one hand 
we need to bring out publications with an aim to defend our national and legitimate 
cause and to constantly scrutinise the foreign press to understand the flow of ideas, 
                                                 
1307 One of the three articles of Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu read: “The head of the government -with the 
approval of the president- is entitled to ban any organization, provocation, encouragement and 
publications aimed at reactionism, rebellion, and disruption of social order, social peace, security and 
public order. The government may hand over persons suspected of these actions to the Independence 
Court.” 
1308 Bilgiç, The role of the press in the construction of national identity 1934-1937, p. 35. 
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while on the other hand we need to bring out publications within the nation to produce 
a union of ideas and spirits as the modern time dictates.”1309 
In 1949, the Izmir Municipality also established a radio station, which was 
transformed into a state-run enterprise in 1953. Izmir thus became the third major 
center for radio broadcasting in Turkey after Ankara and Istanbul.  
The first decade of radio broadcasting under state monopoly demonstrates the 
use of radio in the establishment and consolidation of official ideology. The most 
striking of these was the two year ban on playing Turkish music on radios. In his 
address to the parliament in 1934, Atatürk had noted that the music being broadcast at 
the time was far from being perfect and that “it is necessary to collect noble 
expressions describing elaborate emotions and ideas and process them according to 
the contemporary music norms.”1310 Following Atatürk’s speech, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs dictated that Istanbul and Ankara radios play pieces “composed 
according to Western technique” instead of Turkish music. This ban continued 
through 1935 and into the first half of 1936. During this period, a considerable portion 
of the people who had been accustomed to listening classical and traditional Turkish 
music instead turned their antennas to the radios of Egypt, Crimea and Yerevan to be 
able to listen to Arabic and Armenian songs which were closer to Turkish music than 
Western music. Implemented in the name of modernising the society, the ban was just 
another example of the Turkish state’s use of communication channels as ideological 
apparatuses in the Althusserian sense.1311 The transition to the multi-party regime did 
not alter this reality.  
Following the termination of Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, Atatürk - 
who was still the president of the country - founded another opposition party in 1930 
under the name of Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Free Republican Party). With the 
termination of this party shortly after its establishment, there remained no medium for 
the expression of dissent in the country until the 1950s. By 1945, major landowners, 
the rural population (comprising 80% of the entire population at the time) and the 
Turkish bourgeoisie were discontent due to heavy taxes (i.e. 1942 wealth tax,1312 tax 
on agricultural products), increasing inflation and land reform. At a time when Turkey 
had to comply with democratic principles after having signed the UN Treaty in 1945, 
the close relationship it had with the USSR during the 1920s and 1930s deteriorated. 
In 1947, to eradicate the USSR’s influence in Turkey, the U.S.A. initiated the 
Marshall Plan which required Turkey to embrace democracy and free market 
economy. This stipulation paved the way for the formation of the Democrat Party 
(DP) and the transition to a multi-party system with DP’s defeat of CHP in 1950 
national elections. The press, like the faction of society that brought DP to power, had 
                                                 
1309 See Directorate General of Press and Information, official website, available at: 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/sayfa.aspx?Id=61 (last visited on 29/10/2010).  
1310 G. Gökçe, “Sanat Kurumlarının Oluşmasında Atatürk'ün Rolü”, 18 Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi 
Dergisi Cilt: VI (1990).  
1311 L. Althusser, “Ideology and ideological state apparatuses” in L. Althusser (ed.), Lenin and 
philosophy and other essays (1971) 121. 
1312 The 1942 Wealth Levy Tax, No. 4305, levied disproportionately high taxes on non-Muslims, 
discriminating between similarly situated Muslims and non-Muslims for the purpose of transferring 
wealth from the latter to the former. Non-Muslims unable to pay the high taxes within the one month 
period were transferred to labour camps around the country. This discriminate treatment ended de facto 
in December 1943 with the release of the remaining non-Muslims from the labour camps, and de iure 
with the annulment of the law in 15 March 1944. See A. Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ 
Politikaları (2000), at p. 135-153. 
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great expectations, particularly concerning the democratisation of the country. Among 
the first issues the DP addressed was the freedom of press. On 15 July 1950, a liberal 
press law was adopted, soon followed by a law granting journalists social rights. Yet 
at the same time, legal amendments designed to increase government control over the 
press and universities were passed in 1953. Press organs critical of the government 
were subjected to censorship. By 1955, court cases against the press had increased.  
The media in Turkey, restricted in its content by the state from its very 
inception, has often been used as a medium of manipulation.1313 The DP rule between 
1956 and 1960 brought legal restrictions on freedom of the press and the closure of 
the journalists’ union. In this period, radio turned into a political apparatus of the 
government. The names of citizens who joined the Homeland Front, DP’s political 
extension, were announced on a daily basis on the radio to create a surveillance effect 
on society. In short, radio became a tool for “manufacturing consent”1314 and 
monitoring the society.  
After the 27 May 1960 coup d’etat which brought down DP, the most 
significant development in mass communications in Turkey was the beginning of 
television broadcasting in 1967. Public TV broadcasting through the Turkish Radio 
and Broadcasting Corporation (TRT), established in 1964, gradually became the most 
innovative and effective means through which the state reached the masses. The TRT 
television channels, similar to TRT radio channels, began their broadcasting every 
day with the national anthem. The news headlines followed the order of state 
protocol, i.e. news related to the President preceded those on the Prime Minister, 
causing TRT reporting to be labeled as “protocol reporting”. TRT started permanent 
broadcasting in 1974. With the reduction of the price of TV sets, the number of 
houses with TVs proliferated.  
Turkey experienced its second military coup in 1970, which was followed by a 
period of great political instability, particularly in the final years of the decade. 
Between 1974 and 1980, TRT became the battle ground for the political struggle 
between the National Front governments1315 and CHP. Military regimes established 
after each coup d’etat also sought to seize the entire media establishment. September 
12th, 1980 coup, Turkey’s third, was the first time when a military intervention was 
announced to the public via TRT. It also marks the beginning of the structural 
transformation of the political and social life in the country that stretches to present 
day. This period was characterised by attacks on opposition groups and by a process 
of uniformisation where even the most benign form of dissent was prohibited and 
suppressed. The aim was to create a citizenry which was uncritical, non-interfering 
                                                 
1313 One of the prime examples of this were the incidents of 6-7 September 1955, when government 
instigated violent mobs attacked unarmed non-Muslim civilians and their properties and institutions in 
Istanbul. The incidents were triggered off by a news in Istanbul Ekspress Newspaper that Atatürk’s 
house in Thessaloniki was bombed. At a time when relations with Greece were strained over Cyprus, 
this news incited attacks on non-Muslim minorities, which were tolerated and even supported by the 
state. The incidents resulted in the declaration of martial law and the issuing of bans on the press. It 
was later found out that the news was a product of yellow journalism. See D. Güven, Cumhuriyet 
Donemi Azınlık Stratejileri ve Politikaları Bağlamında 6–7 Eylul Olayları (2006).  
1314 E. S. Herman and N. Chomsky, Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media, 
(1988). 
1315 The coalition government established on 31 March 1975 by Suleyman Demirel, constituted of the 
right-wing political parties in the parliament, was later named as the “First National Front 
Government.” The Second National Front Government was formed in 1977, again by Suleyman 
Demirel, and remained in power until 1978.  
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and ready to sacrifice their individuality in the name of the “nation”. The media, 
especially the television, was the most important tool for realising this aim and was 
used very effectively. In 1983, the Communications High Council (Haberleşme 
Yüksek Kurulu-HYK), a hybrid civilian and military body, was established to oversee 
the communication policies of the government. This and similar bodies regulating 
different walks of social life consolidated the longitude of military tutelage over 
society. 
The final instance of military regime came to an end with the coming to power 
of Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party- ANAP) under the leadership of Turgut Özal 
after the national elections in 1983. This marked the beginning of the “liberalisation 
process” in Turkey. ANAP transformed the economy through free-market reforms. 
While political and social factors mainly shaped the media in 1980s, “economical 
factors have become the determinant afterwards.”1316 The private entrepreneurship 
encouraged by ANAP’s liberal economy policies was also visible in the media 
industry, where companies entered into a bitter rivalry to dominate the market. This 
resulted in the transfer of media ownership from “journalist families” to giant 
companies.1317  
The launch of the first private television, “Magic Box” (which was later 
renamed as Star 1), in 1990 was a landmark event for mass communication in Turkey. 
Star 1 had to begin its broadcasting via satellite from Germany due to the existence of 
a constitutional prohibition on private broadcasting at the time. The company was 
able to circumvent Article 133 which established TRT’s monopoly over all 
broadcasting activities, mainly because Ahmet Özal, the son of President Turgut Özal, 
was one of its shareholders. With an amendment to Article 133 in 1993, state 
monopoly over broadcasting was abolished. In 1994, the Radio and Television Law 
was adopted, providing the legal framework for private broadcasting.  
The launch of a private TV created a dynamic atmosphere with a miscellany 
of actors. Many thematic channels, such as Kral TV (for music videos and 
entertainment), were the creations of Star TV. The increase in the number of private 
channels during the 1990s and the opening of the first private radio in 1992 
engendered the diversification in Turkey’s media. Consequently, many issues that 
were previously considered taboos became debatable. After the 1980 coup d’etat, 
many hitherto repressed and silenced groups in society emerged in the forefront of 
Turkey’s public sphere, thanks to the dynamism in the media. Throughout this period, 
the highest ratings were received by televised debates between public intellectuals 
who delved critically into the recent history of the country until early hours of the 
morning.  
Turkey’s economic transformation during the 1980s gave rise to the 
emergence of very strong media holdings in the next decade. The big capital 
penetrated from these holdings into the media, which left no room for smaller media 
groups in the sector. The media holdings’ organic relations with political power 
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1317 Ş. Çağlar and S.Ç. Mengü, “Media groups and their market shares in Turkey during globalization”, 
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caused a cross monopolisation1318 in the industry.1319 The Polly Peck Group under the 
ownership of Asil Nadir was the first group to take the lead in monopolisation. On the 
other hand, the fastest growing media holding was Doğan Media Group, owned by 
Aydın Doğan. The result of this change had inevitable consequences for both print 
and broadcasting media. On the press front, the rapid tabloidisation of newspapers in 
the 1980s and commercialisation/deregulation of the media in the 1990s generated a 
tendency toward sensational news journalism. After the passing of the new 
broadcasting legislation in 1994, concentration in the media sector intensified and 
commercial media content increasingly became more banal.1320 Turkey’s media was 
once again not functioning as the “Fourth Estate” on two crucial issues: freedom of 
expression and freedom of access to information.  
At the end of the 1990s, the media that has for long been controlled by the 
state evolved into a tool of manipulation for private capital groups for their political 
and economic benefits in their relation with governments. The most important 
consequence of this media model has been the “post-modern military coup” of 28 
February 1997. Mainstream media organisations, prompted by Turkey’s military 
establishment, published fictitious news/content on the rise of Islamism. This 
catalysed public anxiety over the longitude of the secularist regime and created public 
support for the toppling of the Refah-yol (Welfare-path) coalition government 
between the center right True Path Party (DP) and the Islamic conservative Welfare 
Party (RP). During its monthly meeting in February, the National Security Council, an 
executive organ comprised of civilian and military leaders, “advised” RP leader 
Necmettin Erbakan to resign. The military’s message was clear; Erbakan faced a more 
direct military intervention had he not agreed to step down.  
The government was not the only target of the February 28th process. Cengiz 
Candar and Mehmet Ali Birand, two well-known journalists working for mainstream 
media, also became the targets of the fictitious news leaked by the Chief of Staff 
which alleged that they were on the payroll of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). 
Based on false documents fabricated by a senior member of the Turkish Armed 
Forces allegedly based on the testimony of a PKK militant-turned-informant, both 
journalists were labelled as “PKK agents” by the mainstream media, which did not 
feel the need to check the accuracy of the information leaked from the military. 
Journalists implicated in these fabrications were dismissed by the media patrons, 
while a leading human rights activist also branded as a PKK agent survived an 
assassination attempt.1321  
The 1999 national elections resulted in the creation of a coalition government 
between the Democratic Leftist Party (DSP), Motherland Party (ANAP) and National 
Action Party (MHP). Meanwhile, RP had an internal schism between the 
“traditionalists” and the “reformists”. The reformist members, who defined 
themselves as “conservative democrats”, founded Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice 
and Development Party- JDP), which came to power in 2002. Notwithstanding its 
                                                 
1318 Cross monopolisation refers to the situation where economically strong large companies investing 
in other sectors begin to own media organs in the interest of gaining prestige and political power rather 
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1319 Dağtaş, “Uniformity of media in Turkey: Tabloid journalism accompanied by racy popular 
culture”, p. 3. 
1320 A. Aksoy and K. Robins, “Peripheral vision: Cultural industries and cultural identities in Turkey’, 
A 29(11) Environment and Planning 1937 (1997), at p. 52. 
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Islamist roots, JDP formed a single-party government on the basis of a pro-EU 
agenda, which many considered to be an oxymoron both in Turkey and abroad. 
Indeed, since the foundation of the republic in Turkey “the depiction of Islam as ‘the 
other’ or as the symbol of ‘non-modern orientalness’ has always constituted the 
essential substance of the secular state’s legitimacy itself”.1322 JDP’s pro-European 
stand suggested that the “historical mission” of the establishment in Turkey has been, 
in a way, “stolen”. This mission, defined by Atatürk himself and internalised by the 
society as “catching up with the level of modern contemporary civilisations” was no 
more under the monopoly of the state’s establishment. This challenged the 
preconceptions of the establishment and the mainstream media, which has 
traditionally allied itself with the regime and its agents, namely the military and high 
bureaucracy. 
The economic crises of November 2000 and February 2001 had serious 
repercussions for the media industry because some of the media companies also 
invested in the banking sector. The bankruptcy of a number of large private banks 
showed that this “business-media-banking cycle is no longer operational” in 
Turkey.1323 The banking crises eventually led to the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency’s (Bankacılık Denetleme ve Düzenleme Kurulu- BDDK) 
revocation of the banking licences of a number of business groups, which also owned 
media companies. The management of the bankrupt banks were taken over by the 
Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu- TMSF), making 
TMSF a big player in the media industry in 2004.1324    
The EU process which accelerated with the acceptance of Turkey as a 
candidate country in 1999 required the undertaking of reforms in the media sector as 
well as in fundamental rights and freedoms and implied not only fundamental legal 
changes but an overhaul of the prevalent mindset and dominant culture in the media. 
A crucial aspect of the democratisation process was the redesign of the relations 
between the military and the civilian actors in politics, media, academia, judiciary, 
bureaucracy and civil society. The prominence and indeed domination of the military 
in all walks of social life and political structure in Turkey made the process of change 
painful and difficult. The historical role attributed to the media in consolidating the 
influence of the army through “state-military correspondence” and reproducing the 
statist political culture made it one of the most crucial actors of the political transition 
in the country. The Turkish media, especially the mainstream media, was caught in 
between the state that depended on it for the preservation of official ideology and the 
society which, as never before, started demanding a truly independent and unbiased 
media.  
 
3. The media landscape in Turkey  
Turkey has a population of 74,816,000, the majority of which consists of young 
people; 50% of the total population is under the age of 28. This shows that Turkey has 
quite a young reader population; the majority of readers are between the ages of 16 
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and 34.1325 According to the United Nations Development Programme, the rate of 
literacy in Turkey is 88.7%1326 and compared to its population, the total number of 
readers (of any kind of written press) is considered to be low. Although 60% of the 
people in Turkey do not read a newspaper regularly, 90% watch TV on a daily 
basis.1327 Turkey, with 5 hours daily viewing, has one of the highest TV audience 
ratings in the world.1328 According to a report which surveyed TV viewing during the 
first three months of 2009, the serials and the cooking shows are the most popular 
programs among the Turkish people.1329 News channels and discussion programs 
have high ratings as well. Besides, Turkish people perceive the TV channels as one of 
the most reliable sources of information.1330   
According to the recent data of the Advertisers’ Association, advertising 
spending in Turkey rose by 36.3% in the first half of 2010 to 1.84 billion TL (1.2 
billion USD) and is expected to increase by more than 30% by the end of 2010. The 
total size of the advertising sector is likely to reach 3.7 billion TL by the end of the 
year.1331 Television’s share in the advertising market includes 55.59% of the 
advertising expenditure. The advertising shares of other media forums are as follows: 
print media (26.70%); outdoor (7.03%); internet (6.59%); radio (2.78%); and cinema 
(1.31%).  
There are 33 communication faculties in Turkey with around 21,000 students. 
Since 2008, students in Turkey are being given media education starting from the 
primary school. 
 
3.1 Print and broadcasting media  
The media sector in Turkey is structurally divided into congregations. The biggest 
eight of the 15 media groups are Albayrak, Doğan, Çukurova, Ciner, Çalık, Feza, 
Doğuş and İhlas Groups. All major private TV and radio stations, newspapers and 
periodicals belong to these groups. The Doğan Media Group and Merkez Group also 
have the monopoly over the distribution of the print media through Yay-Sat and 
MDP, respectively.  
Established in 1980, Doğan Media Group is the biggest media holding in 
Turkey. The Group has eight dailies: Hürriyet, Milliyet, Radikal, Posta, Vatan, 
Fanatik, Referans and Hürriyet Daily News. Hürriyet and Milliyet have a nationalist 
and statist position while Radikal has a social-democrat point of view. Posta is a 
tabloid newspaper and Referans was a financial paper that has recently been merged 
with Radikal. Doğan Media Group also owns the national TV channels Kanal D, Star 
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and CNN Turk and radio channels Radio D, Slow Turk Radio and Radio Moda. As 
for a digital platform, the group has D-Smart, which includes many thematic and pay-
watch channels. Moreover, the group provides access for all of the channels on 
Türksat satellite. It has activities in the field of cinema and advertising through D 
Productions. Channel Romania D is another investment of the group in Romania. The 
group also includes Doğan Burda Rizzoli (DBR), a joint venture with the German 
publishing house Burda and the Italian media corporation Rizzoli.1332 Doğan runs its 
own news agency, DHA, and publication house, Doğan Kitap. In the merchandising 
sector it has D&R.   
Zaman has been the most circulated daily in Turkey since 1986. It is also 
published internationally in Australia, the United States, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Romania, Kazakhstan, Kyrghizistan, Macedonia, and Turkmenistan. 
Zaman and the English language daily Today’s Zaman were founded by the Feza 
Group. In 1994, the Group also launched its own news agency, Cihan, and weekly 
magazine Aksiyon. Feza has a partnership agreement with Samanyolu Group. Both 
groups are affiliated with the Fethullah Gülen movement, an extremely well organised 
and close knit conservative community which operates Turkish instruction schools 
and universities across the world and invests internationally in various sectors of the 
economy. 
Doğuş Media Group was founded in 1999. Its first channel was the news 
channel, NTV. In addition, the Group is working with international brands such as 
CNBC, NBA, Billboard, Virgin, and National Geographic.1333 
The Albayrak Group was established in 1952. Until 1982 it was active only in 
the construction sector. The group began publishing the daily Yeni Şafak in 1995.1334 
Having liberal and left-wing columnists who are outside the Islamic community the 
paper has emerged from, the paper “offers relatively broader perspective especially 
about the controversial issues”.1335 Since 2007 it runs TVNET, a news channel.  
Ciner Holding was an active company in the automotive and energy sectors 
under the name of Park Holding. In 2002 the holding entered into the media sector. In 
September 2007 Ciner Publishing Holding was founded under which Habertürk.com, 
Habertürk Radyo, Habertürk TV, Ajans Habertürk and Gazete Habertürk are running 
today. The holding has international TV and radio channels and journals such as 
Bloomberg TV and Bloomberg HT Radyo. The Turkish language editions of 
Newsweek, FHM, Marie Claire Maison, Marie Claire, Food and Travel, GEO, and 
Mother and Baby also belong to the Ciner Group. 
Çukurova Holding currently publishes the Akşam, Güneş, Tercüman and 
Alem newspapers and owns the Show and Sky Turk TV stations. The leader of the 
GSM sector Turkcell is owned by the Çukurova Holding and Digiturk which 
broadcasts the national football league matches is another important investment of the 
group. 
The Turkuvaz Group belongs to Çalık Holding. In December 2007 the group 
bought the Merkez Medya Group from Ciner Holding and so became the owner of the 
                                                 
1332 These three media groups together publish 22 magazines in Turkey. See Barış, “The Turkish Media 
Landscape”, p. 291. 
1333 Ibid.  
1334 Ibid., p. 62. 
1335 Ibid., p.291.  
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newspapers Yeni Asır (Izmir), Sabah, Takvim, Günaydın and Pas Fotomac, the 
weeklies Bebeğim ve Biz, Sinema, Home Art, Yeni Aktuel and Gobal Enerji, as well 
as the TV station ATV.1336 
According to DGPI, as of 2008, there are 2,459 newspapers in Turkey, 55 of 
which are national, 23 are regional and 2,381 are local.1337 “The print media in Turkey 
are dominated by national newspapers which have a daily circulation of between 4.5 
and 5 million. Regional newspapers do not play an important role, though the big 
national newspapers have supplements for some of the regions (Aegean, Ankara, 
Black Sea etc.)”.1338 Among the national dailies, according to their average weekly 
sales, Zaman (651,072), Posta (485,971), Hürriyet (440,345), Sabah (371,007), 
Habertürk (255,423) and Sözcü (232,812) are the major ones.1339 Istanbul and Ankara 
are the media centers of Turkey. The headquarters of all the national newspapers and 
broadcasting companies are located in these two cities. On the other hand, Izmir, the 
western port city of Turkey, is the only city that has a regional newspaper, namely the 
Yeni Asır, which is known on the national level. The press, with a few exceptions, is 
characterised by statist and nationalist rhetoric because of its historical ruins that were 
detailed in the previous sections.  
DGPI reports that, as of 2008, the total number of television channels in 
Turkey is 258, of which 27 are national, 16 regional and 215 local. 65 of these 
channels are available on cable and 92 on satellite.1340 The multimedia groups are the 
main actors in the private broadcasting market. According to the ratings of September 
2010, Kanal D, ATV, NTV, CNN Türk and Habertürk are the top five of the list.1341 
Public broadcaster TRT has 5 national television channels: TRT 1 (general), TRT 2 
(culture and art), TRT 3 (youth channel with sports and music programs and 
broadcasts live from the Turkish National Grand Assembly at specific hours) and 
TRT 4 (education). TRT also has a regional channel (TRT-GAP) for the south-eastern 
region of Turkey and two international channels (TRT-INT for Europe, USA and 
Australia; TRT-AVRASYA for Middle Asia and Caucasus).1342 The most significant 
change concerning state television TRT in the European Union accession process has 
been the launch of 24 hours Kurdish language broadcasting on January 1st, 2009. TRT 
6 became the first TRT channel ever to exclusively broadcast in a language other than 
Turkish.  
                                                 
1336 European Stability Initiative, “Turkey – Armenia manual: Information and contacts to persons and 
institutions working on Turkey-Armenia relations” (2010), available at: 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_picture_story_-_turkey_armenia_manual_-_august_2010.pdf (last 
visited on 29/10/2010), at p. 63. 
1337 “Türkiye'deki gazete, dergi, radyo ve televizyonların sayısı, Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel 
Müdürlüğünün kayıtları ile gün yüzüne çıktı”, MedyaRadar, 02/10/2008, available at: 
http://www.medyaradar.com/haber/gundem-21476/turkiyedeki--gazete--televizyon--radyo-ve-dergi-
sayisi-ne-kadar--peki-kac-iletisim-fakultesi-var--iste-cok-ilginc-rakamlar.html (last visited on 
29/10/2010).  
1338 European Stability Initiative, “Turkey – Armenia manual: Information and contacts to persons and 
institutions working on Turkey-Armenia relations”, p. 60. 
1339 “Eylül ayının en çok izlenen kanalı hangisi oldu?”, gazeteciler, 01/10/2010, available at:  
http://www.dorduncukuvvetmedya.com/gectigimiz-haftanin-gazete-satis-rakamlari-belli-oldu.html (last 
visited on 29/10/2010).  
1340 “Türkiye'deki gazete, dergi, radyo ve televizyonların sayısı, Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel 
Müdürlüğünün kayıtları ile gün yüzüne çıktı”. 
1341 “Eylül ayının en çok izlenen kanalı hangisi oldu?”. 
1342 Barış, “The Turkish media landscape”, p. 292. 
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The number of private radio channels currently broadcasting in Turkey is 
around 1,087 and 100 of them are also available on cable. Of these 36 are national, 
100 are regional and 951 are local radio stations. TRT also has four national radio 
channels with different broadcasting themes: Radyo 1 (general), Radyo 2 (TRT-FM, 
native classical, folk and pop music), Radyo 3 (primarily classical music and also 
jazz, polyphonic and western pop music, broadcasts news in English, French and 
German) and Radyo 4 (pop music). TRT’s international radio service Türkiye‘nin 
Sesi/The Voice of Turkey broadcasts in 26 languages. TRT also has ten regional radio 
stations.1343  
Additionally there are 14 weeklies selling around 110,000 copies combined. 
Of these, the four best selling weeklies are Aksiyon (founded by Feza Group), Yeni 
Aktüel (Turkuaz Group), Newsweek and Economist. As a result, the circulation of the 
weeklies is quite low compared with the dailies.    
  
3.2 News agencies 
In Turkey there are a total of 24 news agencies. The official news agency Anadolu 
Ajansı (Anadolu Agency- AA), operating since 1920, is the oldest and the primary 
source for the press. AA has 41 offices in Turkey and 26 abroad.1344 Doğan Haber 
Ajansı (Doğan News Agency-DHA) is the news agency of Doğan Holding and was 
founded in 1999. It currently has 30 domestic and 19 international offices. The Feza 
Group has Cihan Haber Ajansı (Cihan News Agency- CİHAN), which was 
established in 1994. The agency has 6 domestic offices. It provides an average of 450 
text stories, 400 photos, 180 photo stories and 85 video stories per day. CİHAN also 
provides news and services in English and Arabic.1345 İhlas Haber Ajansı (İhlas News 
Agency- İHA) is owned by Ihlas Holding. It has 145 offices in Turkey and abroad. 
Dicle Haber Ajansı (Dicle News Agency- DİHA) was founded in 2002 with 
headquarters in Istanbul, 5 other offices in Turkey and one office in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
DIHA offers news in Turkish, Kurdish and – occasionally – English.   
 
3.3 Online media  
The Internet emerged in Turkey in 1993, for the first time on university campuses and 
soon after in offices, businesses and homes. According to the Turkish Statistical 
Institute’s survey in April 2010, the access rate household internet use has increased 
from 30 to 41.6% within one year. Men between the ages of 16-74 amount to 53.4% 
of the total population while women have a using rate of 33.2%. Internet is mostly 
used for the purpose of sending e-mails and shopping.1346 Internet cafes played a 
massive role in proliferating the use of the internet in Turkey. Many segments of the 
Turkish society, who have never used a computer or the internet, were introduced to 
this technology via internet cafes.  
Turkey’s television and radio broadcasters’ increasing use of online services, 
the proliferation of online daily news papers, political parties’ and politicians’ 
                                                 
1343 Ibid., p. 293. 
1344 Ibid., p. 295.  
1345 Ibid. 
1346 “Internet Kullanım Araştırması Sonuçları”, Iv.kuvvetmedia, 18/08/2010, available at: 
http://www.dorduncukuvvetmedya.com/internet-kullanim-arastirmasindan-cikan-dikkat-cekici-
sonuclar.html (last visited on 29/10/2010). 
 425
accessibility via e-mail, and people’s increased awareness about the internet reveals 
the speed and breadth of internet development in Turkey. However, internet and cell 
phone usage is still very limited and highly expensive for most Turkish people. On the 
other hand, the ratio and method of internet usage in Turkey differs from region to 
region. Whereas the use of internet is very high in the “central-west”, it declines 
towards the “center-east”. Internet use for access to news, and research and 
educational purposes is lower compared to the use of game, pornographic and 
friendship sites. 
The use of social media is limited due to the lack of requisite technological 
infrastructure, yet it is quite popular especially among the young people. The use of 
mobile phones for access to social media sites is higher than that of the internet, 
particularly among youth. Facebook, twitter and personal blogs are the most common 
means of using the social media. On the other hand, access to Youtube continues to be 
blocked since 2007 due to videos which were found by a Turkish court to be insulting 
of Atatürk. While small enterprises especially in the agricultural sector use the social 
media in order to sell their products and compete with the gigantic companies, 
tourism companies consider the social media as a way to reach out to international 
customers in a short and the cheapest way.        
 
3.4 Minority and alternative media   
There are few, yet quite established, minority newspapers run by non-Muslim 
communities in Turkey. The daily Iho and the weekly Apoyevmatini address the 
Greek Orthodox community located in Istanbul. The Jewish weekly Şalom was 
established in 1947. It was published in Ladino until the 1980s. When Ladino could 
no longer be transferred to the new generation Jews, the paper switched to Turkish, 
leaving only one page in Ladino. It has a circulation of nearly 3,500 copies and has 
500 subscribers abroad. It has a large staff with 40 authors and 15 employees. The 
Armenian minority has four newspapers: Jamanak, Marmara, Lraper and Agos. 
Jamanak is the oldest Armenian newspaper, published since 1908, and Marmara is the 
second oldest, since 1940. Published six times a week, the Friday edition of Marmara 
contains a section in Turkish. Its circulation is around 1,500. Half of the subscriptions 
are sent abroad to the Turkish Armenian diaspora around the world. Lraper is the 
news bulletin of the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul, published in Armenian, 
Turkish and English.  
Agos is the only example of a minority paper that reaches to broader segments 
of society. Originally established with the goal of breaking the walls between the 
Armenian and Turkish communities in Turkey, Agos is published predominantly in 
Turkish with only a few pages in Armenian. Following the assassination of its editor-
in-chief Hrant Dink in 2007, the paper increased its efforts to reach out to the broader 
public in Turkey by increasing its Turkish pages, employing new columnists from 
outside the Armenian community, and adding new sections. The paper is popular 
among dissident political groups as well as those that want to support the paper in 
protest to Dink’s murder, and has Armenian, Greek Orthodox, Turkish, Kurdish, 
Sunni and Alevi staff and columnists. Agos started with a circulation of 2,000. By the 
time of Hrant Dink’s death it had reached around 6,000. Dink’s successor until June 
2010 was Etyen Mahçupyan, a reputable public intellectual, and since then Rober 
Koptaş, who has been a columnist at Agos since the 1990s.  
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Aras Publishing is the only Armenian publishing house in Turkey. It was 
founded in 1993 by a group of Istanbul Armenians. It has now established itself as 
one of the few publishing houses producing works in two languages, Turkish and 
Armenian. Aras intends to safeguard the cultural legacy of Turkey’s Armenians for 
future generations. 
Azadiya Welat is the only daily published in Kurdish. Following a 1991 law 
that lifted the ban on the speaking and writing of the Kurdish language, weekly Welat 
was launched in Istanbul on 22 February 1992. Subsequently closed down by courts, 
the weekly changed its name to Azadiya Welat in 1996. It has been publishing since, 
albeit with interruptions due to court-imposed bans. In 2003, the paper moved its 
headquarters from Istanbul to Diyarbakir and in 2006 it became a daily. The paper is 
distributed across the country and has a circulation between 4,000 and 10,000.  
Apart from the minority media, there are only a few examples of alternative 
media organs that are not owned by any of the big media groups and that emphasise 
objectivity and impartiality in reporting as well as independence from the state, 
military, media industry as well as any power structure in Turkey. The most notable 
alternative media organs are the daily Taraf, the online Bianet and Açık Radio.  
Taraf is owned by Alkım Kitapevi, a bookshop chain which is not a part of the 
gigantic media outlets. Although praised in Islamist circles, Taraf’s stance can be 
described as neither pro-AKP, nor pro-Islam, but anti-military. The paper’s daring and 
harsh reporting against the military led to the Chief of Staff’s cancellation of the 
paper’s accreditation for entry into press meetings organised at the headquarters of the 
armed forces. While the newspaper is sympathetic to AKP circles, it has also 
criticised the government harshly particularly on the Kurdish question, freedom of the 
press and police brutality. The paper is a coalition of secular and atheist intellectuals, 
many with leftist backgrounds, as well as religious writers from the Islamic 
community. Although its circulation is relatively low, the paper has dominated 
Turkey’s political agenda ever since it was launched in 2007 through publishing 
confidential documents seemingly leaked by military personnel revealing a series of 
failed coup attempts by senior military leaders against the JDP government.1347 
Bianet, or BIA, is an online news portal which was initiated as a project in 
2003 with the support of the European Union’s Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights. The purpose of the project was to establish a countrywide network in Turkey 
for monitoring and covering media freedom and independent journalism. BIA reports 
on freedom of expression violations, monitors newspapers’ coverage of human rights, 
extensively covers women’s and children’s rights and monitors the media’s 
compliance with the ethical codes of the profession.1348 
Açık Radio went on air in 1995 and is an exceptional and independent radio 
channel which is outside the media establishment. It is a collective where all 
shareholders have equal shares and is quite close to a non-profit organisation. Its 
programming is based on citizen/audience participation and it relies on the donations 
of its listeners collected through biannual drives broadcasted alive on the radio. Açık 
Radio is a defender of the environmentalist movement in Turkey and has a multi-
cultural and liberal stance.    
                                                 
1347 O. Ogret and S. Martens, “Pressing for freedom: Two centuries of ceaseless struggle in Turkey”, 
Hürriyet daily news (2010), available at: http://www.Hürriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=part-iii-
requiring-a-gut-feeling-alongside-a-lot-of-guts-2010-06-07 (last visited on 29/10/2010). 
1348 Barış, “The Turkish media landscape”, p. 299. 
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4. The media regulatory framework in Turkey  
Economic liberalisation in the 1980s and the EU accession process in the 2000s 
implied and required the restructuring of the media sector and the undertaking of legal 
reforms to enhance media independence, pluralism and freedom in Turkey. 
Successive governments since 1999, when Turkey was officially declared as a 
candidate for EU accession, in particular the Justice and Development Party which 
has been in single-party government since 2002, have sought to harmonise the 
national legal framework with European standards without compromising the official 
ideology of the state. A further concern has been the ensuring of the continuation of 
government control over the media. The attempt to simultaneously achieve these 
mutually exclusive goals has created tensions and contradictions in the development 
of Turkish media policy and the regulatory framework, which is a characteristic 
feature of Turkey’s reform process in recent years. 
 
4.1 Actors of media policy and regulation 
The multiplicity of the media policy and regulatory institutions in Turkey may at 
times create confusion over their competences and mandates. Three principal types of 
actors develop policies for the media and regulate the sector: executive bodies, 
independent regulatory agencies, and self-regulatory professional media 
organisations. While all three groups of actors are briefly outlined in this section, the 
mandates and powers of the first two are discussed in the next section on structural 
regulation. 
At the executive level, the Ministry of Transportation is responsible for 
regulating the internet; there is a Ministry of State in charge of radio and television, 
which also has the competence over the Radio and Television Supreme Council 
(Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu-RTÜK); DGPI under the Office of the Prime Ministry 
has mandate over the press, including the accreditation of the press for the purposes of 
relations with the government; and HYK, a body made up of civilian and military 
officials, is tasked with the oversight and approval of the government’s 
communication policies.  
The Information and Communication Technologies Authority (Bilgi 
Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu-BTK) is an independent agency responsible for 
regulating the internet and mobile communication. BTK’s equivalent in the 
broadcasting sector is RTÜK, an independent agency in charge of regulating private 
radio and broadcasting.  
There are few independent bodies that monitor the media from within the 
profession. Basın Konseyi (Turkish Press Council), established with the initiative of a 
group of journalists in 1998 for the self-regulation of the press’ compliance with 
professional ethical rules and codes of conduct, is a contentious body whose 
autonomy from state ideology is widely contested by members of the profession. In 
recent years, newspapers have started to select ombudsmen among their columnists or 
editors to respond to readers’ concerns and critiques and to monitor the compliance of 
their paper with ethical rules of journalism. However, newspapers exempt from 
ombudsmen’s mandate their website editions, some of which are criticised by human 
rights groups for their discriminatory content particularly against women and 
minorities.  
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The primary journalist associations in Turkey are: Türkiye Gazeteciler 
Cemiyeti (Journalists Association of Turkey), Türkiye Gazeteciler Federasyonu 
(Federation of Journalists), Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği (Progressive Journalists 
Association), Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı (Foundation of Journalists and Writers), 
Medya Derneği (Association of the Media), Ekonomi Muhabirleri Derneği 
(Association of Economy Reporters), Foto Muhabirleri Derneği (Association of 
Photo Reporters), Parlamento Muhabirleri Derneği (Association of Parliamentary 
Reporters) and Basın Konseyi (Press Council). There are two journalist unions called 
Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası (Union of Journalists in Turkey-TGS) and MEDYA-
SEN (DİSK) but their prominence is low.   
The Journalists Association of Turkey represents central and statist tendencies 
of the mainstream media members. It has members from the Doğan media group as 
well as from the republican newspaper, Cumhuriyet. The Progressive Journalists 
Association was founded by the leftist media members. The Foundation of Journalists 
and Writers has a religious identity and the Association of the Media was founded by 
journalists that are supportive of the AKP government. The Press Council on the other 
hand is entirely the construction of the Doğan media group. None of these 
associations have the capacity, ability or will to contribute to the development of 
media policy in Turkey.  
 
4.2 Structural regulation  
There are a number of principal laws that regulate the structure and content of the 
media in Turkey, all of which have been revised and/or re-enacted within the past 
decade: the Press Law for the print media; Law no. 3984 on radio and television (for 
private broadcasting); Law no. 2954 on TRT (for public broadcasting); Law no. 5651 
for the internet and mobile communication (“the Internet Law”); Law no. 5809 on 
electronic communications; Law no. 406 on telegram and telephone (“the 
Telecommunications Law”). Law No. 2813 on wireless and Law No. 3348 
establishing the Ministry of Transportation also include provisions regulating the 
telecommunications industry. 
 
4.2.1 Licensing rules 
As stated earlier, until 1993, there was a constitutional ban on private broadcasting in 
Turkey. State broadcaster TRT’s monopoly over broadcasting was de facto terminated 
in 1990 with the launch of STAR 1 TV channel, which broadcasted via satellite from 
Europe. With the emergence of hundreds of private broadcasting companies within a 
matter of few years, a chaotic situation emerged in the absence of a legal framework 
to regulate the market. To provide a legal basis to this de facto situation, the 
constitutional ban on private broadcasting was abolished in 1993, followed in 1994 by 
the adoption of the current Radio and Television Law (no. 3984), which replaced the 
1983 law (no. 2954). With this legal amendment, the name of the regulatory body was 
changed from the “Radio and Television High Council” to the “Radio and Television 
Supreme Council” (RTÜK).  
RTÜK was established in 1994 for regulating private radio and television as 
well as monitoring their compliance with Law no. 3984. Its main regulatory function 
was to issue broadcasting permits and licences and assigning frequencies. Its 
monitoring function entails enforcement powers against private broadcasters that do 
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not comply with the law. RTÜK’s mandate does not extend to TRT, which is subject 
to a separate law, Law no. 2954, which applies solely to the public broadcasting 
agency.1349 Its nine members are elected by the parliament among candidates 
nominated by political parties represented at the parliament. Individuals related to 
RTÜK members up to the 3rd degree cannot be shareholders, managers or partners of 
radio and TV companies. While RTÜK defines itself as “an autonomous and 
impartial” public body,1350 its composition “is considered to be profoundly influenced 
by the political considerations of governments and, thus, substantially undermining 
the Council’s claim of impartiality.”1351 The second ground of criticisms against 
RTÜK is the punitive powers it has been equipped with in monitoring private 
broadcasters’ compliance with the law. This will be discussed in detail below in the 
section on content regulation. 
Though established primarily as a regulatory body to assign broadcasting 
frequencies, RTÜK has not been able to perform this function as of today. The 
agency’s repeated attempts from mid-1990s onwards to complete frequency 
allocations failed due to the interference of the National Security Council, opposition 
by broadcasting companies, court orders and political battles in the parliament.1352 As 
part of the restructuring of telecommunications services, in 2002, HYK and Türk 
Telekom have been made partners of RTÜK “to speed up the process of allocating the 
frequencies and to end the chaos in an unregulated broadcasting market.”1353 
Accordingly, frequency planning has been included within Türk Telekom’s mandate. 
However, this endeavour “has been unsuccessful mainly due to discordance among 
these regulatory bodies and the pressure of the media conglomerates.”1354 The 
commencement of frequency auctions was halted due to government’s “fear of 
retaliation by the media giants” and the National Security Council’s intervention “to 
oblige broadcasters to acquire a national security clearance document which would 
supposedly prevent the establishment of religious TV channels”.1355 While Turkey has 
committed to the EU to carry out the frequency allocations in 2011, there is no 
progress on this front and private radio and television broadcasters continue to operate 
without licences.  
In the meantime, in 2005, HYK decided not to pursue frequency allocations 
any longer since Turkey had already started to plan the switchover to the digital. 
While RTÜK had been planning to switchover to digital since 2002, the process 
halted due to internal rifts between the public broadcasting TRT and private 
broadcasters.1356   
While RTÜK is tasked with assigning frequencies, BTK undertakes frequency 
planning. In accordance with its competences outlined in Law no. 5809, BTK is also 
tasked with advising the Ministry of Transportation on planning the 
telecommunications sector; following the new developments in technology and 
                                                 
1349 Barış, “The Turkish media landscape”, p. 295. 
1350 See RTÜK, official website, available at: 
http://www.rtuk.org.tr/sayfalar/IcerikGoster.aspx?icerik_id=80775e05-caec-4a48-bac5-39fd6375da3b 
(last visited on 29/10/2010). 
1351 Barış, “The Turkish media landscape”, p. 296. 
1352 For a detailed discussion, see Sümer, The impact of Europeanisation, pp. 113-115 and 118-125. 
1353 Barış, “The Turkish media landscape”, p. 295. 
1354 Ibid., p. 295-296. 
1355 Ibid., p. 296. 
1356 Sümer, The impact of Europeanisation, p. 144. 
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providing support for domestic companies in the production of technology; ensuring 
free competition in the provision of goods and services in the market; and defining 
and implementing the performance standards for manufacturing of systems and 
equipments to be used in telecommunications sector. Tasked with monitoring 
compliance with Law no. 3984, BTK has the power to notify relevant bodies on non-
compliance and impose sanctions when required; ban access to the internet on 
grounds, inter alia, of obscenity and child abuse; and take measures for consumer 
protection.1357  
HYK was established under Wireless Law no. 2813 of 1983. Presided by the 
Prime Minister or a minister he appoints, the high council is made up of the ministers 
of interior and transportation, a high level representative from the chief of staff, the 
general secretary of the National Security Council and the undersecretary of the 
national intelligence agency. It meets biannually for the review and approval of 
communications policies. The Telecommunication Authority (Türk Telekom), 
established after the separation in 1995 of postal and telecommunications services 
hitherto provided together by the PTT and privatised in 2005, is Turkey’s telecom 
operator in charge of providing telecommunications services. 
All telecommunications activity in Turkey is regulated under the 
Telecommunications Law (Law no. 406), which was amended in 2000 and 2001 in 
order to modernise the provision of services and improve the infrastructure. In 2004 
and 2005, the power to provide satellite communication services and the services 
provided over cable TV has been transferred from Türk Telekom to Türksat Uydu 
Haberleşme Kablo TV, which was established in 2004.1358 The privatisation of Türk 
Telekom was finalised on 2005 with the sale of 55% of its shares to Oger Telecoms 
Joint Venture Group.   
 
4.2.2 Ownership regulations 
The primary legislative motive in the adoption of the Broadcasting Law in 1994 was 
“to carry out the frequency allocations as soon as possible to regulate the de facto 
operations of the broadcasters, not regulating ownership.”1359 With RTÜK’s failure in 
its repeated attempts to undertake frequency allocations due to the rifts between 
private broadcasters and the government, “the mushrooming of commercial 
broadcasters got out of control and the loopholes in media ownership regulations 
enshrined in law were abused by the media proprietors to increase their power.”1360 
Article 29 of the Broadcasting Law regulates media ownership in Turkey. It 
bars, inter alia, political parties, associations, unions, professional associations, 
foundations, local governments, companies from owning media or partnering with 
media enterprises. Cross-media ownership and foreign ownership is limited to 20%, 
and foreign investors are barred from having a share in more than one media 
enterprise. Individuals who have a 10% share or more in a broadcasting company are 
precluded from entering into public tenders.  
                                                 
1357 See Information and Communication Technologies Authority, official website, available at: 
http://www.tk.gov.tr/Eng/abo_boa/func_authority.html (last visited on 29/10/2010). 
1358 The amendments were made pursuant to Law no. 5189 of 16 June 2004 and Law no. 5335 of 21 
May 2005. See, Türk Telekom, “legal”, available at http://www.turktelekom.com.tr/tt/portal/About-
TT/Company-Profile/Legal/ (last visited on 29/10/2010). 
1359 Sümer, The impact of Europeanisation, p. 130. 
1360 Ibid. 
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And yet, the largest media groups mentioned earlier not only dominate the 
media sector, but also have investments in many other sectors of the economy and 
“there seems to be no efficient way to control the concentration of the media 
ownership”.1361  
 
4.3 Content regulation 
Turkey lacks a unified, coherent and concise content regulation for the media. There 
are multiple laws and regulations governing different sectors of the media. The 
overregulation of the media sector has been exacerbated in the EU accession process 
through multiple “reform packages” hastily adopted by the parliament without having 
gone through a process of deliberation and consultation with civil society and the 
media. Each package law carries identical titles which give no indication of their 
content1362 and contains multiple amendments to various laws, ranging from laws 
from the criminal code to laws governing the media, and from laws governing the 
environment to financial regulation. The patch work style of law making has become 
a characteristic feature of the reform process in recent years, further complicating the 
already complex regulatory framework concerning the media, fundamental rights and 
liberties as well as other areas of social life.     
 
4.3.1 Constitutional framework  
In recent years, relative progress has been achieved in reforming the constitutional 
provisions on the media. The 2001 constitutional amendments removed the 
prohibition in Articles 26 and 28 of minority languages in the expression and 
dissemination of thought and in media. But, the amendments left untouched wide 
restrictions attached to the exercise of these rights on grounds of national security, 
public order, and the integrity of the state with its nation and territory. In case of the 
violation of these restrictions by print media, Article 28 authorises seizure by court 
order and allows, where delay poses a danger, immediate seizure by competent 
authorities, pending a court order within 24 hours. The right to privacy protected 
under Article 20 is also subject to similar restrictions on grounds of public order, 
national security, prevention of crime, public morality, public health and protection of 
rights of others. Under Article 29, there is no requirement to receive prior permit to 
publish periodicals and non-periodicals. Article 133 guarantees the right of private 
companies to establish and operate radio and television, subject to conditions laid out 
in Law no. 3984.  
 
4.3.2 Legislative framework  
There are two principal types of laws regulating the content of the media in Turkey: 
the media-specific laws that directly regulate the sector; and laws in the penal system 
which severely curtail the content of the media.  
 
                                                 
1361 S. Papathanassopoulos, The Mediterranean/Polarized pluralist media model countries, in G. Terzis 
(ed.) European media governance: National and regional dimensions (2005) 191, at p. 194. 
1362 Typically, the names of these reform packages are “Laws on the Amendment of Certain Laws”. 
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Media-specific laws  
The Press Law, adopted anew in 2004, is a legislation that is liberal on its face and yet 
quite authoritarian between the lines. Rights that are tenets of free and independent 
media go hand in hand with severe restrictions that are characteristic of authoritarian 
regimes. The law protects the freedom of press and the right to information, 
guarantees journalists’ right to protect their news sources, and grants individuals’ 
right of reply to defamatory or untruthful news. At the same time, the law contains a 
wide catalogue of restrictions. In addition to similar restrictions imposed in the 
constitution, the law also limits the freedom of the press in the name of “the 
protection of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary”.1363 Prosecutors 
widely interpret the concepts of “national security”, violation of “territorial integrity” 
and “disclosure of state secrets” to bring cases against journalists who report news 
deemed to be against state interests, such as disclosure of human rights abuses by 
security forces in the name of the fight against Kurdish insurgency, criticisms of the 
military’s interference into politics and disclosure of failed coup attempts by high 
ranking military officers. Article 11 attributes criminal liability to editors and 
translators of written work where the author is abroad or unidentified. This provision 
is being used against editors who have published Turkish translations of foreign 
language books on controversial political issues, such as Ragip Zarakolu who has 
been prosecuted for having published books recognising the Armenian Genocide of 
1915.  
One main difference of the new Press Law is the requirement imposed on 
printing companies to notify the prosecutor in order to receive publishing permission 
and to submit two signed copies of each issue to the prosecutor, who is granted the 
power to seize papers. Under the previous press law, district governors were 
designated as the authority to notify. The shift of powers from the executive to the 
judicial branch is potentially restrictive of freedom of press since it enables courts to 
open cases against printing companies which fail to comply with the red tape. Courts 
do not refrain from making use of their power to seize printed press on the basis of a 
very restrictive interpretation of freedom of press and speech.  
Law no. 3984 on broadcasting respects the right of reply and rectification,1364 
guarantees individuals’ privacy of life and protects them from offences against their 
personality beyond the limits of criticism; prohibits broadcasts which “humiliate or 
insult people for their language, race, color, sex, political opinion, philosophical 
belief, religion, sect, and any such considerations”; outlaws incitement to hatred and 
hostility through discrimination; and protects women, minors and the weak against 
programs inciting to violence and discrimination. On the other hand, it introduces 
significant restrictions on broadcasting on the basis of, inter alia, “the existence and 
independence of the Turkish Republic, the territorial and national integrity of the 
State, the reforms and principles of Atatürk”; and “the national and moral values of 
                                                 
1363 Article 3 reads: “The press is free. This freedom includes the right to acquire and disseminate 
information, and to criticise, interpret and create works. The exercise of this freedom may be restricted 
in accordance with the requirements of a democratic society to protect the reputation and rights of 
others as well as public health and public morality, national security, public order and public safety; to 
safeguard territorial integrity; to prevent crime and the disclosure of state secrets; and to ensure the 
authority and impartial functioning of the judiciary.” 
1364 Though, compared to the Press Law, the right of reply is held to lesser standards under Law no. 
3984, which requires radio and television stations to broadcast disclaimers upon court order only.  
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the community and Turkish family structure”.1365 These amorphous concepts leave a 
wide margin of appreciation to RTÜK, which has the power to sanction broadcasters 
which do not abide by these standards. In 2002, amendments made to the law limited 
RTÜK’s sanctioning powers from suspending an entire TV or radio broadcasting 
operator to suspending the relevant program.1366 Still, RTÜK maintains significant 
punitive powers, and continues to be perceived as “a ‘penalising’ body rather than a 
regulatory one”.1367 
The agency adopts a restrictive interpretation of the law’s limitation clauses 
and imposes disproportionate sanctions against media operators. In 2005 alone, 
RTÜK asked defence from 20, issued warnings to 33, suspended programs in 9 and 
fined 4 national television channels for having broadcasted programs “having 
negative effect on children”; forced a local radio station off the air for 30 days for 
“disseminating separatist propaganda” and “inciting hatred and enmity”; and 
suspended two local television channels for “undermining the state and its 
independence.”1368 In 2006, RTÜK relied again on Article 4 of Law no. 3984 for 
initially suspending for one month the broadcasting of the Anatolia’s Voice radio 
station for playing a song about the Kurdish question and subsequently suspending it 
without limitation in February 2007. Similar sanctions were brought upon local media 
run by minorities. In August 2004, RTÜK suspended for 90 days the broadcasting of 
Gün TV and Can TV in Diyarbakır and Hakkari FM radio station in Hakkari, which 
are provinces predominantly populated by the Kurds. 
While injunction of broadcasting is only possible by court order, exceptions 
are made to this rule where there is a threat to national security and a serious risk of 
disruption of public order, in which case injunction is possible with executive order 
(of the prime minister or a minister). Where an order of injunction is made, 
broadcasters have the right of appeal to the Court of Cassation, which is required to 
issue a ruling within 48 hours. Courts frequently resort to their injunctive powers 
under the law. In Özgür Radyo v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) found the warning and licence suspensions imposed on a pro-Kurdish radio 
station to be an infringement of freedom of expression. The Court held that statements 
made on the radio, which were found by national courts to constitute defamation as 
well as incitement to violence and separatism, did not incite violence or hate and had 
already been published by other media organs without being prosecuted.  
Public broadcasting falls outside the mandate of RTÜK and is regulated by a 
separate law, i.e. Law no. 2954 on the TRT. The standards of public broadcasting 
outlined in the TRT Law are quite similar to those laid out in Law no. 3984 on private 
broadcasting: protecting the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation, 
national sovereignty, the republic, public order and public interest; consolidating 
Ataturk’s ideals and reforms; and complying with the national security politics and 
national economic interests of the state. Moreover, “TRT’s staff, as public employees, 
has to act in accordance with the mandate of protecting the priorities of the state”, laid 
out in Article 9 of the law.1369  
                                                 
1365 Article 4.  
1366 Law No. 4756 of 21 May 2002 and Law No. 4771 of 9 August 2002. 
1367 Sümer, The impact of Europeanisation, p. 135. 
1368 Barış, “The Turkish media landscape”, p. 296. 
1369 Barış, “The Turkish Media Landscape”, p. 296. 
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The impartiality of the public broadcaster TRT has always been questioned in 
Turkey and the agency has been criticised for “its permanent endorsement of the 
official position of the state and/or government in almost any subject ... and careful 
avoidance from any engagement with controversial issues.”1370 In recent years, 
however, there has been a considerable change in TRT’s broadcasting policy 
following AKP’s coming to power. Political issues such as Cyprus, relations with 
Armenia and the Armenian genocide, the Kurdish question and the army’s 
intervention into politics have started to be discussed and debated on TV and the 
radio. Programs investigating the country’s recent past and questioning the official 
history narrated by the state are regularly being aired by the TRT. This change is a 
reflection of the weakening of the army’s power over politics as part of the process of 
democratisation in Turkey. With the coming to power of a government whose 
position on the core political issues in the country is in contradiction with the official 
position of the state and which, based on its democratic legitimacy, claims the power 
to set Turkey’s official policies on these issues, the state - i.e. the army - has lost its 
control over TRT. Having said this, TRT’s impartiality continues to be a matter of 
contention in Turkey. Opposition parties and mainstream media organs critical of the 
government criticise public TV for being too close to and partial towards the 
government and for not standing at equal distance to all political parties. 
The Internet Law (no. 5651) was prepared by BTK and entered into force on 
23 May 2007.1371 The law regulates all content on the internet, without making a 
distinction between traditional press content online and broadcasting online, including 
the social media. It lays out the obligations and responsibilities of content, space, 
access and collective use providers as well as internet crimes. The law identifies the 
following eight internet crimes: encouraging suicide; sexual abuse of children; 
facilitation of use of drugs or stimulators; provision of substances that are dangerous 
for health; obscenity; prostitution; gambling; sports betting and games; and crimes 
regulated in the 1951 Law no. 5816 on Crimes against Atatürk. Courts have unlimited 
powers to restrict access to the internet in the name of preventing these crimes.1372 In 
an internationally notorious incident of internet censorship, an administrative court 
made use of this power to ban Youtube in January 2008.  
A relevant law is the 2004 Law on Information, which requires public 
institutions to respond citizens’ queries within 15 days. Citizens have the right to 
apply to administrative courts where this rule is not obeyed. Authorities may decline 
to disclose the requested information on grounds of “state secrets”.  
 
Indirect content regulation 
In addition to the above cited laws which are directly relevant for media regulation, 
the Anti-Terror Law and the Penal Code also regulate the media, in a negative way, 
through restricting freedom of expression and media freedom. Both laws perceive the 
                                                 
1370 Ibid. 
1371 Law on the Regulation of Broadcasts on the Internet and on the Fight against Crimes Committed 
through the Internet, no. 5651 of 4 May 2007. 
1372 “Upon the decision of judicial authorities, i.e. Republican prosecutors and courts, the Presidency of 
Information Technologies Institution (BTK) can ban access to the internet. However, for our 
Presidency to release such a decision the content and domain of the internet site to be banned must be 
located outside of Turkey. The Presidency can place a ban on sites originating in Turkey based on a 
court ruling on crimes committed by the banned site against children and on obscenity”. 
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commitment of offences through the press and media as an aggravating factor, 
increasing sentences by one third to a half.  
The new Penal Code (no. 5237), adopted in 2005, has a number of provisions 
significantly curtailing media freedom. The law criminalises the encouragement of 
military personnel to disobedience with the law (Article 319); alienating the people 
from the military (Article 318); insulting the President (Article 299), the government 
and military and security forces (Article 301); incitement to crime (Article 214); 
praising crime and criminals (Article 215); incitement to hatred and animosity 
(Article 216); incitement of the people to disobedience with the law (Article 217). The 
sentences under Articles 213-217 and 299 are increased by half and one third, 
respectively, where the one of the offences is committed through the press or the 
media.  
The restrictive nature of the Penal Code has been taken to the ECtHR which 
found, in the Düzgören and Ergin group of cases, the conviction under Article 318 of 
journalists for having published statements or distributed leaflets considered to incite 
the abstention from military service to violate Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
The Anti-Terror Law (no. 3713), as amended in 2006, has similarly restrictive 
provisions curtailing freedom of press. Article 6(2) makes it an offence to print or 
publish declarations or leaflets of terrorist organisations. Under Article 6(4), where 
such offence is committed through the press or the media, the owners and editors-in-
chief of the media organs concerned are also liable to a fine. The most problematic 
provision of the Anti-Terror Law is Article 6(5), which allows the suspension of 
periodicals for a period of 15 days up to one month by court order or, where delay is 
detrimental, by a prosecutor. Article 7(2) makes it an offence to disseminate 
propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation, subject to 1-5 years of imprisonment. 
Where such offence is committed through the press and media, the sentence is 
increased by half. The article also imposes liability to the owners and editors-in-chief 
of the press and media organs concerned.  
The constitutionality of Article 6(5) was contested by former President Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer before the Constitutional Court on the grounds that suspension of the 
future publication and distribution of a periodical infringed upon the freedom of the 
press as protected under Article 28 of the Constitution. In its judgment of 18 June 
2009, the Constitutional Court found Article 6(5) to be compatible with the 
constitution and rejected the president’s request for annulment.1373  
The compatibility of Article 6(5) of the Anti-Terror Law with Article 10 of the 
ECHR was contested before the ECtHR in the case of Ürper and Others. In its 
judgment of 20 October 2009, the Court observed that the practice of banning the 
future publication of entire newspapers, whose content was a priori unknown, had a 
preventive effect on the professional activities of journalists and amounted to 
censorship. The issue was raised again before the Strasbourg Court. In its judgment of 
                                                 
1373 Constitutional Court, decision no. 2009/90, Official Gazette of 26 November 2009. In its judgment, 
the Court pointed out the public interest in combating with terrorism: “…taking into consideration the 
nature of acts that result in the suspension of the publication of periodicals, the magnitude of damage 
caused by the commission of those offences through the press and the media, as well as the aim, extent 
and methods of terror in our country and the facility of the press and media organs to communicate 
with the masses and the former's influence on society, it has been concluded that the provision in 
question aims at the continuity of democratic society.” 
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15 June 2010 in the case of Turgay and Others,1374 the ECtHR noted in particular that 
in its judgment of June 2009, the Constitutional Court of Turkey did not take into 
account the judgment of Ürper and Others v. Turkey and once again found the 
suspension of future publications of a periodical to be in violation of Article 10 of the 
ECHR.    
Countless journalists have been prosecuted under the Anti-Terror Law for 
having disclosed and published the names of public officials engaged in fight against 
terrorism, made the propaganda of the terrorist organisation and published the 
statements or declarations of the terrorist organisation. Two most recent examples of 
the implementation of the above mentioned laws concern the weekly Nokta and 
Express magazines. The incidents that eventually resulted in the closure of Nokta in 
2007 started with the magazine’s publication on 8 March 2007 of the classification by 
the Chief of General Staff of journalists and media organs on the basis of their 
accreditation. On 29 March 2007, Nokta published sections from a diary reportedly 
belonging to Özden Örnek, the former Chief of Navy Forces. Based on this diary, the 
article reported that a group of generals conspired to stage a coup against the elected 
government in 2004 but were obliged to call their preparations off when Hilmi Özkök, 
the Chief of General Staff at the time opposed their attempts. Following the 
publication of this article, on 13 April 2007, the police raided the offices of the 
magazine, seized its computers and opened an investigation. A defamation case was 
brought against Alper Görmüş, the Editor in Chief of Nokta. While Görmüş was 
eventually acquitted, his repetitive requests for the inclusion of the coup attempts into 
the case were rejected by the court. In later years, the allegations of coup attempts 
proved to be true, but no case was brought against the retired generals for conspiring 
to stage a coup. Another recent example against freedom of press is the case against 
İrfan Aktan, who was prosecuted for an article he wrote on the Kurdish question, 
published in Express on 15 October 2009, where he quoted a PKK militant and a PKK 
publication. Aktan was convicted to one year and three months imprisonment and the 
editor of the magazine to a fine for having made “the propaganda of the terrorist 
organisation” in violation of Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law. 
 
4.3.3 Cultural and political pluralism in the media 
As stated earlier, broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was prohibited until 
recently, exception being made for Armenian, Greek and Hebrew – mother tongues of 
groups granted minority status under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty grants 
not only non-Muslim minorities, but all citizens the right to use “any language … in 
the press, or in publications of any kind”. However, Turkey has, until recently, never 
allowed any minority group other than the three Lausanne minorities to exercise this 
right. One of the greatest impacts the EU accession process has had on the media in 
Turkey was the lifting of this ban and the allowing of public and private radio and TV 
broadcasting at the local and national level.  
The 2002 and 2003 amendments to Law no. 3984 effectively paved the way 
for broadcasting in minority languages, without explicitly identifying the purpose of 
                                                 
1374 ECtHR, Turgay and Others v Turkey, nos 8306/08, 8340/08 and 8366/08, judgement of 15 June 
2010. 
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the reforms to be as such.1375 Broadcasting was allowed in “the different languages 
and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives”1376 with the 
caveat that such broadcasts shall not contradict the Constitution and “the indivisible 
integrity of the state with its territory and nation.” However, the right to broadcasting 
was not granted to all minority languages spoken in Turkey. Instead of allowing the 
exercise of this right upon demand, the government a priori identified which 
languages merited benefitting from the law. The selected minority languages were the 
Zaza and Kirmanci dialects of the Kurdish language, Circassian, Bosnian and Arabic. 
The duration, scope and nature of broadcasting in these minority languages were not 
specified in the laws, but were left to the discretion of RTÜK.  
Regulations adopted by RTÜK further restricted the already limited and 
conditional rights granted by the parliament. The 2002 regulation establishes “direct 
state control over the content of broadcasting, prohibits children’s programs and the 
teaching of minority languages, restricts broadcasting to a few hours every week, 
subjects decisions on the language and dialect of broadcasting and the profile of 
viewers to bureaucratic authorisation, requires simultaneous and subsequent 
translation into Turkish for TV and radio programs, respectively, and prohibits 
broadcasting in violation of national security, general morality and the indivisible 
territorial and national integrity of the state.”1377 The 2004 regulation allowed private 
broadcasting in minority languages at the national level for the first time, but again 
subject to strict time limitations and red tape. Local and regional broadcasters are 
required to submit RTÜK an audience profile in order to receive permits. Diyarbakır-
based Gün TV unsuccessfully challenged this regulation in courts. 
On 7 June 2004, TRT commenced broadcasting in the selected five languages. 
TV broadcasts are for 45 minutes per day five days a week, while radio broadcasts 
last 30 minutes each day five days a week. The content and time restrictions imposed 
on broadcasting, the red tape imposed on local broadcasters and the outdated content 
of programs have been criticised by minorities who perceive the reforms as an attempt 
by the Turkish government to deceive the international community by creating a false 
impression about the protection of minority media in Turkey. AKP Government’s 
“reforms” on public broadcasting in minority languages continued with the 
commencement in 1 January 2009 of public broadcasting in Kurdish at TRT 6 radio 
and TV stations, followed by the launch in April 2009 of public broadcasting in 
Armenian at TRT’s Voice of Turkey Radio.1378 While TRT has 6 exclusively 
broadcasts in Kurdish for 24 hours, broadcasting in Armenian is limited to a total of 
one hour per day.    
Notwithstanding this significant yet limited progress in establishing the 
regulatory framework for a pluralist media through allowing broadcasting in minority 
languages, minority media in Turkey continues to be subject to the dual blockade of 
the state and the mainstream media. Surveillance by the military and the state on the 
one hand and harassment by the statist and nationalist mainstream media on the other 
                                                 
1375 The scope of the right was gradually expanded through a series of laws. Initially, the reforms were 
limited to public broadcasting in minority languages, but were gradually expanded over time to extend 
to private broadcasting.   
1376 For the problematisation of this phrase, see D. Kurban, “Confronting equality: The need for 
constitutional protection of minorities on Turkey’s path to the European Union”, 35 Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review (2003), at pp. 151-214 and p. 197. 
1377 D. Kurban, A quest for equality: Minorities in Turkey (2007), at p. 17.  
1378 The broadcasting in Armenian takes place between 7.30-8 am and 6-6.30 pm every day. 
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often leads to a degree of self-censorship in the minority media organs. As Etyen 
Mahçupyan, the successor of Hrant Dink as the editor-in-chief of Agos, points out, 
“since we have the desire to keep Agos alive and since there is particular pressure on 
Agos, we implement technical auto-censorship, meaning we say what we have to say 
but change the way we say it”.1379 This often causes the minority media to withdraw 
from political debates for fear of persecution by the state as well as the mainstream 
media.             
Turkey’s recent history is full of banal incidents where members of the 
minority media have been prosecuted under the Anti-Terror Law and the Penal Code; 
discreetly or openly threatened by state agents, military officers, mafia and criminal 
networks; killed in daylight by “unidentified perpetrators”; tortured by agents of the 
military regimes; imprisoned for years for having criticised state policies or advocated 
the rights of minorities; and reported on taboo issues such as clandestine coup 
attempts by the military, the Armenian genocide, the Kurdish question etc.1380 One of 
the most tragic and clear instances of state persecution of dissident journalists has 
been the conviction of the Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink for “having 
insulted Turkishness”, followed by his assassination by agents of a criminal network 
whose plans were known to the military and police intelligence well in advance.1381  
 
4.3.4 Non-legal restrictions on the media: the executive and the media 
The media and the judiciary are not the only to blame for restrictions on freedom of 
the press in Turkey. The JDP government in general and the Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan in particular have been frequently criticised by both the Turkish 
media and the international community for their anti-democratic statements, conduct 
and policies towards the press. Erdoğan became notorious for the civil cases he 
brought against dissident cartoonists who depicted him as various animals in 
criticising his policies. Though he lost each of the lawsuits he filed against the 
cartoonists, the Prime Minister’s intolerance against criticism seems to have not 
changed. This is evident, for example, in his aggressive position against the Doğan 
Media Group.  
In September 2008, the Prime Minister appealed to the public to boycott the 
newspapers of the group which implicated the complicity of senior JDP officials in 
                                                 
1379 M. Christensen, “Notes on the public sphere on a national and post-national axis: Journalism and 
freedom of expression in Turkey”, 6 Global Media and Communication (2010) 177, at p. 189. 
1380 Ogret and Martens, “Pressing for freedom: Two centuries of ceaseless struggle in Turkey”. 
1381 On 6 February 2004, Hrant Dink, the founder and editor-in-chief of the Armenian-Turkish weekly 
Agos, published an article in his paper which suggested the possibility of Sabiha Gökçen, Atatürk’s 
adopted daughter and the first Turkish female pilot who has been the symbol of the educated-modern 
Turkish women, may have been an adopted Armenian orphan who survived 1915. When this news was 
covered in front page by Hürriyet, the most popular daily, a number of columnists in mainstream media 
reacted strongly to Dink. Finally, the Chief of the armed forces made a public statement, rejecting as 
unacceptable the allegations on Sabiha Gökçen and indirectly accusing Dink of threatening national 
unity and peace in Turkey. This incident made Dink the target of verbal and physical attacks by the 
media and extreme right wing groups. Meanwhile Dink was convicted of “denigrating Turkishness” on 
the basis of an indictment which deliberately distorted his writings and portrayed him as a threat to the 
“Turkish nation.” The media’s overall coverage of the case was extremely biased, making him a target 
of further nationalist attacks and hate crimes. Eventually, Dink was assassinated on 19 January 2007 by 
a 17 year old Turkish nationalist who told the police that he killed Dink because he read in papers that 
the latter hated the Turks. For an excellent coverage of Dink’s life and the responsibility of the media 
in his murder, see T. Çandar, Hrant (2010). 
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one of the biggest fraud cases in Germany concerning an Islamic charity organisation 
which was found to have embezzled charitable contributions. The Turkish press 
severely criticised the government for affording protection to individuals in Turkey 
pointed by the German court as the masterminds of this scheme, including Zahid 
Akman, the then head of RTÜK and the highest executives of Kanal 7, a pro-
government TV channel. The Turkish press accused these individuals with 
channelling embezzled funds to Turkey and even claimed that some of the money 
might have been funnelled to the JDP government. While Germany cancelled the 
licence of Kanal 7 INT in Germany, Erdoğan rejected persistent appeals to dismiss 
Akman from his public position as the head of the media watchdog agency.1382 The 
JDP government’s biggest conflict with the Doğan Media Group was in September 
2009, when it levied a record high 2,5 billion dollars fine, which nearly corresponded 
to the total value of the company’s assets, for tax evasion. Finally in 2010, the Prime 
Minister Erdoğan called on media patrons to dismiss those columnists which 
criticised the government’s economic policies, arguing that their distorted portrayals 
would serve to destabilise the well functioning Turkish economy. Overall, the JDP 
government, in particular the Prime Minister, has performed miserably on the 
freedom of press, taking a harsh position against the dissident journalists and media 
groups.   
Law no. 3984 was initially prepared on the basis of the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Trans-border Television. RTÜK has recently prepared a draft law 
amending Law no. 3984 on the basis of the EU’s Directive on Audiovisual Media 
Services, introducing a new concept of broadcasting and paving the way to 
establishing digital broadcasting. The draft replaces the terms “radio” and “television” 
with “media services providers” and introduces “services upon demand” as a third 
category. If and when the draft is approved, the law will increase the share of foreign 
investment in broadcasting companies from 25 to 50% and enable a foreign company 
to partner with two national broadcasting companies. On the other hand, though the 
draft has aspects prepared on the basis of the EU law, it is being criticised for further 
restricting freedom of expression through enhancing the management and auditing 
powers of RTÜK and authorising it to block broadcasts.  
While there is no special law on penalisation of defamation or protection of 
privacy, the new Penal Code introduces for the first time a number of safeguards on 
this issue. Article 133 prohibits wire tapping. Article 132 protects the privacy of 
communication, making the unlawful disclosure of communication between persons 
punishable by one to three years of imprisonment and increasing the sentence by half 
where the offence is committed through the media. Article 134 guarantees the right to 
privacy, increasing in case of violation the sentence by half where the act is 
committed through the media. The imposition of additional penalties where the 
offence is committed through the media shows the real purpose of the law to be 
deterring the coverage of contentious political issues such as the military, minorities 
and the Kurdish question. In 2009, Turkey ranked 122nd in freedom of the press, 
falling 20 places in comparison to 2008 due to a surge in cases of censorship, 
                                                 
1382 Deniz Feneri e.V. (Lighthouse), a German-based Islamic charity organization, was found by a 
German court to have embezzled 58 million euros in charitable contributions mostly collected from the 
Turks living in Germany, at least 17 million euros of which were channelled to private enterprises 
within the Islamic community in Turkey. While the Frankfurt court convicted three staff of the 
company in Germany, it passed the ball to Turkish authorities stating that the actual masterminds of the 
fraud were in Turkey.   
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especially towards the Kurdish media, and efforts by government bodies, the armed 
forces and the judiciary to control media content. In 2010, Turkey ranked 138th out of 
178 countries.1383  
 
5. Media policy and democratic politics: an assessment 
Ever since the late Ottoman era, the media has always been considered to be one of 
the leading actors of Turkish modernisation. On the other hand, the modernisation 
process was a state-guided project rather than the result of a collective public demand. 
Thus, the Turkish media has always been in an interdependent relationship with the 
state. Beginning from the early republican era, modernisation has also been associated 
with democratisation. State modernisation was based on the assumption that the more 
the society was modernised, the more democratic the regime would be. The Turkish 
media, as both the “subject” and the “object” of this process, has until very recently 
stood by the state. However in recent years, particularly after the initiation of the EU 
process which encouraged different social groups to be more vocal and persistent in 
demanding democratisation, the media landscape and its traditional rhetoric began to 
go through a political, institutional and mentality change. While a number of reforms 
were carried out in the areas of press freedom, media regulation and economic 
liberalisation towards fulfilling the EU’s accession requirements, there remains much 
to be accomplished to realise media freedom, independence and impartiality. The 
current ownership system and structure of the media in Turkey fall far short of 
achieving the democratic ideals.  
On the other hand, the emergence of dissident media and the internet during 
the past decade has provided a growing space for alternative news which cannot pass 
through the filters of the establishment media. This has made possible citizens’ 
participation in the production and dissemination of the news, a crucial contribution to 
the process of democratisation. However, citizens’ participation by itself is not 
sufficient to establish democracy in the media. Crucial in this regard is the process of 
“constructing citizenship”. As it happens in the Western cases, the modern state in 
Turkey aims to create “citizens” by the mediation of education. Apart from the 
education, communication was another apparatus for the state in order to reach the 
masses and make them “ideal/proper citizens” under its control. So the Turkish 
national citizenship has been figured as an institution of the republican regime in 
which the ideal citizens had to have the basic features of being Turk, Muslim, secular, 
republican and duty-based–passive at once. So the borders of the ideal citizenship in 
Turkey refer to the borders of the Turkish media. Turkish citizens as the members or 
the consumers of the media have a direct affect on it. All these features are maintained 
by the laws and regulations. Because citizenship in Turkey is not a result of the issue 
of law but the laws is the result of the state-imagined citizenship.  
A number of incidents in the past few years demonstrated that the mainstream 
media in Turkey lacks the ability and will to function as the “Fourth Estate.” The 
culpability of daily Hürriyet as well as a number of columnists writing in this and 
other mainstream media in the prosecution, conviction, targeting and eventually 
assassination of Hrant Dink, and the prosecution of many other journalists, 
intellectuals and writers who express dissenting political views on the Armenian 
                                                 
1383 Reporters Without Borders, “Press freedom index 2010”, available at: http://en.rsf.org/press-
freedom-index-2010,1034.html (last visited on 29/10/2010). 
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genocide, the Kurdish question and state policies on these issues has been widely 
commented on,1384 as well as the assassination of Hrant Dink and the police raid of 
weekly periodical Nokta in April 2007 to seize leaked documents implicating failed 
coup attempts by senior military leaders. News stories published in alternative media 
such as Nokta and daily Taraf on clandestine coup plans by senior military officers 
became the grounds for struggle between different media groups. The statist-elitist 
mainstream media generally underestimated such news while those sympathetic to the 
government selectively published news that suited JDP’s interests and policies. Also 
during this period, the Internet, the “uncontrollable” media, became the medium 
through which news that would not be covered by the mainstream media were 
provided to the public. Particularly striking were secretly recorded voice and video 
footage implicating senior military officers and political figures, some of which have 
been used against suspects in criminal cases. Indictments filed against hundreds of 
defendants in the Ergenekon case frequently relied on such footage. The use of the 
internet for leaking unlawfully obtained documents showing illegal conduct has on 
the one hand provided the public with the kind of information that the media did or 
could not provide and on the other hand raised serious issues concerning due process 
and the right to fair trial of those incriminated by such information.   
 
                                                 
1384 Christensen, “Notes on the public sphere on a national and post-national axis”, p. 178. 
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The case of the UK 
Rachael Craufurd Smith and Yolande Stolte 
 
1. Introduction 
The United Kingdom today 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (UK) is a constitutional monarchy 
and a unitary state consisting of four countries: England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. While the UK is governed by a parliamentary system with its seat of 
power in London, it has 3 devolved national administrations: Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, which all have a range of powers such as health, education and 
culture. The UK government retains power concerning all matters that have not been 
devolved.1385 With regard to the media, the UK parliament has reserved matters 
pertaining to broadcasting, telecommunications, data protection, video recording and 
cinema licensing/classification, UK Official Secrets legislation, competition 
(including newspaper mergers) and intellectual property. Reserved and devolved 
powers may overlap, as for example the Scottish Gaelic television channel can be 
argued to fall both under language & culture (devolved) and broadcasting (reserved). 
The UK has no written constitution. Many rules relating to government take 
the form of unwritten conventions, though certain measures that can be considered to 
have constitutional status are enshrined in legislation, such as the Human Rights Act 
1998 (hereafter, HRA). At the centre of the British constitution lies the doctrine of the 
sovereignty of parliament, which the constitutional theorist AV Dicey argued meant 
that parliament, as the ultimate source of law, can create such law as it determines and 
that no person or court can override statute law. The UK is, however, a member of the 
European Union and the courts in the United Kingdom have accepted the primacy of 
EU law.1386  Britain was one of the first states to sign the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereafter, ECHR) in 1951 and has since adhered to it on an 
international level. With the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 the 
ECHR has been afforded enhanced status within the domestic legal systems. The 
English legal system is founded on the common law, while Scots Law is based on 
civil law principles with common law elements.   
There are currently 62 million people living in the UK, of which the greater 
majority live in urban areas.1387 
 
History of the media in the UK: newspapers 
In Britain, licensing of the printed press ended in 1695 and was not renewed. 
However, in 1712, stamp duty was introduced, a tax levied on each (half) sheet of 
newspaper, coupled with a tax on news paper advertisements. The stamp duty assured 
that newspapers were too expensive for the general public and assisted in restricting 
ownership by raising the publishing costs.1388 Stamp duties rose significantly over the 
                                                 
1385 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Scotland Act 1998, Government of Wales Act 1998. 
1386 See, for example, Factortame Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transport (no.2) [1991] 1 AC 603.  The 
internal effect of EU law (then EEC law) was provided for in the European Communities Act 1972. 
1387 Office for National Statistics, “Population estimate”, available at: 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=6 (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1388 R. Craufurd Smith, Broadcasting Law and fundamental rights (1997), at p. 16. 
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years to attain this objective. However, the “underground press”, which evaded stamp 
duty, flourished and the government responded with stronger coercive powers and 
reduced the stamp duty significantly to make tax evasion less attractive.1389 From the 
mid-eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century, a growth in advertising 
provided the press with the means to become more politically independent.1390 The 
radical press carried little advertising; it could initially survive on the proceeds of 
sales alone, allowing it to be relatively free from economic/commercial influences.1391 
Stamp duty was abolished in 1855,1392 though the press was still controlled through 
generally applicable blasphemy, treason and sedition laws.1393  
Advertisers became a powerful force by the mid-nineteenth century when 
advertising sales became the main form of financing newspapers. A rise in advertising 
agencies and major national advertisers saw a decline in political prejudice in 
advertising selection and this practice was slowly abandoned.1394 In spite of this, left-
wing newspapers had difficulty attracting advertising as their readership was less 
affluent. This led some of the radical press to temper their radicalism in order to 
attract a different, more upmarket, audience while others continued with a small 
audience, covering their losses by other means of income.1395 National newspapers 
overtook provincial newspaper sales in 1923 and, while newsprint was rationed for a 
time due to war,1396 sales continued to rise up until the mid-1950s when competition 
with other types of media, such as radio and television,  started to show its effects.1397 
Circulation numbers dropped and many national newspapers were running at a loss by 
the 1960s.  
From the early twentieth century national newspapers were generally owned 
by “press barons” with varied reasons for owning newspapers, though common 
reasons were to further a political cause, party or their own political career.1398 Few 
papers had a wide spread of shareholders. Newspaper chains with national as well as 
local titles increased rapidly, though it was not till after the First World War, that 
press concentration became more pronounced with large scale consolidation of 
regional chains of newspapers.1399 While some papers became less hierarchical and 
took a more bi-partisan approach to political reporting after the Second World War 
(hereafter, WWII), this was not universally so and some of the papers became more 
partisan in the mid-1970s in response to the polarisation of British politics.1400 
Concentration of media ownership became more pronounced in the following period 
as did cross-media ownership, both national and international. The press generally 
experienced a right wing shift1401 and cross-ownership linked press groups with major 
                                                 
1389 J. Curran and J. Seaton, Power without responsibility: the press and broadcasting in Britain 
(1991), at p. 14. 
1390 Ibid., pp. 39-40.  
1391 Ibid., p. 18. 
1392 Advertisement duty had been abolished in 1853 and paper duty was abolished in 1861. 
1393 Craufurd Smith, Broadcasting law and fundamental rights, at p. 19. 
1394 Curran and Seaton, Power without responsibility, at p. 40. 
1395 Ibid., p. 41. 
1396 Newsprint restrictions lasted till 1955, due to import difficulties rising from the post-war dollar 
crisis and the Korean War, see C. Seymour-Ure, The British press and broadcasting since 1945 (1996), 
at p. 16. 
1397 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
1398 Ibid., p. 34. 
1399 Curran and Seaton, Power without responsibility, pp. 50-51. 
1400 Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
1401 Ibid., p. 124. 
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interests outside the media, integrating them into core sectors of financial and 
industrial capital, such as furniture, gas and oil, banking and travel.1402 During the last 
15 years, eight media owners have dominated the national press.1403 The local and 
regional media are even more consolidated with four publishers dominating 70% of 
the market share across the UK and all but one having significant cross media-
interests.1404 
 
History of the media in the UK: radio and television 
Radio broadcasting started in the UK in 1922 when the British Broadcasting 
Company, established by the Post Office as a cooperative venture owned by the radio 
industry,1405 started daily transmissions as the sole licensed radio broadcaster. The 
company was restructured in 1927 into the British Broadcasting Corporation, the 
present day BBC.  
In 1934 the British government appointed a committee charged with assessing 
the viability of setting up a public television service. The committee recommended 
the BBC should be charged with bringing television broadcasting to the British public 
as a regular service. The BBC started regular “high definition” broadcasting in 1936, 
but the service was suspended in 1939 due to the outbreak of WWII, when the aerial 
was needed for different purposes.1406 The service resumed after the war and in 1954 
the government decided that a second television channel was to be added, operated on 
commercial lines. The channel would, however, still be regulated by a public body 
responsible for imposing public service requirements: the newly inaugurated 
Independent Television Authority (hereafter, ITA). This new channel would be 
organised as a series of separately owned regional franchises, each provided with a 
monopoly of television advertising in its own geographical area.1407 ITV started 
broadcasting in London in 1955, gradually extending to cover other areas. The first 
few years were difficult for commercial television, with few advertisers willing to 
move from traditional forms of advertising to television advertising. However, by 
1960 commercial television was making significant profits. By the end of the 1960s 
there were 16 million TV licences in the UK.1408 The 1970s brought Channel 4, a 
further form of a PSB set up as a non-profitable body, funded by advertising and 
statutory obliged to cater for tastes and interests not covered by the other two 
channels.  
The election of the Conservative Government under the leadership of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1979 led to major changes in the state regulation of 
communications. The Thatcher government was strongly committed to deregulation 
and felt that the broadcasting sector should be led by the free market model. The new 
technological developments in the broadcasting sector, such as the arrival of cable and 
satellite, meant that the once limited spectrum was now capable of expansion and no 
                                                 
1402 Ibid., p. 94. 
1403 See House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 1st report of session 2007-2008, “The 
ownership of the news”, 27 June 2008, HL Paper 122-1, at p. 41.  
1404 Ibid., p. 46. 
1405 P. Humphreys, Mass media and media policy in Western Europe (1996), at p. 112. 
1406 Teletronic, “The history of the BBC: part 7”, available at http://www.teletronic.co.uk/herestv7.htm 
(last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1407 House of Lords, Communication Committee, First report: “The British film and television 
industries”, 25 January, 2010, HL paper 37-I, at p. 140. 
1408 Ibid., p. 143, a television licence is needed to own a television. 
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longer required the previous level of strict regulation. This led to a media policy 
aimed at deregulation in order to stimulate competition and provide incentives for 
innovation that would benefit customers.1409 Cable television in the UK was not faring 
well, mainly due to legal restrictions which prohibited it from generating its own 
programming.1410 These restrictions were lifted in 1980 and the Thatcher government 
started promoting privately owned cable systems, considering them the main route to 
more technologically advanced cable broadband systems.1411 However, growth of 
cable remained very slow, until, in 1991, a relaxation of the cable regulations allowed 
cable companies to carry telephone services next to television. 
On 1 November the Broadcasting Act 1990, which aimed to significantly 
deregulate British television, received royal assent. Satellite television had been 
launched in 1989 in the UK by Rupert Murdoch’s Sky Television, followed by British 
Satellite broadcasting in 1990. Neither was making a profit and in the final days of the 
Thatcher government they were allowed to merge, without any reference being made 
to the Independent Broadcasting Authority. The creation of British Sky Broadcasting 
(hereafter, BSkyB), marketed as Sky, essentially created a monopoly on the satellite 
pay TV market. The Broadcasting Act of 1990 precipitated a wave of consolidation 
within ITV reducing the original fifteen franchises to five. The Broadcasting Acts of 
1996 and 1997 led to even further deregulation, and provided the groundwork for 
Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT), which was launched as a subscription service by 
ITV but failed. The final analogue television channel, Five, was launched in 1997 as a 
for-profit channel – but still nominally a public service channel. At this point all 
public service channels (BBC 1 and 2, ITV, Channels 4 and 5) were receiving public 
support, such as free or cheap access to the limited analogue spectrum, free access to 
digital capacity, in return for undertaking certain programming commitments, and, in 
the BBC’s case access to the licence fee. 
In 2002 a BBC-led consortium took over DTT and launched “freeview” digital 
television, a free-to-air broadcasting service. The 2003 Communications Act 
continued the previous trend of deregulation, resulting in further consolidation within 
ITV and relaxed content obligations on PSBs.  Five separate sectoral regulators were 
combined to become the Office of Communications (Ofcom) in anticipation of further 
consolidation of communications technologies. Consolidation of media ownership 
also continued. In 2008 the switchover from analogue to digital television began, 
which will end in 2012. Catch-up television is increasingly available for all channels, 
as well as live streaming of television over the internet. 
With the application of digital technology and growing communications 
convergence, the distinctions between the activities of broadcasting and print 
companies are beginning to erode, posing difficulties for regulation based on media 
type.  
 
2. The media landscape in the UK 
The media landscape in the UK has developed into a large and diverse market, open 
to international participants. The following discussion provides a brief overview of 
                                                 
1409 R. Wise and J. Steemers, Multimedia: A critical introduction (2000), at p. 97. 
1410 Ibid., p. 101. 
1411 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
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the current media environment, discusses journalist’s background and education and 
considers media literacy and public perceptions of the media in the UK. 
 
2.1 The media market 
The print media 
In the UK there are currently roughly 14 national newspapers,1412 1200 local/regional 
newspapers and 600 niche or highly local newspapers1413. The national press is 
predominantly based in London. Most of the national daily newspapers in the UK 
have special Sunday versions which are highly popular. Free weekly (local) 
newspapers are relatively common in the UK, which are heavily supported by 
advertising with little emphasis on editorial content. In Metropolitan areas free daily 
newspapers have come to the market, offering editorial content that approaches the 
quality of some of the paid-for daily newspapers, with Metro currently being the most 
successful. 
In June 2010 none of the UK-wide national newspapers were showing a year-
on-year rise in circulation1414 and the regional press is not faring much better.1415 Most 
national newspapers show serious decline in circulation, though part of this is 
explained by their decision to all but stop free giveaway copies.1416  
Of the print media the regional press receives the largest portion of total media 
advertising expenditure at 11.6%. The national press is the next largest at 10.5%, 
though all print media advertising expenditure is currently declining. Consolidation 
has become a recent trend with local media, with newspaper groups disposing of and 
acquiring titles. This trend has led to the five major regional newspaper groups 
accounting for over 70% of newspaper circulation.1417 
 
Radio 
As of July 2010, there are 288 individual analogue stations and 191 digital stations in 
the UK. This results in 334 unique radio stations in the UK, as some stations 
broadcast both analogue and digitally.1418 There are an additional 75 stations 
broadcasting on digital satellite, 24 stations available on freeview and 35 on cable; 
most of these are either analogously or digitally simulcast.1419 Of the total radio 
stations, 267 are local commercial stations, 10 are UK wide commercial stations and 
57 are public, BBC run, stations.1420 
In 2008 90% of the UK population could receive a signal from at least one 
digital radio multiplex, most being able to receive three or more.1421 The number of 
radio stations that are available in an area vary between 23 (Northern Ireland) to 59 
                                                 
1412 Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC), available at www.abc.org.uk (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1413 See: The Newspaper Society, available at http://www.newspapersoc.org.uk/ (last visited on 
04/10/2010). 
1414 “National press ABC’s: Quality sales tumble”, Press Gazette, 16/07/2010. 
1415 “Regional ABCs: regional sales continue to slide”, Press Gazette, 25/02/2010. 
1416 “ABCs analysis: how bulk has disappeared since 2009”, Press Gazette, 16/07/2010.  
1417 Ofcom, “Media ownership uules review”, 31/07/2009, at p. 34. 
1418 Ofcom, “The communications market report”, at p. 208. 
1419 Ibid., p. 208. 
1420 Ibid., p. 208. 
1421 Ofcom, “The communications market report 2009”, at p. 176. 
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(London).1422 Community radio, which is mainly financed by grants, is on the 
increase, with 17% of the UK population now able to receive community radio 
stations.1423  
While the average time spent listening to the radio is declining,1424 90.6% of 
the adults in the UK listen to the radio on a weekly basis, which is up from the 
previous year by 0.3% (nearly half a million listeners).1425 The BBC’s share of all 
radio listening hours is 54.6% and is currently holding stable year-on-year. National 
commercial radio accounts for 11% of all radio listening hours and local commercial 
radio accounts for 32.2%.1426 The average time spent listening to the radio increases 
with age, with children spending the least time listening to the radio.1427 
The total radio revenue for 2009 is estimated to be around £1.1 billion. The 
BBC accounts for £660 million and commercial radio for £432 million. Less than half 
of the later (£202 million) is made up of national advertising sales, with commercial 
sales (31%) and sponsorship (22%) supplementing this amount.1428 Expenditure on 
radio advertising has been declining since 2007. Radio is currently receiving a 2.8% 
share of all advertising expenditure.1429 
The radio industry is experiencing ongoing consolidation, with the two largest 
commercial radio groups, Global (British) and Bauer (German) now owning 37.1% of 
all commercial radio licenses.1430 In terms of audience share, Global and Bauer 
account for 16.6% and 10.7% respectively of all radio listening hours, while the BBC 
accounts for 46.2%.1431 
 
Television 
In 2009 there were 490 television channels broadcasting in the UK.1432 Television can 
be received through different platforms in the UK with different geographical 
coverage. Analogue terrestrial television can be received by 99% of the population, 
98% can receive digital satellite television and 81% can receive digital terrestrial 
television (DTT).1433 The availability of DTT is rising rapidly with the digital 
switchover from analogue to digital in the UK. By 2012 DTT coverage will match 
analogue coverage.1434 Further platforms to deliver television are cable and Internet 
Protocol Television (IPTV). 
In the first quarter of 2010 the take up of multi-channel television had risen to 
92.1% of UK households.1435 The five main PSBs in the UK attract 57.8% of all 
viewing hours in UK homes, with BBC1 being the most popular channel, followed by 
                                                 
1422 Ibid., p. 178. 
1423 Ibid., pp. 208 -209. 
1424 Ofcom, “The communications market report 2010”, at p. 189. 
1425 Data for the second quarter of 2010, Ibid., p. 214. 
1426 2.2% of the audience share is classified as ‘other’, Ibid., pp. 214-215. 
1427 Ibid., p. 215. 
1428 Ibid., p. 198. 
1429 Ibid., pp. 198-199. 
1430 Ibid., p. 203. 
1431 Ibid., p. 204. 
1432 Ibid., p. 99. 
1433 Ibid., p. 157. 
1434 Ofcom, “The communications market report 2009”, at p. 119. 
1435 Ofcom, “The communications market report 2010”, at p. 158. 
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ITV1.1436 There is little movement in the top 10 most watched channels, though there 
is some movement in the top 20.1437 
Television industry revenue stood £11.1 billion in 2009,1438 of which 24% is 
generated by public funds, 28% by advertising and 41% by subscriptions.1439 92% of 
UK households have taken up digital TV,1440 of which 53.1% subscribes to pay-tv. 
TV attracts 27.5% of the total advertising spending in the UK.1441 Of the total hours of 
television programming, 11% were first-run originations.1442 PSBs have to comply 
with original production quotas which pertain to programming made in the UK and 
commissioned from independent producers, or a broadcaster’s own in-house 
production facilities. The quotas vary per broadcaster and apply separately for peak 
viewing times.1443 These quotas are generally between 50-90%1444 and are generally 
met and exceeded by all broadcasters.1445 There is a further 25% independent 
production quota for all PSBs to ensure that production companies that are not 
attached to any broadcaster have access to mainstream channels. This quota has been 
exceeded by all broadcasters during the last 5 years.1446 
 
Online media and social media online 
All national newspapers have an online version with the website of the Mail online 
having been the most visited national newspaper for the last 6 months.1447 Most major 
broadcasters operate websites which offer the option of watching programs that have 
recently been broadcast on demand for free. 
In the UK Facebook is by far the most used social networking site, with a 
unique audience of 24.2 million.1448 Twitter is the next most popular social network 
with 3.7 million users.1449 UK users spend an average of 6 hours and 9 minutes on 
Facebook every month.1450 Currently 9% of the adult UK population maintains a 
website or a blog,1451 with those in higher socioeconomic groups being slightly more 
likely to maintain one.1452 
 
News agencies  
The UK has a wide range of news agencies, a number of which, such as Reuters, have 
attained an international reputation. These agencies can be distinguished according to 
                                                 
1436 Ibid., p. 175. 
1437 Ibid., p. 174. 
1438 Ibid., p. 123. 
1439 6.4% is classified as “other”. Ibid., p. 126. 
1440 Data for first quarter of 2010, see: Ofcom, “The communications market report 2010”, at p. 97. 
1441 Ofcom, “The communications market report 2010”, at p. 97. 
1442 Ibid., p. 133. 
1443 Ibid., p. 133. 
1444 For a full overview of the quotas and compliance, see: Ofcom, “The communications market report 
2010”, at p. 142. 
1445 Ofcom, “The communications market report 2009”, at p. 103. 
1446 Ofcom, “communications market report 2010”, at p. 143. 
1447 “Mail online stays top as it hits new traffic record in June”, Press Gazette, 29/07/2010. 
1448 “The ups and downs of social networks” BBC News, 22/07/2010. 
1449 Ibid. 
1450 Ibid. 
1451 Defined as those over the age of 16. 
1452 Ofcom, “UK adults’ media literacy” (2010), at p. 50. 
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their geographical coverage, subject focus and media orientation. The largest 
agencies, such as Reuters, the Press Association, News Team International and 
National News and Pictures have broad coverage and employ their own journalists. 
Reuters started life covering the financial sector but moved into general news 
reporting in the mid-nineteenth century and now operates 200 bureaus worldwide and 
is the world’s largest international news agency.1453 In 2008 it became a subsidiary of 
the Canadian company, renamed Thompson Reuters. The company is of particular 
interest for the Mediadem project in that it is subject to the Reuters Trust designed to 
guarantee the independence of its reports.1454 
There are also news agencies operating at the devolved national and regional 
levels.  In Scotland, for example, both Scottish News and Sport and Hard Edge Media 
provide varied coverage of Scottish news and events, while a similar role is performed 
in Wales by the Wales News and Picture Service. The Press Association covers 
developments in Ireland as well as the UK. At the regional level there are numerous 
smaller agencies such as the South West News Service, North News and Pictures, 
Mercury Press Agency (Liverpool) and the Cavendish Press (Manchester based).   
Not all news agencies employ journalists to carry out independent 
investigations. Some such as The Profile Group simply review existing reports and 
repackage them. Within the UK the news agencies are represented by the National 
Association of Press Agencies. 
Increasing reliance on news agencies is a cause for concern in the UK, 
especially where international news is concerned.1455 The BBC is generally 
recognised as one of the few news organisations capable of foreign news 
gathering.1456 
 
2.2 Journalists’ background and education 
Age, gender and social background 
The largest survey into journalism was conducted by the Journalism Training Forum 
in 2002.1457 This survey provides detailed information on journalists and is the most 
recent survey to provide specific data on journalists at work. It should be noted 
though that the survey on which the study was based achieved a low return rate 
(11.5%), which may have distorted some of the data,1458 though the sample was large 
enough to provide reliable information.1459 
While the data varies per sector, journalists in the UK are on average relatively 
young, with 35% aged between 22-39 and another 32% aged between 30 and 39.1460 
The gender balance is 49% women and 51% men, thus providing a nearly equal split 
                                                 
1453 See: Thomson Reuters, “Reuters news agency”, available at: 
http://thomsonreuters.com/content/media/pdf/news_agency_overview.pdf (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1454 For more information on this, see: Thomson Reuters, “Founders share company limited”, available 
at: http://thomsonreuters.com/content/corporate/PDF/about_us/reuters_founders_share.pdf (last visited 
on 04/10/2010). 
1455 House of Lords, “The Ownership of the news”, at par. 53 and 80. 
1456 Ibid., par. 299. 
1457 Journalism Training Forum, “Journalists at work” (2002). 
1458 S. Frith and P. Meech “Becoming a journalist: Journalism education and journalism culture”, 8 
Journalism (2007), 137, at 139. 
1459 Journalism Training Forum, “Journalists at work”, at p. 12. 
1460 Ibid., p. 21. 
 454
between the sexes.1461 However, women earned on average £5000 less than men, 
though this can be partially explained by the average age of female journalists being 
lower and the fact that a high proportion of female journalists work in low paying 
sectors.1462 A very large proportion of journalists are white, over 96%, and only very 
small groups from ethnic minorities participate in the profession.1463  
In the last few decades there has been a noticeable increase in the social 
exclusivity of journalism. The typical journalist, born in 1970 comes from a family 
with an income of 42.4% above the average family income, where this was only 5.5% 
for those born in 1958.1464 The result is that the typical journalist will come from a 
family that is better of than 3 out of 4 families in the UK.1465 Top journalists are more 
likely to be independently schooled than not. Though only 7% of the UK population 
is independently schooled, nearly 55% of the top journalists are.1466  
 
Education and professional training 
The 2002 survey of the journalism profession showed that 98% of all entrants to the 
journalism profession have a degree, of which 43% has a postgraduate degree.1467 
While these figures are likely to be distorted by the low return rate of the survey,1468 it 
does show a definite trend towards journalism becoming a graduate profession in the 
UK. There are still no formal academic entry requirements to journalism, though as 
the above data shows, the reality may be different. The National Union for Journalists 
(NUJ) estimates that currently 80% of all entrants to the profession have a degree.1469 
It is further generally necessary to have some relevant work experience to access the 
profession,1470 which can form a barrier for entry due to the majority of work 
experience placements being unpaid. 
At the time of the survey, 58% of those working in journalism hold a 
journalism qualification and a further 3% was working towards a qualification.1471 
Most of these qualifications were accredited by the National Council for 
Journalists.1472 Newspaper journalists are most likely to hold a qualification, while 
those working in the magazine industry are least likely to.1473 
 
                                                 
1461 Ibid., p. 21. 
1462 Journalism Training Forum, “Journalists at work”, at p. 10 and 22. 
1463 Ibid., p. 21. 
1464 The Panel on Fair access to the Profession, “Unleashing aspiration: the final report on fair access to 
the profession”, July 2009, at p. 20. 
1465 Ibid., p. 21. 
1466 Journalists working mid-2000s, Ibid., p. 19. 
1467 Journalism Training Forum, “Journalists at work”, at p. 24 and 26. 
1468 Frith and Meech “Becoming a journalist”, at 139. 
1469 See: National Union of Journalists, “FAQs” available at: 
http://www.nujtraining.org.uk/faqs.phtml#6 (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1470 The Panel on Fair access to the Profession, “Unleashing aspiration: the final report on fair access to 
the profession”, at p. 101 and 103. 
1471 Journalism Training Forum, “Journalists at work”, at p. 34. 
1472 Ibid., p. 35. 
1473 Ibid., p. 35. 
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Salary 
A trainee broadcast journalist can expect to earn between £15.000 and £18.000 a year. 
An experienced broadcast journalist will generally earn between £25.000 and £40.000 
a year, though top salaries can be £100.000 or more.1474 Newspaper journalist can 
expect to earn around £15.000 during training and may expect to earn between 
£15.000 and £40.000 a year. As in broadcast journalism, top salaries may rise above 
£100.000.1475 The median level of income in 2002 was £22,500.1476 Generally 
speaking salaries in broadcast journalism are higher than in print journalism, 
especially for those journalists who appear on screen.1477 
 
2.3 Media literacy 
Media consumption 
Since 2007 there has been a strong increase in the number of households that use 
digital television and internet. A 2009 survey shows that 89% of the households in the 
UK has digital television, 71% has internet access and 91% use mobile phones.1478 
Currently 90% of the households with Internet have a broadband internet 
connection.1479 The households without internet cite “a lack of interest” and “cost” as 
the most common reason for not having internet access.1480 Those in the lowest socio-
economic group and those aged 65 and above, have the lowest uptake of internet and 
digital television.1481 The main reasons for the use of television and radio, is for 
relaxation and to keep up to date with the news, whereas the main reason cited for 
using the Internet are “to find out and learn things” and to keep in touch with other 
people.1482 Three out of ten UK adults who use the internet either at home or 
elsewhere watch television and films over the internet.   
 
Access to different types of media 
The Communications Act 2003 provides Ofcom with the duty to ensure the 
availability of a large range of electronic communication service, television and radio 
services.1483 98.5% of the households in the UK are capable of receiving digital public 
service television.1484 The UK is currently switching from analogue to digital TV 
which should be completed by the end of 2012, though the switchover will not 
                                                 
1474 Figures are a rough estimate, available at: 
https://nextstep.direct.gov.uk/PlanningYourCareer/JobProfiles/JobProfile1351/Pages/Income.aspx (last 
visited on 04/10/2010). 
1475 Figures are a rough estimate, available at: 
https://nextstep.direct.gov.uk/PlanningYourCareer/JobProfiles/JobProfile1459/Pages/Income.aspx (last 
visited on 04/10/2010). 
1476 Journalism Training Forum, “Journalists at work”, at p. 53. 
1477 Frith and Meech, “Becoming a journalist”, at 139. 
1478 Ofcom, “UK adults’ media literacy”, at p. 9. 
1479 Office for National Statistics, Statistics Bulletin, “Internet access house holds and individuals” 
(2009), at p. 1, available at: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/iahi0809.pdf (last visited on 
04/10/2010). 
1480 Ofcom, “UK adults’ media literacy”, pp 19-20. 
1481 Ibid., p. 9. 
1482 Ibid., pp. 26-28. 
1483 S. 3(2) Communications Act 2003. 
1484 Ofcom, “Access and inclusion statement”, 15/10/2009, at p. 25. 
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significantly affect the number of households capable of receiving a television signal. 
It is estimated that after the switchover 98.6% of UK households will be capable of 
receiving public service digital television and 90% will be capable of receiving both 
public service digital television and all commercial multiplex channels, which is a 
significant increase from the 73% of households which could receive all analogue 
commercial channels before the switchover. Most households in the UK have access 
to broadband at basic speeds of up to 512Kbits/s. British Telecommunications 
(hereafter, BT) estimates this figure to be around 99.6% of all UK households.1485 
Furthermore, 90% of all UK households currently have access to a 2MBit/s 
connection and the government has set itself the target of ensuring 2MBit/s 
connections for virtually all UK households by 2012.1486 Broadband access for rural 
communities such as the highlands and islands remains a concern and the government 
has recently created Broadband Delivery UK (BDUK) within the department of 
Business, Innovation and skills in order to achieve their Universal Service 
Commitment. 99% of the UK population is covered by 2G mobile network: the figure 
is somewhat lower for 3G coverage, at 92%, with rural and remote areas having the 
least coverage.1487 
 
Role and power of the media 
Although the extent and nature of media influence is hotly contested, the UK has 
introduced a number of measures designed to restrict the ability of any one individual 
or point of view to dominate the media.1488 These measures primarily relate to the 
audiovisual sector, which is considered particularly influential because of the 
combination of pictures and sound, and include the prohibition on political 
advertising, impartiality requirements, restrictions on election broadcasts and media 
ownership controls. Although political parties and many politicians now have their 
own websites, they do not directly control the main media sources in the UK. Political 
bodies are not allowed to own broadcasting licences and although press barons such 
as Beaverbrook and Rothermere, who dominated the print media in the early part of 
the twentieth century, sought to exert political influence, they did so independently of 
political power in parliament.1489 There remains, however, scope for indirect political 
influence, particularly in the audiovisual sector, through the government’s power to 
appoint key personnel at the BBC and Ofcom, and during negotiations regarding the 
renewal of the BBCs Charter.  It has also been suggested that the Hutton Inquiry, set 
up by the Labour government to investigate BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan’s report 
on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, led to subsequent BBC caution in the coverage 
of a number of controversial events.1490 
In terms of media influence on the public, television is by far the main source 
of news for the UK population. Figures from 2006 indicated that 65% of the 
population relied primarily on television, with only 14% looking to newspapers and 
                                                 
1485 Ibid., p. 38. 
1486 Ibid. 
1487 These are coarse figures with a large error margin, for full details see: Ofcom, “Mostly mobile: 
Ofcom’s mobile sector assessment, second consultation” (2009), at p. 112. 
1488 For discussion of media effects see: G.G. Sparks, Media effects research: A basic approach (2009), 
especially chapter 9. 
1489 Curran and Seaton, Power without responsibility, at pp. 45-48. 
1490 H. Tumber and J. Palmer, Media at war (2004), at p.156. 
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11% to radio.1491 Five national television channels dominate the field, together 
attracting 97.5% of viewers: the BBC, Sky, Channels 3, 4 and 5.1492 The picture is in 
fact even more concentrated in that only three companies, the BBC, ITN and BSkyB, 
produce the news for these channels. 
In general national broadcasters have been slow to adapt to social and political 
changes, which is sometimes blamed on the impartiality doctrine.1493 In 2010, 
however, the leader of the right wing British National Party (BNP) was 
controversially invited to take part in one of the BBC’s flagship discussion 
programmes “Question Time”, following the election of 2 BNP members to the 
European Parliament in 2009.1494 In addition, in the run up to the 2010 general 
election UK television broadcasters followed the US lead and organised for the first 
time three televised debates among the leaders of the Conservative, Labour and 
Liberal Democratic parties. The performance of the Liberal Democratic leader, Nick 
Clegg, at the first of these debates precipitated a sudden and unprecedented spike in 
support for the Liberal Democratic Party, suggesting that the broadcast media have 
considerable power to frame public perceptions of the political landscape and the 
viability of specific democratic options.1495 This spike was not ultimately reflected, 
however, in an increase in the number of elected Liberal Democrat Members of 
Parliament. 
The printed press is not required to be impartial and British newspapers adopt 
a more or less explicit political bias. They can also take political advertising. 
Interestingly, a paper’s bias is not necessarily in line with that of its subscribers: the 
Sun newspaper, for example, which supported the Conservative leader Margaret 
Thatcher during the 1980’s, nevertheless retained a significant proportion of Labour 
readers throughout this period. Though this might be thought to confirm the weakness 
of the “hypodermic needle” theory of media impact, the Sun itself has claimed that it 
has had a tangible political influence, particularly in relation to the defeat of Labour in 
the 1992 election.1496 More recently, it has been argued that the selective use of 
opinion polls by the print media during the 2010 general election and negative 
reporting cut back the advantage that Nick Clegg obtained from the first televised 
debate.1497 Whether or not the print media are able to effect a major change in 
political allegiance, the growing sensitivity of politicians and their spin doctors to 
                                                 
1491 Ofcom, “Report for the Secretary of State Pursuant to Section 44A of the Enterprise Act 2002 of 
BSkyB plc’s Acquisition of 17.9% Shareholding in ITV plc”, 27/10/2007, figure 3.1. 
1492 Ibid., figure 4.1. 
1493 For a discussion, see D. Tambini and J. Cowling, (eds) New news: impartial broadcasting in the 
digital age  (2002) and  the work of the Glasgow Media Group, in particular J. Eldrige (ed.) Glasgow 
media group reader volume 1: News content, language and visuals (1995)  and G. Philo (ed.) Glasgow 
media group reader volume 2: Industry, economy, war and politics (1995). For a recent reappraisal of 
the doctrine by the BBC see BBC, “From seesaw to wagon wheel: safeguarding impartiality in the 21st 
Century” (2007), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/our_work/other/century21.shtml (last 
visited on 04/10/2010) noting that ‘impartiality is often about…bringing extra perspectives to bear, 
rather than limiting horizons or censoring opinion’ (p. 6).   
1494 J. Robinson and S. Brook, “Coup or crisis?  Can the panel discuss…”, The Guardian, 26/10/2009. 
1495 C. Hope, “Nick Clegg’s TV debate performance ‘changed election dynamic’ says Ashdown”, The 
Telegraph, 16/04/2010. 
1496  P. Chippindale and C. Horrie, Stick it up your punter, The uncut story of the Sun newspaper 
(2005). 
1497 A. Grice, “Sun’ censored poll that showed support for Lib Dems”, The Independent, 23/04/2010. 
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adverse media coverage ensures that the views and interests of media owners such as 
Rupert Murdoch are, at the very least, taken seriously by political leaders.1498  
New media services are also beginning to show their capacity to supplement 
the established media, influencing the development and impact of news stories.  For 
example, in 2009 Twitter was used to get around an injunction preventing the 
mainstream media from revealing the name of a chemical company involved in legal 
proceedings, while the Guardian newspaper experimented with “crowd sourcing” to 
help review the many documents detailing the, in some instances fraudulent, expense 
claims lodged by Members of Parliament.1499 
 
Citizen involvement in online content production 
Content creation by internet users is on the rise in the UK. The most common form of 
content creation is uploading photos onto a website, which is done by 49% of all adult 
internet users. Other popular activities in the UK are: making and uploading short 
videos (11%), maintaining a blog (12%) and setting up a website (15%).1500 In 2009, 
44% of adult internet users had a social networking profile, which is nearly double the 
number of 2007, while commenting on blogs is also on the rise.1501 Setting up a social 
networking profile is mainly popular under those aged 34 and under, and females are 
more likely than males to have one. In the UK Facebook is the most popular social 
networking site.1502 
With regard to political participation online, 22% of all adult internet users 
have signed an online petition and 7% has contacted an MP or local councillor online. 
 
Trust in the media 
Only 18% of the British population trusts the printed press, which is the lowest figure 
in the EU.1503 This is possibly attributable to the fact that it is well known in Britain 
that the written press is free to be partisan. 
UK adults place the most trust in information found on TV and radio, as 
respectively 52% and 50% of the adult population find this type of information to be 
reliable and accurate. Information found on the internet and newspapers is considered 
less reliable.1504 A majority of users say that they tend to trust the news output from 
TV (54%), radio (66%) and news websites (58%).1505 
 
                                                 
1498 P. Toynbee, “Murdoch’s malign influence demeans British politics”, The Guardian, 11/07/2009.  
For discussion of Rupert Murdoch’s influence on the editorial slant of his newspapers see Curran and 
Seaton, Power without responsibility, chapter 7. 
1499 R. Booth, “Trafigura: A few tweets and freedom of speech is restored”, The Guardian, 13/10/2009 
and “Investigate your MP’s expenses”, The Guardian, available at: http://mps-expenses.guardian.co.uk 
(last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1500 Ofcom, “UK adults’ media literacy”, at p. 51. 
1501 Ibid., p. 51. 
1502 Ibid., p. 53. 
1503 European Commission, Directorate General Communication, Eurobarometer, autumn 2009, 
“national report UK”, at p. 12. 
1504 Ofcom, “UK adults’ media literacy”, pp. 72-73. 
1505 Ibid., p. 73. 
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3. Media policy in the UK 
In the following section we consider the legal status of freedom of expression and 
information in the UK, before turning to examine structural and content regulation in 
the communications sector.  The regulatory framework for the media in the UK has 
developed into a complex system including elements of state, co and self regulation, 
with different types of media subject to different regulatory techniques.  
 
3.1 Freedom of expression and information 
Fundamental legal norms on freedom of expression 
The UK follows the common law legal tradition and does not have a written 
constitution as such. Many rules relating to government take the form of unwritten 
conventions, though certain measures that can be considered to have constitutional 
status are enshrined in legislation, such as the Human Rights Act 1998. At the centre 
of the British constitution lies the doctrine of the sovereignty of parliament, of which 
a more controversial aspect, particularly in the light of the UK’s EU membership, is 
the principle that parliament cannot bind its successors. 
Within the UK there has been a strong presumption that individuals remain 
free to do anything that the law does not proscribe. The emphasis on liberties rather 
than rights has meant that until recently human rights were not codified in the UK, 
and, though UK courts have recognised the importance of human rights under the 
common law, they could be overridden by legislation as indeed they can be by 
express legislation even today – the Human Rights Act having retained this aspect of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. 
Britain was one of the first states to sign the European Convention on Human 
Rights (hereafter, ECHR) in 1951 and has since adhered to it on an international level. 
However, as the UK has a dualist approach to international law, the provisions of the 
Convention, though having some influence on the development of the common law, 
were not legally binding internally in the UK and could therefore not be directly 
enforced in the UK courts. In 1966 the UK accepted the right of their citizens to have 
recourse to the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter, ECtHR) in cases where 
they have exhausted domestic remedies. 
The position of human rights in the UK changed radically with the adoption of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter, HRA), which gave effect to key articles of the 
ECHR in the UK. The act requires courts to take into account any previous decision 
of the ECtHR, though it does not formally require them to follow these 
judgements.1506 Should there be a conflict between a ruling of the House of Lords and 
a ruling of the ECtHR, the English courts are required to follow the ruling of the 
House of Lords.1507 Of particular importance is section 3, which states that the UK 
courts have to interpret legislation, whenever possible, in accordance with human 
rights, though primary UK legislation cannot be invalidated on human rights grounds. 
Courts may only issue a declaration of incompatibility which does not affect the 
continuing validity of the statute in question.1508 
                                                 
1506 S. 2 HRA 1998. 
1507 Price v Leeds City Council [2005] EWCA Civ 289, Confirmed by the House of Lords in Leeds City 
Council v Price [2006] UKHL 10. 
1508 S. 4 HRA 1998. 
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Section 6 of the HRA states that it is unlawful for a public authority to act 
incompatibly with convention rights. All bodies that have functions of a public nature 
are covered by this provision, which can lead to the HRA imposing obligations on 
private bodies as well as the state, for example with regards to privacy. Especially 
relevant for the media is section 12, which requires courts to have particular regard to 
the importance of freedom of expression when deciding whether to grant any relief, 
and in particular when granting an injunction prior to publication. It requires courts to 
take into consideration the public interest in the availability of the contested 
information.  
The HRA has both vertical and horizontal effect. Although the HRA itself 
only covers public bodies, it is applicable to the courts, which have consequently 
given effect to rights under the ECHR in private law actions between individuals and 
private companies. It should be noted though that a violation of rights which stems 
from private law, will not give rise to a cause of action under the HRA. However, 
where there is cause of action in private law the court must interpret this action in line 
with the HRA. Certain sections of the media have been extremely critical about the 
operation of the HRA, especially its influence on the development of the law of 
privacy. The Conservative Party, now in coalition government, has indicated that it 
would like to abolish the HRA and instate a new bill of rights for the UK. 
 
Freedom of information and the media 
The right to freedom of information contained in art 10 of the ECHR is protected in 
the UK through the HRA, but there is also specific legislation aimed at insuring 
freedom of information. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (hereafter, FOI Act) 
contains a general right of access to information held by public authorities in England, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland. The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, 
which came into force at the same time as the FOI Act, contains similar public-
disclosure obligations as those contained in the FOI Act. The predecessor of the FOI 
Act, the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information, which had a much 
wider margin of discretion when responding to access requests,1509 was replaced by 
the FOI Act when it came into force on 1 January, 2005. The Act contains 23 
exemptions to the general right of access,1510 divided into two types: “absolute” and 
“qualified” exemptions. Where an absolute exemption is applicable, no public 
authority may disclose the requested information, not even where disclosure would be 
in the public interest. Where there is a qualified exemption, information may only be 
disclosed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in 
maintaining the exception.  
The UK Information Commissioner is charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring public authorities’ compliance with the statute. Where a public authority 
refuses to disclose information, the internal complaint procedure of the authority must 
be followed and where this does not lead to a satisfactory result, independent review 
may be sought from the Commissioner. An appeal lies from the Commissioner’s 
                                                 
1509 D. Cooper “UK Freedom of Information Act 2000: Boon or bane?” 26 Company Lawyer (2005) 
217, at p. 217. 
1510 Ss. 21 to 44 FOI Act. 
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decision to the First–tier Tribunal (Information Rights)1511 and then, as a last resort, to 
the High Court. 
 
Ranking of media freedom in the country under study 
The UK has ranked between 20 and 28 in the Press Freedom Index of the Reporters 
Without Borders, since the start of the publication of the index. The UK is currently 
ranked at the highest rank it has achieved so far: 20th place. The media in the UK is 
deemed free to report on all aspects of British life.1512 
Due to its constitutional framework there is no entrenched guarantee of press 
freedom, though the HRA, as noted previously, emphasises the importance of the 
Convention right to freedom of expression. Nevertheless, freedom of the press has 
historically been an important part of Britain’s unwritten constitution and legal 
tradition.1513 Licensing of the (written) press was abolished in 1684 and ever since 
there has been a general right to publish written material without prior state 
authorisation, though sedition laws and stamp duties were used to curb the radical 
press well into the nineteenth century.1514 The broadcast sector was, from its inception 
in the early twentieth century, subject to government regulation and even today there 
remain laws that limit the freedom of both the print and audiovisual media. 
Freedomhouse currently ranks the UK 27th in their 2009 world ranking of freedom of 
the press. The factors they cite as limiting media freedom in the UK are libel laws 
favourable to the plaintiff, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the intimidation of 
journalist in Northern Ireland.1515 
 
Relevant international treaties signed by the UK 
The UK is a signatory state to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions 2005. It is also a signatory to the Council of Europe European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on Cybercrime, though has yet to 
ratify the latter convention. 
 
 
3.2 Structural regulation 
Licensing rules 
In the UK the media regulator “Ofcom” is responsible for licensing all commercial 
radio and television channels transmitted by satellite or terrestrial networks and by 
cable. Under the Broadcasting Act 1990, as amended by the Broadcasting Act 1996 
and the Communications Act 2003, there are several groups of people who are 
disqualified from holding a licence. The main groups of people that are disqualified 
                                                 
1511 Previously called the Information Tribunal, originally the Data Protection Tribunal specifically set 
up to hear appeals under the Data Protection Act and later the FOI Act 2000, the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications Regulations 2003 and the Environmental Information Regulation 2004. 
1512 See: CPU Media Trust, “United Kingdom”, available at: http://www.cpu.org.uk/page-
view.php?pagename=UnitedKingdom (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1513 Humphreys, Mass media and media Policy, at p. 199. 
1514 Curran and Seaton, Power without responsibility, at pp. 40 chapters 2 & 3. 
1515 See: Freedom House, Freedom of the press 2009, Press freedom rankings by region, available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2009 (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
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from holding a broadcasting licence1516 are: political organisations, advertising 
agencies, local authorities and those people who, in the opinion of Ofcom, are subject 
to undue influence by a disqualified person such as to act against the public 
interest.1517 Religious bodies may only hold licences with Ofcom’s prior approval and 
there are restrictions on the type of licence they can hold.1518 Publicly funded bodies 
cannot hold radio service licences.1519 Prior rules restricting foreign ownership of 
broadcasting licences were removed by the Communications Act 2003. It is a criminal 
offence to provide broadcasting services without a licence.1520 
The EU Authorisation directive has been implemented in the UK by the 
Communications Act 2003, thus moving the previous regime of telecommunications 
licensing on an individual base with conditions based on market power, to a general 
authorisation regime. New online media will, however, generally fall into the category 
of “content service” for the purpose of the Communications Act 2003 and will 
therefore not fall under the general regulation applicable to “electronic 
communication services” as regulated by the EU Authorisation and Framework 
directive.1521 New online media in the UK are currently not subject to licence 
conditions, though under the amendments of the Communication Act 2003 to 
implement the Audiovisual Media Service (herafter, AVMS)  Directive, anyone who 
wishes to provide an on demand programme service must notify the relevant 
regulatory authority, Ofcom, in advance if its intention.1522 
The print media in the UK are less regulated than the broadcast media and are 
not subject to a licensing system. Anyone with the funds to start a newspaper is free to 
do so. There are, however, rules on cross-ownership and competition regulations that 
pertain to newspapers, discussed further below. 
 
Ownership rules 
In the last decade there has been significant deregulation of media ownership rules in 
the UK, with increasing emphasis on the role of competition law to check undue 
concentrations. Ownership was previously heavily regulated in order to promote 
plurality of content, thereby enabling access to different viewpoints and facilitating 
citizens’ democratic participation. With increasing diversity and choice of content, the 
result of new digital services transmitted over the Internet or satellite and terrestrial 
networks, this underlying rationale for ownership regulation has decreased in 
importance.  
                                                 
1516 A licence granted under the 1990/1996 Broadcasting act for independent television services, 
independent radio service, digital terrestrial television broadcasting and digital terrestrial sound 
broadcasting. 
1517 For a full list see: Schedule 2 of the Broadcasting Act 1990, Schedule 2 of the Broadcasting Act 
1996 and ss. 348-350 & Schedule 14 of the Communications act 2003. 
1518 They cannot hold a channel 3 or 5 licence, a national sound broadcasting licence, a public teletext 
licence, an additional television service licence and a television or radio multiplex licence. 
1519 Schedule 2, part 2, s. 3 Broadcasting Act 1990. 
1520 S. 13 & 97 Broadcasting Act 1990. 
1521 S. 32(2) Communications Act 2003. 
1522 S. 368BA Communications Act 2003, as amended by the Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 
2010. 
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Ownership rules are primarily of two types. The first, discussed in the 
previous section, prevents certain bodies from owning licences. The second restricts 
the number of licences any one individual or group can own and are set out below.   
In relation to television, all accumulation rules at both national and local levels 
were removed by the Communications Act 2003. Consolidation among the various 
Channel 3 (ITV) licencees was thus made possible, subject to competition law 
oversight. Cross-media restrictions have, however, been retained in relation to certain 
combinations of print and broadcast interests. Companies with a 20% share of the 
national newspaper market are prohibited from holding, or acquiring, 20% or more of 
the shares in the holder of a Channel 3 television licence. In addition, a company in 
which a major newspaper proprietor has more than a 20% stake cannot own more than 
a 20% stake in a company with a Channel 3 licence.1523 Local television ownership is 
also affected by cross media ownership rules with limits on ownership of certain 
combinations of local radio stations, local newspapers and a regional channel 3 
licence where market shares are high and coverage overlaps.1524 The rules considering 
local licences are currently under review.1525 
In relation to radio, current restrictions on ownership of multiple licences are 
fairly complicated. The main rules are that no single person may hold a licence for 
more than one national multiplex service for radio, nor can someone hold two local 
multiplex licences with overlapping territory. There are no restrictions on the number 
of national analogue radio licences a person can hold. The number of local licences a 
single person can hold can generally not exceed two in the same locality and 
calculations take place on a complicated point system based on coverage and potential 
audience shares.1526 
There are currently no media ownership rules pertaining to newspaper 
ownership, other than those concerned with mergers of large newspapers, discussed in 
the next section, and rules concerning cross media ownership, as discussed above. 
There are further specific rules preventing cross media ownership at the local level, 
concerning local analogue licences, local newspapers and regional channel 3 licences 
where audience and market shares overlap and cross a certain threshold. There are 
however strong indications that the rules concerning cross media ownership of local 
media will be relaxed in the near future, in part to ease the position of local 
newspapers, which have been affected by Internet and free media services.1527 
 
Competition rules 
Aside from specific media ownership regulations, competition rules also apply to the 
media. The position is complex in that not only have the general competition rules 
been modified to take into account media pluralism concerns, but Ofcom also has 
concurrent competition powers in relation to those media services it regulates.  
Media mergers are subject to the general merger rules contained in sections 22 and 23 
of the Enterprise Act 2002, which enable the Office of Fair Trading to make a 
                                                 
1523 Part 1, Schedule 14 Communications Act 2003. 
1524 For full regulations see Communications Act 2003, schedule 14. 
1525 House of Commons, Culture, Media and Sports Committee: 4th report, “Future of local and regional 
media”, 24 March 2010, HC Paper 43-I, chapter 4. 
1526 S. 9, Schedule 2, part III, Broadcasting Act 1990. 
1527 See: House of Commons, “Future of local and regional media” and Ofcom reports. 
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reference to the Competition Commission where a merger is likely to result in a 
significant lessening of competition in the relevant market. Where a merger is thought 
to raise specific media plurality concerns the Secretary of State is empowered, though 
not required, to trigger an investigation and can block a merger on media pluralism 
grounds.1528 The public interest factors that can be taken into consideration in this way 
are: the accurate presentation of news and freedom of expression in newspapers; the 
plurality of views in the newspaper market; the plurality of the media in general and 
the need for a wide range of high quality broadcasting appealing to different tastes 
and interests; and, finally, the need for a genuine commitment on the part of the media 
owners concerned to the objectives of section 319 of the Communications Act, which 
include due impartiality, taste and decency.1529 Where the Secretary of State has given 
a merger intervention notice that mentions a media public interest consideration, 
Ofcom will provide an advisory report to the Secretary of State concerning the likely 
effect of the merger on the specified media pluralism concern.1530 
Under sections 316-318 of the Communications Act 2003, Ofcom also enjoys broad 
powers to regulate competition in relation to licensed broadcasters. Ofcom can 
include in the terms of its licences such conditions as it sees fit to ensure fair and 
effective competition.1531 Where Ofcom considers that action by a licensee threatens 
competition it can give directions to the broadcaster concerned and if no action is 
taken the broadcaster can ultimately be fined or even lose its licence. Ofcom has 
recently exercised this power by fixing the wholesale prices at which the satellite 
broadcaster BSkyB sells on its premium sports channels to competing media 
providers.1532 
 
3.3 Content regulation 
General structure of content regulation in UK 
In the UK the written press is largely self-regulated by the Press Complaints 
Commission (hereafter, PCC) Editors’ Code of Practice (hereafter, PCC code of 
conduct) which is applicable to both printed and online versions of printed 
publications, though not all publications subscribe to the code.1533 The editors are 
responsible for the conduct of the journalist working for their publication and are 
therefore responsible for ensuring the code is followed. It has become common 
practice for compliance with the PCC code of conduct to be written into editors’ 
contracts.1534 The PCC cannot impose fines to enforce compliance with the code, but 
it can force an editor to print an adjudication against their newspaper or magazine. 
The lack of power of the PCC to impose financial penalties has led to wide criticism 
that the PCC is an ineffectual body, incapable of keeping the press in check, though 
this is contested by the PCC itself. It should be noted that section 12 of the HRA 
requires courts to take into account “any privacy code” when considering whether to 
                                                 
1528 Ss. 42, 59 and 67 Enterprise Act 2002. 
1529 Ss. 58(2A-2C) Enterprise Act 2002. 
1530 S. 377 Communications Act 2003. 
1531 S. 316 Communications Act 2003. 
1532 For more details, see Ofcom, “News”, available at: www.ofcom.org.uk/media/news/2010/03/nr-
_20100331 (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1533 House of Commons, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, “Press standards, privacy and libel: 
second report”, 9 February 2010, HC paper HC362-I, at para. 553. 
1534 Press Complaints Commission, “code of conduct”, Introduction. 
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grant an injunction preventing publication and this has led to some consideration of 
the privacy provisions of the code in the courts. 
The broadcast media, both public and commercial, are subject to content 
regulation by Ofcom under the Communications Act 2003. This requires Ofcom to 
establish certain standards for the content of programmes transmitted as part of 
television or radio services.1535 These standards are set out in Ofcom’s broadcasting 
code, which is accompanied by guidance notes. The notes are non-binding but give an 
indication of how the code will be applied in certain situations. It should be noted that 
Ofcom has a certain “bias against intervention”1536 and in practice a form of co-
regulation takes place, with industry regulation backed-up by statutory enforcement 
by Ofcom.1537 
The broadcasting code is enforced by Ofcom’s Sanctions Committee, which 
has a variety of duties, the most relevant here being the consideration of content-based 
cases.1538 Where a service provider breaches the content provisions, the Committee 
may direct the service provider to issue a correction, they may impose a fine and in 
the most severe cases, they can revoke the broadcasting licence.1539 It should be noted 
that the code covers all licensed services and to some extent also the BBC, though as 
noted below the BBC alone oversees compliance with impartiality and accuracy 
standards. 
The BBC is largely self-regulated with its own code, the BBC’s editorial 
guidelines, which, in many aspects, parallels the Ofcom Broadcasting Code. The 
BBC’s editorial guidelines are broader than the Ofcom Broadcasting Code as they 
apply to all BBC content, whether this be for radio, television, online content, mobile 
devices, interactive services or the printed word.1540 Compliance with the guidelines is 
monitored by the Executive Board, who is responsible for ensuring compliance with 
the code and guidelines.1541 The Executive Board is overseen by the BBC Trust, the 
BBC’s specific regulatory body. The BBC Trust has the power to investigate areas of 
concern and hear appeals on complaints made to the executive board on editorial 
matters. They can apply internal controls such as reprimands, or even dismissal to 
enforce the editorial guidelines. In particular, the Trust is ultimately, and solely, 
responsible for compliance with impartiality and accuracy standards.1542 
Video on Demand (hereafter VoD) content is partly regulated by the 
Association for Television on Demand (hereafter, ATVOD), with Ofcom as a co-
regulator, through a regulatory framework that implements several provisions of the 
AVMS Directive. It sets minimum content standards for those VoD services that are 
under its editorial control, namely those services that offer content comparable in 
                                                 
1535 S. 319 Communications Act 2003. 
1536 S. Carter, “The Communications Act: myths and realities” (2003), Speech delivered to Media and 
legal Practitioners, available at: http://media.ofcom.org.uk/2003/10/09/the-communications-act-myths-
and-realities-thursday-9-october-2003/ (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1537 L. Hitchens, Broadcasting pluralism and diversity: a comparative study of policy and regulation 
(2006) at p. 14. 
1538 The full terms of reference for the Ofcom Content Sanctions Committee are available at: 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/csg/ocsc_index/ocsc_tor2/ (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1539 Ss. 344 and 345 Communications Act 2003. 
1540 S. 2 BBC Editorial Guidelines 
1541 S. 3.2 BBC Trust, “BBC protocol on editorial standards”, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/protocols/d4_editorial_standards.
pdf (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1542 Ibid., s. 2.2 and s. 44(5)b BBC Agreement. 
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form and content to television programmes. In case of non-compliance fines can be 
imposed and in extreme cases the service may be suspended.1543 
The British Board for Film Classification (BBFC) is an independent non-
governmental body that regulates the film and video industry in the UK. The BBFC 
was originally set up by the film industry itself to achieve national uniformity in film 
classifications. It was granted further powers under the Video Recordings Act 
1984,1544 which provided that all video recordings offered for sale or hire 
commercially in the UK should be classified. It should be noted that though BBFC 
classifications will generally be followed, statutory powers on film remain with the 
local councils, which can overrule any of the Board’s decisions in their jurisdictions. 
 
General content requirements designed to satisfy citizen’s information needs 
One of the principal duties of Ofcom is “to further the interests of citizens in relation 
to communications matters” and to “further the interests of consumers in relevant 
markets, where appropriate by promoting competition”.1545 Ofcom is responsible for 
ensuring that the news provided by (regional) Channel 3 services, is capable of 
competing with other television news services.1546 Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code 
further sets several standards for content that are directly aimed at satisfying citizens’ 
information needs. According to section 319 of the Communications Act 2003, 
Ofcom is obliged to set standards that will secure the objective of due impartiality and 
due accuracy. There are further provisions that limit political advertising, ban 
misleading advertising and prohibit use of techniques which exploit the possibility of 
conveying a message to, or influencing the mind of, viewers or listeners, without their 
being aware of it taking place. The rules discussed above concerning media 
competition and media pluralism are also relevant here, as they are aimed at allowing 
citizens access to different view points. The BBC editorial guidelines largely mirror 
the Ofcom Broadcasting Code and contain their own standards for impartiality and 
accuracy. However, as the BBC’s editorial guidelines apply to all BBC content, 
whether this be for radio, television, online content, mobile devices, interactive 
services or the printed word,1547 they are of wider applicability than the Ofcom 
broadcasting Code, which applies mainly to broadcast radio and television services.  
There are complicated rules governing Party Political Broadcasts (hereafter, 
PPB) and referendum campaign broadcasts. Ofcom is required under section 333 of 
the Communications Act to set standards for these types of broadcasts, which are 
further developed by the Broadcasters’ Liaison Group. All the main parties and those 
parties standing in at least one sixth of seats in each nation are allocated a specific 
number of PPB’s.1548 The BBC has it own rules concerning PPB’s, but these 
provisions largely mirror those of the Communications Act 2003.  
Self-regulation of the printed press through the PCC code of conduct is less 
extensive than that under the Ofcom Broadcasting Code. There is no requirement for 
                                                 
1543 Ss. 368i-368n Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 2009. 
1544 The act was repealed and brought back into force by the Video Recordings Act 2010, after it was 
discovered the 1984 act was invalid due to a procedural mistake. 
1545 S. 3 Communications Act 2003. 
1546 S. 280 Communications Act 2003. 
1547 S. 2 BBC Editorial guidelines. 
1548 The numbers differentiate between nations but the main parties are generally allocated around 4 
broadcasts each, with one broadcast for each ‘smaller’ qualifying party. 
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impartiality as most papers have a certain political bias of which readers are well 
aware. The code does, however, have a requirement of accuracy, which states that the 
press must take care not to publish inaccurate, misleading or distorted information, 
including pictures. 
Recently there have been calls from James Murdoch to relax the impartiality 
requirements to make it easier for foreign companies like Fox to obtain a broadcast 
licence in the UK.1549 While content requirements are applicable to foreign broadcasts 
that are relayed by broadcasters within the jurisdiction, the application of these rules 
is somewhat less stringent as the terms due impartiality and due accuracy have been 
interpreted by Ofcom to allow the fact that the service is  aimed at a difference 
audience to be taken into account.1550  
 
Codes of conduct, ethic codes and codes on editorial freedom 
As mentioned above, the Press is regulated by the PCC Code of Conduct which is 
enforced through holding editors responsible for the adherence to the code by the 
journalists working under them. Recently it has been suggested by the advertising 
agency that the self-regulation code for non-broadcast media should be extended to 
social network sites. 
 
Quota rules and obligations to invest in content production 
The vast majority of content that originates from the UK is commissioned and 
produced by the Public Service Broadcasters (hereafter, PSB’s).1551 Ofcom sets UK 
production quotas for these broadcasters. Due to financial pressure on the commercial 
PSB’s, the investment in UK based content is currently decreasing. The current 
content requirements for PSB’s are laid down in section 273 of the Communications 
Act 2003, however the only types of content Ofcom can mandate are news and 
current affairs programmes. 
Television broadcasters in the UK are subject to the provisions of the AVMS 
Directive, which requires that where practicable, more than half of all programming 
of television channels should consist of EU produced content. The PBS channels 
easily meet this obligation in the UK, and carry a high proportion of UK original 
productions.1552 All television channels licensed by Ofcom have to report annually on 
the proportion of EU content they carry and, where they fail to meet the 50% mark, 
they must explain why they have failed to do so. It has recently been suggested that 
Ofcom should work more closely with UK cable and satellite channels to ensure the 
provisions on EU content of the AVMS Directive are adhered to.1553  
 
                                                 
1549 J. Murdoch, “The absence of trust”, lecture given at the Edinburgh International Television Festival 
2009, 28/08/2009. 
1550 Broadcast, “Fox news cleared of war bias”, 19/06/2003, available at: 
http://www.broadcastnow.co.uk/news/multi-platform/news/fox-news-cleared-of-war-bias-by-
itc/1121070.article (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1551 House of Lords, “British film and television industries report 2010”, para. 172. 
1552 Ibid., para. 251 and 169. 
1553 Ibid., para 253. 
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Advertising rules 
Advertising is self-regulated for all media by the Advertising Standards Agency 
(hereafter, ASA). The ASA enforces codes that are designed for consumer protection 
and the levelling of the playing field between advertisers. These codes are created by 
the Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) and the Broadcast Committee of 
Advertising Practice (BCAP) and ensure that all non-broadcast marketing 
communications covered by the codes are “decent, honest and truthful and prepared 
with a due sense of social and professional responsibility” and “that all broadcast 
advertisements conform to the enduring principles shared by the self-regulatory and 
statutory systems, namely that advertisements should not mislead, harm or 
offend”.1554 The codes are regularly updated, with the latest version coming into force 
1 September 2010. Aside form the advertising requirements contained in these codes, 
broadcast advertising has to comply with the requirements of the AVMS Directive, 
which are contained in the Communications Act 2003 and monitored by Ofcom. 
Ofcom has set quotas on the amount of advertising that is permitted per hour, 
currently between 7-9 minutes for “spot” advertising and between 9 and 15 minutes 
for the total advertising time per hour.1555  
The UK has an outright ban on political advertising in the broadcast media, 
intended to prevent wealthy groups gaining undue influence through the media.1556 It 
is still to be determined whether the ban is compatible with ar1t 10 ECHR in that 
although the UK government has argued that it is, recent rulings by the ECtHR render 
this questionable.1557 The possibility of the ban being overruled in future cannot, 
therefore, be excluded.1558 
  
Rules regarding media publishing 
In the UK, defamation law differs under English and Scottish law. The main 
differences are that under English law a distinction is made between libel (written) 
and slander (spoken), which is relevant as in the case of libel, damages can be claimed 
without having suffered a financial loss as a result of the statement, whereas slander 
requires actual damage. The distinction between libel and slander is inconsequential 
under Scottish law as the requirement for a defamation action is that some harm has 
been caused, not necessarily financially. It should be noted that local authorities and 
central government bodies cannot sue for defamation, nor can political parties. 
The UK is notorious for having a defamation law that is considered favourable 
to claimants. This, combined with potentially large sums that can be awarded by way 
of damages, has resulted in a relatively high number of claims, further helped along 
                                                 
1554Committee of Advertising Practice, “CAP regulatory statement 2010”, available at: 
http://www.cap.org.uk/CAP-and-BCAP-Consultations/Closed-consultations/CAP-Code-Review-
consultation.aspx and “BCAP regulatory statement 2010”, available at: http://bcap.org.uk/CAP-and-
BCAP-Consultations/Closed-consultations/BCAP-Code-Review-consultation.aspx (last visited on 
04/10/2010). 
1555 See: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/broadcast/other-codes/rules.pdf. 
1556 S. 321(2) Communications Act 2003. 
1557 TGV and Rogaland Pensioners Party cases. In the UK the issue was addressed in R (on the 
application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport 
[UKHL] 15; [2008] 2 W.L.R. 781.  
1558 See: T. Lewis and P. Cumper “Balancing freedom of political expression against equality of 
political opportunity: the courts and the UK broadcasting ban on political advertising” Public Law 
(2009) 89.  
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by the rise in “no win no fee” actions and the ease of finding a jurisdictional base 
through the Internet. The UK is increasingly a venue for “libel tourism”, which has 
led the US to take action in order to protect the position of the First Amendment 
protection of free speech.  
Once a reputation has been defamed, the defendant has to establish the truth of 
the statement by way of defence, though, as an alternative, the common law 
recognises certain defences, in particular, “fair comment”, “neutral reportage”, and an 
absolute privilege for “reporting parliament” and “proceedings in UK and certain 
international courts”. The courts in the Reynolds case also developed a further 
qualified privilege for “responsible journalism”, which applies to comments made 
without malice that can reasonably be believed to be true. The person publishing must 
have a legitimate interest in publishing, or be under a duty to do so (i.e. publishing is 
in the public interest) and the person receiving must be under a duty to, or have a 
legitimate interest in, receiving the information.1559 Anyone can invoke this privilege, 
though it has most often been applied in a journalistic context and while journalists 
have to act in “good faith” and on an “accurate factual basis”, they are not required to 
guarantee accuracy of the facts.1560  
Despite the development of defences such as those contained in the Reynolds 
case, there remain concerns about this area of law and the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Media has recently reviewed the existing rules on defamation. 
Their report considered the possibility of introducing statutory defences and noted 
that under certain circumstances limitations on the ability of companies to obtain 
damages may be warranted. The review further noted that at the moment there seems 
to be no temporal limit on bringing defamation actions in relation to on-line 
publications, a matter that may also require reform. 
The influence of the HRA has led courts in the UK to develop a right to 
privacy on the back of earlier tort law and breach of confidence actions, which are 
both based in the common law. The courts consider whether “there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy”, balancing the individual rights under arts 8 and art 10 of the 
European Convention without giving initial priority to either article. The courts 
appear to afford significant protection to sensitive medical details and to children 
where they may be exposed to publicity, but appear reluctant to go as far as the 
ECtHR in the Hannover1561 case and afford blanket protection to celebrities when in 
public places. The courts have also allowed sensitive personal information relating to 
sports and media celebrities to be published, where the person has previously 
represented themselves to be a role-model. 
 
Copyright 
All works produced by the British Government are subject to Crown copyright, 
though there are eleven general waivers which, amongst others, include primary and 
secondary legislation and government press notices.1562 Copyright generally does not 
                                                 
1559 Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 1 AC 127. 
1560 Ibid. 
1561 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294. 
1562 For a full list of waivers see: The National Archives, “Use of information previously covered by the 
Crown copyright waiver, available at: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/advice/crown-copyright/copyright-
guidance/waiver-of-crown-copyright (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
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hinder news reporting as fair dealing for the purpose of reporting current events does 
not infringe copyright in a work, though sufficient acknowledgement of the work 
should be given where possible.1563 Copyright can exist in headlines under UK law, 
which has the potential of hampering news reporting, though copyright protection 
here is not very strong.1564 
 
Social media 
In the UK there are few rules governing social media publishing. In principle online 
publications are treated as print publications under the law. There has been some 
debate as to the extent to which the protection offered to journalists applies to 
bloggers. The general law regarding media publishing will apply to any publication 
and will therefore cover social media participants. Most social media sites have their 
own (additional) rules through contractual terms for the use of a site, but these are by 
no means standardised and self-regulation in this area does not take place yet. 
Bloggers can sign up to the PCC code of conduct, though this is by no means 
common practice, partly due to high costs. It is more common for “serious” bloggers 
to state that they adhere to the principles of the PCC code or to the NUJ code of 
conduct. 
Interestingly, there has been some discussion whether online defamation is 
slander or libel. As this generally concerns written content there is a strong argument 
for considering it libel, though following a recent case under English law it may be 
classified as slander where comments are made “in the heat of the moment”.1565 This 
distinction is relevant as slander is not necessarily actionable.1566 Bloggers seem to be 
liable for defamatory comments on their sites made by third parties, if they fail to 
remove them after becoming aware of them.1567  
A similar approach applies to Internet Service Providers (hereafter ISP) if they 
fail to act after having been made aware of defamatory comments on their server.  
 
Rules regarding information gathering processes 
In the UK, journalistic sources are protected under section 10 of the Contempt of 
Court Act 1981, which recognises that in a free and democratic society journalistic 
sources should be protected and a presumption is made in favour of journalists 
wishing to protect their sources. There are however exceptions where national 
security or the prevention of disorder and/or crime are at issue, in which case 
disclosure of the source will be warranted in almost all cases. There is also an 
exception where disclosure is in the interest of justice, though courts are rather more 
reluctant to order disclosure on this ground unless vital public or individual interests 
are at stake. Concerns have, nevertheless, been voiced that UK courts have been 
unduly protective of commercial and property interests. In this context, Article 10 
                                                 
1563 Art. 30, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
1564 The Shetland Times v Wills [1997] FSR 604. 
1565 Smith v ADVFN Plc [2008] EWHC 1797. 
1566 J. Tumbridge, “Defamation: the dilemma for bloggers and their commenters” 31 European 
Intellectual Property Review (2009) 505, at 505. 
1567 Carrie v Tolkien [2009] EWHC 29. 
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ECHR may be beginning to have an influence, in that the ECtHR has overturned 
several UK cases where source disclosure was ordered.1568 
As mentioned above, the UK has a general right of access to information held 
by public authorities in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland through the FOI 
Act.1569 Journalists have generally remarked that the FOI Act has not had a major 
impact on their reporting, though the added avenue of information-gathering can 
assist them in certain cases.1570 One of the main issues remains that the process of an 
FOI request is slow and therefore does not provide an adequate source of information 
for (one-day) news stories. However, investigative reporters have remarked that the 
FOI Act has made a “noticeable” difference to their reporting.1571 
In the UK the Data Protection Act 1998 (hereafter, DPA 1998) establishes a 
range of rights and duties to safeguard personal data. Section 32 of the Act exempts 
“processing (...) undertaken with a view to the publication by any person of any 
journalistic, literary or artistic material”, where this is done in the public interest. This 
is a broad exemption as publication is simply defined as to “make available to the 
public or any section of the public’ and “any person” avoids debates about when a 
person can be considered a journalist. The exemption, however, is not applicable to 
the entire act, though it is applicable to all eight data protection principles, minus the 
7th principle, which provides that “[a]ppropriate technical and organisational measures 
shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and 
against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data”. 
Pictures are generally considered to be private data under the DPA 1998 in the 
UK and breach of confidence claims will often invoke the DPA 1998. Children are 
well protected from having their pictures published in the press,1572 though no case 
has been brought to the courts as of yet, relying on the new (far reaching) ruling of the 
Reklos and Davourlis v Greece1573 of the ECtHR. It remains to be seen how this 
ruling will be interpreted by the UK courts. 
The PCC Code of conduct provides that the press “must not seek to obtain or 
publish material acquired by using hidden cameras or clandestine listening device” 
and where there is “a reasonable expectation of privacy”, this should be honoured. 
Under-16s are afforded special protection and should not be interviewed or 
photographed without parental consent. However, the code notes that there may be 
exceptions to these provisions where they can be demonstrated to be in the public 
interest. 
 
Rules regarding search engines 
The UK currently has no specific rule governing search engines and access to 
information. A recent court ruling in the UK concluded, however, that search engines, 
in this case Google, were not “publishers” at common law and therefore could not be 
                                                 
1568 Most recently in Financial Times (ltd) v United Kingdom [2010] 50 EHRR 46. 
1569 And a similar right to access to information held by public authorities in Scotland under the 
Information Scotland Act 2002. 
1570 S. Holsen et al, “Journalists’ use of the UK FOIA” 3 Open Government: a journal on Freedom of 
Information (2007), at p.13. 
1571 Ibid., p. 9 and 13. 
1572 See for example: Murray v Express Newspapers Plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 
1573 Reklos and Davourlis v Greece [2009] ECHR 200. 
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held liable for defamatory content that appears in natural search results, both before 
and after they have been notified of the defamatory nature of the content.1574 A search 
engine was ruled to be a “facilitator” rather than a “publisher”. Where search results 
are generated automatically without human input, there is no control over the search 
terms chosen by users and the websites indexed in search results. Where this is the 
case, a search engine is no more than a facilitator. It should be noted though that 
Google does have a “notice and takedown” system in place which blocks the URLs of 
the offending material after they have been notified, but this does not stop parts of the 
text of the blocked URL of showing up in the search results and it is these fragments 
of text, which can be defamatory, for which Google is not liable as they are deemed a 
mere “facilitator” here.  
 
3.4 Supervision 
Under section 6 of the HRA it is unlawful for a public authority to act incompatibly 
with a convention right. This section applies to “any person certain of whose 
functions are functions of a public nature” and where a body performs both public and 
private functions, section 6 only applies to those actions that are public in nature. As 
most media regulatory bodies can be considered to be a “public authority” or to be 
performing functions of a public nature their actions can ultimately be reviewed under 
the HRA. Thus, Ofcom, the PCC, ASA, ATVOD and the BBFC are all covered by 
section 6 in whole or in part. Newspapers, however, are not covered,1575 and 
broadcasters only in the few instances where they perform regulatory functions, such 
as where they are responsible for ensuring that election broadcasts comply with the 
Ofcom Codes.1576 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1574 Metropolitan International Schools Ltd (t/a Skillstrain and t/a/ Train2Game) v Designtechnica 
Corp (t/a Digital Trends) [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB). 
1575 Venables and Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd  [2001] Fam 430, para D1 
1576 A. Nicol, et al., Media Law and Human rights (2009), at par. 3.40. 
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Table 1    
 Ofcom BBC Trust PCC 
Regulatory 
Document 
Communications Act 2003 & 
Broadcast Code 
BBC editorial 
guidelines 
PCC Editor’s 
code of practice 
Type of 
regulation  
Statutory, contractual undertaking 
with licensees Self-regulation 
Voluntary self-
regulation 
Competence 
 
TV and radio sectors, fixed line 
telecoms and mobiles and the 
airwaves over which wireless 
devices operate 
All BBC content 
regardless of creator, 
method and manner of 
creation  
Newspaper and 
periodical 
industry 
 
Composition 
 
Non-Executive Chairman, 
Executive Directors (incl. Chief 
Executive), and Non-Executive 
Directors 
Chairman, Vice-
Chairman and ten 
Trustees, declare 
personal/business 
interests and interests 
of immediate family 
Independent 
Chairman 
appointed by 
industry, lay 
members and 
industry 
members 
Ultimate 
power of 
appointment 
Nominations Committee appoints 
board; Chairman of Ofcom is 
chairman committee. Chairman is 
appointed jointly by the Secretary 
of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport and the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry, under the 
provisions of the Office of 
Communications Act 2002 
The Queen, on advice 
of Ministers after an 
open selection process 
Independent 
appointment 
commission 
Sanctions Rectification, Fine revocation of licence 
Internal discipline and 
rectification Rectification 
Mode of 
Financing 
Grant-in-aid from the department 
for BIS, licence fee, and 
administrative charges for 
electronic networks and services, 
the provision of broadcasting and 
associated facilities 
Licence fee 
Levy on the 
newspaper and 
periodical 
industries 
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Table 2    
 ASA ATVOD BBFC 
Regulatory 
Document Advertising Code 
UK AVMS 
Regulations 
2009/2010  ( specific 
code to follow) 
Video 
Recordings Act 
2010 
Type of 
regulation 
Self-regulation and co-regulatory 
with Ofcom in relation to 
broadcasting 
Co-regulation with 
Ofcom 
Self-regulation 
for cinema and 
statutory 
regulation for 
video works 
Competence 
 
Marketing communication in all 
UK media 
Video on Demand 
services 
 
Cinema and 
video works 
offered for sale 
or hire 
commercially 
Composition 
 
ASA council administers code, 
2/3 of members are independent 
of industry. 
Independent chair, 
five independent and 
four industry 
members 
One president, 
two vice-
presidents and a 
management 
team 
Ultimate 
power of 
appointment 
Appointment following public 
advertisement by the ASA 
Chairman 
Open recruitment on 
Nolan principles 
Council of 
management 
with no actual or 
perceived 
interest in 
classification 
decisions & 
policy. 
Sanctions 
Wide range: fines, pre-vetting, 
ban, withdrawal of trading 
privileges etc. 
Financial penalties, 
restrictions or 
suspension of service 
- 
Mode of 
Financing Levy on advertising spend 
Regulatory fees, 
consultation ongoing 
Independently 
financed by fees 
charged for 
classification of 
submitted works 
 
4. Media policy and democratic government 
The status of the media in the UK 
Though the media in the UK have not generally been afforded any special legal status, 
both the political establishment and the courts regard the media to play a central role 
in the democratic process. In 1995, for example, the then Conservative government in 
its 1995 White Paper on media ownership observed: “[a] free and diverse media are 
an indispensable part of the democratic process. They provide the multiplicity of 
voices and opinions that informs the public, influences opinion, and engenders 
political debate. They promote the culture of dissent which any healthy democracy 
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must have”.1577 Similar views were expressed by the subsequent Labour 
administration.1578 With the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, UK 
courts are required to “take into account” the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights relating to Convention rights, although prior to this, freedom of 
expression was already considered by some judges to have a special constitutional 
status.1579 In McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers Ltd, Lord Bingham 
stated: “[t]he proper functioning of a modern participatory democracy requires that 
the media be free, active, professional and inquiring.  For this reason the courts, here 
and elsewhere, have recognized the cardinal importance of press freedom and the 
need for any restriction on that freedom to be proportionate and no more than is 
necessary to promote the legitimate object of the restriction.”1580   
 
Multiple democratic functions 
Although political parties, politicians, and UK government and devolved bodies 
increasingly have their own websites, the traditional print and broadcast media 
continue to be the primary means through which they convey their policies to the 
general public. And for members of the public, the mass media constitute their main 
source of information on domestic and foreign events.1581 As Niklas Luhmann has 
observed “[w]hatever we know about our society, or indeed about the world in which 
we live, we know through the mass media”.1582 
But to perform this democratic function the media need to do more than 
simply act as a conduit for the views of politicians: they can enhance citizens’ abilities 
to make informed choices through explaining the wider context to political decisions 
and examining alternative policy options; they can go beyond merely reporting on 
political developments and take a more activist role, seeking to set the political 
agenda, raise awareness of problems, or campaign for change; they can provide a 
location for public (rather than merely professional) debate through, for example, the 
publication of readers letters, “phone-ins”, or internet fora; and they can perform a 
vital investigative or “watchdog” role, checking for abuses within government, public 
and also powerful private bodies – what Leonard Downie refers to as “accountability 
journalism”.1583 A central question for those framing media policy in the UK today is 
consequently whether the media are able to perform, and are actually performing, 
these various roles – mediator; expositor/educator; agenda setter/campaigner; public 
forum and investigator/watchdog – given the current economic climate and 
technological developments.  In both the print and audiovisual sectors there is 
increasing concern that this, unfortunately, is not the case. 
 
 
                                                 
1577 S. Barnett, “Journalism, democracy and the public Interest: Rethinking media pluralism for the 
digital age”, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism working paper, (September 2009) at p. 3.  
1578 Ibid. 
1579 HRA 1998, section 2 and see discussion of relevant case law and academic commentary by Lord 
Steyn in McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 277 at 296-298. 
1580 [2001] 2 AC 277, at 290-291. 
1581 See section on the Role and Power the Media at section 2.3. 
1582 N. Luhmann, The reality of the mass media (2000), p. 1. 
1583 L. Downie, “The new news”, James Cameron Memorial Lecture, 22/09/2010, City University 
London. 
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Media regulation: the bifurcated approach in the UK 
As discussed above, the UK has adopted a bifurcated approach to media regulation, 
with the printed press and broadcast media subject to distinct regimes. The print 
sector has fought hard for the maintenance of a “light touch” self-regulatory system, 
which it considers necessary to insulate it from government influence. To date this has 
been accepted by both Labour and Conservative administrations, the previous 
government expressing its “strong belief” that “a free press is vital to the health of 
our democracy. There should be no laws that specifically seek to restrict that freedom 
and Government should not seek to intervene in any way in what a newspaper or 
magazine chooses to publish”.1584 The main constraints on the printed press stem from 
general laws relating to obscenity, national security, privacy, contempt of court and 
defamation, though print mergers can be reviewed on media pluralism grounds where 
the Secretary of State decides to intervene under the Enterprise Act 2002.1585 Unlike 
in some European countries, the print sector does not benefit from state subsidies, 
which could threaten its independence, though newspapers and magazines are zero 
rated for VAT purposes.1586 
By contrast, the broadcast media are subject to a variety of restrictions 
intended to ensure coverage of the main strands of political thought and to insulate 
broadcasters from undue political and commercial influence. These measures include 
ownership restrictions; impartiality requirements, restrictions on editorialising; 
specific rules relating to party political and party election broadcasts; prohibitions on 
political advertising and the sponsorship of news programmes; restrictions on the 
amount of advertising that can be included within news programmes and a right of 
reply.1587 In addition, commercial public service broadcasters who receive operating 
licences from Ofcom are required to transmit a certain proportion of public interest 
programming, including national and regional news.1588 The BBC is required by its 
Agreement with the Government to meet a range of public service obligations, 
including the provision of news and current affairs, requirements that are fleshed out 
further by the BBC Trust.1589 Apart from its regular radio and television news 
broadcasts and its online news services, the BBC provides dedicated coverage of the 
Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies, Scottish and Westminster Parliaments and 
key parliamentary committees.  
Although the combination of two very different regulatory models operating 
side by side in one system is not the result of a carefully thought out master plan for 
the media sector, it can be rationalised on the basis that it may in fact enhance content 
diversity, firstly, by offering citizens both partisan (newspapers and magazines) and 
non-partisan (radio and television) sources, and, secondly, by providing a range of 
services more or less insulated from direct governmental (printed press) and 
commercial (licence fee funded broadcasters) pressures.  It has also been justified on 
                                                 
1584 Department of Culture, Media and Sport, “Privacy and Media Intrusion”, 2003, Cm 5985, at p.1.  
The reference to ‘intervention’ here is rather ambiguous: the Labour Government did not use the law to 
repress the media but they certainly sought to manipulate news coverage through the activities of 
communications officers such as Alastair Campbell and carefully cultivated links, see, for example, N. 
Davies, Flat earth news (2008), 198-202. 
1585 Enterprise Act 2002, s. 58(2A-2B). 
1586 HMRC Reference: Notice 701/10 (August 2003). 
1587 See more detailed coverage in chapter 3. 
1588 Communications Act 2003, ss. 264-271 and 279. 
1589 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, “Agreement between HM Sec. State for Culture, Media 
and Sport and the BBC”, July 2006, Cm 6872. 
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the basis of the perceived greater emotional impact of the audiovisual media and the 
limited spectrum available for broadcast services, necessitating regulation in the 
public interest. Yet, the coherence and legitimacy of singling out a specific media 
sector to meet costly public interest requirements is debatable and the spectrum 
scarcity rationale has been undermined by signal compression techniques and 
digitisation.1590 With growing convergence among what were previously discrete 
media sectors – newspapers, for example, now operate across a number of platforms 
offering online versions with video inserts, links to related stories, and sites for reader 
interaction  – the bi-polar regulatory model that characterised much of the last century 
is now under considerable strain.  
 
The written press 
As indicated above, the press has not generally been afforded any special legal status 
over and above that afforded ordinary citizens.  It is, however, the main beneficiary of 
the protection from defamation actions afforded fair and accurate reports of 
parliamentary and judicial proceedings, certain public meetings and reports, including 
reports prepared by companies and civil society organisations.1591  The press is also, 
on occasion, allowed to attend certain judicial hearings that are closed to the 
public.1592  At present the main concerns regarding the UK printed press are the 
implications for independent journalism of dwindling revenues; the failure of certain 
newspapers to maintain ethical standards; the perceived weakness of the existing self-
regulatory regime; and media consolidation. In relation to the former, all of the 
quality daily newspapers have encountered a steady loss of readers, with The Times’ 
circulation falling to less than half a million for the first time since 1994.1593 Regional 
papers have been badly affected, with sixty UK newspaper titles and 25 offices 
closing over a period of just six months in 2009, though the pace of decline appears 
now to be slowing.1594 The Scottish press, in particular, has been exposed to damaging 
competition from modified versions of London based daily papers, such as The 
Times.1595 All papers have been affected by the growth of free online news sites 
provided, for example, by the BBC. Although online versions of the established daily 
papers are attracting increasing numbers of readers and thus advertising revenue, they 
have not compensated for the loss of advertising, in particular of classified 
advertising, experienced by the printed press. Newspapers are thus looking to 
establish new business models and the News International papers, The Times, Sunday 
                                                 
1590 See discussion by E. Barendt, Broadcasting law: A comparative study (1995), pp. 5-9. 
1591 Defamation Act 1996, sections 14 and 15, schedule. 
1592 Primarily those involving children and family matters, see G. Robertson and A. Nicol, Media law 
(2007), pp. 19-20. 
1593 S. Busfield, “ABC’s:  Times Slips below 500,000 for the First Time in 16 Years”, The Guardian, 
10/09/2010, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/sep/10/abcs-national-newspapers (last 
visited on 04/10/2010). 
1594 D. Ponsford, “Regional ABCs: improving picture for UK dailies”, Press Gazette, 25/08/2010 and 
C. Rowe, “How are freelance journalists coping in the current economic downturn?”, journalism.co.uk, 
02/04/2009, available at: http://www.journalism.co.uk/5/articles/533978.php (last visited on 
04/10/2010). For a recent overview of the state of the local press see House of Commons, Culture, 
Media and Sport Select Committee Report, “Future for local and regional Media”, HC 43-1, 6 April 
2010, 11-17. 
1595 R. Greenslade, “Can the scottish press be saved?  The declining sales figures suggest not”, 
18/05/2010, The Guardian, available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2010/may/18/newspapers-scotland (last visited on 
04/10/2010). 
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Times and News of the World, all recently moved to charge for access to their online 
sites, joining the Financial Times.1596    
The financial crisis in the print media has resulted in many journalists losing 
their jobs and those who remain in employment, often lower paid young journalists 
with less experience, are now expected to provide material for both online and print 
services.1597 As a result, journalists have less time to engage in serious investigative 
journalism and careful fact checking, leading to greater reliance on press releases and 
recycled agency material. The run-up to the Iraq War illustrated once again how 
dependent the press are on government information and selective briefings in times of 
conflict, as well as the reluctance of certain papers to go against the official line even 
when in receipt of contrary reports.1598 A few papers and journals have, however, 
been established with, or have subsequently developed, structures designed to insulate 
them from corporate, proprietorial or political pressures.1599 The Guardian newspaper, 
for example, is backed by the Scott Trust, while the constitution of the Economist 
prevents any individual or corporation gaining a majority shareholding and the 
magazine’s independent board of trustees has power to appoint and dismiss the 
editor.1600 The House of Lords Communications Committee in their report, The 
Ownership of the News, concluded that they did not believe “an internal company 
structure can be an adequate substitute for competition law and statutory regulation in 
ensuring that no single voice becomes too powerful. We are clear that regulation to 
ensure a plurality of media ownership is still relevant and necessary”.1601 
In relation to press governance, self-regulation through the Press Complaints 
Commission (‘PCC’) has been subject to repeated criticism.1602 In particular, the PCC 
is thought to have focused unduly on addressing individual complaints regarding 
breaches of the PCC Code of Conduct, rather than raising press standards more 
generally. It has no power to fine newspapers and does not adjudicate on matters 
where legal proceedings have been initiated. There is also the perception that the PCC 
is unduly accommodating to press interests: although the proportion of independent 
members of the Commission has gradually increased, seven of its seventeen members 
are serving editors or editorial directors. The Code Committee, which updates and 
reviews the PCC Code, has no lay members. With such limited powers it is not, 
perhaps, surprising that the tabloid press has at times cynically resorted to unethical, if 
not illegal, practices, such as phone tapping, and celebrity harassment in order to 
obtain copy.1603 The House of Commons Culture Media and Sports Committee 
recently proposed that the PCC should take a more proactive role in monitoring press 
                                                 
1596 P. Robins, “Paywalls: Why papers’ websites could be the next iTunes or amazon”, 18/05/2010, The 
Guardian, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/organgrinder/2010/may/18/newspaper-
paywalls-reader-offers (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1597 The consequences for democratic government are well set out by Davies, Flat earth news. See also 
House of Commons, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee Report, “Press standards, privacy and 
libel”, 24/02/2010, HC 362-1, at pp.77-80. 
1598 Davies, Flat earth news, chapter 9, ‘The Blinded Observer’. 
1599 Such systems may also be introduced to ease competition authority concerns. When Rupert 
Murdoch purchased The Times and Sunday Times in 1981 he strengthened the role of the Independent 
National Directors, a majority of whom must agree to the appointment or dismissal of the papers’ 
editors., House of Lords “The ownership of the news”, paras. 215-217. 
1600 See Barnett, “Journalism, democracy and the public interest”, at p.10.   
1601 House of Lords, The Ownership of the News, para. 220. 
1602 The numerous official reports on the functioning of the PCC are detailed at House of Commons, 
Culture, Media and Sports Committee report, “Press Standards, Privacy and Libel”, at chapter 6. 
1603 Ibid., chapter 5. 
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conduct, have greater lay participation, and enhanced enforcement powers.1604   
Reform during the present Coalition Government appears likely so that a move to 
tighten regulation rather than deregulate may take place in the print context.  It is also 
possible that press conduct will increasingly be subject to review in the courts, given 
the gradual evolution of a right to privacy following passage of the Human Rights Act 
in 1998. 
 
Ongoing concentration of ownership in the media 
Concentration of ownership in the press sector, particularly at the local level, has been 
significant, and four large groups now account for around 72% of the regional 
press.1605 In relation to the national press, eight companies dominate, with News 
International, a subsidiary of News Corporation, owning The Times, Sunday Times, 
News of the World and the Sun.1606 Although consolidation has been supported by the 
major press groups on the basis that it leads to cost savings and synergies, enabling 
titles to survive that would otherwise fold, consolidation can also lead to a reduction 
in the number of distinct voices, centralisation, and an undue focus on 
profitability.1607  Section 58 of the Enterprise Act 2002 incorporates a series of media 
pluralism considerations that the Secretary of State can address where mergers 
involve print and broadcasting companies. In relation to the press, this requires 
consideration of the need for “accurate presentation of news”, “free expression of 
opinion” and whether there is “a sufficient plurality of views in each market for 
newspapers in the United Kingdom or a part of the United Kingdom”.1608 The House 
of Lords Communications Committee has suggested that this should be extended to 
cover an examination of whether the merger would “impact adversely on 
newsgathering” and Steven Barnett has noted that this could be taken further to 
“demand safeguards for professional training, for investment, and for different kinds 
of investment output”.1609 To date there has been no government support even for a 
more limited amendment.   
The audiovisual sector has also been subject to significant consolidation in 
light of the deregulation initiated by the Communications Act 2003. This has been 
particularly marked in the radio sector, with two conglomerates, Global and Bauer, 
owning the majority of commercial stations.1610 Tony Stoller observes that much of 
the output is common across these stations, with a concomitant loss of genuinely local 
programming.1611 Mergers have also taken place in the television sector, with Granada 
and Carlton merging in 2004 to become ITV plc. The remaining independent Channel 
3 companies continue to have specific geographical links: Scottish Television Group, 
                                                 
1604 Ibid., Conclusions and Recommendations. 
1605 See House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, “The ownership of the news”, vol.1 HL 
Paper 122-I, 2008, at para.162 and Barnett, ‘Journalism, democracy and the public interest’, at p. 4. 
1606 House of Lords, “The ownership of the news”, at para. 161. 
1607 For examples of these diverse views see the evidence given to the House of Lords, “The ownership 
of the news”, at paras. 170-201 and discussion by Barnett, “Journalism, democracy and the public 
interest”, at pp. 2-4. 
1608 Enterprise Act 2002. s. 58(2A-2B). 
1609 House of Lords “The ownership of the news”, at para. 243; Barnett, ‘Journalism, democracy and 
the public interest’, at p.14. 
1610 House of Lords, “The ownership of the news”, at para. 282. 
1611 T. Stoller, Sounds of your life (2010). 
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which serves central and northern Scotland; Ulster Television, Northern Ireland; and 
the Channel Islands Group. 
The Communications Act 2003 also facilitated further cross-media 
consolidation, a recent example being the purchase by Richard Desmond, owner of 
the Daily Express and Daily Star, of the Five Group which runs the fifth television 
channel in July 2010. News Corporation, owner of News International, which 
currently owns 39% of the pay television broadcaster BSkyB, has also indicated its 
intention to retake complete ownership of the company. Earlier this year, the 
Government requested Ofcom to further investigate the impact of removing the 
remaining local cross media ownership rules, which restrict ownership of print, 
television and radio services in the same local area. Ofcom concluded, contrary to its 
earlier findings, that complete removal of the rules would not be unduly prejudicial to 
media pluralism and the Government now appears likely to press ahead with 
deregulation in this area.1612 Further liberalisation is primarily justified on the basis 
that this will support struggling local newspapers, though the synergies to be gained 
from cross, as opposed to mono, media consolidation are disputed.1613 With these 
final restrictions removed, the main constraint on media mergers will be the operation 
of competition law, incorporating the media plurality test. 
 
The financial struggle in the audiovisual media sector 
In economic terms, the pay television sector does not appear to have been particularly 
affected by the downturn, subscriber numbers remaining buoyant with BSkyB moving 
close to 10 million subscribers, 3 million for its high definition services.1614 By 
contrast the advertiser funded commercial broadcasters have seen a significant 
downturn in revenues and have had to face increasing audience fragmentation, with 
competition from pay television and online services.1615 In 2004 Ofcom identified 
certain programme genres that it considered the commercial broadcasters would be 
unlikely to continue to fund in the current climate, in particular, regional news and 
documentaries.1616 Ofcom research also revealed that expenditure on network news 
and current affairs programmes by the five main PSB channels fell by £39m or 14%, 
from £289m in 2004 to £250m in 2008, with a reduction in news and current affairs 
output particularly marked in Scotland and Wales.1617 Recent figures relating to the 
production of news and current affairs content to 2009 are, however, somewhat more 
encouraging, indicating that the position has at least now stabilised on the public 
service channels and in some cases marginally improved.1618 In particular, the decline 
in news viewing appears to have halted, with the majority of viewers still watching 
                                                 
1612 Ofcom, “Response to the Secretary of State (DCMS):  Local Media – cross media ownership 
rules”, (9 August 2010). 
1613 G. Doyle, “The economics of monomedia and cross-media expansion: A study of the case 
favouring deregulation of TV and newspaper ownership in the U.K”, 24 Journal of Cultural Economics 
(2000) pp.1-26.  
1614 Ofcom, “The communications market report 2010”, at p. 98. J. Plunkett, “BSkyB Signs up 3 
millionth subscriber to high-definition service”, (2/09/2010), The Guardian, available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/sep/02/bskyb-high-definition-subscribers (last visited on 
04/10/2010).  
1615 Ofcom, “The communications market report 2010”, at p. 121. 
1616 Ofcom, “Review of public service broadcasting phase 2 - meeting the digital challenge”, 
28/09/2004. 
1617 Ofcom, “Public service broadcasting annual report”, 21/07/2009, at p. 4. 
1618 Ofcom, “The communications market report 2010”, pp. 134-135. 
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the flagship news programmes on linear channels rather than dedicated news 
services.1619 
There remains, however, real concern over whether the commercially funded 
public service broadcasters will be able, or will wish, to continue to meet the same 
level of public service commitments in the future.  ITV, whose licence comes up for 
renewal in 2014 previously indicated that it no longer wished to continue to provide 
regional news coverage and, as indicated above, Ofcom has made a number of 
proposals for alternative means of funding such programming in the future.1620  
Although the present Coalition Government will not be implementing the previous 
government’s plans for local news consortia, Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt has 
initiated a review into how local news services can be provided, possibly involving a 
combination of networked and local news. The viability of such services without 
significant public subsidy has, however, been questioned.1621 At the ultra-local level 
Steven Barnett has noted the valuable role that Community radio services can play in 
providing information and campaigning on local issues, though he notes that they do 
not have the resources or staff to carry out sustained investigative journalism.1622 
These services are licenced by Ofcom and are required to be not-for-profit, to engage 
where possible members of the community, and to fulfil certain social objectives, 
namely, facilitating discussion, providing education and enhancing awareness of, and 
strengthening, the particular community.1623 Licensed community radios are funded 
through a range of public grants, including seed money provided directly by Ofcom. 
Concerns over television news coverage are not restricted to regional and local 
news, in that just three companies – BBC, BSkyB and ITN - provide the news 
services for the main commercial broadcasters Sky, BBC, ITV, Channels 4 and 5.1624  
Although new web services would appear to be offering additional independent 
sources of news, research carried out by Chris Paterson suggests that the situation, at 
least in relation to international news, is little different on the web: “[w]e are left with 
a picture of an online news world (in the English language) where only four 
organisations do extensive international reporting (Reuters, AP, AFP, BBC) a few 
others do some international reporting (CNN, MSN, New York Times, Guardian and 
a few other large newspapers and broadcasters), and most do no original reporting”, 
relying on pre-existing agency copy.1625 As Paterson notes, many online sites, such as 
Google News, operate merely as aggregators, and although a wide array of news and 
current affairs sites run by freelance journalists, civil society and not-for-profit 
organisations have sprung up, the economic challenges facing independent online 
                                                 
1619 S. Purvis, “Halt in decline of flagship news programmes”, Ofcom news release, 03/06/2010. 
1620 Ofcom, “Review of public service television broadcasting phase 3 – competition for quality”, 
08/02/2005. 
1621 R. Andrews, “Why Hunt’s local TV news idea is a non-starter”, 26/07/2010, paidContent:UK, 
available at: http://paidcontent.co.uk/article/419-why-hunts-local-tv-news-idea-is-a-non-starter/ (last 
visited on 04/10/2010).  
1622 Barnett, “Journalism, democracy and the public interest”, p. 12. 
1623 Community Radio Order 2004, Statutory Instrument No. 1944, Stationery Office, 2004, s.2.2. 
1624 See Ofcom, “Report for the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 44A of the Enterprise Act 2002 
of BSkyB’s acquisition of 17.5% shareholding in ITV plc”, 27/10/2007 and R. Craufurd Smith, “Media 
ownership and the public interest:  The case of Virgin media, British Sky Broadcasting and its ITV 
shares”, 1 Journal of Media Law (2009), pp. 21-36. 
1625 C. Paterson, “International news on the internet:  Why more is less” (2007) 4 Ethical Space:  The 
International Journal of Communication Ethics (2007) 57, at p. 63. See also: ‘News agency dominance 
in international news on the internet’, Centre for International Communications Research Papers in 
International and Global Communication No.1/06 (May 2006) 5. 
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news sites makes it difficult for them to engage in systematic independent news 
gathering and investigation.1626 Nor can the same level of philanthropic support be 
counted on as in the USA, where private funding has facilitated the introduction of 
ventures such as the non-profit news service “ProPublica”.1627  
 
The future of the BBC 
It is not solely the commercial public service broadcasters who are being affected by 
changes to the broadcasting market and the current economic difficulties; the BBC 
has been subject to increasing criticism from commercial operators for its expansion 
into areas that they see as potential fields for development. In particular, its highly 
successful online, free, news site, which attracts more UK readers than any other, 
poses an undoubted challenge to alternative advertiser funded and subscription online 
services. In his 2009 MacTaggart Lecture at the Edinburgh International Film 
Festival, James Murdoch controversially stated that “dumping free, state-sponsored 
news on the market makes it incredibly difficult for journalism to flourish on the 
internet…We seem to have decided as a society to let independence and plurality 
wither. To let the BBC throttle the news market and then get bigger to 
compensate.”1628 Particular criticism has been levelled at the purchase by the BBC’s 
commercial arm, BBC Worldwide, of the Lonely Planet Guide, considered to bear 
little relation to the BBC’s primary broadcasting activities. In part to pre-empt the 
inevitable, the BBC has already started to cut back on certain services, overheads and 
salaries, and in September 2010 announced that it would not increase its licence fee, 
as previously planned, in 2011. Its Charter and Agreement come up for renewal in 
2012, during the course of the present Coalition Government, and the present Culture 
Secretary has indicated that the BBC both needs to adapt to the changing economic 
environment and that cuts to the licence fee settlement are likely.1629 Given the 
financial pressures on the commercial public service sector, the role of the BBC as a 
core provider of quality news and current affairs programming would appear to be 
even more important than ever - indeed its existence was relied on by Ofcom as a 
basis for accepting further relaxation to the local cross-media ownership rules.1630 As 
Mark Thompson, Director-General of the BBC argued in the subsequent MacTaggart 
Lecture in 2010, the BBC is crucially important because it is founded on the idea of 
creating a public space.1631 If funding is removed from the BBC, it will not only 
remove funding from the UK creative economy as a whole, it could also bring into 
question the continuing viability of that unique public space.   
The BBC also sought to respond to criticisms of the scale of its activities by 
the introduction of “public value” test, an approach outlined in its 2006 Agreement 
with the Government.1632 A similar test has been endorsed by the European 
                                                 
1626 For discussion see the papers in N. Fenton (ed.), New media, old media, journalism and democracy 
in the digital age (2010). 
1627 For discussion of this and other non-profit US news ventures see Downie, “The new news”. 
1628 J. Murdoch, “The absence of trust”, lecture given at the Edinburgh International Television Festival 
2009, 28/08/2009. 
1629 M. Brown and J. Robinson, “BBC licence freeze could prove costly”, The Guardian, 20/09/2010. 
1630 See Ofcom, “Response to the Secretary of State (DCMS) local media – cross media ownership 
rules” (2010). 
1631 M.Thompson, “The battle for quality”, MacTaggart Lecture given at the Edinburgh International 
Television Festival 2010, 27 August 2010. 
1632 BBC Agreement 2006, Cmn 6872, paras. 23-33. 
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Commission in a number of its state aid broadcasting cases.1633 When the BBC 
proposes new services, their potential impact on the commercial sector is reviewed by 
Ofcom and their potential advantage to the public examined by the BBC Trust, which 
then decides, balancing the various benefits and disadvantages, whether the service 
should be allowed to proceed.1634 It is apparent that this process has led the BBC to be 
more cautious in launching new services and in 2009 the BBC Trust decided against 
the provision of an online local news video service, in part because the market impact 
assessment indicated that the launch would have a significant negative effect on 
commercial providers, particularly newspaper publishers.1635 Supporters of the 
proposal had, however, argued that this was an important opportunity for the BBC to 
improve its local provision, to combat centralisation, and connect further with local 
communities as part of its public service mission.1636 
In terms of the quality of its coverage, the BBC has in the past been criticised 
for limited coverage, and inclusion, of programmes from the devolved nations, and 
for over-simplified coverage of European affairs.1637 Indeed, centralisation of 
production has been seen as a wider problem within the public service sector, with the 
Culture Secretary recently observing that “three out of five PSB programmes are 
made in London. Our news is horribly centralised and I do believe that we should be 
giving more space to local policies.”1638 In 2007 the Scottish Government sought to 
raise the profile of these concerns by appointing a Broadcasting Commission, chaired 
by Blair Jenkins, to consider, inter alia, whether broadcasting policy should be 
devolved to Scotland.1639 Although the Commission stopped short of calling for the 
devolution of media powers to Scotland, it did propose that Scottish Ministers should 
have greater responsibility, within the UK framework, for operational matters relating 
specifically to Scotland and that there should be enhanced Scottish representation on 
the Ofcom Board. The Commission also proposed the establishment of a new Scottish 
digital television network and called on public service broadcasters to comply with 
existing commitments to include Scottish programming and in certain cases to extend 
these commitments further.1640 
 
UK media and EU law 
One notable aspect of UK media policy has been the growing influence of European 
Union law, both competition law – particularly important in relation to state aid and 
                                                 
1633 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules 
to public service broadcasting”, 02/07/2009, OJ C257/1, paras. 88-89. 
1634For further discussion see BBC Trust website, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/our_work/pvt/index_shtml (last visited on 04/10/2010). 
1635 BBC Trust, “Local video, public value test, final conclusions” (2009). 
1636 Ibid., para 4.3.1-4.3.8. 
1637 In relation to European affairs, the BBC commissioned an independent report, “BBC news 
coverage of the European Union”, January 2005, available at: 
http://www.bbcgovernorsarchive.co.uk/docs/reviews/independentpanelreport.pdf (last visited on 
04/10/2010).  The corporation has subsequently sought to address the issues raised in the report. 
1638 Reported in allmediascotland.com, “Hunt reiterates support for local TV”, 28/08/2010, available at: 
www.allmediascotland.com/press_news/26846/hunt-reiterates-support-for-local-tv (last visited on 
04/10/2010). 
1639 Scottish Broadcasting Commission, “Platform for Success”, 8/09/2008, available at: 
http://www.scottishbroadcastingcommission.gov.uk/about/Final-Report.html (last visited on 
04/10/2010). 
1640 Ibid. 
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the sale of premium television programme rights - and media specific regulations.  
The adoption by the EU of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMS) in 
2007 led to the introduction of a co-regulatory system for on demand television 
services, the UK previously having taken the view that the internet, very much like 
the press, should be an area subject to self-regulation. 1641  On-demand programmes 
are to be overseen by the Association of Television on Demand, ATVOD, and 
commercial content by the Advertising Standards Authority but with back-up power 
of oversight retained by Ofcom.1642   
 
Judicial development of the law relating to the media and the impact of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 
In any overview of the development of media policy and democratic politics it is 
necessary to mention briefly the continuing role and influence of courts in the UK.  
Although section 12 (4) of the Human Rights Act 2008 calls on courts to have 
“particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of 
expression”, this has not afforded freedom of expression any special priority over 
other competing rights.1643 Indeed, the Human Rights Act is not regarded as an 
unqualified good by certain sections of the press, particularly given its role in the 
development of the law of privacy.1644 In other areas, such as the protection of 
journalists’ sources, the courts have continued to show limited understanding of press 
interests, as evidenced by the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
Financial Times case.1645 There is also concern at the willingness of the English 
courts to grant what are known as "super-injunctions”, which both prohibit media 
reporting on a particular issue and coverage of the fact that the injunction has been 
sought and granted.1646 
More positively, English courts had, even prior to the coming into force of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, developed a “responsible journalism” defence to defamation 
claims in Reynolds v Times Newspapers, discussed further above.1647 The defence 
requires the court to assess a wide range of factors, including the steps taken to verify 
published information, the urgency of the matter, and the “tone” of the article, and 
although these factors have been held not to be cumulative they nevertheless impose 
on journalists a high standard of investigation and careful record keeping.1648 The law 
of defamation is currently under wide ranging review, given concerns that it unduly 
favours claimants with deep pockets and is increasingly being used to deter legitimate 
                                                 
1641 Directive 2007/65/EC, amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the 
pursuit of television broadcasting activities 18/12/2007, OJ L 332/27–45. 
1642 See: http://atvod.co.uk/. 
1643 For an early but extensive appraisal of the impact of the Human Rights Act on press freedom see H. 
Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media freedom under the Human Rights Act (2006). 
1644 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457, in particular Lord 
Hope at para. 113. 
1645 See ECtHR, Financial Times and Others v United Kingdom, [2010] E.M.L.R. 21. 
1646 Most controversially in relation to the ‘Trafigura case’, on which see A. Rusbridger, “Trafigura:  
anatomy of a super injunction”, guardian.co.uk, 20/10/2009. 
1647 [1998] 3 All E R 961. 
1648 See, for example, discussion in T. Welsh, W. Greenwood and D. Banks, Essential Law for 
Journalists (2007), pp. 275-281. 
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debate on matters of public interest, for example, in the scientific field.1649 There is 
also a perceived need to respond to the introduction in the USA of “anti–libel tourism 
laws”, designed specifically to prevent the enforcement of UK defamation rulings in 
the US.1650 
 
5. Conclusion    
The media in the UK are in the process of adapting to a difficult economic climate 
and political change. With a receptive Conservative Party dominating the present 
Coalition Government there will undoubtedly be pressure for further deregulation in 
the commercial broadcasting sector. The remaining cross-media ownership 
restrictions are to be abolished, Ofcom’s policy making powers are likely to be 
curtailed, and it is possible that existing content requirements, such those relating to 
impartiality, imposed on commercial television broadcasters such as BSkyB could be 
removed.  On the other hand, some strengthening of the self-regulatory press regime 
can be anticipated and a new co-regulatory system for television on demand is now in 
force, so there are also counter pressures at work in certain sections of the system.  
UK governments are able to exert an indirect influence over key regulatory 
bodies, such as Ofcom and the BBC Trust, through their power of appointment and 
new appointments under the existing government could thus influence the strategic 
approach of these bodies. The position of the BBC is also likely to be weakened when 
the next Charter is agreed with the Government, with an anticipated reduction in the 
licence fee, a move that should assist commercial competitors, particularly those keen 
to develop online services.   
Although the UK media are widely seen as being largely free from 
governmental influence, pressure points and indirect forms of influence consequently 
remain. In particular, the Government has considerable power to influence the overall 
balance and structure of the domestic media landscape and a reluctance to alienate 
powerful media voices, notably the Murdoch owned press, may lead it to exercise this 
power in specific ways. The links between the political and media spheres frequently 
lack transparency and are, by their very nature, difficult to detect and evaluate. 
On a more positive note, the UK has an extremely diverse media marketplace, 
incorporating different regulatory approaches. Within this system it is possible to 
identify a number of innovative models, designed to provide at least a degree of 
insulation from both political and commercial influences. Freedom of information 
legislation has given the media access to new sources, facilitating its watchdog role, 
and UK courts are now required to take into account the importance of freedom of 
expression alongside other human rights. Finally, the internet offers additional 
opportunities for conveying information, enhancing dialogue, influencing the media 
agenda and, as illustrated by wikileaks, evading domestic legal constraints.  
                                                 
1649As in the case involving Dr. Singh, who, though successful on appeal, spent two years defending an 
action brought against him by the British Chiropractic Association:  British Chiropractic Association v 
Singh [2010] EWCA 350.  On defamation, see the current Defamation Bill [HL] 2010-11 and, for 
general discussion, M. Sweeney, “UK government plans major review of libel law: Ministry of Justice 
announces draft defamation bill to be put out for consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny in the new 
year”, The Guardian, 9/07/2010. 
1650 The securing the protection of our enduring and established constitutional heritage Act or ‘Speech 
Act’, H.R. 2765 (2010), prohibits US courts from enforcing foreign defamation judgements where 
these fail to comply with US First Amendment or similar state constitutional protections. 
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The case of the European Union and the Council of Europe  
Federica Casarosa*  
 
1. Introduction 
The history of media policy in Europe began at the national level with governments 
involved to different degrees in the regulation of the press, and then the radio and 
broadcasting sectors.1651 While the press enjoyed greater autonomy, paving the way 
for the creation of self-regulation, broadcasting attracted more attention from national 
governments which resulted in mostly successful attempts to monopolise and control 
the sector.1652  
From the outset, state intervention in the field of the media was triggered by 
the capability of the mass media in particular, to influence readers, listeners or 
viewers in their choices, regardless of whether these were of a commercial, social or 
political nature. This capability can evidently have positive and negative effects, as 
the media can have a function of integration in promoting social cohesion and 
solidarity, but they can also prove harmful by contributing to the breakdown of shared 
values, social norms and patterns of behaviour.1653 From a democratic politics 
perspective, it can be acknowledged that the media can provide programmes which 
support particular social, civil and political values, through the provision of a wide 
range of programming, including news, current affairs, documentaries, educational 
programmes, etc., and at the same time offer opportunities for citizens’ engagement in 
public discourse. Thus, the regulation of media sectors has also been driven by the 
need to create an informed citizenry. Although media regulation has for decades 
implied that readers, listeners and viewers are passive receivers of the information 
provided, technological developments have substantially challenged this premise. In 
recent years, media users appear to have more choice in accessing and selecting and 
even producing and disseminating information and materials, due to technological 
innovation.1654 Nonetheless, such technological changes do not occur in a regulatory 
vacuum. Pre-existing rules and regulation are still applicable. The challenge is 
therefore to define whether and how the existing rules should be reviewed and 
perhaps updated.1655  
                                                 
* Thanks to Fabrizio Cafaggi and Evangelia Psychogiopoulou for useful suggestions on some of the 
questions addressed in the paper. The content of Paragraph 2 profited from the relevant work of 
Fabrizio Barzanti and from the useful and rich conversations had in preparation of this part. 
Responsibility is my own. 
1651 See M. Bailey, Narrating media history (2009).  
1652 See for instance Article 11 of the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen 
[Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizens] in France, where it provided that “The free 
communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen 
may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this 
freedom as shall be defined by law”.  
1653 For a detailed analysis of the functionalistic approach to the media and its critics, see J. Harrison 
and L. Woods, European broadcasting law and policy (2007), at p. 21 ff.  
1654 See the definition of the so-called ‘non-linear’ services provided by Directive 2007/65/EC, below 
par. 2. For a wider analysis of the convergence issue see D. Tambini, D. Leonardi and C. Marsden, 
Codifying cyberspace: communications self-regulation in the age of convergence (2008).  
1655 Note the process that involved the broadcasting sector in the EU, where directive 1989/552/EC, 
otherwise known as the Television without Frontiers directive, has been involved in three reviewing 
processes, finally resulting in the current Audiovisual Media Services directive in 2007. See below par. 
2.  
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So far, the focus has been on the regulation of the content available through 
the media, either by ensuring that certain types of programmes are made accessible to 
the public or that access to media outlets is offered to the various segments of society. 
However, the same results can be pursued through a different type of rules which 
concern structural regulation of media sectors. In this sense, who owns the media, the 
rectius who also controls or influences the media directly or indirectly, is the focal 
point. Indeed, the concentration of the power to influence citizens in the hands of few, 
whether in economic or political terms, seems likely to constrain the possibility for 
citizens to impart and receive information and ideas. Governments have thus adopted 
a range of different tools to facilitate the variety (i.e. plurality) of providers of 
information, such as media ownership rules, licensing and authorisation regimes and 
competition law.  
Given the framework outlined above, it is clear that the two most relevant 
supra-national institutions at European level could not but be involved in these issues, 
though on the basis of different perspectives. Such involvement could be justified 
under two dimensions: practical and political. For the former, the advent of new 
technologies obliges not to interpret media services only on a national dimension, 
rather on a cross-national one, (which has already triggered the development of trans-
border markets). For the latter, a more comprehensive approach, for instance at EU 
level, could prevent national political compromises shaped only according to the 
lobbying activity of powerful media outlets at national level. 
As will be developed below, the European Union competence over media 
sectors has been progressively achieved through the joint (but not always coordinated) 
activity of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Parliament and 
Commission. The expansion of EU competences in the field of media is mainly to be 
ascribed to the ECJ in confirming its jurisdiction over areas that might not have been 
thought to be included in the original economic scope of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) Treaty. In particular, although the cultural dimension of 
broadcasting could have been perceived as hampering the possibility of bringing it 
within the scope of the EU competences, the ECJ was able to draw a distinction 
between its cultural and economic dimension, defining broadcasting as a tradable 
service, thus, subject to the rules on free movement between the Member States. This 
economics based approach was the underlying rationale that was then used by the 
European Commission to push for regulatory intervention in the media sector. Yet it 
was only through the inclusion of a specific article on culture in the Treaty of 
Maastricht that the path was opened for more comprehensive interventions,1656 despite 
the limited competence enjoyed by the EU in the cultural field. The current policy 
framework recognises both cultural and the economic dimension, and at the same 
time fosters the protection of public interest values, such as media pluralism and the 
protection of human dignity in the media sectors.  
The history of the Council of Europe’s (CoE) involvement in media policy has 
a different basis, as it dates back to 1950 when the CoE acknowledged the importance 
                                                 
1656 See the recent Commission Communication on Creative Content Online, in the Single Market, 
COM (2007) 836 final, where the Commission considers that policy makers should still consider the 
need to promote the dual objectives of competitiveness and cultural diversity in order to manage the 
systemic changes currently taking place. See I. Maghiros, “Information, telecommunication 
technologies and media convergence challenges – perspectives on the creative content industries” in C. 
Pawels, H. Kalimo, K. Donders, and B. Van Rompuy (eds), Rething European media and 
communication policy, (2009), at p. 41.  
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of freedom of expression and information by declaring it a fundamental right in 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR gave 
the CoE the legal means to defend that freedom in practice: although it has been 
rarely invoked before the 1960s and 1970s, Article 10 of ECHR has since become 
increasingly important and has been used to make the point in many cases of the 
European Court of Human Rights that the right to freedom of information takes 
precedence over the political, legal, and economic imperatives which are sometimes 
given as reasons for restricting it. In a parallel process, the CoE also devised tools and 
structures to guarantee and strengthen freedom of expression across the continent. 
From the 1958 European Agreement concerning Programme Exchanges1657 to the 
recent Convention on Cybercrime, the CoE’s work has encapsulated and regulated an 
increasingly complex world of information addressing the most relevant issues, such 
as journalistic freedom1658 and the protection of pluralism. It is should be emphasised 
that, since 1981, media issues gained such a importance to require a separate expert 
committee, the Steering Committee on the Mass Media, which was created within the 
Human Rights Directorate of the CoE. The role of this committee was to develop 
alone or in collaboration with other Council bodies recommendations and resolutions 
covering general or specific media issues.1659  
The following analysis will take into account these two different frameworks 
in order to inquire into the interventions that have developed progressively to address 
the issue of a free and democratic media system by the EU (in par. 2) and by the CoE 
(in par. 3). This will provide the basis for a comparative evaluation of the 
effectiveness of these supranational organisations in supporting media freedom and 
independence, taking into account the institutions or bodies involved in the process 
and the type of regulatory instruments used in each context (par. 4). Conclusions will 
follow.  
 
2. EU media policy  
The role of the European Union in the field of media policy has become especially 
pronounced over the last decades. However, EU media policy is closely intertwined 
with the wider perspective of the regulatory framework for communications. The 
traditional distinction between regulation of infrastructure (communication) and 
regulation of content (media), although technological innovations have blurred the 
boundaries between the traditional telecommunications and media sectors, still resists. 
Thus, the current analysis will focus on regulation of content, however, where needed, 
will take into account also the current framework of infrastructure regulation.  
From a different perspective, it is acknowledged by academic literature that 
EU media policy is rooted into industrial policy,1660 and this can be interpreted as one 
of the reasons why this policy has been mostly focused on regulating capital 
                                                 
1657 See that this Agreement and the following European Agreement on the protection of Television 
broadcast, in 1960, provided the basis for the programme exchanges within the European Broadcasting 
Union, allowing television companies to authorise or prohibit cable retransmission or broadcasting in 
the signatory states. See K. Karaca, Guarding the watchdog: The Council of Europe and the media 
(2003), at p. 13.  
1658 See the Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information, available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=342907&Site=CM (last visited on 26/10/2010) 
1659 See Karaca, Guarding the watchdog, p. 15.  
1660 A. Hartcourt, The European Union and the regulation of media market (2004) at p. 9.  
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investments and provision of services within the internal market as primary 
objectives.1661  
Since the first interventions, not all media sectors have been addressed by the 
EU institutions.1662 The focus of the enacted regulations has been on broadcasting,1663 
with the landmark Directive on Television Without Frontiers (hereinafter TWF) in 
1989.1664 This directive clarified the approach of the EU to the broadcasting sector, as 
it was predominantly directed at providing the basis for the free circulation of 
television programmes in the Community and establishing a minimum harmonisation 
of rules on advertising. Economic consideration was the structure of this regulatory 
intervention, but it was coordinated with non-economic elements, such as the 
protection of minors and of human dignity, the introduction of the right of reply 
throughout Europe,1665 and the protection of cultural diversity.1666 Given the 
membership of all the EU member states to the European Convention of Human 
Rights, the European legislator was able to leave the remaining aspects of television 
programming content to the application of Article 10 of the ECHR.1667  
Only in the 1990s was a legitimate means to develop a more comprehensive 
policy in the media field defined, through what is now Article 167 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union on culture included in the 1992 Treaty of 
Maastricht,1668 and the 1997 Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam.1669 The action of the EU was also enriched with a more 
interventionist approach of the EU institutions setting the agenda for the development 
                                                 
1661 At the same time the EU could not ignore the fact that media systems are embedded within the 
national states, due 19th century historical development of such systems. Thus, the European 
intervention over media system was required to balance also such national elements. See E. 
Dommering, “General introduction”, in O. Castendyk, E. Dommering, A. Scheuer, European media 
law (2008) at p. 11.  
1662 See D. Hutchinson, “The EU and the press: policy or non-policy?”, in K. Sarikakis, Media and 
cultural policy in the European Union, 24 European Media studies (2007) 183.  
1663 The possibility for the EU to develop its media policy in this sector is to be found in the two main 
decisions of Sacchi and Debauve, and in particular the former which declared that broadcasting as a 
trade-able service. See Case C-155/73, Giuseppe Sacchi, Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunale 
civile e penale di Biella, ECR (1974) 00409 and Case C-52/79, Procureur du Roi v Marc J.V.C. 
Debauve and others, ECR (1980) 00833.  
1664 Note that the Green Paper on the establishment of a common market for broadcasting, especially 
satellite and cable - Television without frontiers, COM (84) 300 final, dates back to 1984 and it took 
five years of negotiations to get the subsequent directive approved.  
1665 Note that in some Member States such a right was already enforced, for instance in the case of 
Italy.  
1666 See, for instance, Article 4 TWF Directive on the promotion of distribution of European media 
products and the production of Television programmes.  
1667 See below par. 3.  
1668 In particular, Article 167 provides that:  
 “1. The Union shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while 
respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural 
heritage to the fore. 
 2. Action by the Union shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States 
and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas: 
 — improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the 
European peoples, 
 — conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance, 
 — non-commercial cultural exchanges, 
 — artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector”.  
1669 See OJ [1997] C340/109. On the content of the Protocol see also, R. Mastroianni, “Il Protocollo sul 
sistema di radiodiffusione pubblica”, Il diritto dell'Unione Europea (1990) 538 and ff.  
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of the information society, which was outlined firstly in the 1993 White Paper on 
Growth, Competitiveness, and Jobs1670 and in the 1994 Bangemann Report,1671 and 
then more clearly defined within the media and communication system in the Green 
Paper on the Convergence of Telecommunication, Media and Information Technology 
Sectors, and implications for Regulation of 1997.1672 The latter document envisaged, 
in the drafting, the abandonment the public service broadcasting model in favour of a 
horizontal regulation of the media;1673 however, in the final version the old sector-
specific approach was retained, and only in more recent interventions, such as the 
Audiovisual Media Service Directive (hereinafter AVMS), this shift can be seen in 
practice.1674  
It is clear from the history of the development of EU media policy that the 
primary rationale for this policy is to be found in the economic sphere, developing 
three axes of regulation: regulation of networks (including the fixed 
telecommunications/IP networks, mobile networks, cable networks, broadcasting 
networks as well as satellite networks); regulation of service provision (where 
broadcasting was the most prolific area of regulation); and regulation of content.1675 
These three components have mostly envisaged trade liberalisation and market 
integration in the media sectors; however, this has not excluded indirect interventions 
to improve the level of freedom and democracy of the media systems at European 
level. The main rationale that has provided this (in)direct effect has been the 
introduction in the European debate of the concept of media pluralism,1676 used since 
1992.1677 However, this notion has never been defined in clear terms by the European 
institutions, rather it has been understood from different perspectives, namely cultural 
and political, and emphasis has been placed on its relationship with competition 
law.1678  
                                                 
1670 European Commission, Growth, competitiveness, employment: The challenges and ways forward 
into the 21st Century - White Paper. Parts A and B. COM (93) 700 final/A and B.  
1671 Commission Report on Europe and the global information society: recommendations of the high-
level Group on the information society to the Corfu European Council [follow-up to the White Paper]. 
Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement No. 2/94. 
1672 Green Paper on the Convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology 
sectors, and the implications for Regulation - Towards an information society approach, COM(97) 623 
final.  
1673 In particular, the document proposed a public library model in which the information required was 
bought in from third-party producers and made available to the public in form of a virtual library.  
1674 However, the coordination between this and previous directives, such as the 2000 e-Commerce 
directive, is not perfectly clear, as it is possible that linear and non-linear services provided by a single 
platform could be regulated, either simultaneously or successively, by the aforementioned directives, 
ending in an ambiguous regulatory framework for the service provider. See more on this point in M. 
Holoubeck and D. Dramajanovic, European content regulation – A survey of the legal framework 
(2007) at p. 122 and ff.  
1675 See H. Kalimo and C. Pawels, “The converging media and communications environment”, in C. 
Pawels, et al., Rethinking European media and communications policy (2009) 3, at p. 4 and ff.  
1676 The notion of ‘media pluralism’ is frequently nuanced and often assimilated with related concepts 
such as ‘media diversity’, ‘plurality of the media’, ‘media variety’ and ‘information pluralism’. See D. 
Westphal, “Media pluralism and European regulation”, 13 European Business Law Review 5 (2002) 
459.  
1677 See the Commission Green Paper, Pluralism and media concentration in the internal market – An 
assessment of the need for community action, COM (92) 1980. For a criticism of the ‘catch-all’ concept 
of media pluralism with a limited interest in a more clear definition see V. Zeno-Zencovich, La libertà 
di espressione – Media, mercato, potere nella società dell'informazione [Freedom of expression – 
Media, market, power in the information society] (2004), at p. 33.  
1678 See Dommering, “General introduction”, pp. 22-23.  
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In order to analyse the direction taken by the EU in this respect, it is useful to 
clarify briefly the different meanings attributed to media pluralism by the EU 
institutions: first, cultural pluralism can be understood as way of promoting content 
variety in the different media as a part of a more general cultural policy. In this sense, 
the rational is partly economic, i.e. a solution for market failure where the market 
does not produce enough cultural goods owing to high production costs and low 
demand, and partly non-economic, i.e. for educational purposes. Political pluralism, 
instead, is part of the governmental media policy focus on increasing the possibilities 
for all political and social movements to have access to the media. Finally, pluralism 
can be defined also as a competition law concept, in the sense of facilitating a 
multiplicity of providers to access the media market. This approach takes into account 
the need to monitor dominant providers in order to prevent abuses and merger 
controls, which could potentially result in dominant positions being exploited to 
monopolise adjacent upstream and/or downstream markets, which should be 
prevented.  
Media pluralism has been interpreted by the EU institutions as a precondition 
for the existence and the exercise of the fundamental right of freedom of 
expression,1679 and its derived freedoms to hold opinions, to receive and impart 
information and ideas, since it ensures the representation and reproduction of the 
different viewpoints that are present within a democratic society.1680 However, 
academic literature has underlined that this diversity should not to be evaluated only 
under a quantitative dimension, rather under its actual qualitative variety and 
diversity, either for the political or the cultural facet.1681 
The enhancement of pluralism has resulted as an indirect effect of the 
competition rules, in particular general competition tools to tackle over-dominant 
positions of providers,1682 while positive obligations fostering the production of 
European audiovisual products in order to promote variety of content can only be 
found in cultural based interventions. It should be noted that the two approaches were 
mostly related to two different institutions involved in media policy, namely the 
European Parliament and the Commission. The latter was more involved in the media 
ownership and media concentration dimension as this appeared more closely 
connected with the internal market perspective, without taking pluralism as an EC 
objective;1683 whereas the former, through various resolutions has shown the cultural 
dimension greater attention.1684  
                                                 
1679 This link is to be found both in the legal text, such as in the case of Article 11 of the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in the jurisprudence of the ECJ, in relation to Article 10 of the 
ECHR. See more below for further detail.  
1680 See F. Barzanti, “Governing the audiovisual space – What modes of governance can facilitate a 
European Approach to media pluralism”, unpublished, provided by the Author (2008).  
1681 D. Westphal, “Media pluralism and European regulation”. 
1682 See the application of Articles 81 and 82 TEC, inter alia, in case Commission, Decision 
2004/311/EC of 2 April 2003, Newscorp/Telepiù (Case COMP/M.2876), OJ L110/73, 16/04/2004. 
1683 Note that the Commission Green Paper on pluralism and media concentration in the internal 
market, clearly expressed the position of the Commission on the fact that preserving pluralism is not in 
itself an EC objective.  
1684 See the several interventions of the European Parliament published mainly in the 1990s: Resolution 
on media takeovers and mergers, OJ C 68, 19/03/1990, p. 137; Resolution on media concentration and 
diversity of opinions, OJ C 284, 2/11/1992, p. 44; Resolution on the commission Green Paper 
“Pluralism and media concentration in the internal market”, OJ C 44, 14/02/1994, p. 177; Resolution 
on concentration of the media and pluralism, OJ C 323, 21/11/1994, p. 157; Resolution on pluralism 
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Only more recently, through the reference in Article 6.1 of the Treaty of 
Lisbon,1685 the intertwining connection between fundamental rights and media 
pluralism has gained more legal substance, as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union explicitly recognises freedom of expression and information as 
fundamental rights that belong to everyone, in Article 11. This provision, 
corresponding to the wording of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights in its first indent,1686 clearly states in paragraph 2 that “freedom and pluralism 
of the media shall be respected”. As it appears from the travaux préparatoires of the 
Charter, the second indent was inserted at a later stage in the long drafting process of 
Article 11. It was indeed included into an amendment originally providing explicitly 
for cultural and political pluralism to be “guaranteed”.1687 However, after further 
modifications, the final agreed and adopted version eventually included the significant 
change of the verb “guaranteed” into “respected”. Thus, on the one hand, the 
inclusion in the Charter of the principle of pluralism in the media – though not 
defined nor articulated – can surely be taken as an indicator of its acknowledged 
relevance as a principle that results from the constitutional traditions common to the 
EU member states, and hence the necessity to observe it as a general principle of 
Community law, as it stems directly from the freedom of expression.1688 However, 
Article 11.2 shows and reinforces the prevailing attitude of the Community towards 
media pluralism as a predominantly negative stance, rather than in terms of a 
proactive approach to guarantee it directly and in practice, and promote it at European 
level.  
The aforementioned reference in the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not the 
only source of primary EU law where media pluralism is addressed. Indeed, the 
Protocol on the system of pubic broadcasting in the Member States, introduced as an 
annex to the Treaty of Amsterdam and which entered in force in 1999, explicitly 
refers to media pluralism in the context of pubic service broadcasting (PBS). In 
focusing on PBS, the protocol mainly purported to offer an interpretative aid for the 
application of EU competition and state aid law to the funding of public service 
broadcasters, which are set up and organised by each Member State. The Protocol 
highlights the need to strike a balance between the realisation of the public service 
remit entrusted upon PSBs and the achievement of the common supranational interest 
in the efficient and undistorted functioning of the EU's internal (broadcasting) market; 
                                                                                                                                            
and media concentration, OJ C 166, 3/07/1995, p. 133. See K. Sarikakis, Powers in media policy: The 
challenge of the European Parliament (2004).  
1685 Note the vague wording of Art. 6 (1) which provides that the Charter has the “same legal value of 
the Treaties”, nonetheless interpreted as conferring on the Charter the same legally binding nature of 
the EU treaties.  
1686 See below par. 3, Article10 (1) of the ECHR provides that “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises”, while 
Article11 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights replicates the same text of the first two sentences, 
but it excludes any reference to the last indent. This does not imply that the EU legislator wanted to 
limit the possibility for Member States to impose licensing rules on broadcasting, television and media 
enterprises; rather this gap is filled by the application of Art. 52 of the Charter, that clarifies in (3), “in 
so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall 
be the same as those laid down by the said Convention”. 
1687 B. Klimkiewicz, “Media pluralism: European regulatory policies and the case of Central Europe” 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS (2005), at p. 4.  
1688 Barzanti, “Governing the audiovisual space”, p. 19.  
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and hence to reconcile the latter with the former.1689 In dealing with such a public 
service task that has a strong political dimension, the Protocol indicates that the 
reason for paying this special account to PBS rests upon the consideration that “the 
system of public broadcasting in the Member States is directly related to the 
democratic, social and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve 
media pluralism”. Also in this case, then the negative integration route, founded on 
the application of the free movement and competition rules and the removal of 
national barriers to trade prevailed over a positive harmonisation route, based on the 
adoption of regulatory measures to approximate justified obstacles to trade 
integration. 
Before examining the few positive interventions within the media policy field, 
the important role of the ECJ in regulating media markets in the EU should be 
acknowledged, as it “has represented the only EU institution with the legal resources 
to assess national media laws and Court decisions, and mandate direct changes to the 
composition of the media market”.1690 The ECJ's role in media regulation has been 
crucial. It was indeed the ECJ that established the legal competence of the EU to 
engage in media policy-making through its judgments in the Sacchi and Debauve 
cases.1691 Indeed, the legal definition of broadcasting as a service of economic 
interest, paved the way not only for the Court to develop its body of media case law; it 
also placed broadcasting in the realm of economic policy to be decided at the 
European level, pointing to also the legal basis that could be used for the adoption of 
the already mentioned TWF directive.  
Within the following case law, two main points can be raised highlighting the 
different perspectives that the ECJ has had on media regulation, in particular taking as 
a point of reference the media pluralism notion.  
First, the safeguard of media pluralism at Member State level has been 
justified given its connection to freedom of expression, which is mainly protected by 
Article 10 ECHR.1692 The ECJ has stated that “fundamental right form an integral 
part of the general principles of law, the observance of which it ensures”.1693 
Accordingly, in ensuring the exercise of fundamental market freedoms, the ECJ has 
also guaranteed respect for the fundamental right to freedom of expression and the 
maintenance of media pluralism which connected to it.1694 Thus, in balancing 
                                                 
1689 On the role and importance of PBS, see also I. Katsirea, Public broadcasting and European law: a 
comparative examination of public service obligations in six member states (2008) at p. 167 ff.  
1690 Harcourt, The European Union and the regulation of media markets, p. 36.  
1691 See Case C-155/73, Giuseppe Sacchi, and Case C-52/79, Procureur du Roi v Marc J.V.C. Debauve 
and others.  
1692 A separate body of judgments based on Article11 of the Charter of European Fundamental Rights 
is yet to be developed, as no reference to this provision has been made by the ECJ in its most recent 
case-law. It is possible that the incorporation of the Charter in the Treaty of Lisbon would pave the way 
for a coordinated reference to the ECHR's and Charter's provisions.  
1693 See Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon 
Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others, 
ECR 1991 I-2925, par. 41.  
1694 Note that in many cases the lack of consistency between the interpretation of Art. 10 by the ECtHR 
and the concurrent interpretation by the ECJ has been emphasised by academics, not only in terms of 
formality (for instance given the different locus standi provided in the two jurisdictions), but also in 
terms of substantial results, for instance where the ECJ did not refer to the most relevant case law of 
the ECtHR or to no case law at all. For a detailed analysis of the relevant case law of the ECJ on 
freedom of expression see L. Woods, 'Freedom of expression in the European Union', 12 European 
Public Law (2006) 371 and ff.  
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different fundamental rights and principles, the ECJ has demonstrated that there is no 
absolute trade integration taking place at the expense of protected human rights. In 
other words, trade law should respect in its application wider values such as freedom 
of expression, and more specifically media pluralism. An example of this approach 
can be seen in the Familiapress case, where an Austrian ban on marketing magazines 
containing prize crosswords was analysed by the ECJ, and a balance was struck 
between the free movement of goods, and freedom of expression (on the part of the 
publisher of the German magazine) and media pluralism (of the Austrian press), on 
the other.1695  
From a different perspective, the ECJ has elaborated a consistent set of 
judgements regarding the application of the freedom of movement rules where the 
presence of national regulations that could result in impediments to trade can be 
justified, and thus upheld, because they aim to safeguard media pluralism.1696 This 
approach stems from the reasoning that media pluralism forms part of cultural policy 
which may constitute an overriding requirement relating to the general interest thus 
justifying a restriction on the freedom to provide services.1697 However, this 
possibility was not interpreted in an expansive fashion, as the ECJ conducted 
assessments of the cases in light of a strict proportionality and necessity test, which 
resulted in several negative appraisals of the possibility of upholding national 
regulations.1698 In this line of cases, the ECJ has certainly interfered with Member 
States' regulation, despite clearly recognising that media pluralism is part of a policy 
domain reserved to Member States.1699 This was also recently supported by the 
Centro Europa 7 judgement,1700 where the Court indirectly, yet manifestly, interfered 
with Italian policy towards media pluralism, by challenging the compatibility with EU 
law of governing the process of granting broadcasting licences, for lack of objective, 
transparent, non-discriminatory and proportional criteria contained within them.  
Turning to the legislation in force at European level concerning media 
services, the existing pieces of legislation harmonise national rules, mainly in 
television broadcasting, and introduce in several provisions rules that improve the 
level of freedom and democracy in Member States' media systems.  
However, it must again be noted that the trigger for intervention by the EU 
legislator is found in the objective of favouring the completion and the effective 
functioning of the internal market for broadcasting services.1701  
                                                 
1695 See Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich 
Bauer Verlag, ECR 1997 I-03689.  
1696 See Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders and others v The Netherlands State, ECR 1988 2085; 
and Case C-211/91, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium, ECR 1992 I-
6757.  
1697 Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and others v Commissariaat voor 
de Media (“Mediawet I”), ECR 1991 I-04007; Case C-353/89, Commission of the European 
Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands, ECR 1991 I-4069; Case C-148/91, Vereniging Veronica 
Omroep Organisatie v Commissariaat voor de Media, ECR 1993 I-00487; Case C-250/06, United Pan-
Europe Communications Belgium SA and Others v Belgian State, ECR I-11135.  
1698 See case Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda.  
1699 See R. Craufurd Smith, Broadcasting Law and fundamental rights (1997), at p. 186.  
1700 See ECJ C-380/05, Centro Europa 7 Srl v Ministero delle Comunicazioni e Autorità per le 
garanzie nelle comunicazioni, Direzione generale per le concessioni e le autorizzazioni del Ministero 
delle Comunicazioni, ECR 2008 I-00349.  
1701 See B. De Witte, “Non-market values in internal market regulation”, in N. Nic Shuibhne (ed.), 
Regulating the Internal Market (2006) 61.  
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The first point of reference is the TWF Directive that paved the way for the 
EU audiovisual regulation and policy. The text was elaborated in parallel with the text 
of the European Convention on Transfrontier Television,1702 and took into account not 
only the market dimension of the audiovisual services but also their cultural value. 
This was also clarified by the fact that the Directive introduced some specific and 
content-oriented measures aimed at promoting wider values, such as the protection of 
minors, respect for human dignity and protection of the consumer. Moreover, against 
the background of the cross-sectional clause of Article 167 (4) TFEU, the TWF 
Directive embodied provisions such as the “European-quota rules” intended to 
promote the distribution of European television programmes and independent 
productions.1703 Additionally, the Directive imposed measures to ensure that events 
which are regarded by Member States as being of major importance for society, could 
not be broadcast in such a way that a substantial part of the population of that country 
would be prevented from accessing them.1704  
The successor to the TWF Directive, the recently adopted AVMS 
Directive,1705 also is oriented in this direction. This is the result of a second and more 
radical amendment to the TWF Directive, which was necessary to adapt it in 
accordance with the technological developments taking place in the media sector, and 
to structure and consolidate at the EU level one of the two poles of the future, and 
currently under development, “law of convergence”.1706 One of the relevant changes 
is the graduated extension of the scope of the application of the Directive to “all 
audiovisual media services”, moving away from the traditional identification with 
television broadcasting, to a wider notion that encompass new platforms for delivery, 
such as satellite and cable television, and new media, such as personal computers and 
mobile phones. Article 1 (a) of the AVMS Directive distinguishes in particular 
between linear (television broadcasting) and non-linear (video-on-demand) services, 
including in the latter definition any service “provided by a media service provider for 
the viewing of programmes at the moment chosen by the user and at his individual 
request”.1707 Thus, this wide definition also permits the inclusion of services provided 
through the Internet and delivered to any digital device within the Article's 
application.  
Although the language of the provisions seems more exhortative than binding, 
the Directive also extended the reach of the European-quota rules and added a 
measure providing for a right to short reporting so as to ensure freedom and plurality 
of information. In this sense, the Directive, without mentioning directly freedom of 
expression or media pluralism, promotes them. It is precisely freedom of expression 
and media pluralism that the measures mentioned above aim at achieving.  
In the interim between the two Directives on the broadcasting/audiovisual 
sector, another attempt were made by the EU institutions to deal with another 
                                                 
1702 See below par. 3.  
1703 See Article 4 and 5 TWF directive.  
1704 See Article 3, lett a. TWF directive.  
1705 Directive 2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 
amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting 
activities, OJ L 332, 18.12.2007, P. 27–45.  
1706 G. Morbidelli and F. Donati (eds) Comunicazioni: verso il diritto della convergenza 
[Communications: towards a law of convergence] (2003).  
1707 See Article 1 (g) AVMSD.  
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perspective related to the promotion of free and independent media. The case refers to 
the proposal to adopt a Directive on “Concentration and Pluralism in the Internal 
Market”, which was mainly aimed at harmonising the disparities between national 
regulations on media concentrations and at setting common standards for measuring 
and evaluating them at EU level. This proposal on the one hand advanced the internal 
market functioning rationale to legitimise the intervention, but on the other hand it 
referred to the need to promote media pluralism at the European level. However, the 
proposal did not materialise in a legislative intervention, not even in its less ambitious 
formulation which was free from direct references to media pluralism.1708 The reason 
for the failure was primarily related to the lack of a legal basis upon which the 
Directive could be based.1709 At the same time, national governments and national 
regulatory agencies resisted the attempts to move the policy arena to the European 
level. This demonstrated the huge difficulties the EU faces when seeking to including 
public interest goals in its policy-making, given its reliance on economic instruments 
for regulating media markets.  
If the printed press is examined, EU competences there are substantially 
limited.1710 The printed press is one of the prime examples of national or even regional 
competence, and its situation often reflects the varying media traditions in the different 
Member States, and the common for the Member States resort to self-regulation in the 
field. Thus, there is no EU legislation specifically on the printed press, nor can there be 
such legislation under the present state of the Treaty. Nevertheless, the EU institutions, 
and in particular the European Commission, have always looked favourably on the 
development of the written press throughout the EU.1711  
The previous discussion of the interventions of the EU shows that, despite the 
tendency to indirectly promote freedom of the media, through the prism of media 
pluralism, weak solutions are provided and evident regulatory gaps emerge at the EU 
level. This is possibly all due to the lack of an explicit competence in this area on the 
part of the EU. However, the EU institutions have presented differing alternative 
solutions that attempted to achieve the same goal through soft law and independent 
studies. Particular mention should be made of the three step process on media pluralism 
elaborated in 2005 and put into practice in 2007.1712 The process was based on a 
broadened concept of media pluralism, covering not only media ownership issues but 
                                                 
1708 For a wider account of such an initiative see Harcourt, The European Union and the regulation of 
media market, p. 62-89.  
1709 See R. Craufurd Smith, “Rethinking European Union competence in the field of media ownership: 
The internal market, fundamental rights and European citizenship”, 29 European Union Law (2004) 
652.  
1710 Hutchinson, “The EU and the press: policy or non-policy?”, p. 191 and ff. See that the latest 
intervention by the Commission on this issue dates back to 2005 with the Commission staff working 
paper, strengthening the competitiveness of the EU publishing sector - The role of media policy, 
SEC(2005) 1287, 7/10/2005.  
1711 In June 2009, a European Charter on Freedom of the Press has been presented, drafted by journalists 
across Europe. The Charter on Freedom of the Press initiated by the European journalist community is 
an important reaffirmation of the basic values, including freedom of expression and information that 
underpin Europe's democratic traditions and are enshrined in fundamental legal texts such as the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Charter is therefore an important step towards reinforcing these 
basic values and rights allowing journalists to invoke them against governments or public authorities 
whenever they feel the freedom of their work is unjustifiably threatened. 
1712 See the Press Release of the overall process, European Commission, “Media pluralism: 
Commission stresses need for transparency, freedom and diversity in Europe’s media landscape”, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/52 (last visited on 25/10/2010). 
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also access to a variety of information (so citizens can form opinions without being 
influenced by one dominant source) and transparent mechanisms that guarantee that 
the media are genuinely independent. 
The process includes the Commission Staff Working Paper on Media 
Pluralism1713 that provided an account of the essential work undertaken by the 
Council of Europe on the issue, and offered a concise first survey of Member States' 
audiovisual and print media markets. This was followed by a study on media 
pluralism1714 that provided the concrete and objective criteria for measuring media 
pluralism. The process was then supposed to end with a Commission Communication 
on indicators for media pluralism in EU member States, to be followed by a broad 
public consultation, but that is yet to be completed. Although the study, published in 
early 2009, raised conflicting reactions from academics and policy-makers, the 
positive aspect of this debate is the attention it attracted at the European level. Far 
from suggesting regulation, a task for the Member States, the EU Commission was 
given a monitoring role of media pluralism in the EU Member States.  
There is an additional point to the specific situation of new media, and in 
particular Internet providers that can alternatively or contextually provide access, 
content and/or services. This group of operators includes not only audiovisual service 
providers which are web-based (such as a on-line TV channel), but also operators who 
provide user-generated audiovisual content (e.g. Youtube), and intermediaries in the 
distribution of content (such as search engines). As mentioned above, the AVMS 
Directive does not include in its definition of non-linear audiovisual services the 
second category, in order not to impose the burdens of registration and administrative 
costs on actors that operate only as platforms which do not undertake any editorial 
tasks and activities. However, some authors have criticized this legislative choice, 
arguing that it results in a regulatory gap because the AVMS Directive does not deal 
with liability for illegal or harmful content (or provide an exemption from which) in 
the case of content distributors, nor does it contain any clarification of their 
obligations with regard to audiovisual content that is not edited by them but to which 
they provide access. Thus, user-generated content portals can only be regulated by the 
E-commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC) as “information society service 
providers”, and consequently, be subject to the different liability regimes in force in 
the various Members States.1715  
On a different note, it should be noted that the current distinction between 
transmission1716 and content regulation with respect to audio-visual services also has 
difficulties in grasping the third category mentioned above, as search engines and 
Internet portals that provide access to content edited by third parties do not fall either 
in the transmission regulation or in the content services provision regulation. Hence, 
                                                 
1713 European Commission, Commission staff working document on media pluralism in the Member 
States of the European Union, SEC(2007) 32, 16/01/2007.  
1714 See the K.U.Leuven et al., Independent study on indicators for media pluralism in the Member 
States - Towards a risk-based approach (2009) available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/study/final_report_09.pdf (last 
visited on 25/10/2010).  
1715 See P. Valcke, D. Stevens, E. Lievens and E. Werkers, “Audiovisual media services in the EU next 
generation approach or old wine in new barrels?”, 71 Communications & strategies (2008) 103, at p. 
113 ff.  
1716 Network operators providing technical transmission services, including conditional access services, 
are regulated by the Electronic Communications Directives of 2002. See below par. 4, part. fn 108.  
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although they can be framed as “gatekeepers” of information and knowledge, they can 
only be regulated under the e-commerce directive's liability regimes.1717  
Given the importance of new media in the lives of citizens, and in particular 
the participatory models of Internet-based services,1718 the current regulatory 
framework seems to still lag behind, as it is not yet able to address the legal issues at 
the core of the new technological environment. The EU should then to start a careful 
and profound analysis of the possibilities through which such new media could be 
regulated, so as to implement freedom of expression.  
 
3. The media policy of the Council of Europe  
The Council of Europe has a long history of interventions in the field of free and 
independent media, interpreted as a fundamental basis for the development of a 
democratic and participatory legal framework for citizens.  
The main reference point has been the practical and effective application of 
the principle of freedom of expression as embedded primarily in the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 
in Article 10. As a matter of fact freedom of expression has been described by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as “one of the basic conditions for the 
progress of democratic societies and for the development of each individual”.1719 
However, it is not only the jurisprudence of the ECtHR where freedom of expression 
has been affirmed has been affirmed; many other texts of the CoE refer to it, 
clarifying in each case the limits that it should be subject to. In this sense, the CoE 
clearly endorses the interpretation of freedom of expression as a “relative” right rather 
than an absolute one, which should always be balanced in the broader system of 
human rights in any case of conflict or overlap.1720  
The main documents regarding freedom of expression are: the aforementioned 
ECHR and related jurisprudence; the European Convention on Transfrontier 
Television (ECTT); the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM) and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
(ECRML). Although all of them contribute to the definition of the boundaries of 
freedom of expression, for the purpose of this study only the first two will be analysed 
in depth. Additionally, this study will take into account the recommendations and 
resolutions taken by different bodies of the CoE, such as the Committee of Ministers, 
the Venice Commission, the Steering Committee on Media and New Communication 
Services and the European Ministerial Conferences on Mass Media policy, that also 
contributed to the debate on the multiple facets of freedom of expression.  
The first provision to be analysed is Article 10 of the ECHR that provides:  
                                                 
1717 See the recent case involving a search engine decided by the ECJ, joined Cases C-236/08 to C-
238/08, Google France, Google, Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Luteciel 
SARL (C-237/08), Centre national de recherche en relations humaines (CNRRH) SARL, Pierre-Alexis 
Thonet, Bruno Raboin, Tiger SARL (C-238/08), 23 March 2010, nyr.  
1718 See more generally Y. Benkler, The wealth of networks (2008).  
1719 Handyside v the United Kingdom, n. 5493/72, judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A, n. 24 § 49.  
1720 See for instance the common case of conflict between the right to freedom of expression and the 
right to respect for private life, also included in the ECHR under Art. 8 which has been analysed more 
recently by Von Hannover v Germany, n. 59320/00, decision of September 24 2004, 40 EHRR 1. On 
this case see E. Barendt, “Balancing freedom of expression and privacy: The jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg court”, 1 Journal of Media Law (2009) 49.  
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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the 
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
This provision distinguishes three main components of freedom of expression: 
the right to hold opinions, the right to receive information or ideas, and finally the 
right to impart information or ideas. It is possible to attach each of the aforementioned 
rights to the position of speakers and listeners. Although these three dimensions are 
all protected by the same comprehensive principles they can in practice conflict with 
each other, such as in the clear case of hate or racist speech.1721 One further dimension 
that instead is not expressly mentioned in the letter of the Article is the right to seek 
information, which has become, through the case law of the ECtHR, the basis for the 
protection of the activity and role of journalists. 
From the perspective of media regulation, the aforementioned article does not 
prevent states from defining licensing schemes. However, the second provision of the 
article sets limits to the core right, listing a number of grounds on the basis of which 
the right may legitimately be restricted, provided that the restrictions are prescribed 
by law1722 and are necessary in a democratic society. Under the ECtHR case law the 
latter element implies “a pressing social need”, which is evaluated by each state with 
some discretion (the so-called “margin of appreciation”). The ECtHR justifies this 
approach by linking the permissibility of restrictions to freedom of expression with 
the existence of duties and responsibilities which govern its exercise.1723 Moreover, 
the latter must be used only when strictly necessary and should always be interpreted 
narrowly. In other words, the right to freedom of expression is always the norm and 
any restrictions of it the exception. 
It should be noted that the right to freedom of expression may also be limited 
on the basis of Article 17, ECHR, which can be regarded as a safety mechanism, 
designed to prevent the ECHR from being misused or abused. In particular, the 
ECtHR applied it in order to limit the expansion of the protection offered by Article10 
to racist, xenophobic or anti-Semitic speech; statements denying, disputing, 
minimising or condoning the Holocaust, or (neo-)Nazi ideas.1724  
                                                 
1721 A speaker’s right to utter racially abusive remarks, for example, would be pitted against a listener’s 
right to be protected from racism. All this would have to be weighed up against third parties’ right or 
interest not to allow racist utterances in public. 
1722 According to the Court, the requirement is not only of a legislative provision that should be 
complied with, rather the law applicable could also be for instance a ministerial ordinance, however it 
must be sufficiently precise in order to enable the applicant to regulate its conduct. See the case 
Gawęda v Poland, n. 26229/95, judgment of March 14 2002, Reports 2002-II.  
1723 See M. Janis, R. Kay, A. Bradley, European human rights law: text and materials, 3rd ed. (2008), at 
p. 292 and ff.  
1724 Norwood v the United Kingdom, n. 23131/03, judgment of November 16 2004, Reports 2004-IX.  
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Regarding the relationship between freedom of expression and the democracy 
enhancing role of the media, it should be emphasized that the ECtHR case-law has 
continually referred to the so-called “argument for democracy” as a basis for its 
reasoning.1725 In particular, the Court has stressed on many occasions the role of the 
media as a source of information and as a venue for the presentation of different 
political positions, with the ability in both cases of enhancing and supporting citizens 
in defining their own opinions. These two roles are the EctHR's main focus for these 
activities. Concerning the former, i.e. as a source of information, the main point of 
reference is that the radio and television “are media of considerable power and 
influence. Their impact is more immediate than the other print media”.1726 
Concerning the latter, i.e. the provision of a forum for public debate, this was 
traditionally applicable to the press, but it is yet to be found in the new media 
technologies that contributed to an active participation of citizens.1727  
From a different perspective, the ECtHR has attributed the function of “public 
watchdog” to the media, implying their monitoring role over governments and the 
importance of the publication of any wrongdoing.1728 In particular, the Court has 
repeatedly presented the press as an “agent of the people”,1729 with the ability to 
enhance the public's “right to know”.  
Given the relevant importance of this role of public watchdog, journalists have 
been provided with a privileged protection by the ECtHR. The Court has given legal 
recognition and protection to specific journalistic practices and realities: the freedom 
to report and comment on matters of public interest; presentational and editorial 
freedom (including recourse to exaggeration); protection of sources of information; 
and intellectual property rights. However, this has not been thought of as a form of 
disparity of treatment between two classes of speaker, i.e. journalists and those who 
are not journalists.1730 The differentiation is instead based on a taxonomic approach to 
free speech,1731 where speech value depends on the type of content it carries. Indeed, 
the Court has never distinguished the subject expressing her own opinions or ideas, 
                                                 
1725 T. McGonagle, “Free expression and respect for others” in Y. Lange (ed.), Living together: a 
handbook on Council of Europe standards on media’s contribution to social cohesion, intercultural 
dialogue, understanding, tolerance and democratic participation, (2009) 5, at p. 11.  
1726 Purcell and others v Ireland, n. 15404/89, decision of April 16 1991, DR70, 262.  
1727 See Castells v Spain, n. 11798/85, judgment of April 23 1992, Series A, n. 236, where the Court 
clarified that, “the preeminent role of the press in a State governed by the rule of law must not be 
forgotten […] freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming 
an opinion on the ideas and attitudes of their political leaders. In particular, it gives the politicians the 
opportunity to reflect and comment on the preoccupations of public opinion; it thus enables everyone to 
participate tin the free political debate which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society” 
(ib. § 43).  
1728 Goodwin v the United Kingdom, n. 28957/95, judgment of March 27 1996, Reports 1997-II, where 
the ECtHR stated that the “vital public watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of 
the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected” if the press could not 
protect their confidential sources. See in a different framework, Jersild v Denmark, n. 15890/89, 
judgment of September 23 1994, Series A n. 298 and more recently Tonsberg Blad as a Haukom v 
Norway, n. 510/04, judgment of March 1 2007, 46 EHRR 30.  
1729 See D. Carney, “Theoretical underpinnings of the protection of journalists’ confidential sources: 
Why an absolute privilege cannot be justified”, 1 Journal of Media Law (2009) 117.  
1730 See P. Wragg, “Free speech is not valued if only valued speech is free: Connolly, constituency and 
some article 10 concerns”, 15 European Public Law (2009) 111.  
1731 T. Martino, “In conversation with professor Eric Barendt: hatred, ridicule, contempt and plan 
bigotry”, 18 Entertainment Law Review (2007) 48, at p. 51, cited in Wragg, “Free speech is not valued 
if only valued speech is free”, p. 118.  
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but rather distinguishes three types of content that hierarchically are classified in the 
following way: political speech, artistic expression, and commercial speech.1732 
Although useful, rough categorisation has been criticised as difficult to apply in those 
cases where the boundaries between the different categories is blurred, in particular 
where the Court has faced the hybrid nature of many types of expression. The 
consequence of such a difficult inclusion of speech into the “right” category could 
then result in a different decision based on a higher or lower level of protection 
accorded.1733  
As already mentioned, the ECtHR has affirmed that speech involving political 
issues and also political figures1734 serves a central role in the functioning of 
democratic societies. Therefore, arguments that a restriction of such discussion is 
necessary in such a society will be harder to maintain.1735 However, the Court did not 
distinguish the case of protection accorded to civil servants and politicians, in 
particular when they are under attack through insult and injury, underlining the fact 
that in both cases they “must enjoy public confidence in conditions free of undue 
perturbation if they were to be successful in performing their tasks and it may 
therefore prove necessary to protect them from offensive and abusive verbal attacks 
when on duty”1736.  
Regarding the media, and broadcasting in particular, the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR is quite developed. As already mentioned, Article 10(2) provides the 
possibility for States to regulate broadcasting through licensing schemes; however, 
any regulatory framework would still have to satisfy the other requirement of the 
same proviso, namely that the restrictions should be prescribed by law and be 
necessary in a democratic society.1737  
The main precedent on this issue concerned Austrian legislation on the 
national public monopoly on broadcasting.1738 The Court held that such monopoly 
was not necessary to guarantee impartiality, balance and diversity in broadcasting, 
and also compared the Austrian approach to the regulatory choices made by other 
European countries on the same issue. In particular, the Court emphasised that other 
countries achieved the aforementioned objectives by enhancing competition in the 
broadcasting licensing market, instead of restricting it. It is important to note that in 
this case the Court combined the analysis of the technical conditions for broadcasting 
with concentration problems, interpreting both elements in the light of pluralism. The 
Court acknowledged the common problem of scarcity of frequencies and channels 
                                                 
1732 For the supremacy of political speech, see Lingens v Austria, n. 9815/82, judgment of July 8 1986, 
Series A n. 103.  
1733 See Thorgeir Thorgeirsan v Iceland, n. 13778/88, judgment of June 25 1992, Series A n. 239.  
1734 See Feldek v Slovakia, n. 29032/95, judgment of July 12 2001, Reports 2001-VIII.  
1735 See Bowman v the United Kingdom, n. 24839/94, judgment of February 19 1998, Reports 1998-I; 
more recently Brasilier v France, n. 71343/01, judgment of April 11 2006. 
1736 See Janowski v Poland, n. 25716/94, judgment of January 21 1999, Reports 1999-I, § 33.  
1737 See Janis, Kay, and Bradley, European Human Rights Law: text and materials, p. 303. Note that 
the ECtHR followed the ECJ's position concerning public monopoly in broadcasting, showing 
reluctance to declare that they were incompatible with Article 10 ECHR in the 1960s and 1970s, with 
the change in decisions following technological developments and the changed attitude regarding 
network industries also at the national level, such as in the cases of France, Germany, Spain and Italy. 
Only in 1995 did the ECtHR find that the creation of public monopolies was infringing Article 10 
ECHR. See P. Ibanez Colomo, European Communication Law and Technological Convergence – 
Deregulation, Re-regulation and Regulatory Convergence in Television and Telecommunications, PhD 
Thesis (2010) at p. 47.  
1738 Informationsverein Lentia and others v Austria, Judgment of November 24 1993, Series A n. 276.  
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available in the national broadcasting markets, a condition that is shared by all 
countries in European, however, ruled that such technical condition cannot only be 
solved through a restrictive solution that limits the access of any competitor to the 
market. At the same time, “fears that the Austrian market was too small to sustain a 
sufficient number of private stations for concentration and 'private monopolies' to be 
avoided were groundless, being contradicted by the experience of several European 
countries, comparable to size to Austria”.1739 
Although the letter of the Article 10 ECHR does only refer to licensing 
schemes, the ECtHR did not limit its scope and addressed the issue of content 
regulation for broadcasting channels. The case concerned the refusal of national 
authorities to grant a licence to a television channel,1740 justifying the decision on the 
fact that the channel was exclusively devoted to automobiles matters. The Court 
accepted the reasoning of the Swiss government that required, in order to grant the 
broadcasting license, the broadcaster to contribute to the development of a pluralistic 
culture, showing that the restrictions on freedom of expression on the grounds of 
pluralism could also be justified by the application of Article 10. This is in line with 
the previous case law that views the state as the “ultimate guarantor” of pluralism in 
the media sector.1741  
The principle of media pluralism is also acknowledged in other texts adopted 
within the framework of the CoE activity, also dating back to the 1982 Declaration on 
the freedom of expression and information. More recently, mention should be made of 
the ECTT, where pluralism is expressly cited in Article 10 bis showing the relevance 
of this issue, though the wording of the provision still remains vague. Another 
important text that became a milestone on this issue is Recommendation R (99) 1 on 
measures to promote media pluralism,1742 which was recently amended and enlarged 
in its approach by Recommendation (2007) 2 on media pluralism and diversity of 
media content and the Declaration on protecting the role of the media in democracy 
in the context of media concentration. Recommendation (2007) 2 takes into account 
the development of technology and its effects on structural pluralism and content 
diversity. In particular it stresses the fact that pluralism of information and diversity of 
media will not be automatically guaranteed by the multiplication of the means of 
communication offered to the public. Therefore, states should ensure that “a sufficient 
variety of media outlets provided by a range of different owners, both private and 
public, is available to the public”. This should be provided through specific regulation 
that takes also into account the current trends of media integration and ownership 
concentration, increased by digitalisation and convergence. Thus, in terms of 
structural regulation, the CoE encourages the state to limit “the influence which a 
single person, company or group” has on the media, “introducing thresholds based on 
objective and realistic criteria” in order to make space for “other media” as well, “for 
example community, local, minority or social media”. While, in terms of content 
regulation, the Recommendation goes on, suggesting that states should “adopt any 
                                                 
1739 Ibid., §42.  
1740 Demuth v  Switzerland, n. 38743/97, judgment of November 5 2002, Reports 2002/IX.  
1741 McGonagle, “Free expression and respect for others”, p. 15.  
1742 Note that this text provided for the first time the definition of “media pluralism”.  
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necessary measures in order to ensure that a sufficient variety of information, 
opinions and programmes is disseminated by the media”.1743  
The focus on structural regulation and in particular on media concentration is 
not a new item in the agenda of the CoE. The patchwork regulatory framework at 
European level concerning ownership rules, and the difficulties in reaching political 
agreement on binding measures on this issue1744 opened the floor for a leading role for 
the CoE in proposing non-binding standards with the objective of enhancing media 
pluralism. For instance, the Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on protecting 
the role of the media in democracy in the context of media concentration1745 lists a set 
of conditions aimed at avoiding the risk of misuse of the media's power in a situation 
of strong concentration of the media and new communication services. Although 
these indications are very general and theoretical, they touch upon the main ways of 
improving the democratic process and transparency in the media sector, mentioning in 
particular the need for “separation between the exercise of control of media and 
decision making as regards media content and the exercise of political authority or 
influence” and the usefulness of “regulatory and/or co-regulatory mechanisms for 
monitoring media markets and media concentration which could permit competent 
authorities to identify suitable preventive or remedial action”.1746  
The CoE’s activity is not only focused on media pluralism, since media 
pluralism has interpreted it as a component of the wider needs for media 
governance1747 that can provide the basic condition for a democratic society. Indeed, 
the CoE's interventions have also emphasised the need for the participation of citizens 
in political and social debate. In this regard, Recommendation (2007) 11 on 
promoting freedom of expression and information in the new information and 
communications environment views access to the Internet as instrumental for 
accessing information and therefore also as “participation in public life and 
democratic processes”. This Recommendation encourages states to increase the 
provision of online services to citizens in order to streamline and reduce the 
administrative burdens for participation, in the pursuit of e-democracy.1748 However, 
the Recommendation does not evade the fact that effective participation in democratic 
societies requires facing the problem of digital divide, overcoming the still-existing 
disparity of access to ICTs for a large part of society.1749  
                                                 
1743 See the Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
media pluralism and diversity of media content at point II.1, available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1089699 (last visited on 25/10/2010). 
1744 See the failure of the directive on Concentration and Pluralism in the Internal Market, above par. 2.  
1745 Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 January 2007 at the 985th meeting of the Ministers’ 
Deputies, available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1089615&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFB
B55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 (last visited on 25/10/2010).  
1746 See also the activity of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and of the so called 
Venice Commission that have supported the standard setting measures also through resolutions in 
respect of specific countries. 
1747 M. Puppis, “Media governance: A new concept for the analysis of media policy and regulation”, 3 
Communication, Culture & Critique (2010) 134.  
1748 See in particular point IV of the Recommendation, available at: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1188541 (last visited on 25/10/2010). 
1749 See also the previous Recommendation No. (99) 14 on universal community service concerning 
new communication and information services; Recommendation Rec (2003) 9 on measures to promote 
the democratic and social contribution of digital broadcasting; Declaration on human rights and the rule 
of law in the information society (2005).  
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From a different perspective, the CoE considers the media as a forum through 
which citizens not only gather information but also participate directly in reaction to 
the information diffused. This is clearly embedded in the right of reply mechanism 
that can safeguard fairness, balance, impartiality, accuracy and reputational interests. 
It allows those affected by particular media coverage or statements to respond to 
claims made, to challenge biases or to correct inaccuracies. The Recommendation 
(2004) 16 on the right of reply in the new media environment in particular underlines 
the role of the right of reply in a broader perspective, adding to the corrective function 
“the interest of the public to receive information from different sources, thereby 
guaranteeing that they receive complete information”. However, the first binding 
document that clearly refers to the right of reply is the ECTT, in Article 8, though it 
relates only to broadcasting.1750  
The importance of political debate in a democratic society is also taken into 
account in the context of the right of reply. One of the principles set forth in 
Recommendation (2007) 15 on measures concerning media coverage of election 
campaigns states: “Given the short duration of an election campaign, any candidate 
or political party which is entitled to a right of reply or equivalent remedies under 
national law or systems should be able to exercise this right or equivalent remedies 
during the campaign period without undue delay”. 
Increasingly, reactions to media output are enabled by online discussion – in 
which readers, viewers and users can comment – often hosted and moderated by the 
media themselves. The levels of moderation of such fora tend to vary in practice. 
Similarly, the growing online presence of the media in general has facilitated the 
practice of sending feedback to the media. The familiar convention of sending “letters 
to the editor” can now be achieved with the click of a button. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the right of reply – and other mechanisms 
for the promotion of public participation in the media – do not depend exclusively on 
regulatory measures by state authorities. Relevant Council of Europe standards 
recognise the usefulness of, and consistently invite consideration of, the desirability of 
promoting self- or co-regulatory measures in order to achieve these goals.1751 This 
amounts to an important acknowledgement of the value of sector-specific input into 
regulatory and policy processes and even their ability in some circumstances to pre-
empt traditional, state-dominated regulation. Initiatives and practices nurtured from 
within the media sector are often those which enjoy the greatest chance of uptake and 
effective implementation. In such instances, standards can reflect valuable sector-
specific expertise and a sense of (part) authorship can bring a feeling of ownership 
too, thus strengthening commitment to the standards and their application. 
A final point should highlight the parallel interests of the CoE and the EU on 
the definition of the criteria through which press freedom and freedom of expression 
can be evaluated. As a matter of fact, the Resolution 1636 (2008) on indicators for 
                                                 
1750 The recommendation applies to all “means of communication for the periodic dissemination to the 
public of edited information, whether on-line or off-line, such as newspapers, periodicals, radio, 
television and web-based news services.” 
1751 See for instance Venice Commission, Report on self-regulation within the media in the handling of 
complaints, CDL(2008)039, available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2008/CDL%282008%29039-
e.asp (last visited on 25/10/2010). 
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media in a democracy,1752 widens the scope of the similar action taken by the EU with 
regard to media pluralism indicators,1753 demanding a number of provisions that 
Member States should apply in order to allow journalists to work freely and to give all 
political parties access to the media. The text lists a set of basic principles stemming 
from the well-established activity of the CoE, in order to provide a template for the 
level of media freedom enjoyed at the national level.  
 
4. European media policy-making and its effects on state media policies  
When looking at the systems of media regulation of Member States, it is virtually 
impossible to distinguish clearly between what comes from the traditional national 
media regulation and what is the outcome of the legal and policy-making processes 
defined at EU level.1754 Until the 1980s, each Member State developed specific 
regulatory regimes which although substantively different, nonetheless shared similar 
basic elements, such as the dual system of public and private service providers in the 
broadcasting sector. The role of the public service broadcasting was recognised as 
crucial in each Member State (and still is), as it is the bearer and the guardian of 
public interest values, which include contribution to the quality of public discourse, 
the promotion of societal integration as well as national culture and an emphasis on 
news and education.1755 The functioning of this dual system, however, differs from 
country to country, as it can be regulated differently in terms of the role of political 
powers within the PBS, the rules governing the funding of the PBS, the ownership 
limits applicable to the commercial broadcasters, the level of caps on advertising and 
the rules on media content.1756 The press market, instead, is less heavily regulated, 
leaving more space to self-regulatory measures adopted directly by market actors and 
by journalist associations. The applicable statutory rules in this sector focus mainly on 
ownership structures with special attention to limitation of shares holding, multiple 
ownership and cross-media ownership.1757 Content laws for the press are less 
diffused, while state subsidisation of newspapers, and in particular party political 
ones, is still an existing practice.  
Since the 1980s, a trend towards the convergence of Member State media 
policies can be acknowledged initially based on the implementation in national 
systems of the TWF Directive. This Directive represented a milestone in EU 
                                                 
1752 Available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta08/ERES1636.htm (last visited on 
25/10/2010).  
1753 See above par. 2, part. fn 60.  
1754 See M. Moran and T. Prosser, Privatization and regulatory change in Europe (1994), at p. 148.  
1755 See Harcourt, The European Union and the regulation of media market, p. 158.  
1756 There are several studies which have analyzed national media systems and their development over 
the decades, without the intention of being an exhaustive list, see P. Humphreys, Mass media policy in 
Western Europe (1996); I. Nitsche, Broadcasting in the European Union: the role of public interest in 
competition analysis (2001); D.C. Hallin and P. Mancini, Comparing media systems: three models of 
media and politics (2004); Y. Katz, Media Policy for the 21st century in the United States and Western 
Europe (2004); M. Kelly, G. Mazzoleni, D. McQuail (eds), The media in Europe (2004); W. Meier, J. 
Trappel (eds), Power, performance and politics: media policy in Europe (2007); J. Harrison, L. Woods, 
European broadcasting law and policy (2007); A. Charles, Media in the enlarged Europe: politics, 
policy and industry (2009); B. Klimkiewicz (ed.), Media freedom and pluralism: media policy 
challenges in the enlarged Europe (2010).  
1757 See R. Van der Wurff and E. Lauf (eds), Print and online newspapers in Europe – A comparison 
analysis in sixteen countries (2005).  
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audiovisual policy, not only because it was the first legislative intervention in the 
field, but also because it prompted a significant revision of domestic media laws and 
regulations that were in conflict with the letter of the directive. The ECJ, on its part, 
ensured the liberalisation process prescribed by the Directive, imposing changes to 
national regulations, not only in relation to the formal wither transposition of the 
Directive’s provisions, but also by eroding “national media legislation by overriding 
even minimum provisions enacted in the TWF Directive to safeguard the public 
interest”.1758  
This “top-down” mechanism had also an indirect effect: the European 
Commission acted as a policy entrepreneur, by influencing national policy change 
through the recommendation of best practices, models and solutions through a “soft 
law” approach, which included the publication of Commission reports, green papers, 
etc. These suggestions were evidently formulated at the European level, but they 
affected policy formation at the national level. In this way, the Commission can be 
seen to have steered the course of debate over deregulation at the national level.1759  
However, this should not be seen as a one-way process, since national 
governments also disseminated their own policy recommendations, using the EU as a 
platform for rule transfer. For instance, France and Italy lobbied for an EU content 
requirement to protect domestic production,1760 while the UK lobbied for changes to 
the TWF Directive to encompass its non-domestic satellite policy, excluding the 
applicability of content rules to such broadcasters.  
The objective of EU regulation was the deregulation of broadcasting and the 
creation of a single audiovisual market through the legalisation of cross-border 
broadcasting. However, the advent of digital technology and the intertwined effect of 
convergence between broadcasting and telecommunication invalidated the traditional 
argument regarding radio-spectrum scarcity which was used to justify regulatory 
interventions, including the pursuit of public interest goals, in particular media 
pluralism. Indeed digital compression of data, visual images and sound allows 
broadband cables to carry much more capacity that previously possible, thus 
increasing the possibility for new actors to provide broadcasting services through 
digital systems. This paved the way since the 1990s for the entry of new competitors 
on the market, to the creation of strategic alliances, and the undertaking of 
acquisitions and corporate media mergers. The liberalisation that started with the 
                                                 
1758 Harcourt, The European Union and the regulation of media market, p. 200. For a more detailed 
analysis of the case-law, see Harcourt, The European Union and the regulation of media market, p. 22 
and ff. 
1759 However, see P. Humphreys, “The EU audio-visual policy, cultural diversity and the future of 
public service broadcasting”, in J. Harrison, and B. Wessels, Mediating Europe – new media, mass 
communications and the European public sphere (2009) 183, at p. 186 where the Author argued that 
“EU 'negative integration' is easier to achieve because the Commission and the European Court of 
Justice can rule unilaterally on competition related matters, whereas the harmonization of market 
correcting rules - 'positive integration' - is rendered more difficult to achieve because of the need for 
agreement in the Council of Ministers and Parliament”.  
1760 Note that Article 4 and 5 of the TWFD should be read as a semi victory for the French lobby which 
insisted on including provisions capable of reducing the cultural and economic impact of US 
audiovisual imports. Through these measures, the French partially succeeded in transferring their own 
protectionist cultural policy model to the other Member States.  
                     514
TWF Directive was then developed further addressing also areas such as internet, e-
commerce and mobile phones.1761  
However, the failure of the Commission to achieve sufficient political 
compromise to enact the directive on media concentration demonstrates the 
difficulties that the European institutions faced (and still face) in overriding the 
resistance of influential Member States, based on the argument that competence for 
media policy rests with national governments.1762  
In the 2000s, the European policy framework changed to encompass goals 
relating to the social cohesion and European citizenship, and this renewed concern 
towards public interest values can be explained by four different reasons which are 
mainly related to the existing historical and existing economic conditions in Europe:  
the emergence of a liberated media sector within Central and Eastern 
European states following the end of the Soviet era has generated a public 
debate about pluralism and media independence which was less evident in 
Western Europe; 
new technologies enhanced convergence among previously differentiated 
market sectors triggering the consolidation of existing industry players 
through vertical integration, facilitated by the emergence of gate-keeping 
technologies. The opportunities created by these developments in purely 
economic terms, however, are counter-balanced by the risks of potential abuse 
of editorial power by media owners and controllers;  
the liberalisation of the broadcasting sector allowed for the emergence of 
private media entities with the capability of rivalling public sector 
broadcasters, thus reviving concerns about the influential nature of the media;  
globalisation reopened the debate about the impact of foreign ownership and 
the prevalence of foreign content on domestic regulation and culture.1763  
 
Turning to the Council of Europe's influence on national media policies in 
Europe, it is clear that its main legal tool is the ECtHR jurisprudence concerning 
Article 10 ECHR. In effect, Article 10 ECHR makes respect for the human right to 
freedom of opinion binding on all Member States of the Council of Europe. Since the 
entry into force of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention any citizen of a signatory State 
is entitled, after exhausting domestic remedies, to lodge a complaint alleging a 
violation of these human rights with the Court. This has enabled the ECtHR to 
                                                 
1761 See the Telecommunications Package of 2002 which included Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and services; Directive 2002/20/EC on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services; Directive 2002/21/EC on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services; Directive 2002/22/EC on 
universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks, Directive 
2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector.  
1762 Humphreys, “The EU audio-visual policy, cultural diversity and the future of public service 
broadcasting”, p. 197. The Author argued that this lack of intervention paved the way for a de-
regulatory process starting with the deregulation of anti-concentration rules in UK and Germany in 
1996, where governments supported the argument that this process was a positive reaction to enhance 
international competitiveness of national media industries.  
1763 See I. Walden, “Who owns the media? Plurality, ownership, competition and access”, in D. 
Goldberg, G. Sutter, and I. Walden, Media law and practice (2009) 19, at p. 22.  
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develop a rich jurisprudence on allegations about breach of Article 10 ECHR. Within 
the European Union, the rights guaranteed by the Convention, and therefore also by 
Article 10, qualify as general principles of European law, as expressly acknowledged 
in Article 6.2 of the Treaty on the European Union.  
The judgements of the ECtHR clearly shows that freedom of the media is not 
only interpreted as part of the individual right to freedom of expression enshrined in 
Article 10(1) ECHR, but also as a means of promoting freedom of information 
applied by the Strasbourg Court in connection to Article 10(2). This has permitted the 
Court to take into account the social/cultural and political/democratic facets of the 
media and to introduce these into its decisions. For instance, the Court has stressed in 
the judgement concerning the Austrian broadcasting monopoly that the preservation 
of a plural, culturally diverse broadcasting provision was an aim that could justify 
restrictions on broadcasters' freedoms. Nonetheless, such pluralism could be achieved 
by other means than a public service broadcasting monopoly, for example, through a 
dual broadcasting system, as shown by the regulatory choices of other European 
countries.1764 
At the same time the resolutions and recommendations addressing media 
issues have provided European States with a useful toolbox, which in particular 
includes benchmarking and best practice reports able to steer indirectly the political 
choices on national governments.1765 In many cases, although these “soft law” 
instruments impose no legally binding obligation, the CoE has often evaluated the 
implementation of its recommendations for the purpose of evaluating its own 
influence and reminding the states to take the analysed issues into account.1766  
 
5. Conclusion 
The analysis developed in this contribution shows, in the end, that both the EU and 
the CoE have influenced deeply the choices of national governments in their media 
policies. However, it should be noted that while the CoE provides a wider 
interpretation of the concept of media freedom, focusing on the full interpretation of 
the freedom of expression, which is enshrined in the ECHR. Instead, the work of the 
EU can be evaluated as more limited in scope and also much less effective: on the one 
hand it only addressed the issue of freedom of expression through the lens of media 
pluralism; on the other, not only the limited competences of the EU to act and the 
                                                 
1764 See Informationsverein Lentia and others v Austria.  
1765 See for instance the Report “Public service media in the information society”, February 2006, H/Inf 
(2006) 3, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/H-
Inf%282006%29003_en.pdf (last visited on 25/10/2010); Report “Methodology for monitoring media 
concentration and media content diversity”, November 2008, H-Inf(2009)9, available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/H-Inf%282009%299_en.pdf (last visited on 
25/10/2010); Report “Strategies of public service media as regards promoting a wider democratic 
participation of individuals”, November 2008, H/Inf(2009)6, available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/H-Inf%282009%296_en.pdf (last visited on 
25/10/2010).  
1766 Among the most recent reports see the Report “Contribution of public service media in promoting 
social cohesion and integrating all communities and generations”, November 2008, H/Inf(2009)5, 
available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/H-Inf%282009%295_en.pdf (last 
visited on 25/10/2010); Report “How member states ensure the legal, financial, technical and other 
appropriate conditions required to enable public service media to discharge their remit”, November 
2008, H/Inf(2009)7, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/H-
Inf%282009%297_en.pdf (last visited on 25/10/2010).  
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legal basis upon which grounding the legitimacy of legislation, but also the 
difficulties in achieving sufficient political compromise with most powerful member 
States, proved the failure of many attempts to develop a full-fledged media policy.  
The comprehensive approach taken by the CoE, and in particular the important 
role performed by the Steering Committee on the Mass Media, provides a useful 
framework for the evaluation of the policy choices taken by single countries with 
regards to the enhancement of free and democratic media systems. The recent 
Recommendation on indicators of media freedom could then be interpreted as a 
summary of the historical and conceptual development of the principles underlying 
media freedom, capable of being used in practice to evaluate and eventually improve 
existing national media policies. However, until now the reactions of national 
governments have not been seen.  
However, it should be emphasised that the CoE had the possibility of 
intervening directly in national policies only on a case-by-case basis, through the 
claims presented by individuals and organisations at the Strasbourg Court. On the 
contrary, the EU has a more effective role since, within the ambit of its competence 
the supremacy of European law is acknowledged by the Members States, through the 
means of either positive integration or negative integration.  
The need to develop a comprehensive approach to media policy at the 
European level supportive of media freedom and independence comes from a twofold 
reasoning: on the one hand, the cross-national dimension of audio-visual media 
services and the consequent development of the related trans-border markets 
increasingly render national policies and regulatory strategies less apt to deliver 
meaningful results, and also, if left alone, less incisive and successful in securing 
highly sensitive and fundamental objectives, other than mere economic objectives. On 
the other hand, an European intervention could prevent national policies and 
regulatory solutions, especially if predominantly in the hands of national governments 
and politics alone, be dangerously influenced by political pressures and then shaped 
according to contingent and distorted interests.  
The methods through which this objective could be achieved could benefit 
from the comparative analysis of national policies in terms of enhancement of free 
and democratic media, in order to define the best regulatory strategies which could, 
not only fit in the existing national regulatory framework, but also improve its 
potential weaknesses.  
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